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Abstract 
Intellectual property is a territorial right; yet despite this there are a number of 
international treaties mandating standards. Historically, this has allowed private 
international law and intellectual Property to ignore each other. With the advent 
of the Internet this benign neglect has not only ended, but there has been a flood 
of new ideas on reconciling the territoriality of intellectual property with the 
global nature of the Internet. These new approaches attempt to deal with the 
problems associated with international intellectual property litigation - the 
uncertainty of which law applies, multiplicity of claims andforum shopping - 
each of which increases the cost for both users and proprietors of intellectual 
property. This thesis examines these approaches, using wealth maximisation and 
economic efficiency, and determines that none of themfits within the constructs of 
an efficient solution. However, the proposalfor a single applicable law, enabling 
consolidation, is seized upon as efficient. It then follows that the principle of 
consensual exchange, enabling private parties to agree which court has 
jurisdiction and which law applies (rather than States mandating these matters), 
is the efficient solution to the selection problem. This consensual exchange 
proposal contains two paradigms - the bilateral and the unilateral - which in 
turn are broken down into ten propositions. The bilateral paradigm permits 
parties to select not only the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, but also the 
universal applicable law. The unilateral Paradigm uses the doctrine actor 
sequitur forum rei, with the universal applicable law being selected ex ante by the 
proprietor. Finally the propositions are placed within the context of international, 
regional and domestic law (of the four target jurisdictions: England and Wales, 
the United States, France and Germany) and questions of compatibility are 
assessed. 
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I 
Intellectual Property: A Peculiarly Territorial 
Right? 
The world is a collection of States. The extent of each State is set at its territorial 
boundaries; and the laws of each State extend only to those boundaries. It is trite 
to say that intellectual property only exists within those boundaries; the territorial 
nature of intellectual property is a basic concept set out in every textbook. 
' It has 
even been described as its "dominant norm' %2 But every law is territOriai3 - 
criminal, commercial, domestic or otherwise - yet a whole area of law, private 
international law, 4 has emerged to deal with the application of foreign legal 
concepts to domestic disputes. It is this conflict that is central to this work. 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter sets the background to intellectual property and territoriality. It 
begins by briefly examining the history of how the rights came into being; this is 
1 Either expressly, see for example Cornish and Llewelyn (2003): [1-30]; Bently and Sherman 
(2004): 5; or implicitly, see for example Holyoak and Torremans (2005): 27-28; also see the 
recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Lqgardýre (unreported) 14d' July 2005 (Case C- 192/04) 
at [46], 
2 Goldstein (2000): 65. 
3 Troller suggests "the territorial boundaries of intellectual property rights are ... not their special 
characteristic they share it with all other laws": Troller (1983): 137 (cited in van Eechoud (2003): 
97). 
4 It is also called conflict of laws, for a short discussion of the problems with both sets of 
terminology see Collier (2001): 5-6. 
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followed by a short discussion of how the protection afforded was extended from 
being purely domestic to become truly global. Once these rights became global 
new problems emerged with the advent of transnational litigation. 
Chapter 2 examines the conflicting, and often confusing, theories which have 
been used as a basis for private international law. It demonstrates the problems, 
pitfalls and inconsistencies of those theories. It suggests that a new approach is 
needed. 
Thereafter, Chapter 3 introduces the economic approach, it sets out the basis of 
wealth maximisation and then assesses the incentives and costs of intellectual 
property and intellectual property litigation. Finally, it discusses the methods 
applied to private international law. It concludes that the most efficient approach 
to the subject is through using the paradigm of exchange. 
Chapter 4 examines the various solutions proposed to the problems caused by 
transnational intellectual property litigation and concludes that none of the 
solutions, confined as they are by the traditional franieworks, solves those 
problems. 
The central chapter of this work, Chapter 5, proposes a new approach based on a 
"bilateral paradigrW' and a "unilateral paradigm7', which in turn are broken down 
into ten Propositions. These Propositions use efficient exchange as a model to 
build a new approach to private international law, intellectual property and the 
Internet. 
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Thereafter, Chapters 6 and 7 test the basis of those Propositions. They are not 
intended to set out a detailed examination of the law. To undertake such a study 
here could add very little to those works that have already been produced. In 
English5 there are a number of such works, the two most substantial texts being 
Eugen Ulmer's Intellectual Pro erty Rights and the Conflict of Laws 6 written for p 
the European Community and James Fawcett's and Paul Torreman's monograph 
Intellectual Property and Private International Law, ' which deals only with 
English law, but remains the leading text in the field. In addition there are a 
number of publications limited to copyright, in particular Jane Ginsburg's Hague 
Lecture: 8 and Mirelle van Eechoud's Choice of Law in Copyright and Related 
Rights: Alternatives to the Lex Protectioni? as well as those limited to patents 
such as Marta Perteas Sender's Cross-Border Enforcement ofPatent Rights. 10 
Instead the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 details the approaches and weighs their 
relative merit, but ultimately its purpose is to place the ten Propositions within the 
legal framework. The legal framework studied in these Chapters covers the 
international framework, the regional laws and the laws of four national 
jurisdictions: England and Wales, the United States, Germany and France. 
Many different rights have been considered to fall within the scope of "intellectual 
property". These fall into three groups: registered rights (patents, designs and 
trade marks), unregistered rights (copyright, database right and unregistered trade 
5 Numerous works have been published in other languages: for example, Raynard (1990); Novier ý1996) and Blanco (1998). 
7 
Ulmer (1978). 
Fawcett and Torremans, (1998). Torremans (1999) briefly considered some of these issues as they 
affect the United States. 
8 Ginsburg (1998b). 
9 Van Eechoud (2003). 
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marks) and other rights (trade secrets and unfair competition). This work 
concentrates on the traditional areas of intellectual property: registered and 
unregistered rights. The laws of unfair competition are so diverse that it is difficult 
to bring them within the framework of an internationally agreed approach to 
private intemational law. The laws of trade secrets are much more straightforward' 
and rarely have a transnational element, consequently they arc therefore not dealt 
with in this work. Accordingly, in this work the term intellectual property means 
patents, copyright (and related rights) and trade marks (registered and 
unregistered). 11 
11. A brief history of intellectual property rights 
A. Patents 
The concept of the patent emerged from a simple form of patronage. These 
"letters patent" were open letters 12 issued by the Sovereign13 granting the recipient 
the exclusive right to do something. However, these early letters patent were 
rarely granting an exclusive right to one person, but rather making provision for 
anyone with a particular skill to be free to exercise it within a country. 14 Indeed, 
the patent system was originally little to do with rewarding inventive endeavour 
but was a method of ensuring technology transfer. 15 For example I, the origins of 
10 Sender (2002). 
11 Registered designs are not really exploited on the Internet and any rules that apply to patents 
(and to a lesser extent copyright and trade marks) could apply equally to designs. 12 In England these "open letters" were often accompanied by Statutes (e. g. 1331 Pat 5 Ed III P-1 
m. 25) confirming the powers, the letters were identifiable because they bore the King's Great 
Seal. 
13 "rhe powers of the prerogative are of great antiquity in fact, as ancient as the law itself' and the Royal prerogative to regulate trade gave the power to grant a patent: Wallace and Williamson (1900): 2-3. 
14 Wyndham Hulme (1896-1900): 142-3 (Part 1). 
15 This is still the case; for a discussion of granting patents as a method of technology transfer see Blakeney (1989): 87. 
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the English patent system 16 can be traced to the reign of Edward 11 and his son 
Edward J11,17 this was a time when English technology lagged far behind 
Continental Europe and "letters patent" were a way of enticing talented Europeans 
to bring their skills to England. 18 
However, like all Royal Prerogatives, patents were more to do with granting a 
reward or bounty to traders or even to court favourites than for rewarding 
invention. Many of the elements now considered central to patent law, such as the 
requirement of disclosure19 and the time limit, 20 are relatively modem 
innovations. The "improvement' 'of previous inventions was, until comparatively 
recently, considered unpatentable. 21 The Statute of Monopolies, so often heralded 
as the first patent law, 22 was nothing of the kind; as William Mackinnon said in 
1835, there was at that time "no express statute according to which patents might 
be granted-the granting did not rest upon the foundation of statute law". 23 
instead the Statute of Monopolies no more than spelt out the rules of common 
1 24 s 25 aw, which had previously been set out in James I's "Book of Bounty, . 
16 The first known patent for an invention was granted in 1236 for woven fabrics with multicolour 
patterns, the first known English Patent was to John of Utynam. in 1449 for the making of stained 
glass (according to the UK Patent Office) or 1440 to John of Shiedame for manufacturing salt 
(according to Wyndham Hulme). 
17 Edward III granted letters of protection to John Kempe in 1331: Wallace and Williamson 
(1900): 3, note (g). 
18 Some five hundred years later a modem patent system was introduced into Japan for a similar 
reason: Kumagal (1999). 
19 In the United Kingdom the disclosure required was first mandated in an individual case in 1716, 
but it was not until circa 1740 that it was required generally: Wyndham Hulme (1902): 283. 20 14 years: Statute of Monopolies s. 6. 21 See generally Wyndham Hulme (1896-1900): 56 (Part II) (in particular Matthey's Case (1559) 
VVTC 6) and Wyndham Hulme (1902): 282. 
22 There is a record of a patent system existing in Venice in the mid-fifteenth century, this was 
codified in a statute in 1474, although this system disappeared within two hundred years: see 
Mandich (1948). It has been suggested that an even earlier system was used by German miners in 
the thirteenth century: Wegner (1993): 2-3. 23 Patent Laws, 14 February 1837,36 Hansard (Yd Series) column 555. 24 Sherman and Bently (1999): 149-151 and 208-211; Coke (1809) suggests that the Statute of 
Monopolies "maketh [patents] no better, then they should have been, if this act had never been 
made" (at 184). 
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Even when the elements of the modem patent system started to take shape there 
were still doubts about whether it could be justified or not; indeed as late as the 
mid-nineteenth century, there were movements to abolish it. 26 The patent system 
and the justifications for it are still relatively new and in many ways they have 
piggy backed on its older brother, literary property. 
B. Copyright 
It is possible to argue that the concept of "literary" theft dates back to classical 
timeS27 when the crime of "plagiarism" was even, on occasion, considered to be 
robbery28 or theft. 29 In early modem times "copyright" was granted by letters 
31 or patenOO or by a similar privilege, which were generally granted in exchange f 
censorship. However, these privileges were eventually replaced by a statutory 
right to prohibit the copying of a literary work. The first such right was under the 
Statute of Anne. It was this Act that enabled a separate conception of "literary 
property" to develop, which in turn led to the great literary property debate of the 
mid-eighteenth century, where not only the courts, but also the country at large, 
25 The name given to a Proclaimation made in 1610. 26 See Sherman and Bently (1999). 
27 See Streibich (1975-6): 4 et seq (Part I). 28 Putnam (1896): 74, describes how a number of entries to a literary competition judged by 
Aristophanes the Grammarian (c. 257 - 180 BC) were literal copies of pre-existing works. Those 
who submitted these copied works were brought before a tribunal, sentenced as veritable robbers 
and thrust out of the city. 29 In the Royal Irish Academy (M. S. 24 P. 25) there is a report of how in the sixth century 
Columcille copied the book of Finnian and so was accused of theft. The now infamous words were 
uttered by Diannuid "To every cow its calf, and to every book, its copy". 30 Streibich (1975-6): 52 (Part 11). The first Venetian grant was made either in 1469 to Jean de 
Spire or in 1495 to the printer Alde Maanuce; the first French grant was made in 1507 to Antoine 
Verd for an edition of the Epistoles of St Paul; the first English grant was in 1518: Breyer (1970): 
292 n. 42. 
31 In England this right was granted exclusively to the Stationary Company by the King. The 
ancien Regime allowed the French monarch to grant the exclusive privilege to print and distribute 
printed works (as well as public performances) for a discussion of the late history of these grants 
Intellectual Property: A Peculiarly Territorial Right? 17 
considered the nature of literary property. 32 The arguments in this debate were 
greatly influenced by the views of natural rights philosophers such as John 
Locke, 33 but the debate was not about whether there was such a thing as literary 
property or not, 34 but whether it was limited in time or perpetual (or whether a 
common law copyright ever existed 35). When it concluded '36 it was clear that 
there was a limited statutory property right in literary works within England. This 
view spread across the rest of Europe although the philosophical arguments 
supporting this right came not from Locke but from Immanuel Kant37 and Georg 
Hegel. 38 
C. Trade marks 
The protection of "trade marks" (in the broadest sense) dates back to ancient 
times, 39 but it was not until relatively recently that trade marks became property. 40 
The protection of marks was a way of preventing fraud (a police mark) where 
see Birn (1970). Until the end of the Holy Roman Empire, the Emperor and the Heads of the 
various LAnder were able to grant the exclusive privilege to print. 32 Sherman and Bently (1999) is an excellent starting point for discussion of the literary property 
debate (for a detailed discussion see Deazley (2004)); in relation to the United States, France and 
Germany a similar starting point is Davies (2002): Chapters 5,6 and 7. 33 See Chapter V of his Second Treatise of Government: Locke (1998). 34 Cf. Yates J dissent in Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303,98 ER 201. 35 Deazley (2004) argues convincingly that the debate was not simply whether a common law 
copyright continued to exist after the passing of the Statute of Anne, but whether it ever existed in 
the first place. He concludes that, in fact, there was never a common law copyright and it was a 
creature of the Statute. 
36 With the House of Lords decision in Donaldson v Beckett (1774) 4 Burr 2407,98 ER 257, 
which was a dejacto appeal from the earlier decision of Miller v Taylor. 37 See Kant (1994). 
38 See Hegel (182 1) and Knowles (2002). 39 The marking of goods goes back far further, indeed it has been suggested that the branding of 
animals pre-dates literacy: Diamond (1975): 266. The assignment of responsibility (by affixing a 
mark) for the manufacture of a particular product (bricks) can be dated to ancient Egypt: Rogers 
(1949). However, the beginning of a more active regulation of marks is far more modem, indeed in 
the first ten editions of Kerly (Kerly (1894) to Kerly (1972)) it was argued that trade mark law 44 cannot be traced back further than the [nineteenth] century": Kerly (1894): 2; although by the 
eleventh edition (Kerly (1983)) the editors started to discount this myth. 40 In the middle ages certain marks were considered to be hereditary, although a slight change was 
always required to distinguish between the work of the father and the son: Schechter (2002): 24. Notwithstanding, marks were not considered transferable inter vivos. 
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disputes were resolved by the guilds rather than the courts. The mark -itself only 
started to be seen as an asset between the fifteenth and seventeenth century" and 
despite marks being valued and protected, they were still not property. 42 It Was 
only when the registration of trade marks began that the modem mark, as it is 
known today, came into being. 
111. The development of international protection of 
intellectual property 
So how do these Sovereign acts fit within the development of international 
intellectual property law? A development which has been described as having 
three epochs: 43 the territorial period, the international period and the global 
0 
period. 
A. Territorial period 
Intellectual property, as discussed above, is a territorial right. Cornish and 
Llewelyn have identified the four principles of territoriality: 
(1) The right in each country is determined by the law of that country 
and is independent of equivalent rights governing the same 
subject-matter (invention, work, trade mark, etc. ) in other 
countries and neither stands norfalls with them. 
(2) The right only affects activities undertaken by others within the 
geographical territory for which it is granted. This area is 
i 
41jbid: 101. 
42 By 1861 it was possible to say that "it may, no doubt, be urged that in the case of trade marks 
there is no property ... but the analogy between copyright and patents... is no longer far fetched": Lloyd (18 61): 666. 
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normally defined by the boundaries of the State concerned, with 
possible extensionsfor cross-border, sea, air and space activities 
connected to it. 
(3) The right may be asserted only by nationals of the country for 
which it is granted and such others as the law also includes. 
(4) The right may be asserted only in the courts of the country for 
which it is granted. 44 
The early period of intellectual property was defined by these principles. 
Obviously they would have been undermined should the rights have extended 
outside the territory of the granting nation. Therefore, it was during this period 
that free-riding became a problem, as a citizen of one country could ignore 
intellectual property rights granted by the Sovereign of another. 
B. International period 
This led, during the nineteenth century, to a move by nations to co-operate on 
intellectual property issues. The British International Copyright Act 183845 and 
International Copyright Act 1844 46 started the trend of reciprocity, whereby one 
state would give protection to nationals of another state if they did likewise. This 
trend extended to other intellectual property rights and led to a series of bi-lateral 
treaties. 47 By 1883 there were 69 international agreement in place, mainly dealing 
43 The terms used are based on those used by Drahos (1999). 44 Cornish and Llewelyn (2003): [1-30]. This represents what Richard Fentiman calls strong 
territoriality: see Fentiman (2005), where he contrasts this with weak territoriality. 45 An Act for Securing to Authors in Certain Cases the Benefit of International Copyright I&2 
Viet. c. 59 (1838). 
46 An Act to Amend the Law Relating to International Copyright 7&8 Viet. c. 12 (1844). 47 For the history of bilateral copyright treaties see Ricketson (1987): 25-38. 
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with trade MarkS. 48 Those States which benefited from the works of other 
nationals (i. e. those benefiting from positive externalities) did not enter bi-lateral 
treaties and remained isolationiSt. 49 These bi-lateral treaties were a prelude to two 
central agreements: the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Beme Convention of 
1886. 
The Gennan delegation I proposed a universal intellectual property laws at both the 
Berne Conference5o and the Paris Conference-51 Outside those international 
meetings other German scholars, most notably Joseph Kohler, 52 argued that trade 
53 54 
marks actually were "universal"; a view which has now been discounted . 
However, what was adopted in place of universalism was a series of minimum 
standards of protection and the concept of national treatment. " These basic 
requirements persist to this day. 
Unlike universality, the approach of adopting minima and national treatment 
barely intruded upon national sovereignty56 because the standards were 
undemanding and more or less . codified existing state practices. 57 Thus, many 
important concepts were left for signatory states to determine according to 
48 Ladas (1975): Vol 1,4345. 
49 The greatest pirates were Americans, who copied British authors; thus American stayed out of 
much of the "international period". so See Ginsburg (2000): 268. This had also been argued at the earlier Brussels Conference on 
Literary and Artistic Property held in September 1858: Ricketson (1987): 41-2. 
51 Discussed in Crocker National Bank v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1984) 223 USPQ 
909 at 918-21. 
52 See Kohler (19 10) (cited in Derenberg (1961): 734). 
53 Thus, the first person to obtain the right, anywhere in the world, could defend it against anyone, 
anywhere else in the world. 54 Kohler, in the 2d Edition (1910) rejected his own theory and accepted territoriality (see 
Derenberg (19 61): 734). However, the US Courts took a long time to discount this theory: see Weil 
Ceramics & Glass v Dash (3d Cir, 1989) 878 F. 2d 659 at 677: "the universality theory is no longer 
viable". 
55 It is arguable that Article 6bis and 6quater of the Paris Convention actually imposed territoriality 
(see discussion in Chapter 7). 
56 Dinwoodie (2002): 995. 
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58 
national policies and values. However, there remains no interpretative 
mechanism for these international conventionS59 and so national laws remained 
I 
widely divergent. 
Therefore, during the international period the territoriality of rights remained 
fundamental. It has been suggested that this lead to the promotion (indirectly at 
least) of policies of isolationism; 60 albeit governments began to understand that 
internationalisation was a pad of domestic lawmaking. 61 
C. Global period 
Sir Robin Jacob has suggested that "as time goes on... the world will realize that 
at least for intellectual property the days of the nation-state are over. , 62 Indeed, 
looking at European legislation over the last few years this prediction appears to 
be coming true. The Television without Frontiers Directive" introduced the 
country of origin principle for television broadcasts which was applied, in a 
modified form, in the Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Re-transmission 
Directive64 for satellite transmissions. Thereafter, the country of origin principle 
65 was adopted on a wider scale by the E-Commerce Directive , where Article 
3 
makes it clear that the provider of an information society service must only 
57 ibid. 
58 Ibid; also see Stewart (1989): [4.46]. 59 See Cornish (1997), where he criticises WIPO's provision of model laws and for offering interpretations of international conventions. 60 See Austin (2002): 56; where he suggests that the arguments forwarded by some in Eldred v Ashcroft (2003) 537 US 186 would mean the copyright clause precludes the US Congress from 
E ranting copyright protection to any foreigner. 
62 
This was suggested by the government, as the defendant, in Eldred v Ashcroft, supra. 
63 
Jacob (2000): 516. 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC (as amended by Directive 97/36/EC). 64 Council Directive 93/83/EEC. 
65 Council Directive 2000/3 1 /EC. 
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comply with the requirements of the country of origin. This principle was also 
I central 
to the first Draft Services Directive. 66 
Although the E-Commerce Directive states that it does not establish rules on 
private international law, 67 some commentators have suggested that it 
is difficult 
to see how requiring a service provider to comply with its own national rules, and 
then requiring other member States to recognise the application of these 
local 
laws, can be anything other than a rule of private international law. 
68 This, in 
essence, internationalises local regulation, albeit outside the scope of intellectual 
property law. 69 
A similar pressure to internationalise intellectual property law (i. e. increased 
globalisation) has pushed policy making into the realm of trade relationS. 
70 Once 
attached to global trade it becomes more difficult for intellectual property laws to 
be devised to meet the particular needs of a state. At the highest level, the 
divisions in the world have, in the past, limited the globalisation of intellectual 
property rights. The split between the developed and the developing world makes 
this point clearly. The developed world sees intellectual property as a tangible 
private property right that must be protected, whereas the developing world sees it 
as a public good to promote economic development. 71 
66 COM (2004) 2 final/3. 
67 Article 1(4). 
68 Moerel (2001): 189. The Directive at Article 1(4) states that it does not establish additional rules 
of private international law nor does it deal with jurisdiction. However, as the Department of Trade 
and Industry point out "the Directive as a whole does not make clear whether the role of private 
international law is retained or superseded' ': DTI (2002): [4.8]. 
69 The E-Commerce Directive and the Draft Services Directive both exclude intellectual property 
from the country of origin principle: Article 3(3) of the E-Commerce Directive; Article 17 of the 
Draft Services Directive. 
70 Dinwoodie (2002): 1003. 
71 Matthews (2002): 11. For finiher discussions of the impact of stronger intellectual property 
rights in the developing world see Coombe (1996) and Oddi (1987). 
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The push to develop global norms in intellectual property has received 
considerable academic support. 72 The norms that are promoted are almost 
exclusively those of Europe and the United States, 73 which has been perpetuated 
by a tendency to "treat principles as if they were ahistorical, absolute concepts". 74 
However, the Western corporations' demands to extend Western standards of 
intellectual property has not, unsurprisingly, included extending requirements of 
75 fair use or dealing. 
These globaI76 norms were set out in the 1994 Agreement on Trade Related 
aspects of Intellectual Property; this was after a number of previous attempts to 
reach an agreement. The earlier attempts at global action began in the 1970S when 
the Anti-counterfeiting Coalition (an alliance of 100 multinational corporations) 
promoted a code of anti-counterfeiting for the Tokyo round 77 of GATT. 78 This 
code was not adopted during that round due to resistance from developing 
countries. 79This led the US to start taking unilateral and bilateral action to try to 
increase intellectual property protection in other countries. This action was made 
possible by section 301 of the Tariff and Trade Act 193 0,80 which pennits trade 
sanctions to be imposed against a third country where that country did not provide 
72 Professor Sterling proposes an International Copyright Code (see page 174 et seq below). 
Further, Dinwoodie (2000): passim suggests that international norms could be adopted to create 
substantive solutions to solve conflict of laws (see page 74 below). 73 Ironically, the United States was very late to grant any rights to foreigners. Indeed, the US held 
off granting foreigners copyright until the balance of trade in intellectual property was positive: 
see Dutfield and Suthersanen (2004): 4 and Burkitt (200 1). 74 Sherman (1994): 118. 
75 Coombe (1996): 246. 
76 The norms are not strictly "global" as the WTO only has 148 members, whereas the UN (which 
still does not represent every nation) has 191 members. 77 Between 1973-9. 
78 Matthews (2002): 9. 
79 Jbid: 9_ 10. 
80 This was amended by the Trade Act 1984. 
Intellectual Property: A Peculiarly Territorial Right? 24 
adequate protection for intellectual property. Thus, the United States could place 
pressure on a country to improve its intellectual property laws and to push them 
into bilateral treaties. As Duncan Matthews has explained: 
the dual strategy of Section 301 and linking intellectual property 
standards to trade in bilateral negotiations had come to be viewed as 
a successful strategy by US business and government. 81 
This aptly demonstrates the merging of trade and intellectual property. It is 
therefore not surprising that, in 1986, the Ministerial Declaration launching the 
Uruguay round of negotiations for GATT included intellectual property. " It is 
also not surprising that the supranational. norrns eventually adopted in TRIPS are, 
on the whole, a move towards increased protection rather than increased users' 
rights. TRIPS firmly established intellectual property as an acceptable part of 
intemational trade and commerce. 
In addition, the European Community has made a number of legislative 
instruments and has well and truly moved into the intellectual property field. The 
North American Free Trade Agreement also has specific intellectual property 
provisions. 83 Notwithstanding the growth of this regional and global convergence, 
the United States has continued to use the same "dual strategy" to force countries 
to increase their respective intellectual property laws by entering a number of Free 
81 Ibid: 16. 
82 GATT Doc No. MIN. DEC (20 September 1986). 83 NAFTA Chapter 17, Articles 1701-1718. For a general discussion of this issue see BlakeneY (1998). 
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Trade Agreements, each requiring a higher standard of protection than that 
mandated by TRIPS. 
84 
This regional and global convergence of intellectual property norms could be seen 
as undermining a state's right to reflect its own social, political and economic 
conditions 85 to such a degree that many of the arguments of localisation are 
86 becoming increasing irrelevant. 
IV. Why should intellectual property laws be 
territorial? 
It can be seen from the brief summary of the history of intellectual property rights 
that there is very little that makes them different from other laws. Yet there are 
three arguments that are used to suggest that specialist treatment is appropriate: 
(a) intellectual property is created by the grant of a sovereign power (at least 
registere rights are); (b) intellectual property is territorial in nature (i. e. it reflects 
the socio-economic norms of the country); and (c) intellectual property is a 
87 particularly specialised and complicated area of law. 
It is true that intellectual property rights are created by sovereign acts, but as 
Austin points out "all property rights may be described as resulting from the 
84 The United States has entered an increasing number of Free Trade Agreements; the other parties include Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Singapore, Israel, Jordan and Morocco as well as a number of 
regional groupings. They are continuing to negotiate these agreements at a very fast rate. 85 Dinwoodie (2000): 503. 
86 However, the Convention on Biological Diversity (concluded 5thJune 1992) re-asserts national 
sovereignty, which contrasts with the global trade promoted by TRIPS: Gibson (2004): 15. 8' These arguments were identified by Sender (2002): [2.11 ]. 
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exercise of territorially bound sovereign PoWeeq. 88 Taking this further, every right 
requires a sovereign act to create it (e. g. a statute, letter patent etc), so why should 
intellectual property be any different? 89 The answer is simple. It is not different. 90 
The third ground, that the area of law is particularly specialised and complicated 
is, at best, irrelevant. The difficulties of intellectual property do not relate to the 
technicality of the law, but of the subject matter. in reality, intellectual property 
law is no more complicated than many other areas of law which regulate markets, 
such as banking or competition law. The only supposedly special characteristic 
remaining is intellectual property's territorial nature. 
Van Eechoud suggests that it is only the intellectual property lawyer's desire to 
find the territorial confines of a particular right9l that sets them apart from other 
lawyers. All laws, from a socio-economic viewpoint, have always had a strong 
justification for localisation; limiting laws territorially is a way of localising them 
to a pre-defined area. Indeed, this desire for localisation is reflected by the 
literature on subsidiarity, 92 a concep ?3 that is derived from the Papal Encyclical: 
Quadragesimo Anno: 
88 Austin (1997): 329. 
" It has been suggested that what makes copyright special is the "lack of automatic recognition of 
the author's capacity of enjoying and exercising rights in his work... outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the State whose legislation granted him such rights": Boytha (1988): 402. This point 
is exemplified in the United Kingdom by section 159 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 and Orders made thereunder. 90 Westkamp (2006) suggests that that this limitation can be avoided if intellectual property is 
recognised "not as a privilege but as a legal term in its own right! '. 91 This she described as harking back to the work of the old Statutists who spent hundreds of years 
trying to clarify and discover the extent of a particular law: Van Eechoud (2003): 16 (also see page 
45, n. 45 below). 
92 Although subsidiarity relates to the level of decision-making, it has theoretical connections with 
the belief that laws should be localised. 93 Subsidiarity is a central concept of the European Union (see Article 5 of the TEU). 
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Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
community, as also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil 
and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organisation can do. For 
every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the 
members ofthe body, social, and never destroy and absorb them. 94 
Therefore, allowing laws to be made at the local level enables them to represent 
"historical, geographical condition[s], as well as [the] religious, ethical, economic 
95 
and, social requirements" of each social group. These requirements, it may 
appear, are evident from the many different philosophical traditions of intellectual 
property, 96 traditions 97 that are often used to maintain the rigid division and 
territoriality at the heart of intellectual property; in particular the division between 
the civil law personality theories and the common law labour theories. 98 
However, beyond these high level abstract traditions, many authors argue there 
are anthropological reasons for these divisions. Copyright laws, Jane Ginsburg 
suggests: 
94 Given in 193 1; the concept has been linked to Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and others: Stauffer (1999). 
95 ValladAo (1961): 99 (discussing unification of laws). 96 The most complete examination of the various philosophical arguments for intellectual property 
was carried out by Drahos (1996), although his study did not include trade marks. However, an 
examination of the Hegelian and Lockean proprietary theories in relation to trade marks was 
undertaken by Maniatis (2002). For a more general discussion of the philosophy of property see Schlatter (195 1). 
97 These traditions have been described as "invented". For a discussion of the invention of tradition 
generally see Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983); in relation to intellectual property see Bently and Sherman (1999): chapter 11; and in relation to copyright alone see Ross (1992). 98 Even France, where the personality theory is very strong, originally based its justification for intellectual property along consequentialist lines: see Ginsburg (1994). 
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are a component of local cultural and in rmation policies. As such, IfO 
they express each sovereign nation's aspirations for its citizens: 
exposure to works of authorship and participation in their country's 
cultural patrimony. 99 
Similarly, Barbara Ringer argues: 
a nation's copyright laws lie at the roots of its cultural and 
intellectual climate. Copyright provides the inducement for creation 
and dissemination of the works that shape our society and, in an 
imperfect and almost accidental way, represents one of the 
foundations upon whichfreedom of expression rests. 
100' 
0 
The construction of these boundaries has other side effects many of which have 
started to be identified in relation to maintaining and protecting indigenous (or 
traditional) knowledge. It has been suggested that the construction of boundaries 
can legitimise "anthropological homogenising of community at [an] historical and 
geographical moment". 1" This leads to artificial imagined political communities, 
which may, or may not, have some degree of cultural and social homogeny. 
102 
The perfect example is the comparison between the "community" on a small 
island, such as one of the Shetland Islands, with the European Community where 
99 Ginsburg (2000): 267. A brief introduction into the various ideologies of copyright was set out 
by Stewart (1989): Chapter 1. 
100 Ringer (1968): 1050. 
101 Gibson (2004): 4. 
102 This idea of imagined communities, now becoming widely accepted, stems from Anderson 
(1991). Gibson (2005) points out that "while intellectual property laws continue to depend upon 
territorial defmitions and application, it is important to be aware that community boundaries are 
not necessarily compatible or even related to national limits" (at 127). 
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the term "community" is at best aspirational. 103 In fact, boundaries are relational 
to different communities, they are not absolute, but mark out the community in 
relation to others. 
104 
Furthermore, a community might have alternative traditions, both legal and 
otherwise, competing for support and supremacy. 105 Yet, ironically, the 
fragmentation of the world into these imagined communities enable intellectual 
property to provide a "cultural filter" and remove diversity and encourage 
homogenisation. 106 This is further exaggerated when owners of intellectual 
property only exploit their wares in a limited number of countries, 107 which 
inhibits the cross-fertilisation of cultures. 
If these matters are of any significance it is difficult to imagine why the protection 
of intellectual property is at the "root of [the] cultural and intellectual climate" of 
any nation, 108 when each state's political community is to varying degrees 
artificial. Although a state (in the modem geo-political sense) may not have an 
homogenous cultural or intellectual climate, this does not mean that communities 
do not exist within that state, simply that its borders do not define them. 
It has also been suggested that intellectual property reflects the economic 
conditions of a state. Although not irrelevant, the market for intellectual property 
goods is rarely demarcated by national boundaries. The market for copyright 
103 Cohen (1989): 13. 
104 lbid: 58. 
105 Glenn (2004): 26. 
106 Macmillan (2003). 
107 See Capling (1996) where it is suggested that the corporations who control 70% of the global 
music market only release 20% of their works in Australia. 
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works will depend on language borders, rather than national boundaries. There is 
a large market for French language books in the French speaking world, but only 
a limited market outside it. Where countries are divided linguistically, such as 
Belgium, the literary market will also be divided down that line. However, since 
the creation of the European single market the linguistic barriers, rather than 
national barriers set the confines of the market. When considering trade marks the 
point is even clearer; a mark may be very strong in one region, but unknown in 
another. Even within developed countries there are economically developed areas 
and underdeveloped areas, each with different prices and different market 
emphasis. In short, it is clear that markets are not set out by national boundaries. 
V. Intellectual property and the Internet 
The limitations of the territorial approach to intellectual property are exacerbated 
by the Internet. The Internet has presented the world with almost infinite 
opportunities by enabling the transfer of information and knowledge across the 
globe in seconds. Yet from the point of view of intellectual property the Internet 
has been seen not as a panacea, but as a nightmare. The conflicting interest groups 
have tried to propose ways of ensuring fairness both for right holders and for 
users, which range from an on-line jurisdiction with its own court, to leaving 
disputes purely to self-regulation. 109 
Beyond these ambitious (and often misguided) suggestions, real problems have 
been identified in relation to private international law. The following pages, 
"' Although, paradoxically, Lord Mustill. has observed that "the essence of culture is heading now, 
not towards internationalism but non-nationalis&I: Mustill (1999). 109 See Chapter 4. 
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which set out the theoretical basis of private intemational law, 110 will show that 
this is not surprising as there are a plethora of complex issues, conflicting views 
and approaches. Yet none of these are tuned to the problems of the Internet. The 
choice of law ideal for most commentators is a car accident (i. e. a negligence 
claim) with a non-resident passenger, rather than an unauthorised communication 
to the public in cyberspace. 
Therefore, with the obvious differences between a car crash and an unauthorised 
download of music, and considering there are "networks [which] are indifferent to 
national borders ... and legal rules whose competences are territorial, how does one 
reconcile the ubiquity of the infringement with the boundaries of adjunction? "' 1 
The Internet has been described as on the verge of being "lawless"' 12 or 
"anarchic", 113 although, antithetically, it has been suggested that it is over- 
regulated with countries applying their laws extra-territoriality in an unreasonable 
fashion. 114 
A number of proposals have been made to address the ubiquitous nature of the 
Internet; from proposing a general lex, mercatoria'15 for the Internet and for 
copyright, 116 to creating a separate Internet jurisdiction. in the more traditional 
110 See Chapter 2. 
111 Ginsburg (1997): 153. 
112 Wittes (1995). 
113 Cohen (1998): 294. 
114 Playboy v Chuckleberry Publishing (SDNY, 1996) 939 F. Supp 1032 and LICRA & UEJF v Yahoo! Inc & Yahoo France (unreported), 20'h November 2000: for comment see Hugot and Dalton (2002). 
115 The law of the merchant is medieval in origin. It stemmed from merchant's customs and floated 
over local municipal law: for a discussion of the history see Garavaglia (199 1). 116 See Ginsburg (1998b) in particular Chapter V. For an actual proposal see Professor Sterling's International Copyright Code (discussed at page 174 et seq below). 
Intellectual Property: A Peculiarly Territorial Right? 32 
fields a number of harmonisation solutions have been proposed, both of 
substantive law and of private international law. 117 
Yet, many of the proponents for such schemes seem to presume that the law in 
every other country matches their own (in essence using the judicial "cheat" of 
presuming that foreign law is the same as domestic law), for example Perritt 
suggests that "the courts of country X would apply the country X choice of law 
rules, which probably do not differ materially from those that would be applied by 
a court sitting in Virginia". ' 18 Not only does this ignore the fact that the choice of 
law rules differ between nations, it also ignores the differences between the 
several States of the United States. 
The main problem with the Internet is finding a way to locate the situs of the 
damage caused or of a transaction, where it is difficult to know where any action 
starts or finishes. Especially, when the political outlook of the world is different 
and local perceptions have different interests, those countries with strong 
protection may look to those countries with weak protection (or no protection) as 
harbouring pirates. 119 These differences of protection can easily cause either 
havens for infiingement or choke points which forbid "infringement" to cross a 
particular "border". 120 But, there are two important things caused by the Internet 
that present real problems: forum shopping and multiplicity of claims. 
117 See Chapter 4. 
"s Perritt (1996): 6. 
119 Geller (2000): 126-7. 
120 Ibid. 
Intellectual Property: A Peculiarly Territorial Right? ý3 
A. Forum-shopping 
If every forum across the world determines the dispute in the same way, by 
applying equivalent laws to facts, then forum shopping would not flourish. 121 
However, the law applied is different in almost every forum, but it is not just the 
differing laws that will affect the choice of forum, there are also varying rules of 
court procedure. 122 Although a claimant may weigh the procedural advantages for 
themselves or disadvantage for the defendant, they still usually shops at the forum 
with which they are most familiar. 123 
It is a truism to suggest that a person only undertakes forum shopping to maximise 
their chances of success in litigation. 124 Therefore, it is not surprising that forum 
shopping has been described as inevitable 125 and traditionally accepted by 
common law courts as they feel that they have "no sort of right, moral or legal, to 
take away from the claimant any real chance he may have of advantage". 126 The 
problem is that "as a practice, 'forum shopping' has pejorative connotations"127 as 
it "runs counter to ideas of equality that are basic to Western views of justice"; 128 
indeed, it was recorded to be "one of the seven deadly sins" at The Hague. 129 But 
what can really cause rancour is that forum shopping may turn "an unpromising 
121 Bell (2003): 23. 
122 See Moore (2001), particularly at 901-24 where she shows that notwithstanding the uniformity 
of patent law across the United States, the different procedural resolutions applied by the various 
federal districts lead to different results. 123 Collins (1976): 36. 
124 Moore (2001): 920-921 notes that in patent litigation where the claimant chooses the forum 
they win 58% of the time and where the defendant chooses the forum (by applying for a declaratory judgment) they win 56% of the time (although this may be attributed to defendants 
only starting cases they think they can win: ibid at 922). 125 Lubbe v Cape (2000) 1 Lloyd's Rep 139 per Buckley LJ at 154. 126 Peruvian Guano Co v Bockwoldt (1883) 23 Ch. D 225 per Bowen LJ at 234. 127 Bell (2003): 25; also see Juenger (1989): 553. 128 Von Mehren (1974): 350. 
129 Morris (1971): 149-50 (it was not described in the same fashion in the second edition: Morris (1980); although it is not clear whether forum-shopping was given absolution or whether there 
were other reasons); also see TheAtIantic Star (1974) AC 436 at454. 
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case into an eminently winnable one"130 so that a defendant becomes liable where 
they were not before. Furthermore, a lawyer who engages in forum shopping is 
not acting improperly, but serving their client well 13 1 and failure to shop may even 
compromise their professional duty. 132 
The problems of forum shopping are self-evident. The claimant will attempt to 
file first to get the forum they desire (and so maximise their advantage) whereas 
the defendant will try to file first (for declaratory judgments and so forth) to pre- 
empt the claimant. This destroys any chance of predictability for users of 
intellectual property. 133 It may also lead a user to ensure that their conduct 
complies with the most restrictive law possible (or the most restrictive 
combination of those laws) to avoid infringing any rights. 
B. Multiplicity of claims 
Even where the forum is certain there is another intractable problem with Internet 
disputes. "A party may have to sue in more than one place to fully satisfy a claim 
or to end unlawful conducf'134 and they "may need to initiate several plenary 
actions to fully satisfy their claims"135 as the: 
ubiquity of the Internet has altered the delicate balance between 
creators and users of intellectual property, forcing legal theorists 
130 Bell (2003): 47. 
131 Juenger (1989): 570-1. 
132 Jbid: 572. 
133 It also creates a number of economic costs, which are discussed at page 137 et seq below. 134 Dreyfuss (2001): 424. 
135 Ibid: 422. 
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and lawmakers to re-conceptualise the substance of intellectual 
property w. 136 
Notwithstanding this balance, the real problem is that the Internet presents: 
concurrent even if non-conflicting, jurisdictional claims [so 
imposing a] potentially unbearable burden... on individuals, ... to 
comply with laws ofevery State. 137 
Or as Christopher Reed puts it: 
because the Internet is accessible from almost everywhere in the 
world, transactions whose real-world analogies would have been 
restricted to only one or two jurisdictions may potentially be subject 
to everyjurisdiction. 
138 
The requirement to comply with the law of every nation can lead to very real 
problems such as where the ruling of one court has worldwide effect: for example, 
when CompuServe were unable to prohibit Germans from accessing certain 
pornographic material, the only way they could obey a German court order was to 
totally remove the material from the Internet. 139 Of course, within these diverse 
jurisdictions it may also be possible for different results to be reached regarding 
the same act. This occurred in the EpIlady patent litigation, where the courts of 
136 ibid. 
137 Kohl (2002): 579. 138 Reed (2004): 2. 
139 See Nash (1996). 
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three different countries came to slightly different decisions on whether on not the 
same European patent was infiinged. 140 
To avoid this problem it has been suggested that all claims should be consolidated 
in one court, thereby conserving worldwide judicial resources and those of the 
parties. 14 1 There are two possible approaches for consolidating claims: leaving a 
court to apply a plethora of different laws or deeming a single law to apply to the 
entire dispute. The second approach is advocated by a number of the proposals in 
Chapter 4 as well as being part of the new proposal set out in Chapter 5. 
VI. Concluding remarks 
It can be seen that the rhetoric of territoriality, which was suggested to be the 
defining feature of intellectual property is nothing of the sort. Intellectual property 
is no different from other laws, each of which is equally "territorial". The real 
problem is that a single act can cause "damage" in a plethora of territories at the 
same time and it is unclear how private international law (rather than intellectual 
property) can address these problems. 
140 See Improver v Remington (1989) RPC 69 (UK); Improver v SicommercelRemington (1990) 
IIC 572 (Ger) and Beska & RemingtonlImprover (1990) IIC 586 (Hague, CA) and (1990) lIC 589 
(Hague, DC). 
141 Dreyfiiss (2001): 432. 
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Private International Law: A Myriad of 
Conflicting Theories 
"Conflict scholars have known for some time now that the hard part of their 
inquiry is figuring out what really matters. Answers are a dime a dozen: it is the 
questions that are precious". 1 Before looking for those questions, the general 
A- -2 meories of private international law will be explored. There are three limbs to 
private international law; although interdependent, each limb can be considered 
separately. The first limb is jurisdiction, namely whether or not a court can 
actually hear a matter; the second is determination of the applicable law, or the 
law against which facts in the case will be judged; and the final limb is the 
enforcement of foreign judgments. The theoretical aspects of each of these limbs 
will be investigated. 
1 According to Singer (1989): 3. 
2 For a more detailed outline of the various theories see one of the many textbooks on private international law: e. g. Cheshire and North (1999): Chapter 2 and Anton (1990): Chapter 2. 
37 
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1. Jurisdiction 
The theories surrounding jurisdiction and competence 3 are closely related to the 
territoriality of states, indeed one of three doctrines explored below is based on 
territoriality. However, before progressing to examine these theories, some basic 
terminology needs explanation; jurisdiction can either be limited or unlimited; this 
can be over a person (in personam); limited to property (in rem) or limited to the 
value, but not the rights, in a piece of property (quasi-in rem). 
These terms are unhelpful in relation to the modem jurisdictional approaches. The 
modem distinction is drawn between general jurisdiction, 4 which means that a 
court can hear any matter relating to a particular defendant, and special 
jurisdiction, which grants a court jurisdiction only over a particular dispute. 
5 
A. Allegiance theory 
The use of a person's allegiance to a system of law as a basis for granting a 
tribunal jurisdiction dates back to the feudal system of medieval Europe, 6 where 
the personal bonds between a lord and his tenant gave the lord the right to 
determine any dispute involving his tenant. The allegiance theory waned as 
personal bonds broke down and became less important, 7 but it remains where 
jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the parties. The most obvious existing 
3 The term 'Jurisdicti=7 and "competence" mean slightly different things. In most common law 
countries jurisdiction also encompasses competence (although it is sometimes called justiciablity); 
however in civilian countries the two are far more distinct. Broadly speaking, the competence of a 
court is its power to hear a particular dispute, whereas jurisdiction is the area over which a court 
has authority. In most respects therefore, it is jurisdiction rather than competence that is central to 
this discussion: see Smit (1961). 
4 Or "compjtýnce gen&alel. 5 This use of the terminology special and general jurisdiction began with Trautman and Von 
Mehren (1966). 
6 Von Mehren (1983): 283. 
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examples of the allegiance theory are Articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code, 
which allow the French court to have jurisdiction over any dispute involving a 
French national. Allegiance brings to the forefront one of the anomalies of 
jurisdictional theory, namely that when authority is based on a relationship 
between the subject and the Sovereign, logic would suggest that a judgment can 
only be given against - but not for - the subject. 8 Notwithstanding, this theory is 
dying out, 9 whereasits successor the power theory remains strong. 
B. Power theory (territorial approach) 
The basis of the power theory of jurisdiction in private international law, at least 
according to some, is public international law. As Beale indicated, "the sovereign 
cannot confer legal jurisdiction on his courts or his legislature when he has no 
such jurisdiction according to the principles of international law", 10 or as Mann 
puts it, "the international jurisdiction to adjudicate is... not a separate type of 
jurisdiction, but merely an emanation of the international jurisdiction to 
legislate". " Therefore, Mann agrees with Beale that the rules of jurisdiction in 
private international law must follow those of public intemational law. 
The origin of the power theory, like many other aspects of private international 
law, 12 comes from Huber's De conflictu legum diversarum in diveris imperiis in 
which he set out three principles, two of which are relevant to jurisdiction: 
71bid. 
8 Von Mehren (2002): 34. 
9 See page 301 below. 
10 Beale (1922): 243; although he later retracted his view suggesting that jurisdiction was purely domestic. 
11 Mann (19 84): 67. 
12 Although Mann (1964), suggests that these maxims are actually maxims of public, rather than 
private, international law. 
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1. the laws of each state have force within the limits of that 
government and bind all subjects to it, but not beyond; 
2. all persons within the limits of a government, whether they live 
there permanently or temporarily are deemed to be subjects 
thereof'3 
These principles set out the basic theory of territoriality, they were later adopted 
and refined by Justice Story who made it clear that: 
the laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, 
except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to 
control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own 
jurisdiction. 14 
When these maxims are put into the context of public international law, it brings 
to the forefront the fact that jurisdiction is fundamentally linked to a state's 
sovereigntylS and this link makes it irrefutable that the nature of the power theory 
is universalist. 16 This must be true, as it is clear that each state, large or small, rich 
or poor, has equal sovereignty and therefore has the same precincts of power and 
authority. 17 Indeed, early Continental thinking was in accordance with this view, 
one civilian lawyer opining that: "the adjudicatory authority of a State is an 
13 Huber (1919): 403. 
14 ne Apollon (1824) 9 US (Wheat) 3 62 at 370. 15 See comments of the International Court of Justice in: Denmark v Norway (Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case) (5h April, 1933) Series A-B 22 where they suggest that legislating "is 
one of the most obvious forms of the exercise of sovereign powee, (at 48). 16 Mann (1964): 30. 
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emanation of its Sovereignty". ' 8 In 1964 Mann felt it was possible to proclaim 
that it would be bad law to suggest that a State could proclaim its own 
jurisdictional extent, because to do so would impact on another State's 
sovereignty; 19 however when he reviewed the question twenty years later he was 
not so sure. 20 
The essential characteristic of a sovereign State is its ability to exercise power; 21 
therefore it is unsurprising that Justice Holmes felt he could declare, "the 
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power', )22 and the International Court of 
Justice could confidently state that "a state ... may not exercise its power 
in any 
23 form in the territory of another state'. Accordingly where a state has power over 
a person, it has unlimited jurisdiction over them and the fact that the exercise of 
jurisdiction would be unfair is, in theory at least, 24 more or less irrelevant. 25 
C. Fairness theory 
The power theory originally had no room for fairness. However, this did not last 
and initially the doctrine of forum non conveniens took out some of its sting. 26 
17 Mann (1984): 20. 
18 Waizenegger (1915): 43-44 (cited in Von Mehren (2002): 145). 
19 Mann (1964): 35, although see the discussion of the fairness doctrine below, which had begun to 
evolve by the time he made this statement. 20 Mann (19 84): 3 0. 
21 This is very close to the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty: see Hobbes (1985). 22 McDonald v Mabee (1917) 243 US 90 at 9 1. 23 France v Turkey (S. S. Lotus Case) (1927) PCIJ, Series A, No. 10 at p. 18. 24 The English courts, for example, allowed proceedings to be stayed when the purpose for 
commencing them within the jurisdiction was vexatious or oppressive: see Logan v Bank of Scotland (No. 2) (1906) 1 KB 141 and Egbert v Short (1907) 2 Ch 205. 25 See, for example, New York Life Insurance v Dunlevy (1916) 241 US 518 where an insurance 
company was held liable to account in two different courts for the same debt; for a discussion of 
this problem see Von Mehren (2002): 108-110. 26 This power to stay proceedings on the grounds offorum non convenienes has existed in Scotland 
since 1892: Sim v Robinow (1892) 29 SLR 585; and in the United States since 1947: Gulf Oil v Gilbert (1947) 330 US 501. However, the House of Lords, in The Atlantic Star (1974) AC 436, 
rejected the introduction of the full Scottish doctrine in England, but accepted the principle. The 
ýf 
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This doctrine enables a court to stay an action where it feels that the forum is not 
the appropriate place to hear it. 27 Beyond this limited concession, it has long been 
felt, in some quarters, that "jurisdiction must rest on principles of justice [and] 
arbitrary power ... should [not] be decisive,. 
28 The US Supreme Court in 
International Shoe v Washington 29 took the first bold step away from power 
towards fairness by suggesting that it was acceptable to exercise jurisdiction 
where a defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice"', 30 thus ensuring that the defendant does not have the burden 
of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. 31 
The doctrine of fairness made it into the ALI Restatement (Second) of the 
Conflict of Laws where §24(l) states that "a state has power to exercise judicial 
jurisdiction over a person if the person's relationship to the state is such as to 
make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable". Thus, "a careful inquiry 
[should be undertaken] into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in 
the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on an alien 
defendant [are] outweighed by minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the 
forum State"; 32 indeed the minimum contacts test "is not susceptible of 
mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to 
modem doctrine was introduced in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Consulex (19 87) AC 460. The power is unknown in civilian countries. 27 Indeed, forum non conveniens decisions are actually based, to some extent, on the jurisdiction being fair, therefore in some ways fairness existed in reverse. 28 Meili (1906): 199 (cited in Von Mehren (2002): 147). 29 (1945) 326 US 310. 
30 Ibid. 316. 
31 World-Wide Volkswagen v Woodson (1980) 444 US 286 at 292. 32 Asahi Metal Industry v Superior Court of California (19 87) 480 US 102 at 115. 
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determine whether the requisite 'affiliating circumstances' are presenf 9.33 These 
"minimum contacts" can include strong links between the litigants and the forum, 
whether or not the controversy was closely linked to the forum or whether forum 
law will be applied to the dispute. 
The theory of fairness developed in other jurisdictions at a similar time to its 
emergence in the US; the German scholar Neuhaus 34 argued that a person 
"submits" to a jurisdiction by the doing of certain acts there, thereby factoring in 
fairness and convenience. 35 Indeed, Pfeiffer suggested that it is possible to 
determine jurisdiction in terms of connecting factors. He argued that a person is 
independent of any forum in which they are not resident, however as their 
contacts increase their "independence" decreases and provided that the exercise of 
I 
Juns iction is proportional to the nature of relations, the forum can accept 
jurisdiction. 36 There is obviously a similarity between the International Shoe 
minimwn contacts approach and that adopted by Pfeiffer; the former requires a 
link between the controversy and the forum and the latter requires contacts 
between the defendant and the court's authority. 37 
The fairness theory is justified by the parties' expectations, 38 thus it moves away 
from the state-centric approach of both the allegiance and power theories and puts 
the relationship between the defendant, the litigation and the forum at the 
33 Kulko v Superior Court of California (1978) 43 6 US 84 at 92. 34 Neuhaus (1955) (cited in Von Mehren (2002): 150-151). 35 Von Mehren (2002): 15 1. 
36 Pfeiffer (1995) (cited in Von Mehren (2002): 160-17 1). 37 Von Mehren (2002): 166. 
38 See Kropheller (1982): 205-6 (the task of the legal order is above all to find a just balance of the 
competing interests of the parties) and Geimer (2001) (both cited Von Mehren (2002): 157 and 159 respectively); also see Von Mehren (2002): 137. 
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forefront. 39 Notwithstanding the rapid progress of this theory, 40 it has been 
criticised by those who believe it to be contrary to international law, in that, when 
determining whether or not a court has jurisdiction, the reasonableness of 
64political, economic, commercial or social interests" should be disregarded. 41 
The divergence of these three approaches means that there is a realneed to 
rediscover uniformity and, as Pryles suggests, a "new general or all-embracing 
conception ofjurisdiction is required" . 
42 
11. Applicable Law 
There have been a number of schools of thought on choice of law (applicable law) 
so it is unsurprising that it has been said, "a universal system of clear and 
unambiguous choice of law rules is a utopiaA3 and that "probably no simple 
answer can be given to the question why courts apply foreign law; the reasons 
probably vary from country to country, from century to century and from context 
to context! s! 4 These schools have often evolved from each other, yet they fall into 
two distinct camps: those upholding the interests of the litigants (private parties) 
and those upholding the state's policy interests. The complexity of the theoretical 
approaches to choice of law could be discussed at length; however a detailed 
analysis is not appropriate here and so only a brief summary and critique of each 
of the major theories will be set out. 
39 See Shaffer v Heitner (1977) 433 US 186 at 204. 40 qf Burnham v Superior Court of California (1990) 495 US 604 where it was felt that mere 
P, resence in a State was still enough to give a court jurisdiction (power theory). 
42 
Mann (1984): 28. 
Pryles (1972): 80. 
Private International Law: A Myriad of Conflict Theories 45 
A. Comity 
Although conflict of laws scholarship began in the Middle Ages, 45 it was not until 
the seventeen century that any substantive theory took shape. Before then it had 
more or less been accepted that conflicts were determined by reference to a higher 
"imperial authority" (i. e. the authority from the Holy Roman Emperor or the 
French King46) . The first break from this was the principle 
Of CoMity, 
47 
which was 
developed by the Dutch school, and is usually attributed to Ulrik Huber. 48 He 
stated: 
Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired within 
the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as 
they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such 
49 
government or of its subjects. 
However, it was probably best explained by its most prominent advocate, Justice 
Story: 
43 Kahn-Freud (1974): 150. 
44 Akehurst (1973): 22 1. 
45 It began with the work of Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313-57), who attempted to classify local 
laws as either "real" and "personal". Real statutes only had force within the territory of the 
enacting State; whereas, personal statutes bound all person who owed allegiance to the law 
(wherever they may be). He believed that all statutes could be classified as one or the other. Later, 
Betrand D'Argentre (1519-90) argued there was a third classification: "mixed". Where a conflict 
exists between a real statute and a personal state, real would be supreme. 46 It must be remembered that conflict of laws, as a discipline, only really existed in areas under 
the control of the old Roman Empire and in France. In England there was little or no consideration 
of the complexities of the issue. 47 For a discussion of the history of the theory of comity see Yntema (1966). 4' The theory was mentioned by others, in particular Paulus and Johannes Voet, some years before Huber wrote his seminal treatise: Lipstein (1972): 122. 49 Huber (1919): 403. This maxim is also the basis of the vested rights approach: see below. 
Private International Law: A Myriad of Conflict Theories 46 
'comity of nations ..... [expresses] the true foundation and extent of 
the obligation of the laws of one nation within the territory of 
another. It is derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the 
latter; and is inadmissible, when contrary to its known policy or 
prejudicial to its interests. 50 
Thus, the comity principle asserts that the application of foreign law is not a legal 
duty but a matter of courtesy. So, at a time when sovereignty was supreme and 
absolute, comity enabled its restrictive grasp to be loosened, 51 but beyond that it 
resolves few other problems, for as Dicey stated: 
the application offoreign law is not a matter of caprice or option, it 
does not arisefrom the desire of the sovereign of England, or of any 
other sovereign, ý to show courtesy to other states. It flows from the 
impossibility of otherwise determining whole classes of cases without 
gross inconvenience and injustice to litigants, whether natives or 
foreigners. 52 
Furthermore, if one accepts that comity is not a legal obligation, but merely a 
matter of politics and good international relations, it poses a question, which 
Schafffier asked in the following terms: 
50 Story (1857): 36; cited with approval Fenton v Livingstone (1859) 3 Macq 497 at 548. 51 Anton (1990): 21. 
52 Dicey(1896): 10. 
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where is the beginning or the end of comity? How can questions of 
laws be solved according to views of policy, which are the most 
shifting and uncertain things in the world? 53 
Therefore, to enable private international law to be based on a solid foundation, it 
was impossible to maintain the doctrine of comity. The enforcement of foreign 
law could not, and cannot, be left to judicial views of international relations. A 
judge had to be bound to follow foreign law. 54 Indeed, when one considers the 
separation of powers, it is unclear why it was ever thought appropriate for judges 
55 to determine whether a political courtesy should be extended to a third country. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the comity theory, it was the first break from 
the old, somewhat staid, ideologies and it enabled others to follow. 
B. Vested (acquired) rights 
The idea of having vested or acquired rights was originally proposed by Ulric 
56 Huber, based on those maxims set out above, but the idea was best expressed by 
Dicey who said: 
Judges... never in strictness enforce the law of any country but their 
own. [When] they are popularly said to enforce a foreign law, what 
they do, in reality, is... to enforce not aforeign law, but a right 
57 acquired under the law ofaforeign country. 
53 Cited in Von Savigny (18 69): 33. 
54 For an early example of this view see Watson v Renton (1791) 8 Bells Cas 92 per Macqueen 1JC at 106. 
55 In relation to the act of state doctrine see page 260 below. 56 Huber (1919): 403. 
57 Dicey (1896): 10 and 24. 
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Indeed, he used vested rights to support General Principle No. 1: 
Any right which has been duly acquired under the law of any 
civilised country is recognised and, in general, enforced by English 
courts, and no right which has not been duly acquired is enforced on, 
in general, recognised by English courts. 58 
This theory seems simple enough and manages to address some of the concerns 
caused by territoriality. Indeed, the strong belief in territoriality may explain why 
vested rights were so widely accepted; the common law world embraced them as 
an ideal59 and they featured prominently in the early treatises (e. g. Dicey6o) and 
textbooks, as well as being the basis of the Restatement (First) of the Conflict of 
Laws 61 (drafted by Joseph Beale). Indeed, even today, twenty percent of states in 
the United States still follow this principle. 62 However, despite the continued 
application of the vested rights doctrine, 63 the theory has been heavily criticised. 
64 
One of the main advantages of "vested rights" is its ability to reconcile the 
application of foreign laws with territorialitY. An English court in recopising 
French law would, at first, appear to be giving French law extra-territorial effect. 
58 ]bid: 22. In Dicey (1949) the wording of General Principle No. 1 was modified to address some 
of the changes in theory; it was finally removed from Dicey and Morris (1967). 59 For examples of judicial application see Slater v Mexican National Railway (1904) 194 US 120 
(per Holmes J at 126) and Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York (1918) 120 NE 198 (per 
Cardozo J at 201). 
60 Dicey (1896). 
61 (ALI 1934). 
62 Symeonides (2000): 13. 
63 cf Cheshire and North (1999) who suggest that the theory receives little or no support (at 2 1). 64 There are six criticisms set out in Morris (2000): 538-9. Indeed, even before the vested rights 
theorywas in the ascendancy it was criticised by Von Savigny (1869): 102-3. 
Private International Law. A Myriad of Conflict Theories 49 
However, the first criticism is tha t65 when a Court applies its conflicts rules and so 
assesses foreign law, it is not actually applying foreign law but its own. So the 
foreign laws are not being given extra-territorial effect at all. 
The second, and greatest, criticism is that vested rights are self-contradictory in 
nature. 66 The theory states that a court, in enforcing a foreign acquired-right, is not 
enforcing foreign law at all but merely recognising a pre-existing right. However, 
as Walter W. Cook points out, this is treating legal rights as "things" which are 
independent from the legal systems that create them. 67 In reality, when a court has 
to determine what rights have "vested" or have been "acquired", it needs to look 
at the laws of the country where these rights were acquired, including its conflicts 
laws. Thus, the foreign law must actually be applied to determine the rights that 
have been "acquired", which means it is difficult to see how the doctrine of vested 
right can actually advance private international law. 68 
Finally, even if these other objections could be overcome, it is clear that vested 
rights theory does not reflect the reality of private international law, in that, in 
practice, the courts have found "acquired" rights which would never have been 
44acquired" if the courts of the legal system in question had applied their own 
law. 69 The theory of vested rights could not withstand this onslaught, possibly 
65 By Cheshire and North (1999): 2 1, although also see Judge Learned Hand in Guinness v Miller (SDNY, 1923) 291 Fed 768 at 770 and Cook (1952). '6 Cook (1952): passin; and Carswell (1959). 67 Cook (1952): 30-1. 
68 The work undertaken by Cook received high praise: "[his] technique has enabled him to destroy the intellectual foundations of the system to the erection of which Professor Beale devoted a lifetime": Cavers (1943): 1172. 
69 See Arminjon (1933): 32-33 and 4748. 
(L7O) 
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because it was a "pseudo-scientific" theory without a nonnative basis 70 and so 
was unable to adapt and evolve. 
C. Local law theory (theories) 
The short lived local law theory rose from the ashes of vested rights; it was first. 
expounded by Judge Learned Hand in Guinness v Miller7l and thereafter by Cook 
in his book the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict ofLaW. 72 However it was 
pointed out, when the local law theory was at its nadir, that this single theory is 
actually two separate theories. 73 The first that of Judge Leamed Hand stated: 
no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, and, 
when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, 
he can only invoke an obligation recognized by that sovereign. A 
foreign sovereign under civilized law imposes an obligation of its 
own as nearly homologous as possible to that arising in the place 
where the tort occurs. 74 
This theory initially requires an assessment of what right would have been created 
had the matter been determined in the jurisdiction selected by the forum's choice 
of law rules. Thereafter, the forum seized models its law on that right. In many 
ways, this theory can be seen as a halfway house between vested rights and 
Cook's local law. Cook's theory was not based on high principle but on an 
70 Whincop and Keyes (2001): 15. 71 (SDNY, 1923) 291 Fed 768. 
72 See Cook (1952) particularly chapter 1. This book and theory actually stemmed from Cook (1924). 
73 Cavers (1949). 
74 Guinness v Miller, supra at 770. 
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empirical study of the decisions courts actually made. This theory is best 
summarised by Cook himself. 
the forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign elements, 
always applies its own law to the case, but in doing so adopts and 
enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly 
similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of decisionfound in 
the system of law in force in another state or country with which 
some or all of the foreign elements are connected, the rule so 
selected being in many groups of cases ... the rule of decision which 
the givenforeign state or country would apply, not to this very group 
offacts now before the court of thqforum, but to a similar but purely 
domestic group of facts involving for the foreign court no foreign 
element ... The forum thus enforces not a foreign right but a right 
created by its own law. 75 
Cook's theory, unlike that of Judge Hand, looked at foreign law only to enable the 
local law to be appropriately modelled (and not for the 'right'), thus a judge 
should search that law to find a rule of decision 76 and use it to determine the case 
before the court. 
Neither this theory nor that of Judge Learned Hand is a theory at all, but a 
statement of the obvious. It has been suggested that the local law theory is sterile 
as it merely mandates that the law of the forum is supreme, but does not assist in 
75 Ibid: 20-21. 
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explaining how the conflicts system works especially when the purpose of such a 
system is to find exception to that very rule, 77 because: 
to remind a... judge, about to try a case concerning a foreign 
element, that whatever decision he gives he must enforce only the 
law of the forum is a technical quibble that explains nothing and 
solves nothing. 
78 
However, once Cook's theory was discounted in the United States it led to a shift 
away from the supremacy of private rights to those of the State. Before 
considering the policy based approaches, it is appropriate to discuss 
internationalism, which has dominated civilian thinking. 
A Universalism and internationalism: an allocation approach 
The Universalist school was led by the great Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who 
believed that the principles of private international law could be derived a priori 
or from logic. Yet neither he nor any of his followers put forward the defining 
principle required as a logical base for their theory. However, the internationalists 
or multilateralists, the offipring of the universalists, did put forward such 
grounding. 
76 This is Cavers' term; see Cavers (1949): 825. Although as Juenger (1985) points out applying a foreign law only applies "an inferior replica of the foreign law in action! ' (at 259). 77 Yntema (1953): 317 (postscript). 
78 Cheshire and North (1999): 23. 
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(i) Normative basis 
The internationalists, in particular Pillet, 79 argued that "private international law" 
comesfrom 80 customary "public international law". 81 By this it is not meant that 
public international law provides the authority to set conflict rules, but rather that 
the reasoning behind these rules is derived from public international law . 
82 It 
cannot be disputed that public international law does set some rules of private 
international law, in particular rules governing State immunity, laws prohibiting 
the violation of sovereignty" and so on. However, it does not deal with the 
determination of applicable law. Yet the internationalists argue that there are 
general principles of law and thus of public international law (or the law 
recognized by civilised nations 84) that have been identified: 85 
(1) every state must have a system of conflict of laws; 
(2) states must not altogether exclude the application of foreign laws and must 
respect rights acquired thereunder; 86 
(3) but states may exclude the application of otherwise relevant rules of 
foreign laws on the ground of public policy; 
(4) status bestowed on a person by his personal law must be respected in other 
states in which he is transiently present; 
(5) the lex situs governs immovables; 
79 Pillet (19234) suggests that "private international law is a branch of the tree of public 
international law" (at 2 1) (author's translation). 
80 Despite "private international law" being about four centuries older than "public international 
law": Mann (1984): 27. 
a' There are obviously certain treaties dealing with matters of private international law that do 
constitute part of the corpus of public international law, however this is not the same as customary 
law. 
82 See Kahn-Freud (1974): 166-167 for a discussion of this distinction. 83 See the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (UK) and Bowett (1982): 22-23. 84 McNair (1957): passim. 85 Collier (2001): 390, who sets out a consolidation of what others have identified as general 
principles, he does not advocate them himselE 6 McNair (1957): 16. 
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(6) mobilia sequuntur personam, that is, title to movables, is govemed by 
personal law; 
(7) the lex actus governs the form of a transaction; 
(8) the parties have a free choice of the law to govem their contractual 
obligations. 
87 
It is quite clear that some of these principles are rules of public international law 
or nothing more than introductory, in that principles (1) to (4) (save the "acquired 
rights" set out in the second principle) uphold the public international law 
principle of maintaining certain minimum standards and not illegally 
discriminating. 88 However, these four principles are neither normative nor 
practical, in that they neither explain why a particular rule is adopted, nor do they 
actually contain rules (or even guidance for creating rules) in private international 
law. Furthermore, the rules of public international law do not generally form part 
of domestic law 89 and so individuals cannot rely on them, as an infraction of 
public international law requires an affected State to take action, something which 
has to date happened only rarely. As Kincaid concludes "the forum ... owes no 
legal duty to other states or to the national community to apply choice of law 
rules". 
90 
Looking at the second four principles, it is clear that these are rules of private 
international law but there is nothing to suggest that they form part of the corpus 
of public international law. Even if these rules were universally applied (which 
87 Ibid: passim. 
88 Lipstein (1972): 170. 
'9 Except in a monist State where certain treaties are "self-executing". 90 Kincaid (1996): 195. 
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they are not) this would only lead to a uniform practice, it would not prove that 
they are principles of public international law. 91 Indeed, Kahn-Freund has 
stingingly criticised the internationalist theory by pointing out that these general 
principles have never (and probably can never) been proved normatively; 92 he 
reiterates that many of the proponents of this reasoning believe that simply 
explaining a theory justifies it. 93 The failure of universalists to go beyond 
explaining a rule's pedigree naturally means they have never managed to derive 
an a priori reason for the rule to exist in the first place. 
60 The approach 
Notwithstanding the somewhat dubious normative foundations of the 
internationalist approach, it still remains prevalent in Europe and so an 
explanation of its general workings is appropriate. The internationalist approach 
requires the law of the country most closely connected with the dispute to be 
applied. To discern which country is most closely connected, rules are formulated 
which designate the laws applicable to certain categories of legal relationship. 
Thus, every legal relationship is classified to fit it into a particular category; each 
category in turn has a series of conflict rules. 94 This approach firstly requires 
spatial determination of an issue (the conflicts issue) and thereafter a substantive 
deten-nination of relevant law (the material issue). Indeed, the international 
approach to choice of law, like Justice herself, is meant to be blind. Therefore a 
court would be erring if it decided to consider what would happen if a particular 
rule were applied. This typ. e of approach is simple; if a rule applies to a dispute it 
91 Ibid. 
92 Kahn-Freud (1974): 17 1. 
93 ibid. 
94 Sauveplanne (1982): 22. 
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applies almost unquestionably and there is little more to it. It is therefore 
unsurprising that American lawyers often call this a "mechanistic type of 
, 95 thinking7. 
This mechanistic type of thinking has remained largely unchanged since it was set 
out by SavignY96 in his classic work on the conflict of laws, which was actually 
volume eight of his System of Current Roman Law. " Savigny was a universalist, 
his approach (like the intemationalists) was multilateral. At the centre of this 
approach was the requirement that wherever a dispute is heard the result would be 
the same. The only exceptions permitted to this requirement were what he called 
"laws of a strictly, positive, imperative nature"98 (or what is now called ordre 
public or lois de police). Notwithstanding, he considered those exceptions to be 
44anomalous"99 and believed that as the uniformity of laws increased, these 
anomalies would eventually disappear. 100 
Savigny, like his successors, mandated that each legal relationship should be 
"characterised" with a "seat", which is allocated on the basis of the particular 
characterisation. His original characterisations were: personal status, 101 law of 
things, 102 law of obligations, 103 succession'04 and law of the family (sub-divided 
95 See for example Hancock (1961): 369. 
96 It has been argued that Savigny was not particularly original in his ideas, only his presentation 
of them: Juenger (1985): 162-163. 
97 It was later translated and published in English: Von Savigny (1869). 98 Ibid: 34; discussed: 34-36. 
99 Ibid: 38. 
100 See page 219 et seq below. 101 Von Savigny (1869): 104-128. 
102 Ibid: 129-147. 
103 bid: 148-221. 
104 Ibid. 222-239. 
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in marriage, paternal power and guardianship). 105 Once the relationship has been 
characterised, one of four factors would be assigned, these are domicile (habitual 
residence) (lex domicili), situs (le-x situs), place of transaction (lex contractus) and 
place of litigation (le-xfori). 
The impact Savigny had on private international law cannot be overstated. It may 
be true that his theory was not original, 106 but it remains the predominant theory 
underlying the laws of Continental Europe (and now English law). The only other 
major influence on internationalist theory comes from Pasquale Mancini and his 
treatise Nationality as the Basis ofInternational Law, 107 in which he re-introduced 
the use of citizenship/nationality as a determinant of the applicable law (lex 
patriae), so moving further away from the view that the law should be detennined 
by the law of the forum (lexfori). 
One of the greatest problems with multilateralism is that there is too great a 
disparity in characterisations and connecting factors, so that uniformity, 108 which 
continues to be the ideal of multilateralists, is still unobtainable. 109 
(M) Public policy 
Even though internationalists believe spatial justice should'be blind, they do 
accept that occasionally foreign law should not be applied because to do so would 
105 Ibid: 240-276. 
106 See Juenger (1985). 
107 Published in 1851. 
108 See Rabel (1950) "since Savigny, it has been customary to regard the attainment of uniform 
solutions as the chief purpose of private international law. Cases should be decided under the same 
substantive rules, irrespective of the court where they are pleaded. " (at 94). 109 Juenger (1985): 257. 
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undermine some domestic rule that is designed to protect public welfare (called 
ordrepublic). 
Public policy is something that is very difficult to define as it is a "vague and 
slippery conception". ' 10 It has even been suggested, "the doctrine of public 
policy ... ought to [be) a warning that there was something the matter with the 
reasoning upon which the rules to which it is the exception were supposed to be 
based". "' The public policy exception is a result of friction caused by trying to 
achieve "conflicts justice" and ensuring that the parties' dispute is resolved fairly. 
The problem is that "the very concept of public policy spells uncertainty, 
unpredictability, and lack of uniformity"' 12 and without uniformity there can be 
no decisional harmony, the cornerstone of internationalist theory. 113 it is therefore 
no surprise that it has been suggested that the I'multilateralists, preoccupied as 
they are with puzzles of their own making, easily lose touch with reality"! 14 
The failure to consider the substantive issues involved in a particular dispute, and 
to follow strictly certain rules, has been widely criticised. 1 15 Notwithstanding the 
theory is thought "blind", in practice the blindfold often slips because the vague 
nature of the categories makes it easy for judges to choose the law they would 
prefer to apply 116 by using the "mysterious process ... of adaptation or 
110 Wolff (1979): 179 (cited in Juenger (1985): 200); further see per Judge Lehman ... public 
policy' is frequently used in a very vague, loose or inaccurate sense": Mertz v Mertz (1936) 271 NY 466 at 472. 111 Lorenzen (1923): 747. 
112 Juenger (1985): 201. 
113 Ibid: 206. 
114 Ibid. 205. 
1 15 Sauveplanne (1982): 24. 
116 Hancock (1961): 366. 
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adjustmenf ". 117 Even with these "get outs" it is still suggested by some that in 
attempting to achieve spatial justice (or conflicts justice) they fail to provide 
substantive justice. 
118 
(N) Lois d'application immediate - law ofimmediate application -priority rules 
Laws of "immediate application", 'ýmandatory laws", eingriffsnonnen or lois 
d'application immediate' 19 are laws that are not spatially conditioned and that are 
intended to be applied before conflict rules or, put another way, the local law 
"trump" the foreign law. These trump laws are, according to Francescakis, those 
which safeguard political, social or economic organisations of the state. However, 
Loussouam has pointed out that all laws try to guarantee economic or social 
interests; so the only difference can be the degree of protection ganted to these 
interests. 120 
It has also been argued that these laws are not actually different from the 
traditional rules of ordre public. "' In practice there is probably very little 
difference between lois de police and ordre public, and they are often used 
interchangeably. 122 There are, however, a number of suggestions of what might be 
potential distinctions. Firstly, 
-it 
has been argued that the difference is the time at 
which the test is undertaken - lois de police apply before the conflict rule, but the 
ordre public applies after a foreign law has been found to be applicable. 123 
117 Juenger(1985): 259. 
118 Sauveplanne (1982): 25. 
119 This term (and lois de police) originated with Francescakis (1966); it was based on a study of 
French case law. The courts relied on "lois de police et de s-dretV of article 3(l) of the French Civil Code and the "lois d'ordre public" which has no statutory basis. 120 Loussouarn (1973): 328-9. 
121 Heuz6 (1990): [355] et seq. 122 Sauveplanne (1982): 35. 
123 See Soubeyrand (2000). 
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Alternatively, the difference is the nature of the law, laws which are contrary to 
the ordre Public are of a general nature, whereas lois de police serve a specific 
purpose. 124 
Notwithstanding these differences, the principle behind ordre public and 
mandatory rules is simple -a forum's law should not be sacrificed to the goal of 
decisional harmony 125 - in many ways it has a similar justification to the use of 
policy interests to detennine applicable law. 
(y) Modern adaptations 
To discuss all the modem adaptations to the allocation rules would be beyond the 
scope of this work. They range from the idea that there are cumulative connecting 
factors (i. e. the more factors connecting the dispute to a legal system, the more 
likely it is the laws of that system will be applied), tiered connected factors (i. e. 
either/or factors) and many more. There are also a number of factors which are 
used to determine which law has the closest connection. The oldest factor is party 
autonomy (i. e. what the parties chose), the newer factors, which warrant 
explanation, arefunctional allocation and thefavour principle. 
Functional allocation expressly recognises policy interests. It considers that a law 
which protects a weaker party should be given greater connecting weight (it has 
also been suggested that this rule could be used to promote a more general policy 
interest 126) 
- The more controversial, in terms of a decisional harmony, is the 
favour principle; this permits connections to be selected on the basis of a 
124 Vitta (1979): 122. 
125 Juenger (1985): 278. 
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preconceived result. The older favour principles ensure that contracts, wills and 
other instrument are valid. Some of the modem favour principles support the 
claimant's choice of forum. These modem modifications have moved 
internationalism away from decisional harmony and by doing so have undermined 
its basis. 
E. Policy interests 
The United States, following the rejection of vested rights and local law, 
underwent an intellectual revolution with its proponents suggesting that the 
primary concern of conflict of laws is ensuring that a state has its policy 
protected. 127 This revolution occurred at the same time as American conflicts 
scholarship was in the ascendancy, so much so that policy interests became almost 
axiomatic. 128 There have been a number of policy theories, most of which were 
developed in the third quarter of the twentieth century. Indeed there are so many 
theories that it has been suggested that there is no longer a mainstream of thought 
in conflict of laws, but instead it has dissolved in "a marshy delta with hundreds 
of rivulets and canals and no clear central channel". 129 
126 Van Eechoud (2003): 37. 
127 Ths view first appeared in the sixteenth century when Guy de Coquille (1523-1603) suggested 
that a statute should be interpreted not by the words "but on ... the presumed and apparent purpose of those who have enacted the statute or custom": Junger (1985): 146. 128 Hill (1959): 474. However, as Brimlayer points out, policy analysis has come to mean all things 
to all people: Brilmayer (1985): 459. Despite the pre-eminence of progressive theories there were 
other American scholars who were attempting to promote the belief that the lexfOri should be pre- 
eminent; Ehrenzweig (1960) argued that a court should apply its own laws unless the relevant domestic law, when properly interpreted, can be properly displaced by the foreign law. This theory 
was similar to that proposed by the German Carl Von Wichter in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, for a summary of this see Nadelmann (1964). 129 Lowenfeld (1982): 99. 
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These rivulets and canals can be divided into five main schools: the first, the 
government interest approach; the second, is based around "the most significant 
relationship"; the third school, which is closely related to the second, is based on 
certain "choice influencing considerations"; the fourth school aims to determine 
the "better law" or "principles of preferencd"; and the fifth proposes "substantive 
rules". Although there are differences between these schools, they have one thing 
in common, the promotion of the state's interests over the interests of the 
individual. 
(i) General background 
There are a few basic ideas that have to be set out before it is possible to consider 
the detail of any of these schools, in particular the difference between a 
13 "jurisdiction-selecting! ' rule and "rule-selection". 0A "junsdiction-selecting" rule 
is one that selects a whole legal system as applicable, irrespective of the particular 
laws that this in turn applies. In contrast, "rule-selection" means that a court can 
"pick and chosd"131 which rule to follow for each aspect of the case. 132 The 
question is: 
should a court in dealing with a claim that a foreign law is 
applicable to the case before it or to an issue in that case choose 
between its own and the foreign legal system or, instead, choose 
between its own rule and theforeign rule? 
133 
130 This distinction was originally proposed by Cavers (1970). Although he proposed abolishing 
the jurisdiction-selection approach earlier: Cavers (1933). 131 The French call this: dgpjýwge. 132 As Cavers accepts, this approach is similar to that of the old statutist: Cavers (1970): 103. 
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The real difference between rule selection and jurisdiction selection is that rule 
selection is "result selective". 134 It determines the applicable law on the basis of 
the best "result", not on the basis of applying a pre-ordained rule to select a 
jurisdiction. All policy analysis is "rule selecting7. 
The second background matter is the difference between "true" and "false' 
conflicts. Obviously, a conflict of laws presupposes that the substantive rules of 
two different jurisdictions may be applied to a dispute. However, if those two 
rules are the same or, if applied, they would produce the same result then this is 
considered to be a "false conflict" because it would make no difference to the 
outcome which state's rules were adopted; whereas, if the choice is between two 
different rules that have different outcomes then it is thought to be a "true 
conflict". 
Furthermore, within certain policy theories, it is argued that where one of the two 
states has no interest in the dispute, in particular because it has not legislated in 
the field, this should also be considered to be a "false conflict"; the absence of 
legislation indicating that the forum is "not interested". This second type of false 
conflict is more contentious, as a state's failure to regulate may actually show that 
the forum intends to be "permissive" in that field. 135 Indeed, the basis of the 
common law has always been what is not prohibited is permitted. 
136 
Notwithstanding the slight dissensus, the central plank of the policy approach is 
133 Ibid. 122. 134 Coined by Hancock (1961). 
135 See Guzman (2002): 917-920 (this article has a somewhat confusing use of the word 
"jurisdiction7'). 
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that a rule is only applied once it has been established that there is a true 
conflict. 
137 
(H) Government interest 
Professor Brainerd Currie, who was styled as the father of the government interest 
approach, 138 suggested that judging significant contacts with a state is 
meaningless "unless significance is judged in terms of the polices and interests of 
the states involved". 139 Similarly Cheatham and Reese suggest: 
a choice of law decision is, therefore, of real concern to the states 
involved, since in net effect it determines whose policy shall prevail 
in the particular case. This consideration dictates that the law of the 
state with the dominant interest should, normally at least, be 
applied. 140 
136 Indeed for many years the English only had "civil liberties", in that a person was at liberty to do 
anything that they were not specifically prohibited from doing, rather than positive "human 
righte'. 
13' Although Currie seems to propose, Currie (1963a): 1241-2, that if it appears that there is a true 
conflict the matter should be re-examined more closely to confirm that there actually is such a 
conflict. 
138 See per Justice Sullivan in Bernhard v Harrah's Club (1976) 546 P. 2d 719 at 722-3; Currie 
derived the theory from Workers Compensation cases: see Currie (1961): 274; he cites Justice 
Stone in Alaska Packers Association v Industrial Accident Commission (1935) 294 US 532, see 
that judgment at 547: "the conflict is to be resolved... by appraising the governmental interests of 
each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to their weighf'. It does, however, 
even predate this: Hill (1959): 474. 139 See Currie (1963a). Although Brilmayer (1979): 400, suggests that Currie's approach tended to be a product of his own beliefs about how far certain policies should reach, rather than those of the le vislature. 
14 Cheatham and Reese (1952): 972. 
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It is helpful to summarise Currie's approach before examining it further; his final 
summary extended to six propositions, 141 which were somewhat verbose and can 
be reduced to three: 
(1) when there is a foreign element, the court should consider the policies 
reflected in the different laws and the relevant government interests; 142 
(2) if one state has an interest and the other does not, then the interested 
State's law should be applied; 
(3) if the court finds two states have an interest in a dispute, then (even if the 
forum is disinterested) the court should apply forum law. 143 
The advantages Currie perceived in adopting his approach stem from its 
straightforward methodology and eliminating the need for characterisation and 
difficult rules of construction and interpretation. "' However, unlike most of the 
other "policy" theories, where there is a "true" conflict of laws Currie believed 
that the court should be compelled to apply its own law. He reasoned that for a 
court to do otherwise would be to undermine the legislature's role, because only 
they have the right to subordinate the state's interest 145 in favour of the interests of 
another; 146 notwithstanding, all courts and writers who have accepted the principle 
141 See Currie (1963a): 1242-3. 
142 It has been suggested by Kegel (1963): 181, that this is better described as "political" or 
"public" interest rather than "government interests! '. These alternative words do fit better with the 
approach Currie suggests; however his terminology will be used to remain consistent. 143 As Bridges and Segal (1963) point out, this actually defeats the whole point of the government 
interest approach in that it applies the law of a completely disinterested state over the law of two 
more interested states (at 782). 144 Currie (1959): 173-4. 
145 Although Currie thought that a legislator would be acting wrongly if it decided to take a 
territorial approach to choice of law, such an approach he describes as "sterile formulism7. Indeed, 
it appears that Currie thought some policies are better than others and therefore the legislator 
should not always be followed, in other words he introduces a judicial value judgment: see Currie 
(1958): 208-9. 
146 bid: 176-7, although he modified this view eventually. 
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of Currie's theory have modified it to include the weighing of the forum's 
interests. 147 
The central problem with Currie's approach is that wherever there is a "true 
conflict" one state or the other must actually give up its legitimate interest, 148 or as 
Kramer puts it: 
true conflicts are difficult precisely because there is no general 
theory against which to measure the justice of conflicting laws of 
different states. Because ... true conflicts present a dispute 
between 
competing but equally legitimate versions of what is just in a 
particular case. 
149 
Indeed, when as part of this process a state gives up an interest, it is often without 
ever having had any input in the making of that decision. However, if one allows 
the forum's laws to be "balanced" in the equation this leads to another problem, 
nmnely that states tend to view their own laws as better than foreign laws. 150 
Therefore, to avoid detennining the applicable law solely by considering 
governmental interests, others have suggested that the law with the most 
significant relationship should be applied. 
147 Ehrenzweig (1966): 389. However, it has been suggested that Currie's requirement that a "more 
moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state or the other may avoid 
conflict" (not set out above) is essentially a back-door method of weighing state interests: see Morris (2000): 550; Currie (1961): 278, answers this point. 148 Currie (1963a): 1241. 
149 Kramer (1990): 280. 
150 Leflar (1966a): 298-9. 
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(M) Yhe most significant relationship 
The determination of applicable law on the basis of which state has the "Most 
significant relationship"' 51 to the dispute was adopted as part of the Restatement 
(Second) of the Conflict of Laws. 152 The basic rule proposed that a court should 
determine choice of law in accordance with its own statutory directive. 
153 
However, when it is unclear what the legislative intention was in respect of a 
particular rule, the court should try to ascertain, by interpretation and construction, 
what the conflict rule for the statute should be. ' 54 However, where there is no 
specific conflict law they should consider certain "factore' to help them find the 
state with the "most significant relationship"' 5' to the rule; these factors are set 
out in section 6 of the Restatement (Secon ): 156 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum; 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of 
those states in the detennination of the particular issue; 157 
(d) the protection of justified expectations; 
151 This approach is very similar to the "proper laW" approach: Morris (1951). Although, in that 
article he never actually sets out how the proper law of tort would be determined, he simply asserts 
that the proper law could be determined. 
152 (ALI 197 1); also see the Rome Convention. 
153 §6(l) Ibid. 
15' See the notes on §6(l). 
155 This test is expressly included for determining the applicable law in tort (§145) and contract 
(where the parties did not chose the applicable law) (§ 18 8). 156 Reese set out similar considerations in his article with Professor Cheatham (1952); factors (a), 
(d), M, (9) were included in that article; as were the following (numbered according to that 
article): (2) a court should apply its own local law unless there is good reason for not doing so; (3) 
a court should seek to effectuate the objective of its relevant local law rule in determining a 
question of choice of law; (6) application of the law of the state of dominant interest; (8) the 
fundamental policy underlying the broad local law field involved and (9) justice in the individual 
case. It is clear that these considerations are similar, although not the same, to those in the 
Restatement. 
157 Although US choice of law theory has been based on intra state conflicts, the Supreme Court 
has suggested that the relevant interests of foreign nations are relevant: see Romero v International 
Terminal Operating Co (1959) 358 US 354 at 382-3 (where the court noted "the controlling 
considerations are the interacting interests of the United States and of foreign countries"). Indeed, 
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(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; 
(f) certainty, predictability and unifonnity of results; and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
The factors were only ever intended to provide guidance to the court and so they 
were drafted as broad principles, but it has been suggested that they are: 
too brief to be extremely helpful ... [and fail] to provide meaningful 
insights in determining when these principles should override the 
presumptive law designated by a specific [rule]. 158 
However, much like the other methods of determination, it is clear that "the state 
whose interests are most deeply affected should have its local law applied"159 so 
like other policy-based rationales, "state interests" are important to determining 
the applicable law. 
These state's interests, according to the Restatement, have to be balanced against 
a person's legitimate expectation of which law will apply. Thus, if a person 
conforms their actions to the laws of one state, they should not be criticised if that 
lawful action has an unlawful effect elsewhere. However, the Restatement 
suggests that justified expectations are less relevant to tort disputes than to 
contract, trust or property disputes. 160 
Cheatham*and Reese (1952): 963, make it clear that the rules of "international choice of law 
should be derived from the interests of international society". 158 McDougal (1999): 119. 
159 Note (0 comment on §6(2) of the Restatement (Second). 
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Amazingly, Professor Reese, the Restater himself, suggested in 1963, "choice of 
law, even now, is not ripe for restatement". 161 Indeed one of the reasons he 
proposed the "most significant relationship" test was that "at the very least [it] 
will not stand in the way of progress". 162 The progress he sought was towards the 
creation of certain and definite rules that could be applied wherever there is a 
confliCt. 163 He thought that the guidelines he proposed would enable courts to 
reconcile the various social and political values to create an acceptable body of 
rules. 
164 
(Iv) Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" 
Robert Leflar was a contemporary of the Restater, while Reese was producing and 
promoting the Restatement (Second), Leflar set out a "manageable" number of 
"choice-influencing considerations". 165 These have been adopted by a number of 
States, 166 and are as follows: 
(a) predictability of results (uniformity of result, regardless of forum); 
(b) maintenance of interstate and international order; 
(c) simplification ofjudicial task; 
(d) advancement of the forum's governmental interests (courts should act in 
accordance with the State's social and legal policy); 
"0 Note (b) comment on § 145(l) of the Restatement (Second). 161 Reese (1963): 681. 
162 Ibid: 699. 
163 Ibid: 681. 
16' Cheatham and Reese (1952): 960. 
165 Leflar (1966a): passim and Leflar (1966b): passim. Yntema (1957) produced yet another list of 
considerations (seventeen in total). 166 Five US states use Leflar's method in tort cases; whereas two use his method in contract disputes: Scoles and Hay (2004): 86. 
Private International Law: A Myriad of Conflict Theories 70 
(e) application of the better rule of law. 167 
It is clear that some of these considerations are similar to those set out in section 6 
of the Restatement (Second) and, like others of the same period, Leflar thought a 
court should take into "account the content and function of particular laws as well 
as their geographical origin". 168 All but one of the factors appears more or less 
self-explanatory; it therefore falls to explain the application of the "better rule of 
law". The "better law" 169 is the one that makes "good socio-economic sense for 
the time when the court speaks". 170 Leflar then proceeds to gives a series of 
examples, each making the "better law" seem even more superficial. 
Firstly, he argues that a particular Spanish rule, which would invalidate a 
consensual agreement entered between a married couples in New York, is not the 
best law because it is "pretty medieval". 171 Secondly, he suggests a rule 
prohibiting a wife from suing her husband for unintended injuries to their child is 
not "anachronistic or otherwise contrary to currently accepted social standards". 172 
In yet another example, he suggests that allowing siblings to recover damages 
from each other after an accident rather than limiting recovery to dependents is the 
better law because it is "the more enlightened rule of law" and "more nearly 
167 The idea of selecting laws on perceived merits is ancient, Aldricus who has been credited by 
some as having "discovered" private international law, suggested the most meritorious law should be applied: Yntema (1953): 301-2. 
168 Leflar (1966b): 1585. 
169 Jaffey (1982b): 378, asks: if a court can pick between the rules of two countries for the better law, why "stop short of inventing ad hoc a rule which seems to the court even better than any 
existing one? " This is what Von Mehren proposes see page 74 below. 170 Leflar (1966b): 1588; Leflar suggests this law corresponds to Ehrenzweig's "basic rule of 
validation": Ehrenzweig (1962): 465. 
171 Leflar (1966b): 1590. 
172 Jbid: 159 1. 
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corresponds with the civilised rule". 173 Thus, it appears that a newer law is better 
because it reflects more recent socio-economic policies, whereas older decisions 
may be outdated and anachronistic. 174 
Apparently, according to Leflar, a court will identify contemporary policy by 
looking at recent books and articles and thereafter the court will be able to 
determine the policies that are relevant. 175 It is, however, unclear how 
contemporary academics or indeed any writers, can explain the policy motivations 
of the legislator. If there actually is a policy behind legislation it usually comes 
from either the parties interested in the legislation or from the legislator; a writer 
can only criticise or hypothesise about a policy. Indeed, in the United Kingdom 
for many years even what was said in Parliament was thought to be an unreliable 
indicator of legislative intent. 176 How can a commentator outside the legislature 
give a reliable indicator? 
It is difficult to see how the bland statements forwarded by Leflar can be 
sufficient to indicate the real underlying policy; indeed it has been suggested that 
the striking thing about the relevant judicial reasoning is its "sheer 
shallowness". 177 Furthermore, it has been pointed out that it is not the task of a 
judge in one country to try to refonn the law in another by telling them their law 
173jbid: 1593. 
174 
McDougal (1999): 110. 
175jbid: 115-6. 
176 The rule excluding reference to Parliamentary debates was first stated by Willes J in Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303,98 ER 201 at 217, although the rule varied greatly over the next two hundred years, it was finally abolished in Pepper v Hart (1993) AC 593. 177 
Hill (2000): 538. 
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no longer meets contemporary socio-economic standards; 178 unless, at the very 
least, the relevant laws are abhorrent to public policy. 
The problem with presenting a list of "contacts" or "factors", as both the 
Restatement and Leflar propose, means that it simply leads to a counting exercise; 
thus if the courts find three relevant factors in favour of forum 'X' and two in 
favour of forum "Y", the law of "X" is applied; thereby determining a "centre of 
gravity" for the case. 179 Even if contacts are not counted the 'ýnost significant 
relationship" method requires weighing interests; thus it means that the theory is 
open to criticism from those who want "simple or predictable rules". 180 
(y) Principles ofpreference 
It has been suggested that the Choice-Of-Law-Process, "' the work in which 
David Cavers, set out his principles of preference, "is the most important 
contribution of our era" in the field of conflicts. 182 in his work, Cavers gives seven 
examples of these "principles of preference", 183 leaving it to others to develop 
more. 184 For this reason, it would be pointless to set out and explain each of these 
principles, 185 however it would be helpful to explain the basis of these principles 
by examining just one. 
178 Cavers (1971): 215. 
179 This is exactly what the New York Supreme Court did inAuten vAuten (1954) 308 NY 155. 180 Bridges and Segal (1963): 781. 
181 Cavers (1965) also see his lectures to the Hague Institute: Cavers (1970). 182 Ehrenzweig (1966): 378. 
183 A similar approach with "Canons of Construction! ' has been proposed by Larry Kramer (1990): 319-338; Jaffey (1982b) suggests similar sorts of propositions based on the so called "conflicts 
usticee'. 
84 Cavers (1965): 133. 
18s This is done at ibid. 122-198. 
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Cavers suggests that a broad principle enabling one law to be preferred to another 
(so advancing the purpose of one kind of law over another) avoids the need to 
show one state's law is superior to another. 186 Such principles would be applied 
where there are no conflict rules pre-existing in statute or in case law and the 
conflict is neither false nor avoidable. ' 87 His first principle of preference is: 
where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard of 
conduct or offinancial protection against injury than do the laws of 
the state where the person causing the injury has acted or had his 
home, the laws of the state of injury should determine the standard 
and the protection applicable to the case, at least where the person 
injured was not so related to the person causing the injury that the 
question should be relegated to the law governing their 
relationship. 
188 
The reason Cavers suggests that this principle should be followed is that all states 
establish standards of conduct to protect against physical and financial harm. 
Thus, he says a defendant who is held to a higher standard cannot complain 
because a person who enters a state cannot expect to benefit from that State's 
protection and not be burdened with its higher standards of care. This is extended 
so that if a defendant's action could foreseeably have an effect in such a state they 
should be subject to the higher. standard. 
186 Ibid: 1334. 
187 ]bid. 137. 
188 Ibid: 13 9. 
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There are two things to note about Cavers' proposal: firstly, it only thinly veil 
State preference and secondly basing choice of law on forseeability can lead to 
vague and uncertain results. Looking firstly at state preference, the principle quite 
clearly prefers one law to another, all it does is set out in advance that one type of 
law is superior to another. Therefore the principle essentially prefers those states 
with the favoured policy, thereby showing the non-preferred states to be inferior, 
and so undennining Cavers' central purpose. 
To detennine iIf the higher standard of liability of a particular state is foreseeable 
requires an evidential detennination (thereafter requiring another determination of 
the facts in terms of liability); but when torts are committed over the Internet (for 
example infringement) it is possible to see that following this theory the highest 
standard should be applied. Yet because the approach is rule selective, rather than 
jurisdiction selective, it could lead to the cumulative application of each country's 
most restrictive law being applied to the activity, without all the counterbalances 
being included. 
(vi) Substantive rules 
A similar proposal to the choice-influencing considerations was forwarded by 
Von Mehren. 189 He suggested that there are certain policies and values that a state 
wishes to advance. 190 Hoývever, unlike similar theories, he proposed that instead 
of working out ways to select one law over another, multinational rules could be 
developed. 191 Every jurisdiction should be given equal respect'92 and the court 
189 Von Mehren (1974); Dinwoodie (2000) proposed using this approach for international 
CO ht litigation. op 
1ý Vtg Mehren (1974): 352. 
191 Ibid: 357. 
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oil should thereafter "apply both states' rules, compromising differences on the basis 
of the relative strength of each legal order's claim to regulate. "193 Thus, the rules 
are neither the law of one state nor the other, but are sui generis; therebY 
providing "a more comprehensible [result] than the all-or-nothing solution that 
results from applying either domestic rule". 194 
Von Mehren acknowledges that the reluctance of civilian jurisdictions to allow 
judges to make legal rules would inhibit their development of substantive rules. 195 
But the problems are greater than that. The proposal has one fundamental flaw: it 
is totally unpredictable. How would a person know what law applies? Indeed, in 
many cases the law that applies may not even have been developed! In essence 
this proposal is a cross between proposing a lex mercatoria: 196 (an extra layer of 
law with supranational effect) and a universal law. 
197 
(vii) Pillet's "leur but social " 
The doctrinal approach based on State interests has been largely rejected in 
Europe, 198 but it has not been totally ignored. It was Antoine Pillet'99 who 
suggested that legal rules should be classified on the basis of their social aim (leur 
but sociao, so that laws which were intended to protect personal interests should 
192 IN& 359. 
193 Ibid: 366. 
194 Ibid: 369. 
195 Ibid: 357. 
196 See page 171 et seq below. 197 See page 175 et seq below. 
198 Although see Morris (1951), where he suggests that tort law could have a proper law in much 
the same way as contract law. In respect of contract law see Dicey and Morris (1987): rule 180 (at 
1161). Rule 180 makes it clear that the "proper law" of contract is the law by which the parties 
intended the contract to be governed or where this is not clear the system of law with which the 
transaction has its closest and most real connection. This matter is only briefly discussed in the 
more recent editions as it no longer applies to contracts entered into after I' April 1991 (because 
of the Rome Convention). 
199 In Pillet (19234): see a summary in Wolff (1950): 41-2. 
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apply to all nationals of the state wherever they are located; whereas laws which 
are for the protection of the community should protect everyone within the 
200 temtory of the State. His theory has been called neo-statutist, in other words a 
return to the pre-nineteenth century theories. 
Although it does not address policy in the same way as the American theories, it 
still bases the determination of applicable law on the policy intention behind the 
law. 201 Indeed, considering Pillet's unusual approach, it is surprising that the 
I International Court of Justice adopted it in the first conflict case it decided. 202 
(viii) The difference between the internationalist approach and the policy 
approach 
Gerhard Kegel compared 203 and summarised the differences between the 
internationalist approach (which he titled "the paternal home") and the new policy 
an roach ("the dream home") thereafter he set out a comparison of the . rP 
differences: 204 
Paternal Home Dream Home 
I. Substantive and Conflicts Law Division Unity 
2. Particular Conflicts Rules Wide Conflict Rules Ad Hoc Decisions 
I General Conflicts Rules Exist Do Not Exist 
4. Content of Conflicts Law Conflict Rules Process 
5. Private International Law and 
Public International Law 
Division Unity 
200 Sauveplanne (1982): 28. 
201 In a more extensive way than functional analysis. 202 Netherlands v Sweden (Application of the Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of 
Infants) (1958) ICJ Reports 55 (commonly called the Boll Case). 203 Kegel (1979). 
204 Ibid: 619. 
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6. Treatment of Own and Foreign 
Law 
Equal Different 
7. Treatment of Good and Bad Equal Different 
Substantive Law 
8. Resulting Decision Mostly Application Often Reformulation 
of Existing of Substantive Law 
Substantive Law 
(ix) The use ofstate interests: a critique 
It has been accepted by most American commentators, almost without question, 
that a state has an interest in private law litigation. This view has received 
considerably less support and much criticism outside the United States, 
205 
particularly in the civilian jurisdictions of Europe. The most comprehensive 
critique of Currie's government interest approacfi206 came from Gerhard Kegel 
during his 1963 lectures to the Hague Institute of International Law. 207 He began 
by arguing that a state, or more accurately the legislators, has no interest at all in 
the disputes between private individualS, 208 but only in affairs of state; 
209 these 
affairs encompass law and order, the economy, health, education and public 
regulation, but not the regulation of contracts or tort law. 
205 For an English criticism see Fawcett (1982): 151. Many of the points Fawcett raised are now 
somewhat outdated because of the evolution of the legal profession and the legal system- He 
argued that English courts are not used to teleological interpretation of laws; this is no longer true 
with the ascendancy of the Court of Justice, who only use that approach. Further, he argues that 
foreign laws are not readily available in the United Kingdom, although comparative law is still 
quite rare, the internationalisation of law generally (particularly on the Internet: see Kozyris 
(1994): 172-3) and the United Kingdom's involvement in the European Community has made this 
less troublesome. 
206 The critique is also, on the whole, applicable to other policy based approaches. 
207 Kegel (1963); also see Law Commission (1984): [4.38] and Jaffey (1982a). 
208 For example, in Rv International Trusteefor the Protection ofBondholders AG (1937) AC 500 
the British Government successfully argued that New York law applies to an international loan, 
suggesting, maybe, that governments are not necessarily interested in private disputes. 209 Kegel (1963): 18 1. 
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Kegel's central point is that choice of law is not related to the protection of state 
interests, but with obtaining conflicts "justice" (spatially as well as substantively), 
which seeks to provide the best and fairest solution to all private parties. 210 He 
argues that the proper purpose of choice of law is to obtain substantive uniformity 
of result211 to ensure effective commerce and order. 212 State interests, he 
postulates, should only become relevant where a significant public policy (ordre 
public) is involved. He even goes further, maintaining that the state only serves 
the welfare of its citizens through public law not through the application of private 
law . 
213 This is demonstrated by courts being willing to apply foreign law, even 
when it is that of an enemy State (i. e. during wartime). Which would be consistent 
with ensuring a just outcome for the individual, 214 but diametrically opposed to 
the upholding of state interests. 
Indeed, Kegel's condemnation goes further. He suggests that Currie's insistence 
that he has removed the need for characterisation is actually incorrect; instead he 
suggests that Currie makes the problem several times worse by requiring the 
complicated construction and interpretation of different State policies. 
215 
Furthermore, others have pointed out that if the several states of the US are so 
interested in the application of their laws, why have they not intervened in the 
various cases involving conflict of lawS? 216 
210 Ibid: 183. 
211 Ibid: 188. This is why renvoi exists, in that it enables a court of one nation to "pretend" to be 
the court of another, thus enabling the dispute to be decided as it would have been decided in the 
state of the applicable law. 212 Ibid: 207. 
213 Kegel (1979): 63 1; although the concept'of "public" law and "private" law is not as distinct in 
common law countries as it is in civilian jurisdictions. 
214 Akehurst (1973): 221. 
215 Kegel (1963): 203. 
216 See Lowenfeld (1982): 109, although also see n. 42 of that article where it is explained that the 
Attorney-General of Nevada submitted a letter to the appeal court in Berhard v Harrah's Club 
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If one accepts that state interests are important and that a government's policy 
should, where possible, be given effect, there are real problems with a court trying 
to identify the PoliCY117 underlying a particular law. "' It is quite clear that a 
government represents a bundle of diverse and conflicting views. 219 Therefore, it 
is not surprising that legislative debates do not necessarily give a reliable indicator 
of the legislator's intentions. Often comments made during debates are made 
under pressure; 220 more importantly, the reasons why each legislator votes for a 
particular provision may differ. In many cases, a member of the legislature will 
not attend the debate before a vote and will either vote on the wording of the 
official documents 221 or on the basis of party affiliation. It would be wrong to 
thereby impute a statement they may not have heard to their intent. Similarly, 
amendments are withdrawn for different reasons so the legislation itself may not 
indicate a legislative consensus. 222 
Furthermore, relying on statements by a government minister may undermine the 
separation of powers, by imputing the words of the executive as those of the 
223 legislature as whole. So if the object of the legislation is unclear then the only 
option for the judge is to "guess" its policy objective, which is quite different 
from the legislative intent. 
(1976) 546 P. 2d 719, in which he stated that the enforcement of Nevada's laws was an important 
issue. 
217 For example, Currie (1960) spends forty pages trying to justify a particular policy. 218 In particular, what about the repeal or amendment of a law? As Brilmayer (1979) observed, if 
the law is repealed or changed and the interests of the State in a particular case, are that the "old 
law" should apply-, does this mean that the law should be re-instated? (at 417-18). 219 Hill (1959): 48 1. 
220 See the submissions of the Attorney-General Sir Nicholas Lyell QC in the. case of Pepper v 
Hart (1993) AC 593 at 604-605. 
221 Ibid at 607. 
222 Ibid at 605. 
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Even if one decides to look at legislative documents, debates and so forth, the 
problem of finding a policy within a federation (where the language is normally 
the same) is difficult; but it may be almost impossible when trying to identify the 
underlying policy of another nation, especially when not only its legal nonns, but 
its cultural and political make up may be different. It is not surprising that the 
policy argument leads to courts harbouring three biases: being pro-resident, pro- 
forum and pro-recovery. 
224 
The use of state interests to determine choice of law issues has begun to be 
criticised within the United States, in particular from Brilmayer. She argues that 
interest analysis has no nonnative base 225 and that the particular state interest is 
not derived from empirical assessment but from hypothesis or bold assumption. 226 
Furthermore, she suggests these theories ignore the possibility that a state may not 
want its law applied in some circumstances. 
Finally, it is worth remembering "the plaintiff sues in order to have the wrong 
done to him set right. He or she is not a private enforcer of a public interest"; 227 in 
other words they go to court for their own purposes without caring about the 
interests of the state. 
Kavanagh (2005): 102-3. 
224 See for example Brilmayer (1979): 398; an empiric study of this result carried out by Solimine 
(1990), suggests that it tends to be correct. A similar conclusion was reached by Borchers (I 992b), 
who concluded that all approaches used by US Courts produce this conclusion, except those 
following the Restatement (First) (vested rights), he even suggests this must indicate that the 
courts do not take the new approaches seriously (at 379). 225 Brimlayer (19 85). 
226 Brimlayer (1985): 467; also see Cheshire and North (1999): 26, where it is suggested that 
where US Courts have used the policy basis for assessment they have tended to give a statement, 
without evidence, of the relevant State's "policy". 227 Englard (1993): 46. 
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F. Reasonable expectations 
The theories based on the "reasonable expectations" of the partieS228 would appear 
perfect for selecting the applicable law; indeed it would accord with many other 
legal standards. 229 However, the problem is determining where a person's 
reasonable expectations come from, Kincaid attributes it to territorial sovereignty, 
or as he puts it "when in Rome do as Roman's do". 230 However, even if the source 
of these expectations can be determined, all the approach provides is the 
continuation of previous rules, it does not, in itself, suggest that those earlier rules 
are actually right. Neither does it provide a point in time for determining a 
person's legitimate expectation; does it arise at the time of the incident, at the time 
of commencing proceedings or at another time? 
In relation to contract it is easy to accept Peter Nygh's suggestion that a party's 
reasonable expectations are those set out in a contractual clause, 231 and likewise 
that the applicable law of a contract should also be applied to torts related to that 
contract. However his other suggestion, that in tort claims a claimant can 
"choose" any lex causae with justice being deten-nined by jurisdictional challenge, 
is far from acceptable. 
This approach is apparently based on an international consensus that claimants 
should be able to choose the most favourable law. 232 Although it is true that the 
N 
228 See in particular the work of Nygh (1995) and Kincaid (1996). 
229 For example a person's legitimate expectations of procedure C'due process") leading to the 
possibility ofjudicial review. 
230 Kincaird (1996): 196-7. 
231 Nygh (1995): 294-7. 
232 Ibid: 369. 
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English Courts adopted this approach, as they acknowledge that the courts "have 
no sort of right, moral or legal, to take away from a plaintiff any real chance he 
may have of advantage"233 and later, "if a plaintiff considers that the procedure of 
our courts, or the substantive law of England, may hold advantages for him 
superior to that of any other country, he is entitled to bring his action [in 
England]"; 234 it is far from internationally accepted that the claimant should have 
this freedom. Furthermore, even where courts do accept claimant favourable 
selections it may be this is something that should not be encouraged. Indeed, such 
an approach only encourages uncertainty for both parties. 
G. Political rights theory 
This approach, proposed by Professor Brilmayer, 235 is essentially a policy analysis 
but person centred, rather than state centred. She expressed unease at the 
consequentialist nature of "state interests" which permit a person's interests to be 
sacrificed for the general good of a state, in which they may not even be 
resident. 236 Further, she argued that an individual state might not have sufficient 
political interest to permit it to exercise authority over a party. 237 Adcording to 
Brilmayer, the real difference between the state interest approach and that of 
political rights is that state interests looks at beneficial links between states and 
238 parties, whereas political rights looks at burdens that link. 
233 Per Bowen LJ in Peruvian Guano Co v Bockwoldt (18 83) 23 Ch D. 225 at 234. 234 Per Denning MR in Yhe Atlantic Star (1973) 1 QB 364 at 382. 235 Brilmayer (1989). 
236 bid. 1293. 
237 Jbid: 1295. 
238 bid: 13 0 1. 
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Brilmayer has proposed a number of contacts which are suitable for determining 
whether it is right to apply a law. The first is consent; a person cannot complain 
that a law is applied to which they have agreed to be bound. The next proposed 
contact is domicile, in that it would normally be unfair to apply the laws of 
England to someone living in Australia and so, in such cases, a state must justify 
the application of its law to a non-resident. 239 
The next suggested factor is territoriality, so where "an individual's connections 
with a state are such as to make it fair to impose upon him or her the state's 
conception of substantive justice" that state's law should apply. 240 Thus, a state's 
law should only burden a person if they live within its territory, should they wish 
to leave its territory they should no longer be bound by its law. The final 
connecting factor is mutuality-, a burden should only be imposed on a person 
where they also receive the benefit of a law. 
The political rights approach, although aimed more at party interests, does not 
provide any more certainty than state interests. It is also a rule based theory, 
which means the determination of any litigation will be unnecessary complicated 
I and expensive. 
H. The English Pragmatists 
Lawyers of the common law have always tended to be pragmatic and nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the English approach to private international law. The 
English courts began by hearing cases using a series of legal fictions to locate an 
239 Ibid: 1297. 
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action within England . 
24 1 Next they dallied with the theories of comity and vested 
rights, 242 but when they proved unsatisfactory, English lawyers did not bother to 
find any ffirther unifying theory. 243 The English law tried to achieve justice and 
fairness 244 through the development of certain rules which would be applied by 
the courts. The position of English law and its pragmatic base has been put most 
clearly by Cheshire and North: 
But on what principle are the rules constructed? Is there one 
overriding principle from which they can all be deduced? 
theoretical analyses are unsupported in English private international 
law. They are alien to the common law tradition and if offered in 
argument would be a matter of surprise to an English judge. The 
instinct of the English la"er is to test a proposed rule by its 
practical bearing on normal human activities and expectations. It is 
by this method that in his opinion the purpose of law, which at y 
bottom is to promote justice and convenience can best be furthered. 
He is nothing ifnot an empiricist and a pragmatist. 245 
The pragmatists developed only a few basic policies: the favouring of individual 
freedom, the upholding of consensual agreements (contracts), support for 
multilateralism and maintaining a very limited application of any public policy 
240 lbid. 1306. 
241 See Juenger (1985): 149-150. The fiction was that a place, say Paris, France, was considered to 
be "Paris, at London in the parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the ward of Cheap". 242 For some years the courts followed Dicey's views of vested rights, which he had set out in the 
"general principles". 243 The English courts are, following the enactment of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 and the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, more 
internationalist than pragmatic. 
244 For a more detailed discussion see Graveson (1962). 
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exception. 246 However, pragmatism is an approach and not a theory in its own 
right. 
111. Recognition and enforcement of judgments 
The recognition and enforcement of judgments has only received limited attention 
from most conflicts scholars. Comity remains central, although it is now used as a 
general expression and is no longer accurately defined. 247 Notwithstanding, it is 
generally agreed that the recognition of judgments is neither a matter of 
obligation 248 nor a mere matter of courteSy. 249 
Comity was thought to lead to reciprocity, where a State's court would enforce the 
judgments of another if they did likewise. The US Supreme Court advocated 
enforcement on this basis in the case of Hilton v Guyot, 250 and for over half a 
century this was followed by the courts of the several States. However, following 
the decision in Maxon Co v Stentor Electronic Manf Co 251 it became a matter for 
state courts to determine which approach to take. 
A. "Correctness" and "repose" 
Von Mehren suggests that there are two conflicting "principles" that must be 
taken into account when deciding whether or not a foreign judgment should be 
245 Cheshire and North (1999): 32. 
246 Graveson (1962): 355-6. 
247 Trautman and Von Mehren (1967): 1603. 248 Historically things were different see: Cottinglon's Case (1678) (cited in Kennedy v Earl of 
Cassillis (1818) 2 Swan 313,36 ER 635 at 640); where Lord Nottingham suggested not enforcing 
a foreign judgment was "against the law of nations". 249 Alexander (1928): 222. 
250 (1895) 159 US 113. For a historic perspective see Gutteridge (1932). 251 (1941) 313 US 497. 
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recognised; these are "correctnese' and "repose". 252 The principle of correctness 
"expresses the concern that legal justice, as understood by the society in both 
substantive and procedural terms, be done"'. 253 Whereas the principle of repose 
"accepts the inherent imperfection of human knowledge and institutions and the 
need to put to rest quarrels and disputes that have arisen so that energies of 
individuals and the resources of society can be devoted to more constructive 
tasks" . 
254 
These two principles are in direct conflict. If too much weight is given to the 
principle of correctness then this will create huge social and economic costs by 
undermining the security of transactions255 (this occurred in France prior to its 
abandonment of revision au fond); 256 whereas giving too much weight to a 
judgment, which may, or may not be correct, and may even have been influenced 
by a parties misconduct, is unjust and encourages dishonesty. 257 A particular 
problem with allowing the principle of repose to dominate is that in some 
jurisdictions, a decision at first instance is automatically entitled to an appeal on 
the merits (double degree de jurisdiction). Therefore to enforce, at least whilst an 
appeal was possible, would put the defendant in a more disadvantageous situation 
than in the original jurisdiction. The right balance between correctness and repose 
exists where a court, in which the recognising court has faith, issued the final 
252 Von Mehren (1980). 
253 Ibid: 22. 
254 ibid. 
255 ibid. 
256 The possibility of a de novo hearing before recognition of a judgment. 257 Von Mehren (1980). 
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judgrnent. This means recognising such a judgment prevents a litigant from facing 
harassment or evasive tactics from the opposing party. 258 
Notwithstanding those two general principles, courts invariably have certain 
requirements or limitations on- the enforcement of foreign judgments. At one 
259 
extreme a court will assess whether the foreign court had a full and fair tri , 
this may have a damaging affect on international relations. At the other extreme, 
most courts will not enforce a judgment where there are problems with its 
jurisdictional base, or where enforcement would offend public policy as a state is 
"not prepared to make its legal machinery available where the consequences 
would deeply offend its views ofjustice and morality5i. 260 
B. Jurisdictional challenges to foreign judgments 
It is an almost universal requirement that a judgment will only be recognised. 
where the foreign court had jurisdiction . 
261 However, the decision over whether or 
not a court has the appropriate jurisdiction has, according to von Mehren, 262 two 
theoretical groupings: derivative theories and non-derivative theories. 
258 Ibid: 36. 
259 Contrast Hilton v Guyot (1895) 159 US 113 at 204-5 where the US Supreme Court considered 
the French system provided such a trial, with Banco Minero v Ross (1915) 106 Tex 522 at 537, 
where the Texas Court considered the Mexican court in question did not provide a full and fair 
trial. 
260 VonMehren(1980): 47. 
261 Akehurst (1973): 237. 
262 Von Mehren (1980): Chapter Il. 
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(i) Derivative theories 
These theories take the view that the jurisdictional tests must stem from the basis 
upon which the rendering court actually adjudicated . 
263 The doctrine 
l'unilatiralitj simple asserts that the only question that can be relevant is whether 
or not the State of origin (the state whose judgment is trying to be enforced) had 
jurisdiction over the matter. 264 Thus, if the State of origin had jurisdiction, the 
judgment should be enforced by the receiving State, unless to do so would be 
contrary to public policy. In contrast the doctrine of lunilatiraliM double, which 
is similar, allows the receiving state to refuse to enforce a judgment where the 
receiving state claims exclusive jurisdiction. 265 The public policy exception that 
applies to both these theories somewhat undermines their central hypothesis, as it 
refuses recognition on a ground other than the state of origin lacks jurisdiction. 
In contrast, the bilat6ralitj theory requires not only that the state of origin had 
jurisdiction, but also that the receiving state would have exercised jurisdiction in a 
similar case with comparable facts. The problem with this approach is that 
jurisdictional requirements of states vary. So, for example, if an English Court 
exercised jurisdiction over a claimant by reason of service, and that defendant was 
domiciled in England, should a foreign court, following the bilaMraliM theory, 
agree to enforce the judgment if it only recognises jurisdiction on the basis of 
domicile? Strict adherence of equivalence would suggest they should not, but 
courts have been willing to be flexible. 266 
263 Ibid. 56. 
264 Holleaux (1970): 18-19. 
265 bid: 19. 
266 See Schibsby v Westenholz (1870) LR 6 QB 155 and Gould v Gould (1923) 235 NY 14. 
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(H) Non-derivative theory 
Where a court follows a non-derivative theory, the jurisdictional requirements are 
dependent on the policies of the receiving state. 267 Therefore, the court only 
enforces a judgment in pursuance of a particular policy. The receiving court will 
only enforce where the jurisdictional basis of the judgment and the chosen law 
were reasonable and where the enforcement of the judgment is fair to the 
268 defendant. 
IV. Concluding remarks 
It has been suggested that the coherence of conflict of laws remains subject to 
doubt. 269 This is unquestionably true. Different nations pursue different aims in 
determining how a conflict should be resolved, leading away from certaintyý 70 and 
towards chaos and the unforeseen. None of the theories or approaches set out in 
this chapter provides sufficient uniformity or normative basis for it to be 
conclusively adopted. Therefore, a new approach is required. 
267 VonMehren(1980): 57. 
268 Ibid: 65. 
269 Ehrenzweig (1963): 700. 
270 Although as Currie (1963b) chided, it is possible for laws to be uniform and predictable by 
always applying the law of Alaska! (at 11). 
3 
An Economic Approach 
When the study of economics was first applied to the law it was in very specific 
areas which had a direct relationship to economic principles; indeed, the 
application of economics to some areas of law has never been controversial. The 
most obvious of these uncontroversial areas was competition law (anti-trust), 
which regulates dominance and monopoly. It was considered natural to assess 
competition law using economic principles, because economists had been 
studying monopolistic behaviour even before it was regulated; this area of law is 
so closely linked to economics that some of the leading textbooks have chapters 
dedicated to introducing basic economic concepts. ' 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of economics within some fields of law, the 
general application of economic principles to law and legal' processes was 
received with hostility and not just from those who thought that there should be a 
"pure" theory of law. 2 The first of these new applications was made in the 1960S 
with Guido Calabresi's first article on risk distribution3 and Ronald Coase's 
1 See for example Whish (2003): Chapter 1. 
2 The leader of this school was Kelsen (see Kelsen (1934-5) and Kelsen (1941)). Pure legal 
theorists argue that "law" should be considered without reference to "foreign elements" such as 
moral considerations (e. g. "justice"), sociology of law and, by natural implication, economic 
considerations. 
3 Calabresi (1961). 
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seminal article4 on transaction costs. Thereafter, economics was being applied not 
only to the traditional inter-related fields between law and economics, but also to 
5 
the study of law in general. 
1. The background to "wealth maximisation" 
Before discussing "wealth maximisation", it is necessary to examine its roots: 
utilitarianism and the theory of utility. 6 
A. The fundamental axiom 
Although the idea of measuring utility is often attributed to Jeremy Bentham, in 
fact he was only building from the thinking of earlier philosophers. 7 When 
Bentham proposed8 his "fundamental axiom": "it is the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong! '9 he was, as Newton had 
been a century earlier, "standing on the shoulders of giante'. 10 Bentham's 
fundamental axiom was not particularly original, " but his contribution to the 
4 Coasc (1960). 
5 For good discussion of the rise of law and economics see: Posner (1975); Posner (1979) and 
Posner (2003). 
6 An interesting discussion of the development of utility theory in economics can be found in 
Stigler (1950). 
7A good summary of the pre-Benthamite development of utility can be found in Ward (1907-21): 
Volume XI, Part III, Chapter 5. A more detailed account can be found in Albee (1902). 8 Betham. (1988a): 3. 
9 This maxim was coined almost half a century earlier by Hutcheson (1990) who stated "that 
action is best which secures the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (at iii s 8), although 
there is nothing to suggest Bentham read his work: Ward (1907-21). 
10 The exact quote "If I have seen ftuther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants" was in a 
letter from Sir Issac Newton to Robert Hooke dated 5dFebruary 1676. 
11 David Hume (1985) argued that the tendency to pleasure was the mark of all virtues; Claude- 
Adrien Helv6tius (1758), whom Bentham studied closely (see Ward (1907-21)) proposed a maxim 
in very similar words to that used by Bentham ("La justice consiste... dans, la pratique des actions 
utiles au plus grand nombre"). Joseph Priestly (1768) suggested using a similar standard in 
political reasoning: the goal of a society is to advance "the good and happiness of the members, 
that is of the majority of the members, of any state is the great standard by which everything 
relating to the state must finally be determined"). Bentham, however, links his theory to the work 
of the Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria (1995), where he sets out the proposition that the acts of men 
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theory of utility was to create a united doctrine. The basis of Bentham's thinking 
was both hedonistic 12 and consequentialist. 13 Indeed his basic postulation can be 
divided into two. elements: (a) people act in their own interests; 14 and (b) people 
are seekers of pleasure and avoiders of pain. 
Bentham surnmarises this as follows: 
[by the] principle of utility [it] is meant that principle which 
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to 
the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the 
happiness of the party whose interests are in question. 15 
He went on to suggest a number of considerations that determine how to measure 
pleasure and pain 16 in relation to a particular activity. His analysis went far 
further, in that he identified the sources of pain and pleasure; " however, the 
extent and depth of his theory and his proofs do not add that much more to the 
concept. His simple proposition was that if one adds up the units expressive of the 
good tendencies (pleasure) of the act and then subtracts the units expressive of the 
bad (pain) the balance of the units will suggest whether there is a general good 
should assess "whether or not they conduce to the greatest happiness shared among the greater 
number" (]bid at 7). 
12 Or the belief that pleasure is the highest good and that pleasure has value in itself and all 
pleasure is valuable. This should be contrasted with a eudaemonist who believes that happiness 
(not pleasure) has such value. Although the fundamental axiom relates to happiness, Bentham 
bases his work on pleasure not happiness: Chapter V of Bentham (1988b). 
13 Being concerned about the consequences of a particular moral actions rather than being 
concerned whether something is "right' 'or "virtuous". 
14 See page 106 below. 
15 Bentham (1988b): 2. 
16 Intensity, duration, certainty and propinquity (ibid at 29); he adds three other qualifiers 
fecundity, purity and extent (as in how many people feel the pain/pleasure) (Chapter IV, M. 
Although H. Sidgwick (1981) points out that "propinquity" should not be included as delayed 
pleasure is pleasure nonetheless (at 124 n. 1). 
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tendency or evil tendency. 18 This Bentham expressed by means of felicific 
calculus, 19 although not his equation, it can be summarised as follows: 
( Xea 
su .- 
Im. ')j Total Pleasure 
Citizens 
If the total pleasure in the above equation is positive then the change is desirable, 
as it would increase the overall pleasure in the world; 20 however if it is negative 
then the change would not be beneficial, as it would add to the pain of the world. 
It is also important to remember that utilitarianism is not about maximising an 
agent's pleasure but about maximising all pleasure, therefore a person may have 
to act in a fashion which actually diminishes their own pleasure, if it gives greater 
pleasure to others. 21 
Notwithstanding the huge contribution of Benthmn, he had considerable trouble 
trying to explain how certain aspects of his theory fit together. In particular, he 
accepted that what makes one person happy may not make another happy, or may 
even make them less happy. Furthermore, he worked on the premise that there are 
"units" of pleasure or pain, and that everything was measurable in the same 
"unif '. In other words, the pleasures from one thing can always be equated with 
17 Bentham (1988b): Chapter III, divided into physical, political, moral and religious. 
18 ]bid: 31. 
19 Coined: ibid: Chapter 4. 
20 Although the term "world" is used here (so including both nationals and foreigners), there have 
been discussions of whether "foreignere' should be included in the equation as legislators are not 
responsible for or to foreigners. 21 Mill (1985): 26. 
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the pleasure obtained from something else, provided they are in the correct ratio. 
This would now be called a cardinal scale. 22 
B. The cardinal and ordinal scale 
To demonstrate the basic premises of the cardinal utilitarian scale, imagine that 
eating normal chocolate for thirty seconds equates to one "unit" of pleasure, but 
eating Belgian chocolate for only ten seconds equates to the same single "unif 'of 
pleasure. If someone could choose which chocolate to eat over thirty seconds they 
would be better off eating Belgian chocolate. Alternatively, if eating three apples 
will produce the same amount of pleasure as eating one banana, then if a person is 
being sent to a desert island with limited storage space, only bananas should be 
taken to efficiently use the limited space. However, a problem arises when one 
has a choice of taking bananas or the Complete Works of Shakespeare to the , 
island. If there is a cardinal scale, the pleasure from eating a certain number of 
bananas should exactly correlate with the pleasure of reading Shakespeare. But 
can eating bananas ever equal Hamlet? Or eating apples equate to the pleasure of 
reading A Winter's Tale? 
The acceptance of these differences is where John Stuart Mi1123 deviates from his 
predecessor he accepts that: 
it is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the 
fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more 
22 This term was not used by Bentham, nor indeed was it used by J. S. Mill. 23 Although J. S. Mill was a hedonist, he was (in contrast to Bentham) a psychological hedonist, 
whereby all "acts" are undertaken to increase pleasure. 
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valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all 
other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation 
ofpleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. 
24 
Mill assigns "to the pleasure of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and 
of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere 
sensation". 25 Therefore, Mill does not subscribe to cardinal ranking, but ordinal 
ranking. This means each type of pleasure can be ranked: drinking fine wine is 
more pleasurable than drinking water; whereas reading Wordsworth is of a higher 
order of pleasure to both. This still leaves questions; is reading Shakespeare of the 
same order or a higher order of pleasure than reading Wordsworth? Can twenty 
(or a hundred) pages of Wordsworth equate in pleasure to five pages of 
Shakespeare, or will the pleasure of reading every word ever written by 
Wordsworth never equate to the same pleasure that can be obtained from a single 
page of Shakespeare? If it is accepted that reading Wordsworth can never equal 
reading Shakespeare or drinking water can never equal tasting wine, then this 
results in what is called lexicographical ordering. 26 However this in itself presents 
a whole new problem. 
24 Mill (1985): 16. 
25 kid. This is often explained with reference to "Hayden and the oystee' (an example created by 
Crisp (1997): 23), if you are a soul in heaven waiting to be allocated a life on Earth and you are 
given a choice between the life of Joseph Haydn which will last 77 years and include honour, 
recognition and influence, or the life of an oyster who will have only mild sensual pleasure but can 
live as long as you wish: which would you choose? If one follows cardinal measurement after a 
certain amount of time the pleasures in the life of the oyster will be greater than the pleasures of 
Haydn, but J. S. Mill gives room to choose Haydn as an oyster's life (however long) can never 
equal Hayden's. 
26 Coined by Rawls (1999): 37 n. 23. 
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C. Lexicographical ordering 
If one extends John Stuart Mill's theory to include the extent of the pleasure 27 (the 
number of people effected by the rule), then by adopting lexicographical ordering 
one person9s pleasure of reading Shakespeare can never be equalled by the rest of 
the world's enjoyment of bananas. Therefore, when a good utilitarian legislator 
(who accepts lexicographical ordering) has a choice between ensuring a single 
person's enjoyment of literature at the expense of everyone else's enjoyment of 
bananas, the lawmaker should outlaw bananas. 
These problems can be taken to extremes, for being warm is considered to be low 
order pleasure, whereas reading is a high order pleasure; but, if a person is 
freezing cold, with just a copy of Shakespeare (and a match), what are they to do, 
read it and die? Or bum it and warm up? 
These problems can of course be avoided if one puts matters in economic terms 
by adding the element of choice. However, if an economic approach is adopted 
then it is necessary for a person to have a real choice. In other words, your basic 
needs must be met; only then would it be fair for the pleasures of reading and the 
pleasures of eating to be compared. 
One of the conundrums faced when judging utility is that it is very difficult to 
measure one person's utility in contrast to another's, 28 as one person may desire 
27 Required by Bentham (1988b). 
28 Although contrast Lloyd (1834) "it would indeed be difficult to discover any accurate test by 
which to measure either the absolute utility of a single object or the exact ratio of the comparative 
utilities of different objects. Still it does not follow that the notion of utility has no foundation in 
the nature of things. It does not follow that because a thing is incapable of measurement, therefore 
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cheaper health care another better transport29 or greater copyright protection 
instead of better access to information. Therefore, if both choices were rational 
would it be wrong to undermine the expressed preference of one for another? 
D. Rules and acts 
When a theory is used to devise or justify a particular rule, it does not necessarily 
mean it can be used to justify the enforcement of that rule. 30 So if one wishes to 
adopt a consequentiality theory, such as either utilitarianism or wealth 
maximisation, it is important to determine whether one should adopt a direct or an 
indirect approach. A direct approach C'act utilitarianism") would require every 
person to determine whether every one of their actions actually increases pleasure 
(or wealth). In contrast, the indirect approach ("rules utilitarianism") requires a 
rule to be adopted where normally the adherence to the rule would increase 
pleasure (or wealth), although following it would, in some cases, actually decrease 
pleasure. 
The very nature of legislation and laws generally makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to follow "act utilitarianism", 31 as it would be too uncertain and 
require all legal standards to be judged subjectively. Indeed, much of the 
criticism levelled against utilitarianism is directed against "act utilitarianism7'. 
This is because particular cases can be found where certain actions maximise 
utility, so can be justifiable, but should they become a general practice, they 
it has no real existence. The existence of heat was no less undeniable before thermometers were 
invented than at presenf' (at 29-30). '9 See Gibb (2002). 
30 See Rawls (1955). 
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would be abhorrent. For example, the secret murder of an elderly, malicious, 
unhappy and rich grandfather may maximise happiness, as no one would suffer 
from his malice, his money would pass to his heirs and he would not be 
constrained by his own misery. 32 Therefore, his murder may be "justifiabld" on 
such a basis, but if parricide were generally justifiable grandfathers everywhere 
would live in fear: leading to a significantly reduced birth rate (why produce a 
child who may kill you? ) and the abolition of inheritance (why not spend money 
before family members start trying to kill you? ) Therefore, in the long run, the 
generalised murder of grandfathers would actually be to nobody's advantage and 
a rule is needed to prevent it, but in turn that prevents the (utility maximising) 
individual case. 33 
If one accepts that only "rules utilitarianism7' should guide law makers, a judge (or 
person) is free to use other philosophical bases for the enforcement of those 
rules. 34 Such an approach is called multi-layered decision making 35 and avoids the 
uncertainty that would inevitably result should act utilitarianism be generally 
adopted; thus, John Austin's view was correct when he said: 
... our conduct would conform to rules inferredfrom the tendencies of 
actions, but would not be determined by a direct resort to the 
31 Mill (1925) was very clearly an "act utilitari&', although he recognises the different role played 
by legislator and judge (Bk. VI, Ch. xii, §2), where he describes how the legislator sets the rules 
for future conduct, whereas the judge has to apply a rule already formulated. 
32 This example is a slightly modified from that of Donagan (1968). 
33 This, of course, equally applies to intellectual property. Some works would be created without 
P rotection (i. e. the property right provides no incentive to create) others would not. 4' This avoids the mistake identified by Rawls (1955) of ffiinking that if a rule is justified on 
utilitarian grounds then the practitioner of that rule is completely at liberty to use utilitarian 
arguments to decide whether to follow that rule (at 16). 
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principle of general utility. Utility would be the test of our conduct, 
ultimately but not immediately: the immediate test of the rules to 
which our conduct would conform, but not the immediate test of 
specific or individual actions. Our rules would be fashioned on 
utility; our conduct, on our rules. 36 
Some of the problems and conundrums facing traditional utilitarianism are 
addressed, or at least minimised, by the doctrine of wealth maximisation. 
11. Wealth maximisation 
One of the greatest advantages of using economics as a basis of legal ideas and 
procedures is that it can be used to judge marginal improvements. Many, if not all, 
of the other philosophical bases of law guide us towards an ideal state, they do not 
supply any basis for determining if one non-ideal state is more or less just, or 
right, than another. 37 
A. Normative approach 
Wealth maximisation, the aim of allocative efficiency or "getting the most 
desirable results with the fewest resources", 38 is a form of utilitarianism, which 
incorporates economic theory. Firstly, it is necessary to establish what is meant by 
35 In contrast to single-layered, which says a theory should be taken into account for each and 
every decision and self-effacing which suggests it should never be taken into account at any level 
of decision making. 
36 Austin (1885): Volume 1: 113-4. Also see Rawls (1955): "if similar cases didn't recur, one 
would be required to apply the utilitarian principle directly, case by case, and rules reporting past 
decisions would be of no use" (at 22) in other words because there are difficult decisions rules are 
needed. 
37 See Arrow (1973): 249. 
38 See Gibb (2002). 
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"wealtif '. The most straightforward definition is from Mill who described wealth 
as: 
made up of all useful or agreeable things which possess 
exchangeable value; or in other words, all useful or agreeable things 
except those which can be obtained in the quantity desired, without 
labour or, sacrifice. 39 
According to Posner, wealth equates to utility in the economic sense, but it 
remains distinct from the utilitarian concept of "utility" in terms of happiness, 
although wealth and happiness are positively related. 40 Posner makes it very clear 
that the idea of measuring abstract utility is an anathema to the modem economist, 
whereas the comparison of "values" can usefully be measured for economic 
purposes. 
41 
(i) Wealth and value 
The term "value" stems from the father of economics, Adam Smith, who 
introduced the difference between "value of exchange" and "value of use". As 
Smith noted, "things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or 
no value in exchange. Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase 
,, 42 scarce any thing. It is the concept of "value for exchange" that is vital to wealth 
maximisation as all consensual exchanges enhance wealth, because in economic 
39 Mill (1909): PR 14, although later he contradicts himself by saying "It is essential to the idea of 
wealth to be susceptible of accumulation: things which cannot, after being produced, be kept for 
some time before being used, are never, I think, regarded as wealtlf ' (ibid, Bk 1, Ch 3, § 9). 40 Posner (1985b): 87-8. 
41 ibid. 
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terms, any change leading to an increase in "value" is efficient and anything 
leading to a reduction in value is inefficient. Of course the best unit of value, or 
wealth, is money or price. Although it is true that people receive a different degree 
of satisfaction from the same amount of wealth it does not justify taking wealth 
from one person and giving it to another; because the redistribution of wealth 
enables no increase but only transfer. 43 
It has to be accepted that wealth maximisation is very similar to utilitarianism, 
except that the "dollar" (or "pound") scale is used 44 instead of using "utility". 
Obviously a dollar has no intrinsic value, 45 so it cannot be used as a criterion to 
assign "first" entitlements, 46 but from the point of view of law reform this is not a 
problem because there will always be a present set of entitlements. The purpose of 
wealth maximisation is neither to evaluate new rights nor to suggest whether the 
original allocation was correct (although these issues are of course relevant to 
changes), but to look at changing or modifying those entitlements. 
It must be remembered that the basic theory behind the economic study of law is 
that under certain circumstances certain legal changes will produce a technically 
efficient result. It is neither a method for determining whether something is 
socially or ethically desirable nor a way of promoting mandatory prescriptive 
42 Smith (1999): 131-2. This was obviously long before the development of the market in spring 
water. 
43 Posner (1984): 80. 
44 One advantage of using money instead of utility is it abolishes the Scitovsky paradox (where the 
Kaldor-Hicks test is used to rank social states in terms of utility, where two different states are 
both Kaldor-Hicks efficient to each other: see Scitovsky (194 1); for an example of such a paradox 
see Coleman (1980): 519). This is because dollars, unlike utility are objective comparable. 
45 Coleman (1980) points out a dollar, or wealth, is only a "means to an end" and not "an end in 
itself'; people only want to acquire money to use that money to acquire more (or better) goods, 
services or power. It also requires "pricee' to exist so there needs to be a market (at 527). 
However, he ignores the fact that there is always a price for everything. 
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changes. Wealth maximisation is essentially a way of changing incentives. Thus 
the incentives must be real: if it is impossible to comply with a law then there is 
no incentive to COMPIY17 and so if a law is cheaper to break than uphold it will be 
broken. 
Indeed, one of the main problems with using efficiency as a basis of law is its 
lacks a normative basis. There have always been those who attempt to argue that 
economics is "neutral", so that changes are considered efficient where they have a 
neutral effect on society. 48 Indeed, Posner has suggested that wealth maximisation 
is the "third way" between the extremes of Kantian consent and utilitarianismý9 
In that, unlike utilitarianism, his version of wealth maximisation requires 
consea5o As consent to any change would have to be implied, it is vital to discuss 
when it might be acceptable to imply such consent. 
(H) Consent 
It is relatively uncontroversial to suggest that a person would consent where they 
are either better off, or no worse off, after a change than they were before it. This 
is probably self-evident, a rational person would agree to allowing a change to be 
made if afterwards they would be in a better position than before; it is also 
possible to assume that a rational person is not going to oppose a change, if after 
that change they would be in the same position (or at least a different but no less 
46 Ibid: 526; also see Dworldn (1986): 253. 
47 Posner (1984): 75. 
48 The father of this approach was Robbins (1984) (see in particular chapter 2) who argued that 
economics was only related to "means" and not "ends". So economics cannot, he suggested, 
inform someone whether a particular goal is desirable, only whether or not one way of achieving it 
was better than another. Thus, when a result has a "neutral effecf' on society it must be an "end" 
and no longer a "means", and so it must be efficient. 
49 Posner (1984): 66. 
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disadvantageous position) than before. If a change has this effect it is called 
Pareto5i superior and when all such changes have been made a market (or legal 
system) it is considered to be Pareto-optimal. The advantage of using e Paretian 
criterion is that it provides a relative measure; in other words only the margins 
need to be considered and not absolutes. 
However the Paretian criterion is very restrictive. If law refonn were to be 
pennitted only where nobody suffers adversely, there would be little or no change 
in the law because almost everything hurts somebody. Calabresi has also argued 
that the criterion is pointless. 52 The basis of this argument is that if nobody suffers 
from a change being made then it would have already been made, as nobody 
would have complained. In other words, a society would always be Pareto optimal 
because all costless changes would have already been made. Only where a new 
"idea" is discovered (i. e. it was previously unknown) is it possible to d6tennine 
whether the implementation of that idea is Pareto superior. Thus, Calabresi 
suggests, the term is more or less meaningless and cannot be used as a normative 
guide; however, the purpose of this work is to suggest a new ideological 
an roach, which means that laws based on the present approaches are not Up 
necessarily Pareto optimal. 
The limitation of this criterion has led to a number of justifications for someone 
being worse off because of a change; one is the Kaldor-Hicks criterion 53 (the 
hypothetical compensation test) which permits a change if the gainers could (but 
50 See Posner (1979): 491, although at 495 he accepts that consent is unlikely to be by absolute 
unanimity. 
51 See Pareto (1971). 
52 Calabresi (199 1). 
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do not) compensate those who lose out. 54 Although this avoids the restrictive 
nature of the Paretian criterion it does allow certain people to be made worse off 
by the proposed change. An attempt was made to address this problem by 
suggesting a dynamic use of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion; if a number of changes 
are bundled together it becomes more likely that a person who suffers because of 
one change will benefit from the next, so in the long term everything evens OUt. 
55 
(M) Ex ante compensation 
Using the Kaldor-Hicks criterion it is possible to determine whether or not each 
change is efficient. Where a change increases the wealth of the gaining party by 
more than it reduces the wealth of the losing party it is considered a desirable 
change. This way of looking at things has been criticised by Markovits. 
56 He 
suggests that measuring things this way round is back-to-front, what should be 
measured is not whether the winner wants something enough to compensate the 
loser, but whether the winner's increase in wealth outweighs the wealth lost by the 
loser. 
One problem with using the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is that no actual compensation 
is passed, making it difficult to use as a normative guide. Posner" has suggested 
a way to address this inconsistency, by looking for ex ante compensation. Such 
compensation means that a person is accepting a "benefif' before the fact in 
exchange for risking a loss. This is easy to justify in relation to voluntary 
53 Based on Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939). 
54 There has also been proposed a partial-Paretian approach by Polinsky (1972) which mixes these 
two approaches, so that an individual change can put a person in a worse position, but a series of 
changes (taken together) must benefit everyone or at least not disadvantage anyone. 
55 This dynamic or multi-change approach was proposed by Hotelling (193 8). 
56 Markovits (1980) and Markovits (1983). 
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transactions, such as the purchase of a ticket for a (fair) lottery, because in such 
cases a person has chosen to take the risk of losing. However, the paradigm needs 
more explanation when it is applied in relation to involuntary transactions. 
One of the most difficult involuntary transactions to justify in terms of ex ante 
compensation is negligence. Despite this difficulty, Posner postulates that a 
person is compensated within the negligence system (although not for the 
negligent conduct itselo by reducing the cost of an activity. He uses the example 
of driving. If liability were based on another standard of care (such a strict 
liability) the cost of insurance would be higher (although the number of accidents 
may in turn be lower) and the difference between the two insurance premiums 
58 amounts to the compensation. He continues by suggesting that pedestrians and 
other non-driveks receive the benefit indirectly, either from cheaper public 
transport or more indirectly still by cheaper goods (the cost of goods will include 
haulage costs, these in turn will be related to the cost of driving). It is true that 
there may still be people who are left uncompensated in such a situation, but they 
could be regarded as de minimis. 
Thus when a person indirectly accepts a benefit (by either remuneration or a 
reduced cost) they are consenting. This view has (unsurprisingly) been criticised 
on a number of grounds. The first is that the consent is never given and so this 
merely creates a plausible basis for such consent being given. 59 Secondly, if a 
consensual contract were agreed it is unlikely that Kaldar-Hicks would be its 
57 Posner (1984): Chapter 4. 
58 Ibld: 95. 
59 Calabresi (1991): 1225. 
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agreed basis. 60 Finally, consenting to a risk of hann is not the same as consenting 
to the harm itself. 61 However, it is suggested that "acceptance", which is not quite 
consent, is sufficient because accepting a benefit in return for a "more risky" 
system amounts to accepting the risk and the consequences. This approach, 
although not ideal, is preferable to some more arbitrary systems of economics. 62 
(N) The self-interested "wealth maximiser " 
"The care of mankind for its own well-being... is the ultimate motive-force for all 
economic action"63 , or put more briefly, everyone is a "rational maximiser of self- 
interesf': 64 both of these are central concepts, or assumptions, 65 in wealth 
maximisation. 66 This rationality is not conscious, but is based on a model of 
rational choice. This means that the state of mind of an individual chooser is 
irrelevant because economics is concerned with predicting tendencies of 
aggregates not predicting individual's behaviour. So how is this "self-interest" 
detennined? 
60 Ibid. 
61 See Coleman (1980) where he argues that consenting to the risk of losing something is not the 
same as actually consenting to losing something. He raises another important point (at 536): if 
compensation can equate with consent then it does not matter if that compensation is paid ex ante 
or ex post. 62 However, Coleman (1980) also points out that while it is conceivable that a person's consent can 
be assumed for a Pareto efficient change (as nobody, including the consenting person, is worse 
oft), why would a person consent to being worse off (as they would be under Kaldor-Hicks). The 
best answer, ex ante compensation aside, is the dynamic Kaldor-Hick criterion, suggested by 
Hotelling (193 8), or simply put "you win some, you lose some". 63 VonB6hm-Bawerk (1890): 379; also see Tuttle (1901). 64 This test has two limbs: (a) rationality; (b) self-interest: Frolich and Oppenheimer (1984): 3. 65 A further assumption is that a persons preferences are exogenous, in other words they are not 
affected by the legal system. Thus, a person is not considered to follow the law, simply because it 
is the law. 
66 But not utilitarianism, as Mill (19 85) makes clear, when judging utility a person should act in a 
disinterested fashion (at 26). The problems of disinterest will not be discussed here, as they 
essentially only apply to single-layered utilitarianism and not multi-layered rule utilitarianism. 
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There are two ways of assessing self-interest. Firstly, by using the theory of 
egoism, 67 which suggests that all decisions (unless mistaken) are by their very 
nature self-interested. So every decision attempts to maximise personal utility, be 
it unusual, altruiStiC68 or otherwise. Secondly, there is the concept of narrow self- 
interest, which suggests that people generally act selfishly. This latter alternative 
concept is preferred by most economists69 and will be considered in more detail, 
in particular the analysis of Harrison. 70 He argues that economics requires a wide 
range of human motivations to be ignored in order to make assessment more 
manageable; therefore it limits people to having only one characteristic: 
selfishness. 71 Indeed, he goes further and suggests that the economic mantel of 
self-interest is contrary to psychological thinking, because the degree of 
selfishness required only equates with a child's thinking. 72 So that narrow sejr- 
interest relies on certain behavioural aspects as well. The self-interest often 
manifests itself in the form of exchange. 
The fundamental problem of using exchange as the basis of anything is that 
people place different values on the exchange. The traditional example is of one 
man buying E5 of oranges from another, this exchange must be utility 
maximising, as the oranges must be worth at least L5 to the purchaser (otherwise 
they would not buy them) and less than ES to the seller (otherwise they would not 
67 In respect of utilitarianism: see Mill (1985): 26. 
68 See Landes and Posner (1978). 
69 Although maybe not Posner; see Posner (2003) where he suggests self-interest should not be 
confused with selfishness as the happiness of others may be part of one's own satisfaction (at 3). 
70 Harrison (1986). 
71 lbid: 1321-2. 
72 He relies on Kohlberg (1981) and Kohlberg (1984) who sets three levels of explanation for 
morality pre-conventional explanation (I won't break the contract because I will have to pay 
damages), conventional explanation (if I break my promise, everyone will start breaking promises 
and the world will be chaotic) and post-conventional (I don't break my promise because a promise, 
once made, becomes someone's "property" and it is wrong to violate property rights). 
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sell them). 73 However, when one moves away from basic economic transactions 
to more complex choices, we encounter the "offer-asking7 s74 problem. This is 
where a person is willing to sell a right they already possess for a sum, but they 
would never pay the same sum to acquire the right if they did not already have it. 
For example, a person who has a good view (which they desire) may be willing to 
4'sell" it for E5,000, but if they had a poor view they would not be willing to pay 
the same ; E5,000 to acquire the good view (even if they desired it). This is 
compounded by the endowment effect, which suggests that the subjective 
perception of the value of an asset is higher if one already possesses it, than where 
one must pay to acquire it. 75 
It has been argued by Posner 76 that the endowment effect can be explained by (1) 
wealth effects (our preference changes when our wealth changes, in each case it 
depends on whether the person owns the goods in question); (2) consumer surplus 
(anyone who owns a good must value it more than a non-owner, otherwise the 
73 Dworkin (1986): 242-3 argues that exchange does not prove anything. He uses the following 
example, if A has a book he would sell for $2 (to provide money for medicine) and B would value 
the book at $3 then why should the book not simply be seized (without payment) from A and 
given to B. He suggests that this would increase wealth and so, according to wealth maximisation, 
it would be desirable even though it leaves A without vital medicines. However, this analysis 
completely ignores externalities; leaving A without medicine is likely to have a societal cost 
freater than $1 and so the "taking" is unlikely to be wealth maximising. 
4 Coined by Kennedy (19 8 1). 
75 Harrison (1986): 1358. This point was demonstrated in a study conducted by Knetsch and 
Sinden (1984), where they gave each student entering a room a lottery ticket, half were one colour, 
half another. Those of one colour were told they had to pay $2 to keep the ticket, those possessing 
tickets of the other colour were told they could sell the ticket for $2 or keep it. They found that of 
those who had to "buy" the ticketý 50% choose to do so and of those who could sell the tickets 
only 25% did so. This suggest that the first group was split evenly on whether the ticket was worth 
more than $2, whereas the second group predominately acted as if the ticket was worth more than 
$2 (the result was confirmed by Knetsch and Sinden when they carried out a similar experiment 
with different permeations). This is simply psychological "risk-avoidance", people try to avoid 
making the wrong choice (i. e. improperly exchanging the lottery ticket). Dworkin appeared to get 
this the wrong way round, suggesting not "risk avoidance' but "grass is greenee, syndrome 
(leading to the coveting a neighbours property); he went on to argue that this leads to the cyclic 
Froblem: see Dworkin (19 8 6): 23 8. 
6 Posner (2003): 19. 
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non-owner would buy it from the owner) and (3) rational adaptive preference (the 
cost of adapting to something new). 
B. Criticisms of this approach 
This application of economic analysis has proved very revealing and has lead to 
77 f many unexpected results. For example, Peltzman ound that the imposition of a 
mandatory requirement to wear seat-belts was actually likely to increase the 
number of accidents as the cost of each individual accident, and so careless 
78 driving generally, would be reduced. This is one example of economic analysis 
providing new (sometimes unwelcome) answers to old questions. 
(i) Completeness 
It is therefore not surprising that these answers, counter-intuitive as they are, have 
been subject to criticism. The arguments raised by the original group of critics, 
who were desperately trying to set the boundaries of economic analysis, were 
three-fold . 
79 First, they asked: if economists cannot answer some basic economic 
questions, how could they provide answers to legal problems? This question is 
somewhat obtuse; no science (or social science) has reached a complete and total 
answer to every question. Indeed, scientific endeavour repeatedly proves that the 
prevailing knowledge is wrong or at least incomplete, for example quantum- 
physicists are having great problems understanding even the most basic principles 
77 Peltzman (1975). 
78 In addition, see Arthur D Little Consulting (2002), which concluded that encouraging smoking 
was beneficial to government because it caused citizens to die thus reducing government 
expenditure on pensions, housing and health care. 
79 Set out by Posner (1979). 
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of their subject, 80 but this does not mean that their study has added nothing to 
physics. 
(H) Link to utilitarianism 
second criticism was directed towards the link between economics and 
utilitarianism. The critics postulated that utilitarianism is considered (by them at 
least) to be discredited and so economic analysis must also be discredited. A 
"discredited" social science, they argue, has no role in the study of laws and legal 
processes. Although utilitarianism may no longer be thought to be a "unifying! ' 
theory, it has not been completely discredited, nor has its child "wealth 
maximisatiotý'. 
(W) Distillation 
The third criticism is of the economic methodology, which involves distilling a 
particular legal rule from the plethora of rules and then studying it in isolation. 
This presumes that the rest of the law is in its "perfect" state. 81 This methodology 
means the economist maybe basing their conclusion on a false premise, by 
arguing that one legal rules relationship to another rule is inefficient, as, it may be 
an undistilled rule rather than the distilled one which is inefficient. 
Notwithstanding, if appropriate steps are taken then this problem can be contained 
if not irradiated. 
go See Gribbin (1985). 
81 Michelman (1980). 
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(iv) Moral objections 
Beyond these criticisms there is another very important limitation on the 
economic analysis of law, in that an economist can say that a particular law is 
efficient or wealth maximising but they cannot say whether it is morally right. 
This leaves economists free to suggest a legal reform without having to defend it 
ethically. 82 However, some legal economists have moved on and tried to do just 
that by arguing that a 'Just7' system is necessarily efficient 83 and that the demand 
for justice should never be considered independently of its price. 84 
This movement towards "economic" morality led to lengthy philosophical 
wranglings between efficiency and other philosophical approaches. However, a 
detailed discussion of these differences would be unnecessarily protracted. 
Indeed, Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner have continued a theoretical debate 
about efficiency for over twenty-five years, with Dworkin arguing that efficiency 
and wealth maximisation have no moral justification and, in particular, that 
46wealtlf' is not a value 85 (by which he means "something worth having for its own 
sakd', 
86). In reply, Posner points out that "no one values wealth for its own sake 
87 
and it is merely instrumental. Thus, Dworkin's central question - "why a society 
with more wealth is, for that reason alone, better or better off than a society with 
less [? ]"88- somewhat misses the point. Indeed, his suggestion that it is false to 
suggest that someone is better off having more wealth89 tends to ignore that 
92 See Posner (2003): 14-15. 
83 See Posner (1984). 
84 Posner (1975): 778. 
85 Dworkin (1986): Chapter 12. 
86 Ibid- 240. 
97 Posner (1984): 108. 
88 Dworkin (1986): 242. 
89 Ibid. 245. 
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monetary value can be attributed to many things that are not normally given a 
market value. 
90 
, (y) Fairness 
It has to be accepted that there is nothing to suggest why efficiency is the best 
"norm" to follow. 91 Indeed, it has often been pointed out that economic analysis 
has no nonnative basis, but a "fairness" Cjustice" or "rights") approach is equally 
flawed. In their extensive article Fairness versus Welfare92 Kaplow and Shavell 
argue that "welfare economics" is a better criterion than fairness to make legal 
policy. Thus, they argue that a policy should only be supported if it maximises 
individuals' well being (or Utility) '93 thereby reverting to traditional utilitarianism. 
However, it is their criticism of deontological theory that is most illuminating. 
94 
They accept that fairness 95 accords with internalised, social norms and is 
something with which people feel more familiar, but still they criticise it 
heavily. 96 First, they suggest that notions of "fairness" are independent of the 
effects of the rule and therefore a fair rule may actually have the effect of making 
nobody better off; second, the terms "fairness" and "rights" are used without 
90 Indeed, this is what law is all about. Otherwise, how could a court determine that a broken leg is 
worth E7,250, whereas paraplegia is worth E145,000: see Judicial Studies Board (2002): 3 and 47. 
91 It must also be accepted that capitalism may be contrary to certain legal and cultural traditions, 
in particular that of Islam: see Glenn (2004): 185. 
92 Kaplow and Shavell (2001). 
93 Ibid: 968. 
94 Notwithstanding, they do also criticise wealth maximisation because they suggest it ignores 
important aspects of an individual's well-being: ibid: 996-7. They do, however, accept that 
maximisation of wealth in many contexts reasonably approximates welfare maiximisation. 
9' They do not differentiate between fairness, rights or justice: ibid: n. 7. 
96 Aid: 973. They accept that ideas of what is fair may actually maximise welfare as what people 
consider fair may equate with promoting well-being. They also argue that social norms make it 
easier for people to assess decisions; otherwise, if they were forced to make decisions on a case- 
by-case basis, such people would be bound to make errors (ibid: 1028). 
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being defined. 97 Therefore it is impossible to know why something is fair, other 
than by merely accepting that it is so. Even less satisfactory is the fact that there is 
no universal standard of fairness: all standards of fairness come from within our 
own traditional framework. 98 Finally, fairness normally requires an assessment e-x 
post, based on what actually happened, so prohibiting the planning of activities, 
because only when the result of an activity is known will it be possible to assess 
whether or not it was fair. 
99 
(vi) Distributivejustice 
I Wealth maximisation takes no account of distributive justice objections. Thus, the 
overall wealth of a society will be the same if fl, 000 is spread over 1,000 people 
with El each or one person with ; E1,000. So, for example, where a rich person is 
willing to pay ES for a loaf of bread, whi6h they may or may not eat, but a 
starving person is only able to, pay El for the same loaf of bread, the wealth 
maximising solution appears to be to give the bread to the rich, well fed person. 
This conclusion ignores externalities, the costs on society of a person starving is 
likely to be high. These costs include:. 'lost labour', the cost of health care or 
burying the starved person. Therefore, it may actually be wealth maximising (on a 
societal basis) to allow the poor man to buy the bread for E1.100 It also ignores the 
fact that taxation and other state intervention can be used to re-distribute the 
wealth to ensure that the starving man can obtain bread. 
97 ]bid: 1007. 
98 Glenn (2004): 47. 
99 Kaplow and Shavell (200 1): 10 10. 
100 This of course does not address the "inequity" point raised first. 
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C. Why wealth maximisation? 
The obvious question is why should wealth maximisation be used to provide a 
basis for international intellectual property law reform? After all, intellectual 
property is usually discussed in terms of high philosophical ideals, from Locke's 
concept of property and Kant and Hegel's conception of the expression of the 
personality, to the more humdrum views of. utilitarian thinkers. However, 
intellectual property, like all other property, must be exploited economically. A 
patent is worthless if it is not exploited during its term and its economic worth 
must be exploited as efficiently as possible to maximise the owner's profits. 
Wealth maximisation, lie any other theory, 101 cannot be proved "objectively", 102 
but it does provide a "basic norm"103 and because it is easier to assess 
qualitatively than other theories, it presents a straightforward method for assessing 
intellectual property and private international law. 
111. Game theory 
The normal rules of economics are that a person acts both rationally and 
"independently" from all other people, but this is taken a stage further with game 
theory. The basis of game theory is that a person not only acts rationally but they 
act strategically; therefore a person will modify their conduct depending on what 
they think other "players" will do. The most commonly cited game is the 
101 As Betrand Russell noted, once a theory has been proven to be the right "one" it is no longer 
philosophy (or theory) but science: Russell (1957): 276. (02 
cfDworkin (1996). 
103 Thus, it is accepted that there are other entirely acceptable theories. 
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prisoners' dilemma 104 this game shows how a person is better off "cheating! ' than 
playing it straight. 
A. The prisoners' dilemma 
A modified version of the prisoners' dilemma relates to the copying of intellectual 
property 105 and can be presented in the following matrix: 
Player I 
Original Work I Copy 
,, 4 
1 Original Work 1 100,100 1 -450,470 
copy 470,450 0,0 
As this matrix shows, if both Player I and 2 create original works they both 
receive a pay off (profit) of ElOO; however if Player I produces an original work 
and Player 2 copies it then Player I will have to pay the cost of production E450, 
but Player 2 (who sells cheaply) can copy and make a profit of E470; finally if 
they both chose to copy then there will be nothing to copy, so nobody spends 
money or makes money. 
1'4 It has been suggested that this game is over used, and other games would be more appropriate: 
Baird, Gertner and Picker (1994): 1. 
105 This, game was set up by Gordon (1992). In fact, the issue of copying is much better shown in 
what is called an extensive form game (rather than a normal form game such as the prisoners' 
dilemma). The reason for this is that the act of copying can only take place after there has been a 
decision to produce an original work. However, the result would be the same. 
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As this matrix shows, the production of original works is strictly dominated y 
the other strategy, namely to copy. This is because nobody would risk producing 
an original work if they know that their rival would be better off copying their 
original work than producing a second original work. Further, if their rival also 
decides the best play is to copy they are still better off than they would be if they 
produced an original work. Therefore, no original works will be produced for 
financial gain. However, if legal protection prohibits copying then the only lawful 
option is to produce an original work or to produce nothing. The strategic and 
rational choice would be to produce such works and receive the pay-off of f 100. 
B. Repeated players and unravelling 
There is, as with all theories, a further caveat. The prisoners' dilemma is only 
I played once by each player, therefore players do not need to consider "future 
games". However, game theory suggests that if the players are forced to play the 
game repeatedly (either indefinitely or potentially indefinitely) they will find the 
co-operate solution and adhere to it. This is because the cost of not co-operating 
on every play is greater than the cost of the other player not co-operating on a 
single play. 107 At some point one player will take the risk of suffering on a single 
play, but in so doing they signal to the other player that they are willing to co- 
operate in the future and so, in the long run, the co-operative solution will be 
played. 
106 A dominant strategy is the best choice for the player in a game whatever the choice of the other 
player; whereas a strictly dominated strategy is one that is always worse than any other strategy. 107 See Luce and Raiffa (1957): 97-102. 
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If, however, the players know that a game will only be played a limited number of 
times, say a thousand times, the players will strategically play each game as if it 
were a one-off game. This is because on the thousandth play the players know 
there will be no further games; therefore there is no opportunity to respond to the 
actions of the other player and so the player plays in the same way they would if it 
I 
were a single game. This in turn leads to the "unravelling" of the game because on 
the penultimate play the players know how their rival will play the last game and 
so, in the penultimate game, there is no advantage in co-operation. Thus, the 
players know how their rival will play the penultimate game and so in the 
preceding game there is no advantage in co-operation. This then unravels back to 
the very first play. 
108 
This is why the intellectual property game can be demonstrated as a single play 
because, although players may play repeatedly, they all know they will not be 
playing indefinitely (or even potentially indefinitely), so they do not take the risk 
of co-operation. 
IV. Costs and incentives 
This chapter has explained how wealth is maximised by balancing the "costs" and 
"incentives". These need to be explored before it is possible to examine the 
economic approach to matters of private international law. 
108 Ibid. 
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Of course intellectual property has been studied in economic terms for many 
years. 109 It has even been suggested to be "a natural field for economic 
analysis. "110 In this global period, "' intellectual property is now so intricately 
linked with trade that economic analysis becomes inevitable. At the European 
level, the various Directives and Regulations are based on the free movement of 
goods and services and the right of establishment, 112 similarly the Lanham Act in 
the United States is based on the Commerce clause in the Constitution. 113 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the original motivation for the European 
Commission to address intellectual property issues came from the problems that 
differing intellectual property rights have, on the economic activities of the 
common (single) market! 14 
A. Why an intellectual property right? 
Before examining the incentive / cost balance at the heart of intellectual property 
law, it is important to consider why the protection of intellectual endeavour should 
be achieved by means of a property based system. Property rights can be divided 
into dynamic and static property rights. ' 15 Two agricultural examples presented by 
Posner116 explain this distinction. Firstly, dynamic rights: if there were no 
property rights, a fanner who plants and tends a crop would have no legal remedy 
109 The most complete study to date is Landes and Posner (2003b); a basic introduction to this area 
is: Besen and Raskind (199 1). 
110 Landes and Posner (19 89). 
111 See Chapter 1. 
112 Article 14(2) TEU, Article 95 allows the approximation of laws to achieve the objectives set 
out in Article 14(2). 
113 The original trade marks legislation was based on Article 1 section 8 of the Constitution (the 
Patents and Copyright clause); however this was struck down by the Supreme Court in the Trade 
Mark Cases (1879) 100 US 82 and 100 US 94. 
114 COM (85) 310 def. also see Jehoram (1994). 
115 Posner (2003): 32-34. 
116 ibid. 
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if a neighbour harvests their crop, thus property rights are required to ensure that 
the investment is not wasted (otherwise they would not invest in the first place). 
Static, rights can be exemplified by imagining a cow pasture. If nobody owns the 
field then nobody will have the right (or ability) to exclude animals from it. This 
means that everyone will continue putting out cows to pasture, notwithstanding 
that as the number of cows increases the quantity and quality of grass decreases. 
In turn this would eventually mean that each cow would have to expend more 
effort to eat the same amount of grass. Thus, the cows will either have to eat more 
(and make the problem worse) or altematively they will become'thinner. 
However, if the pasture had an owner, that owner could rent out the land so that 
only the optimal number of cows would gaze. The equilibrium would be reached 
by the market because the payment required by each farmer for grazing would 
reflect this reduction in quantity and quality of grass. This means the owner will 
have to balance the rent charged against the number of cows permitted to graze. 
As these agricultural examples show, most property right arises out of scarcity; 
either scarcity of a particular good or scarcity imposed by efficient use. However, 
as Plant points out what is peculiar to intellectual property rights is that they are 
not a consequence of the scarcity of the object, but the rights themselves create 
scarcity. 117 
Although it remains difficult to use economics to conclusively justify the 
"property" in intellectual property, some steps can be made in that direction. In 
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particular, it is possible to argue that a property right is a more appropriate way of 
protecting the investment than a liability rule. Following the grounds put forward 
by Calabresi and Melarned, 118 a property rule is appropriate where (1) there are 
only two parties to the transaction; (2) the costs of a transaction between the 
parties is otherwise low; and (3) a court called on to set the tenns of the exchange 
would have a difficulty doing so quickly and cheaply given the complexity of the 
exchange or as Polinsky put bluntly: a property rule' 19 should be adopted where 
"the court lacks information about both damages and benefits". 120 The reason why 
insufficient information presents problems is somewhat self-evident: without 
accurate information a court is likely to either set damages too low (and so 
provide an inadequate deterrent to cease the activity) or set them too high (and so 
over compensate the injured party) and so stifle others from undertaking 
legitimate activity. 
The subject matter of intellectual property, namely inventions, creative works and 
the confusion caused by improper use of a trade mark, often makes it very 
difficult to assess damages; how can one accurately price the copying of a book, 
the invention of penicillin or the trade lost by the use of the mark 'Acme'? 
B. Costs associated with property rights 
Once the rules for allocating property rights have been created, there will be four 
costs linked to this allocation: (a) the cost of transferring rights, (b) the cost of rent 
117 Plant (I 934a): 3 1. Although, Landes and Posner argue that intellectual property is like all other 
property (e. g. land), it can be commodified permitting others to be excluded: Landes and Posner 
(2003b): 374. 
118 Calabresi and Melamed (1972). 
119 He was actually talking about injunctions, although traditionally in the US injunctions were 
only permitted in relation to property rights. 
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seeking 121 to obtain a property right, (c) the cost of enforcement and protection of 
that property right and (d) the cost of restricting the use of any property when it 
has a public-good character. 
(i) The cost of transferring rights 
The cost of transferring rights ("transactions costs') is inflated by informational 
problems associated with agreements. Central to the argument over transactions 
costs is Coase's theorem. 122 This has been expounded as follows: 
There are two striking implications of this process that are true in a 
world ofzero transaction costs. The output mix that results when the 
exchange of property rights is allowed is efficient and the mix is 
independent 9f who is assigned ownership (except that different 
wealth distributions may result in different demands). 123 
Assuming Coase's theorem is correct, in a world of zero transaction costs, even 
without intellectual property rights, the same number of things would be created. 
Using a book as an example, imagine that an author would write a book for MOO 
and all the people who wants the book written are willing to divide up the cost of 
production. 124 The book would be produced, when the money was raised, without 
the need of a property right; whereas, the book would not be produced if the 
money could not be raised. An author's expectations of profit will be determined 
120 Polinsky (1980): 1112. 
121 Rent-seeking (in relation to intellectual property) is the spending of money not on producing 
foods or services, but on obtaining a right in the first place. 22 Based on Coase (1960). 
12' The theorem was actually spelt out by another economist, Demsetz (1967): 349. 
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by what they think the market value of their services to be, thus an established 
author may only be willing to write a book for Elmillion or more. However, as the 
expectations of the author increase the transaction costs associated with dividing 
up and collecting money from the potential buyers go up. Eventually the cost of 
co-ordinating the potential buyers would become prohibitive. 
(H) The cost ofrent seeking 
The costs associated with rent seeking cause particular problems in relation to 
intellectual property. For example, rent paid during the research and development 
associated with obtaining a patent is "wasted" if the person paying the rent does 
not actually obtain the patent. Thus, if a patent (once granted) is worth ElOOO and 
it costs E200125 to develop then the person who obtains the patent obtains a benefit 
126 
of F. 800; however everyone else who almost made it loses up to E200 . 
Therefore, each of the failed researchers leads to a societal welfare loss of up to 
E200, which, depending on the number of losers, may exceed the actual societal 
welfare gain. 127 
(iii) The enforcement cost 
The enforcement cost of protecting a property right, once granted, is the central 
consideration of this work. The cost of enforcing intellectual property is 
particularly onerous, as a person may have to enforce that right separately in each 
124 This is exactly what Hogarth did for the production of A Harlot's Progress: see Paulsom 
(1965): Vol 1,5 n. 7: 6-8 " 125 This is also a "renf' although the patentee will be able to benefit from it later, these costs 
should be treated as "sunk". 
126 Although, the closer one is to getting the first patent, the closer one is to making the first 
improvement (assuming such an improvement is possible), therefore in reality the costs are not 
necessarily wasted. Furthermore, it is possible that two competing (but different) inventions will 
be discovered, this is particularly true in the pharmaceutical industry- Landes and Posner (2003b): 
301. 
An Economic Approach 123 
state where it is created or registered. Furthermore, the uncertainty of varying 
protection drives up related costs (both for the user and the owner). If it costs the 
owner ZIOO to go to court and obtain the return of a E100 piece of property, most 
owners would not bother pursuing the claim and would accept the loss of the 
property (as they gain nothing). In contrast, when a person infringes another's 
intellectual property rights they do not have to give up the property, merely decide 
whether it is worth enforcing. 
Therefore, the owner of the intellectual property will have to add up the cost of 
pursuing the action (both legal costs and other costs) and weigh that against the 
potential gains, both in terms of damages and in terms of the "deterrent effecf'. 128 
It has been put bluntly that ifi. 
the property owners' ability to enforce their intellectual property is 
inefficient or unpredictable, its value decreases for its owner, 
competitors, and the public, thereby stifling innovation and 
competition. 
129 
This is because it will divert resources away from the research and development 
of new inventions and towards enforcement. 130 Therefore, the lower the cost of 
127 Ibid described this a "patent race" (at 306-301). 
128 This effect is particularly important in intellectual property. If the owner of an intellectual 
property right publicly goes after a non-commercial user (as has occurred in relation to "peer-to- 
peer" sharing), then it makes others less likely to copy as they fear they will be next: see The 
Times (2005). Although, it is actually doubtful this has much effect as "one off' acts against an 
unknown person do not generally deter people from offending. For example, in Birmingham in 
1973 a youth was sentenced to twenty years for a brutal mugging, his sentence was published 
nationally and locally, yet it was found that there had been no effect on the number of muggings 
either locally or nationally: Baxter and Nuttall (1975). 129 Moore and Parisi (2002): 1334. 
130 Ibid: 1334-5. This works on the basis that inventors are "repeat playere' in the patent game. 
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enforcing intellectual property, the more responsive creators will be to pecuniary 
incentives and the closer the system will be to optimal efficiency. 
131 
(N) The cost of restricting use 
The defining feature of intellectual property is that it has the attribute of a "public 
good". Such goods are characterised by their non-rivalrous nature, meaning 
something whose consumption by one person creates "no subtraction from any 
other individual's consumption of that good". 132 The lighthouse is used to 
demonstrate the problems associated with public goods. Once a lighthouse has 
been built everyone, whether they paid for it or not, can benefit from it. Therefore, 
everyone waits for everyone else to build the lighthouse (knowing they can free- 
ride) and so nobody ever builds the lighthouse in the first place, unless there is 
governmental or quasi-governmental involvement. 133 
However, the subject matter of intellectual property rights is not a true public 
good, but rather it is a partial non-excludable; 134 this is because there are some 
I 
"costs" (however small) in copying the subject matter; either reflected by the cost 
of searching for the work or simply the time spent copying it. The advent of the 
Internet has greatly reduced these costs; therefore, in relation to intellectual 
property found on the Internet, it is fair to assume that such subject matter is 
almost a "full" public good. 
13 1 Landes and Posner (2003b): 344. 
132 Samuelson (1954) (where he defmes collective consumption goods). 
133 Although, Coase (1974) suggests, in fact, this example is ill founded as many lighthouses in 
Britain were paid for privately, albeit with a public right to collect tolls in port. Therefore, a 
lighthouse may not be an appropriate example for true public goods, but it may be for intellectual 
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(v) Monopoly 
Although intellectual property rights are often called monopolies they are not 
monopolies in the strictest sense. Firstly, there is an argument that the subject 
matter of a patent or copyright is new, therefore the rights cannot grant a 
monopoly because prior to the creation of the invention or work there was nothing 
to monopolise. Secondly, there is no evidence to suggest that the grant of an 
intellectual property right also grants the significant market power normally 
associated with monopolies. 135 Notwithstanding these points, intellectual property 
rights are often called monopoly rights and this traditional reference will continue 
herein. 
C. The incentive to create 
The underlying rationale for granting patents, copyright and related rights is that 
the promise of a monopoly creates an incentive to produce inventions and 
intellectual works. Similarly, the protection of trade marks 136 creates an incentive 
to create a "strong brand" and build a mark's reputation. 137 Therefore, if 
intellectual creations were not protected they could be used by everybody and so - 
like the 'public goods' lighthouse - nobody would invest in developing them in 
the first place. Therefore governmental involvement is required (by creating a 
property right) to prevent this free riding'. 
property because, as with the lighthouse, the state steps in to ensure the unrecoverable becomes 
recoverable. 
134 See Novos and Waldman (1984): 237, n. 1. 
135 See Dam (1994): 249-250; he explains how US courts have misunderstood patent law and used 
certain rules regarding the regulation of monopolies, which has produced some undesirable results. 136 The central reason for protecting trade marks is to reduce consumer search costs (see below). 
However, as a brands reputation increases the search costs are proportionally reduced. 
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Jeremy Bentham suggested that intellectual property "produces an infinite effect, 
and it costs nothing! '. 138 However, this conclusion and the underlying rationale 
for 
granting the property right were challenged from the outset. 
139 After one of the 
most detailed studies to date, Machlup concluded that: 
if we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on our 
present knowledge of the economic consequences, to recommend 
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long 
time, it would be irresponsible on the basis of ourpresent knowledge, 
to recommend abolishing it. 140 
Despite this agnostic conclusion the rhetoric behind the "incentive to create" has 
continued. There have been a plethora of different proposals of how this 
"incentive" actually works (or should work). Most of these proposals relate to the 
grant of patents, 14 1 but the principles are generally the sarne and do not affect the 
central rational. A person is granted a property right to enable them to recoup their 
137 The protection of reputation can be taken a step ftirther: see Parfums Christian Dior v Evora 
(1998) RPC 166 (Case C-337/95). 
138 Bentham (1829-30): vol 2 at 230. This comes Erom the fourth book, which was excluded Erom 
the English translation: it was kindly found by Professor Marci Guidi, Pisa University. 
139 See Machlup and Penrose (1950). 
140 Machlup (1958) (a copy of this study is included in Towse and Holzhauer (2002) Vol. 11). 
Lamberton, Mandeville and Bishop (1982) concluded, in an Australian report, that there were no 
arguments for introducing a patent system if you do not already have one and there were also no 
firm arguments for getting rid of a patent system if you do have one. Similarly, Breyer (1970) 
concluded that "taken as a whole, the evidence now available suggests that, although we should 
hesitate to abolish copyright protection, we should equally hesitate to extend or strengthen if' (at 
284). 
141 These include: the patent inducement theory, championed by Oddi (1995), which suggests 
patents should only be granted where the invention was induced by the patent system. The 
problem with this system is, of course, determining when a patent was so induced. The prospecting 
theory of Kitch (1977), argues that the patent system is similar to old prospecting laws and its 
purpose is to "strike a claimý'; this theory is somewhat unrealistic particularly when improvement 
inventions are considered. The "rent dissipation7' theory, suggested by Alexander and Grady 
(1992), means that a patent should only be granted where it provides signals of how the invention 
could be improved. Therefore it should not protect "elegant" inventions or those which cannot be 
improved ffirther. These are just three of the many specific theories that have been put forward. 
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outlay on research and development for an invention or the investment (in time or 
otherwise) in creating a work or brand (trade mark). 142 
This simplicity conceals a paradox, many ground-breaking inventions are difficult 
to commercialise and so leave the inventor without any reward. 143 Similarly, 
many of the most socially desirable books are not rewarded through the copyright 
system, but are written for other reasons. The archetypal example of this is the 
scholarly article, most academics are not directly remunerated for writing articles 
(although these authors are paid by their employers, universities). Indeed, some of 
these authors will go as far as paying to have their books published. They, like 
many other authors, work simply for recognition and not for money. 144 
The ideal economic outcome would be to devise the law so that it achieves the 
optimal balance between the incentives necessary to create the invention, work or 
mark (e. g. by breadth and term) and the costs imposed by intellectual property 
(access, enforcement and administrative). There has been an extensive discussion 
of what should be the optimum copyright term, particularly following e passing 
of the US Copyright Term Extension Act (the "Sonny Bono" Act). 145 The 
142 Therefore governmental involvement is required (by creating a property right) to "prevent ... free riding [which] will eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a trademark ... [and] therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable trademark in the first place": Landes 
and Posner (1987): 270. 
143 For example, Sir Frank Whittle invented the jet engine (although this claim could also be made 
by Dr Hans Von Ohaiw), which he patented in 1930. The first jet plane was not built in the UK 
until 15"' May 1941, by which time the patent had lapsed. Thus, one of the greatest inventions of 
the twentieth century went unrewarded by the patent system (although Whittle received L100,000 
from the British Goveýnment). 
144 This is not new, in 1522 Erasmus went to Basle to see Frobenius, who was printing Erasmus's 
work without his permission, not to complain but to assist the printer in his good work. Erasmus 
acknowledged that the wider the circulation the more universal the recognition. 145 See Eldred v Ashcroft (2003) 537 US 186. 
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prevailing economic view is that the copyright term should be as short as 
necessary to induce production, 
146 but no longer. 
147 
D. Costs imposed by intellectual property 
If the general assumption about intellectual property is correct, namely that its 
existence creates an incentive to produce, then permitting unrestricted copying 
will lead to less intellectual property being produced. Many right owners 
improperly extend this assumption by arguing that all copying reduces their 
revenues and therefore their incentives. However, this is only true where the 
demand-enhancing effects outweigh the demand-switching effect. 148 Inat this 
actually means is that there is no adverse effect on the intellectual property owner 
(or society) where the only people who buy (or make) copies are those who would 
not buy the original at its market price. Indeed, the unrestricted copying of works 
will increase the social utility to each person per work, but this will be offset by a 
reduction in the number of works available (less product variety). 149 
However, even if there was unrestricted copying, there is still value in an original. 
An original artist work, for example Leonardo's Last Supper, is of a totally 
different nature to a poster of the same work or even a copy made by another 
artist. Similarly, a printout of Hamlet, taken from the Internet, will have 
substantially lower value than a bound printed copy of the play. This is because 
146 Breyer (1970), argued against extending the term from 56 years to life plus 50 years (this 
change was made by the US Copyright Act 1976), similarly Landes and Posner (1989): 361-3, 
initially argued that the new term was unnecessarily long. 
147 However, there is now an alternative view arguing that indefinitely renewable copyright would 
be better than having a definite term, because copyright (like other property) needs maintenance to 
avoid over-exposure and to keep the product desirable: Landes and Posner (2003a). 148 Johnson (1985): 165. 
149 kid. 
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such a printout is not as desirable as the original printed book, similarly being the 
46official" version of a book'50 adds value to it. Similarly, this applies between 
counterfeit clothing and the genuine article. Intuitively it is possible to conclude 
that the greater the difference between the original and the copy, either through 
quality or allure, the greater the price differential that will be accepted by the 
consumer, in turn the smaller the need for intellectual property protection! 
51 
(i) Access costs 
Access costs fall on a consumer who places a higher value on the work than the 
cost of making additional copies, but less than the price being charged; in 
addition, these costs also fall on an author who wants to use another's work, but is 
unwilling to pay the licence fee to do so. 152 Thus, intellectual property protection, 
in itself, increases the cost of intellectual property; however, this cost is 
minimised where independent creation is permitted. 153 This removes the need for 
a creator to search all the previously created works to determine whether their 
work (or proposed work) is substantially similar to any existing (protected) works. 
Such a search would place a further cost on the creator, which in turn would 
increase the cost of producing the work and raise its sale price! 54 
(H) Administrative costs 
Administrative costs represent the time cost and fiscal cost of organising a 
licence. It is nonnally argued that an exception to intellectual property rights (or 
150 For example after the copyright expired in The Lord of the Rings J. R. R Tolkien endorsed one 
book as the only version from which he received remuneration. This in turn increased the value of 
the book and allowed it to be sold above marginal cost. 
15 1 Landes and Posner (1989): 329 (copyright). 
152 Landes (2000): 6-7. 
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more strictly an act of copying) is economically efficient when the cost to the user 
of the work (excluding the licence fee itself) would be greater than any licence fee 
payable. Thus, it is suggested that the permitted acts are allowed because the 
transaction costs of negotiating a licence would be so high that there would be 
market failure. 155 
Cost of speculation 
An additional cost which must be factored in, or at least so producers would 
argue, is the cost of the book failing (or a potential invention proving 
unsuccessful). In other words the revenue received from successful books allows 
other books to enter the market. However, as Faffer asked should "the public and 
the successful author ... have to pay handsomely for the publisher's unsuccessful 
speculations"? 156 Notwithstanding, there is no doubt that the cost incurred by the 
original producer is high; therefore there is a need to limit (or stop) others illicitly 
copying the work which would reduce the market price to cost. 
(N) Costs caused by underproduction 
Novos and Waldman 157 suggest that an increase in intellectual property protection 
(they discuss it terms of copyright) may increase the social loss due to 
underproduction (i. e. less intellectual creations will be produced). This is because 
153 An independently created work cannot infringe copyright; similarly a secret prior user of an 
invention is permitted to continue using that invention after it is patented by another. 
154 This cost, of course, exists in relation to registered rights (novelty searches). 
155 This argument is often attributed to Gordon (1982); although since then she has partially 
retracted it see Gordon (2002). 
156 T. Farrer's evidence to the Royal Commission on Copyright, March 16d' 1877. It is of course 
the publisher who takes the risk not the author, yet most legal systems purport to protect authors 
not publishers, so why should the system by geared towards protecting publishers profits when it is 
justified in terms of the author (although where would an author be without their publisher? ). 
Indeed authors are constantly trying to obtain a greater risk (thus a greater reward when it pays 
oft): see Cornish (2002). 
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an increase in protection not only pushes consumers towards purchasing from the 
monopolist, 158 but also towards secondary markets. Every person who enters the 
secondary market deducts a sale from the monopolist creator, thereby reducing 
their incentive to create and causing a societal loss caused by underproduction. 
(y) Costs caused by under-utilisation 
Further, Novos and Waldman 159 suggest that an increase in intellectual property 
protection could (not would) lead to an increased social welfare loss caused by 
under-utilisation (i. e. people will not pay the high price demanded by the 
monopolist); however they suggest that in some circumstances it might not. They 
point out that there is a social welfare loss caused by evading barriers, such as 
intellectual property rights, and only when the sum of the cost of evading a barrier 
and the marginal cost of production is lower than the price charged by the 
monopolist, will there be under-utilisation. In the digital age this analysis still 
holds true, however it is likely that as the cost of copying reduces (even now it is 
still not zero 160) it may have to be reflected in the monopolist's prices. 
E. Search costs 
A central function of a trade mark is to guarantee the origin of the goods. 161 The 
reason for this is straightforward, it enables a consumer to know who 
157 Novos and Waldman (1984): 237. 
158 The prevailing view at the time their article was written was that an increase in the copyright 
protection will lead to more people being forced to purchase from the monopoly producer, which 
in turn will lead to an increase in quality of the goods, the greater the increase in copyright 
protection the better the quality of goods. 
159 Novos and Waldman (1984). 
160 It is now necessary to evade "technical measures", but also there is the cost associated with the 
time spent copying. - 161 Arsenal v Reed (2003) ETMR 227 (Case C-206/0 1). 
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manufactured, distributed or sold them their goods. However, as Schechter points 
out, a trade mark: 
indicates, not that the article in question comes from a definite or 
particular source... which [is] specifically known to the consumer, 
but merely that the goods in connection with which it is used 
emanate from the same ... source ... as certain other goods 
that have 
already given the consumer satisfaction. 162 
Therefore, trade marks provide information to the consumer, not necessarily direct 
information about the origin but information about the continuity of the goods. 
This information reduces the cost of discovering the quality of the goods: in 
economic terms this product information cost is called the "search', CoSt. 
163 This 
represents the cost (in time) that a person has to spend approaching different 
sellers to discover and compare price and quality differentials. 
' 64 Or put another 
way, if a consumer can rely on the information provided by a trade mark they 
need not investigate all the other products in the market every time they make a 
purchase: lowering the cost of the purchasing decision. 165 
In economic terms a trade mark lowers the gap between the market price received 
by the seller and the full price paid by the buyer. 166 This gap represents the cost to 
162 Schechter (1926): 816. 
163 This term was coined by Stigler (1961). 
164 See Ibid: 216; Stigler also points out that cost will not be the same for everyone, search costs 
are dependent on the income of the searcher. 
165 See Mins (1984): 658. 
166 In that the full price of the goods to the consumer includes the time spent searching and the 
transportation cost: see Folsom and Teply (1980). Indeed without these costs, the price paid by a 
consumer will eventually be the same as the cost of production (that costs would include a 
reasonable return on the capital invested). 
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the consumer of obtaining the information about the characteristics of the various 
goods and the cost of adjusting to disappointing or imperfect purchases. 
167 In 
contrast, in the absence of knowledge about the product (either by advertising or a 
trade mark) the cost of consuming it increases. Thus, false advertising or marking 
I 
tend to increase, rather than reduce, the full price of the product. 168 
F. Costs of civil procedure 
(i) Stages of civil dispute 
According to Cooter and Rubinfeld169 a legal dispute has four steps. Firstly, there 
is an intention to undertake an event, such as an act of infiingement, where one 
person (the infringer) is potentially going to causes harm to another (the 
proprietor). Economic efficiency demands the cost of the harm to be balanced 
against the cost of avoiding it. At thiý early stage, before the event has occurred, 
the parties can bargain to strike their own balance (i. e. depending on the market). 
The second stage, after the alleged infringement has occurred, involves the injured 
party (the proprietor) deciding whether or not they wish to assert a legal claim 
and, if so, where to commence proceedings. Following normal economic 
principles, a person will only start litigation where the immediate costs (filing and 
legal fees) are lower than the expected benefits in the future (the value of any 
damages or settlement). 
167 In terms of the economics of advertising (from which a considerable proportion of econon-Lic 
trade mark literature stems), this idea stems from Ehrlich and Fisher (1982): 366. 
168 Ibid: 367. 
169 Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989): 1069-1071. 
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Once a claim has been asserted the third stage begins which lasts until the trial 
commences. It is during this period that the system encourages the parties to reach 
settlement, the likelihood of a settlement depends on the parties perceived chances 
of success. This stage can be viewed as a bargaining game where the co-operative 
solution is to settle, whereas the un-co-operative solution is to proceed to trial. 170 
The fourth and final stage is the trial, by which time all action is un-co-operative 
(unless a mid-trial settlement is considered). 
Private international law has an impact at every stage. During (or at least 
immediately prior) to the first stage the potential infringer will consider the rules 
of private intemational law to decide whether to proceed with the activity or 
attempt to negotiate with the owner. At the second stage, the proprietor will 
consider in which forum it is most efficient to conduct litigation. During the third 
stage, there is potential for negotiations on procedural elements to allow 
proceedings to continue in a particular forum. The parties will also address choice 
of law issues in order to maximise their gain or minimise their loss. Finally, once 
trial begins the costs of undertaking further civil litigation (e. g. restarting in 
another jurisdiction) will have to be considered. Once proceedings have started 
the economic object is to reduce the sum of two costs: the first cost is that 
associated with judicial error and the second cost is that associated with running 
the procedural system. 17 1 There are also additional costs, introduced in Chapter 1, 
caused by forum shopping and the multiplicity of claims. 
170 See ibid, where this is discussed in more detail. 171 Posner (2003): 563. 
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(H) Cost ofjudicial error 
The cost associated with judicial error is essentially the social cost of an incorrect 
legal decision. Thus, if the cost associated with infringing an intellectual property 
right amounted to ElOO and the cost to the potential infringer to avoid infringing 
activity were E80, then no infringement would take place as it would be 
unprofitable. However, if there is a 25% chance of judicial error then the cost of 
infringing activity is reduced by 25% to E75 and so it becomes profitable to 
infringe. 172 
(W) Procedural costs 
The costs imposed by procedure are best examined by looking at a new procedure. 
A new procedure should only be introduced where the reduction in the cost of 
judicial error is greater than the cost to implement the reform. For example, 
should the cost of judicial error be E25 and a particular procedure reduces that 
cost to LIO, but that procedure costs E20 to implement, then it should not be 
introduced as it would be inefficient and impose a social cost of E 10. 
As Posner points out, this approach has actually been used in relation to the 
"amount" of due process to which a person is entitled in administrative 
proceedings. The US Supreme Court, in Matthews v Eldridge, 173 set three factors: 
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and 
172 This example is loosely based on that presented by Posner. 173 (1976) 424 US 319. 
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(3) the Government interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 174 
In other words, a relevant factor is the cost of adding an additional procedural 
requirement compared to the benefit it would bring. Thus, the costs can be 
minimised and wealth maximised, where the appropriate theory governs private 
international law. 175 One of the best examples in the field of private international 
law is the doctrine offorum non conveniens, where there is an explicit balancing 
test between the costs and benefits of alternative forums for litigation. 176 
(N) Certainty and deterrence 
One of the problems, particularly acute in relation to the modem "state-interest" 
based approaches, has been set out as follows: 
The criticism of the modern trend away from mechanical choice-of- 
law rules is that they make it dijficult for people contemplating 
activity in another state to know what laws they have to comply with, 
and their ignorance reduces the deterrent effect of all states laws. 177 
174 Aid at 334-5. 175 Solimine (1990): 59. 
176 Posner (1985a): 305-6; also see the opinion of Justice Jackson in Gulf Oil v Gilbert (1947) 330 
US 501 at 508, where he suggested the interests of the party required "all other practical problems 
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive". In the UK see Rockware Glass v 
MacShannon (1978) AC 795 at 819 where Lord Salmon made it clear that "expense" was a 
relevant consideration. 177 Posner (1985a): 305-6. 
An Economic Approach 137 
However, it is also possible that the deterrent effect will increase rather than 
decrease with uncertainty, 178 although the cost will still grow. This argument 
revolves around the belief that because a person is generally risk adverse, if their 
conduct might be governed by four different laws, each of differing standards, 
they are likely to ensure that their conduct falls within the most restrictive of these 
laws. The deterrent effect of laws has been suggested to be an outdated concept 179 
and in many contexts it is grossly misunderstood, ' 80 notwithstanding it is an 
essential economic consideration that plays at least a part in the blend of 
incentives (and disincentives) that govern economic conduct. 
(y) Forum shopping 
From an economic viewpoint, forum shopping enables a claimant to maximise 
their returns by making an appropriate selection. The nature of this advantage is 
relevant to both the claimant and defendant as it may promote a race to the court. 
The claimant will attempt to file first to get the forum they desires (and so 
maximise their advantage), whereas the defendant will try to file first (for 
declaratory judgments and so forth) to pre-empt the claimant. However, an ex ante 
decision on the appropriate forum will promote an efficient choice, as parties can 
select in advance what court has jurisdiction, thereby promoting a wealth. 
maximising solution; 181 similarly ex ante predictability of the applicable law is 
"the primary goal of the conflict of laws SysteM". 182 Therefore, forum shopping 
decreases ex ante predictability and with it the efficiency of the choice of forum 
and choice of law. 
178 Thi - 
17 
s is suggested by Solimine (1990): 64. 
89 
Fawcett (1982): 154. 
10 See page 123 n. 128 above. is' Moore and Parisi (2002): 1329. 
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A potential user of a work or invention knows that the right holder will try to 
commence litigation in the forum most favourable to them; thus the user will 
systematically make decisions that are the most favourable to the right holder. 
183 
'Merefore, the careful balance, purportedly at the centre of the intellectual 
property law, is disturbed. The first two steps of an intellectual property dispute 
are the decision to use the intellectual property and the decision of which forum to 
select. The first decision can be taken either bi-laterally (where two parties agree 
licence terms) or unilaterally, where a person continues a course of conduct 
believing that in doing so they are not infringing any intellectual property rights 
(or where they think the risle of being sued for infringement is worth taking). The 
second decision can, especially when the action was unilateral, affect the first. 
Using this paradigm, it has been suggested that the ideal case would be where 
there is a voluntary transaction in which neither party can affect forum choice, 
184 
with deviations from that ideal leading to a variety of problems including moral 
hazards 185 (referring to the ex post opportunism of a party, where they controls the 
selection of the forum, causing them to have a less than optimal incentive to 
behave efficiently in their relationship with the other party 186) or an adverse forum 
selection (caused by informational asymmetry and ex ante strategic behaviour of 
182 ibid. 
183 Ibid: 1337. This follows the general belief in law and economics that rules that apply ex post, 
but have effect "retrospectively", will impact on ex ante strategic decisions. 
184 Ibid: 1341; however Moore and Parisi believe that basing jurisdiction on the defendant's 
habitual residence is, inefficient because of virtual "costless relocation7: this suggestion is 
examined in more detail in Chapter 6. 185 Moral hazards arise where an agreement benefits a person when certain conditions occur and 
that person will change their conduct to satisfy those conditions, even where this would be 
inefficient: for a general discussion see Holmstr6m (1979). 186 Moore and Parisi (2002): 1340, n. 45. 
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the infonned party 187) . Therefore, any solution to the 
detennination of disputes on 
the Intemet must attempt to be as close as possible to the ideal case. 
(vi) Procedural costs and the proof offoreign law 
The proof of foreign law has positive costs, the most obvious of which is the 
lengthening of the judicial process. However, this cost can be minimised by 
certain procedural steps; for example, in the United States the rule allowing 
judicial notice (with enquiry) to apply to foreign laws; 188 or the presumption in 
English law that unproven foreign law is the same as English law. 
189 This 
presumption means that where a defendant wishes to disprove infringement of 
foreign intellectual property rights they have to incur the cost of proving each 
foreign law. However, this expense can be used as a tactic to force the defendant 
to settle the case early, even when they may have been able to defend the 
action. 190 Aside from the procedural cost of "proof' there is also the increase in 
costs caused by judicial error, 191 for it is self-evident that a judge applying a law 
with which he or she is unfamiliar with is more likely to do so incorrectly. 
192 
The cost of proving foreign law is exacerbated where the dispute involves 
activities in a number of different states. In other words where intellectual 
property infringement claims, which each relate to a different country, are 
consolidated. If, and when, a dispute requires a court to apply a multitude of 
different laws it creates potential costs caused by pleading foreign law, or face the 
187 Ibid: 1339, n. 44. 
188 Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act and the Uniform Interstate and International 
Procedure Act. The federal courts have adopted the later Act as FRCP r. 44.1. 189 See page 360 at n. 233 below. 
190 See Dutson (1998). 
19' See Whincop and Keyes (2001): 150. 
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alternative of starting proceedings in each court. The costs of pleading a foreign 
law are twofold: the cost of instructing and hearing the evidence of foreign 
experts and the cost ofjudicial error in applying foreign law. 
G. Costs of consolidation 
From a purely practical point of view, if a case heard by a single court involves 
infringement in twenty different countries (assuming this in turn involves the 
application of twenty different laws) then twenty (or even forty'93 ) different 
experts would have to be instructed and they, in turn, would have to have their 
evidence (or opinion) considered. These longer and more complex proceedings 
would push up costs significantly. Indeed, where the claims are consolidated in 
this way it is still necessary to divide up the world so it can be decided which part 
of the activity occurred under which law. 
Once all this myriad of evidence had been heard and digested, the judge would 
have to make his or her decision about whether there was a case of infringement 
in each of the different jurisdictions. As alreadY identified, 194 the cost associated 
with litigation increases as the chances of judicial error increase. Furthermore, the 
greater the number of differing laws being applied in a dispute, the greater the 
chance of internal errors (i. e. getting things mixed up) both by the parties and by 
the judge. The result of such complex and lengthy procedure is more mistakes and 
more appeals; indeed just the appearance of a mistake will increase costs - as this 
192 See Juenger (1985): 259 (applying foreign law "increases the margin of error in adjudication"). 193 Where both sides are permitted to instruct their own expert. 194 See page 134 above. 
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would be enough to trigger an appeal. The net result of all of this is that the cost 
of the litigation would rocket. 
It is therefore suggested that without moving towards selecting a single applicable 
law, the potential cost savings achieved by consolidation would be eaten up by 
error riddled and complex litigation. 
If, however, a single applicable law were selected, the costs would be 
substantially minimised. The selected law may not be the law of the forum, but at 
worst it would result in requiring only one or two foreign experts and the judge 
applying only one foreign law. Furthermore, the evidence supporting the 
infringement could be examined on an international basis forgoing the necessity 
of dividing the claim up into the respective jurisdictions. 
There are grave risks associated with selecting a single applicable law. Firstly, the 
problems of selecting that law; secondly, once that law is selected, the 
undermining of the different societal nuisances which are considered, by some, to 
be central to intellectual property; and finally, the differing scope of the particular 
intellectual property right; for example, Sir Hugh Laddie has pointed out that 
patent claims are not only linguistically different, but often patent applicants will 
make different claims in different countries. 195 
The problems directly associated with this are similar to those associated with 
forum shopping but significantly magnified. If the single applicable law were 
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selected ex ante (by agreement) then the parties could take this into account in 
their bargain and the user could ensure that they stayed within the confines of that 
law (or the licence) thereby avoiding the problems of over-complying. However, 
if the selection of the single applicable law was ex post (without notice) it will 
intensify any race to the court (as the odds are greater); it will magnify any 
inefficiencies caused by over compliance and would be grossly unfair on the 
defendant (whether the proprietor or infringer). This being the case, consolidation 
would only encourage efficient use of intellectual property where the user was 
aware of the law by which they are bound before they commenced use. 
Another concern, which relates only to registered rights, is would a State be 
willing to allow a foreign court to declare its registered right invalid? 
A final concern is that each society (or State) has devised its intellectual property 
laws takin .g into account its cultural, social and intellectual needs, technology 
capacity and so forth'96 and unifying law (either directly or indirectly) "over- 
ride[s] historical, geographical condition, as well as religious, ethical, economic 
and social requirements" of each social group. 197 To ensure that these special 
needs are taken into account, courts use certain mechanisms such as mandatory 
rules and refusing to apply certain laws that are contrary to public policy. If a 
court were asked to apply its own law, as the single applicable law, then there 
would be no problems because any mandatory domestic rules would apply to the 
dispute in any event. Likewise, it would be highly controversial (and in many 
195 Laddie (2001). Thus, the breadth of the claim may be different in different jurisdictions, as 
may the prior art. This is because the some jurisdictions (e. g. the US) priority is assessed on the 
basis of first to invent, rather than the later date of filing. 196 Dreyfuss (2001): 44 1. 
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instances improper) for a court to refuse to apply the lexfori because of a foreign 
State's public policy. 
198 
However, if a court were asked to apply a single applicable foreign law it may 
present problems. If the lexfori has a mandatory rule, should it trump the single 
applicable rule? If so, should it apply only in relation to the local infiingement? 
Or should it trump the single applicable law in respect of the infringement 
worldwide? Similarly, if an aspect of the single applicable law offends the public 
policy of the forum State should it be disapplied globally or just locally9 
Logically speaking, where a law offends the public policy of a forum it should 
offend it if it is applied to domestic elements of the dispute as well as to foreign 
elements. However, if these elements of public policy became too pervasive and 
are applied too freely it would fundamentally undermine every aspect of 
consolidation; unless the single applicable law was that of the lexfori which, in 
itself, might be equally unacceptable. 
V. Private international law: an economic approach 
The economic analysis of conflict of laws is comparatively new. Solimine 199 
recently pointed out, that although there has been considerable literature on the 
choice of law, for many years very little was contributed by law and economics 
scholars. Similarly, Posner has noted that economics has only ever been applied 
197 Valladio (1961): 99. 
198 However, Article 7(l) of the Rome Convention allows signatories the option of considering 
foreign mandatory rules: see Juenger (1995): 450-1. Furthermore, some courts have shown a 
willingness to consider matters of foreign public policy when determining the applicable law: see for example Romero v International Teminal Operating Co (1959) 358 US 354. 
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sporadically to conflict of laws. 
200 Both cite the work of William Baxter '201 WitI, 
his "comparative impairment principle", as one of the few exceptions. 202 Before 
considering this approach and others, the economics of jurisdiction will be 
examined. 
A. Jurisdiction 
(1) Over and under-regulation - territorial application of laws 
It has been argued that a strict territorial application of laws leads to under- 
203 
regulation whereas extreme extra-territoriality leads to over-regulation. This is 
because a State aims to maximise the wealth of its residents; therefore it will 
regulate where there is a positive wealth benefit, whereas it will refrain from 
regulation where it would produce a negative wealth effect. 
Following normal efficiency logic, a transaction which creates a global positive 
wealth benefit should be encouraged. However, assuming every country can apply 
its laws extra-territorially, if there is at least one country in which there would be 
a net wealth loss from the transaction then that country will regulate to stop the 
transaction. This means a transaction which would increase global wealth would 
be prevented by extra-territorial regulation where any one country suffers a net 
wealth loss. 
204 
199 Solimine (2002). 
200 See his foreword to Whincop and Keyes (2001). 201 Baxter (1963). 
202 Solimine (2002): 209; Whincop and Keyes (2001): xiv (Posner). 203 See Guzman (2002). 
204 Ibid: 906-7. Although, a re-distribution of wealth could overcome any wealth loss effects it may 
attract prohibitive transaction costs: Ibid: 908. 
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In contrast, where a state does not apply its laws extra-territoriality it will 
sometimes permit an activity that creates a local welfare loss because exposing 
local firms or consumers to the regulation may create a greater welfare loss. 205 
This is because in the long run the knock on effect of regulation may allow 
foreign (less regulated) firms to undercut local firms and so undermine their 
market position. Where a state cannot apply its regulations abroad it avoids 
applying them locally thus ensilfing the long term competitiveness of the local 
economy. 
It is self-evident that the rules of jurisdiction will affect both the total cost of 
litigation and its distribution; I firstly because legal costs vary between forums and 
secondly because of the different rules on cost allocation at the conclusion of 
litigation (i. e. whether a jurisdiction allows costs to follow the event or not). 
Simple economics would suggest that the litigation should be held in the forum 
that minimises the total litigation cost; 'however, this may leave the claimant with 
a substantial number of forums from which to choose. Therefore, not only will 
this create search costs associated with choosing the forum, but also in addition it 
may be difficult to ascertain which forum actually minimises costs. 
60 Exercise ofjurisdiction 
Jurisdictional rules go hand in hand with forum shopping. When a party chooses 
one jurisdiction over another, they will make the selection on the basis of which 
I 
jurisdiction they think will be most advantageous to them. Thus, if the same law 
would be applicable to the dispute wherever it is litigated, it is self evident that a 
205 Ibid: 9 10-11. 
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claimant will bring proceedings in the forum where their overall costs will be 
minimised, 206 whereas the most efficient forum is the one where the overall costs 
to both parties are minimised. 
However where different laws are applied by different courts, a claimant will 
forum shop to pick a court on the basis of which law it would apply, in particular 
whether it will apply its own law. 207 However, this must be weighed against the 
cost of litigation in each forum. 208 Thus, there will be an inefficient result (an 
increased social cost) if a claimant chooses a forum where they face higher costs 
(but potentially higher damages), unless the defendant's costs are reduced. To 
reduce the social cost incurred by a claimant choosing an inefficient forum, rules - 
are adopted to limit the exercise of jurisdiction or alternatively to empower a court 
to stay proceedings when the forum is inappropriate (i. e. inefficient). 209 
Applying game theory (with perfect information) to jurisdictional choice2 10 
suggests that the claimant will select an efficient forum. This is because the 
claimant knows that if they select an inefficient forum the defendant's best 
strategy (to avoid paying excessive costs) is to obtain a stay-, thereby requiring the 
claimant to pay the costs that accrued prior to the successful jurisdictional 
challenge, in addition to the costs of recommencing the litigation in the new 
forum. Being aware of this, the claimant will not commence litigation in the 
inefficient forum. However, where there is an information asymmetry, the 
206 Whincop and Keyes (2001): 132. 
207 Ibid, where it is suggested that the scale of the advantage in forum shopping comes from the 
willingness of the court to apply the lex fori. This ignores the fact that a court may be chosen because it applies the law of a third country, where other courts (or even that third country) would 
not apply that law. 208 ibid. 
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defendant may incorrectly believe that an efficient forum is inefficient and so ask 
for a stay. Therefore the claimant, knowing of the defendant's ignorance, may 
commence litigation in an inefficient forum, in the belief that the defendant will 
not know the choice was inefficient. 
(M) Jurisdictional trade 
Although this game theory analysis is based on an un-co-operative model, there is 
potential for co-operation in the form ofjurisdictional trade . 
21 1 This trade occurs 
when the parties to the dispute negotiate to reduce litigation costs, for example by 
including a jurisdiction clause in a contract. Obviously a party who agrees to a 
less advantageous forum will expect a lower contract price (or other benefit) in 
212 
retum. 
Although more difficult, it is also possible for parties to agree litigation costs after 
the event but before (or soon after) the litigation commences. This trade, could 
result in a defendant either agreeing not to contest jurisdiction (or actually 
consenting to jurisdiction) in exchange for non-financial incentives, for example 
not relying on certain types of damages claims 213 or voluntarily disclosing certain 
211 
material. 
209 Ibid: 133. 
210 Following the model set out by Whincop and Keyes (2001): 134. 21 1 This term was coined by VVhincop and Keyes (200 1). 212 IN& 136. 
213 This would be appropriate where the litigation forum allows punitive damages (e. g. most US 
States), but the more convenient forum does not (e. g. England). If the claimant agrees not to seek 
4 
punitive damages then the defendant may consent to jurisdiction. 4 In patent litigation, for example, the disclosure requirements in the United States are very 
liberal whereas in the United Kingdom they are more restrictive, therefore it may be that voluntary 
disclosure is offered in exchange for not contesting jurisdiction. 
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The decision to trade has to be made early to be efficient. As litigation proceeds, 
trade becomes more costly and the incentive to change forum wanes; the parties 
have to consider the costs they have sunk (this is coupled by the problems of the 
endowment effeCt)215 and weigh these against the advantage in changing forum. 
Further, as time goes by, settlement on the substantive issue becomes more likely 
and "jurisdictional settlement" becomes less important. 
If jurisdictional trade is possible and courts have the power to stay "inefficienf' 
proceedings (albeit mainly in common law jurisdictions), why are any primary 
jurisdictional rules needed at all? (i. e. limiting general jurisdiction to the forum of 
the defendant's habitual residence). Whincop and Keyes suggese 16 these 
restrictions are necessary to restrict jurisdictional trade. If every court in the world 
could exercise jurisdiction then certain very high cost jurisdictions (either in 
damages or litigation expenses) will be potentially available. So to avoid the risk 
of litigating in a high cost forum, ex ante jurisdictional trade will occur. However 
this trade will involve high transaction costs because both parties will be trying to 
obtain the lion's share of gains and so protract negotiations. 217 Rules of 
jurisdiction minimise these costs and so provide a wealth maximising rule 
(although individual cases may not maximise wealth). 
B. Applicable Law 
In economic terms the adoption of policy interest approaches (particularly 
Currie's approach) increases the likelihood and thereafter the durability of 
215 WhinCop and Keyes (2001): 130. 216 Ibid. 142-3. 
217 Ibid: 143. 
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inefficient laws 218 (i. e. those laws that do not maximise the wealth of residents). 
This inefficiency is caused by a legislator's desire to benefit his or her 
constituents at the expense of everyone else. As public policy theory makes clear, 
interest groups can organise cheaply to extract legislative benefits and only when 
a regulation becomes too costly will the taxpayers be willing to expend the 
relatively large resources necessary to overturn the law .2 
19 However, because this 
is a slow process it means inefficient laws remain in force for a long time. 
Notwithstanding these issues, most economic approaches are still based on state 
interests. 
(i) Comparative impairment 
Baxter began what could be called the "traditional economic approach", 220 Which 
is characterised by its aim of resolving the interests of states rather than parties. It 
is in some respects similar to the policy interests approach; 221 indeed Baxter's 
article was a direct response to Professor Currie's solution to the choice of law 
problem. 222 Baxter's main criticism of that solution was its approach to "true 
conflicts"; he suggested that it is wrong not to balance all the State interests . 
involved (including the forum's). 
Baxter's theory of comparative impairment begins with the principle: 
218 Allen and O'Hara (1999): 1024. 
2 19 There is extensive literature in this field: see for example Becker (1983). 220 This approach has been followed by the Californian courts: e. g. Bernhard v Harrah's Club (1976) 546 P 2d 719. 
221 See page 61 et seq above. 222 See page 64 above. 
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that the private interests in choice of law are necessarily in balance, 
and that the cases can be decided by them as instances of conflicting 
state interests rather than ofconflicting private interests. 223 
His analysis is almost Rawlsian. 224 He suggests that we should imagine that all the 
states get together at a conference to resolve inconsistent laws. At this conference, 
the parties would negotiate and "bargaW' with each other so that their domestic 
laws would apply in some cases but in exchange they agree that foreign law 
would apply in other cases. 225 Because this uses the basic economic premise of 
exchange, it is likely to lead to the maximisation. of the states' wealth (or utility). 
Indeed, he suggests that all states favour one group over another - drivers over 
pedestrians, producers over consumers and so forth - Baxter argues that a conflict 
only occurs where these preferences are divergent. 
From this basic position he postulates that a state has two types of objectives: 
internal and external. Internal objectives relate to the resolution of conflicting 
private interests, whereas external objectives are those which also relate to the 
interests of non-residents; with the objective of the choice of law being to solve 
the problem for state residents in the same way as it would have done if it had 
only involved matters located within its borders. 22ý This approach, overriding 
Currie's objections, allows the subordination of the forum's interests; however, 
the proýlem for Baxter was finding a normative principle for determining when 
223 Baxter (1963): 22. 
224 See Rawls (1999). 
225 Baxter (1963): 7-8. 
226 Ibid. . 17. 
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the external objectives of one state should be subordinated to the internal 
objectives of another. He concluded: 
The principle is to subordination, in the particular case, the external 
objective of the state whose internal objective will be least impaired 
in general scope and impact by subordination in cases like the one at 
227 hand. 
He argues, therefore, that a court should weigh the relative regulatory impainnent 
of the two states' policies, without making super-value judgments (decisions 
about whether a particular policy is right or wrong). This means that the policy 
itself is not evaluated, but only the effect the decision would have on the efficacy 
of that policy. 
There are a number of problems with this approach. Baxter himself acknowledged 
one of them, namely that the comparative impairment principle seemed to be 
"vulnerable to attack ... on the ground of uncertainty ... that it is so vacuous in 
content and uncertain in application as to be inappropriate for adjudicative 
9228 administration'. This is compounded by the fact that "in practice, judges have 
neither the data nor the intuitive undertaking of the complexities of any legal 
problem to make comparative impairment determinations"; 229 furthermore, in 
most cases it will be difficult to find "an easy empirically demonstrable 
solution". 230 Where the conflict between two laws (i. e. a particular type of 
227 Ibid. 18. 
228 Ibid: 20. 
229 Allen and O'Hara (1999): 1030-1. 230 ibid. 
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dispute) is infrequent both states are only likely to suffer de minimis impainnent 
to the effectiveness of their respective policies; but where such a conflict is 
frequent then it is likely that it will cause substantial impairment to the efficacy of 
both states' policies. 
231 
Posner criticises Baxter's approach on the basis that the "impairmenf' depends on 
only one of the two states having a regulatory advantage. 232 However, most states' 
interests are balanced; for example the desire of one country to prohibit the 
infringement of a patent is balanced against another country's desire (where there 
is no patent) to enable free enterprise and the development of technology. Posner 
makes a similar poin ? 33 using a statute of limitations: if the purpose of this statute 
is to exclude stale evidence, he suggests the law of the court hearing the case 
should apply (as they would be more experienced at dealing with older evidence), 
but if the statute's purpose is to provide certainty then the law of the defendant's 
state should apply as this would be the only way of giving potential defendants 
certainty and so giving effect to the statute. 
(U) Comparative regulatory advantage 
The problems identified by Posner led him to suggest that the doctrine of 
comparative regulatory advantage should govern choice of law. 234 Posner's 
theory, like Baxter's, is based on the argument that at the lowest level a state 
"wins" if its resident wins a dispute and a state "loses" where its resident loses the 
case: these cancel each other out. Using an axiomatic examole, he suggests that 
231 ]bid: 1031-3. 
232 Posner (1985a): 305. 
233 Posner (2003): 603. 
234 lbid: 602-3. 
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State A has a desire to enable its residents to travel, transact and do business 
within State B, likewise State B has a desire to ensure the proper regulation of 
travel (safe roads etc), transactions and business within its territory. Therefore the 
applicable law should be the state with the comparative regulatory advantage, or 
put another way the state with the laws that best "fif 'the particular circumstances 
of the dispute. 235 Essentially, he argues that the lawmaker who is best able to 
obtain the necessary infonnation about a particular rule should be able to have 
that rule applied. 
236 
Although it has been suggested otherwise, 237 it is clear that Posner is also applying 
"interest analysis" of another type. 238 Therefore his own criticisms of Baxter's 
approach equally apply to his own tests. Furthermore, his theory minimises the 
parties ability to undertake ex ante planning, as they will only know which law is 
applicable after a complex assessment of the factors, which they will probably be 
unable to know after the event, let alone beforehand. His approach also requires 
most cases to be determined individually and so only after two rules have been 
weighed up against each other will precedent become of assistance. 239 
Furthennore, the chances of judicial error inevitably increase with "recourse to 
alien rules, let alone alien policies", 240 and so the cost caused by judicial effor and 
the additional litigation costs associated with implementing comparative 
regulatory advantage would be far greater than following any traditional rules. 
235 Ibid: 603. 
236 See the interpretation of O'Hara and Ribstein (2000): 1179. 237 Ibid: 1190; Whincop and Keyes (2001), in their Chapter 6, suggest that comparative regulatory 
advantage bases choice of law on the ability to regulate rather than extending regulatory influence. 238 Solimine (1990): 65. 
239 O'Hara and Ribsten (2000): 1179. 
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Mandatory rules 
The application of mandatory rules or lois de police has already been discussed. 241 
These rules enable a court to "trump" rules that would otherwise be imposed by 
the applicable law or even to overturn a choice of law clause in a particular 
contract. Such rules tend to exist in better-developed legal systems with more 
clearly defined legal norms. 242 
It would, of course, be contrary to normal economic principles to overturn a 
contractual term, because contractual agreements are generally wealth 
maximising. However, there are only two situations when legal economics would 
permit it: where weak parties frequently agree to contractual terms which are 
adverse to their interests; and where legislators are better judges of the contracting 
parties' preferences than the parties themselves. 243 
Mandatory rules, which by their very nature cannot be avoided by contract, can 
still be circumvented in other ways. For example, the parties could agree to have 
the case adjudicated within a jurisdiction that does not apply the mandatory rule 244 
or they could take non-legal measures to avoid the effect. Such an agreement 
would only be effective if the contract is either ongoing or repeats, as the 
245 incentive to "cheat" is too high. 
240 Juenger(1985): 259. 
241 See page 59 above. 242 Drahozal (2005): 534. 
243 Whincop and Keyes (2001): 53. 
244 This demonstrates the trade off between subjecting oneself to mandatory rules and choosing a 
developed system of laws: Drahozal (2005): 534. 
245 Whincop and Keyes (2001): 54. 
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(iv) Game theory and state interests 
It has been argued by Kramer 246 that choice of law can be analysed using a 
('Prisoners' dilemma7' game. 247 Firstly, Kramer's theory is based around a belief 
that the state "wins" if its policy is advanced by having its law applied and "loses" 
if it is not applied. He suggests that a state would want its law applied where it 
matters most, in cases of true conflict, 248 and that State A does not beneflt from 
applying State B's laws if State B does not apply State A's law in return. 249 He 
continues by arguing that State B would be better off if. - (a) it applied its own laws 
whenever there is a true conflict; (b) State A is willing to apply either its own law 
or that of State B; since State B would have its laws applied in all cases heard in 
State B as well as some heard in State A. State A knows this to be the case and 
therefore would not apply foreign law at all in its courts. 
However, if both State A and B act co-operatively then foreign law would be 
ap lied in the cases that are most important to the respective States. Thus, a state rp 
is better off acting co-operatively over repeated games, even though it would be 
worse off in a single game. Therefore, game theory suggests that over repeated 
plays (in an infinite game) the players will find the co-operative solution if this 
provides the best payoff. 
250 Thus, because there is a co-operative solution which 
will leave states better off, they will follow it. 251 
246 Kramer (1990): 344. 
247 For a description of game theory see page 114 above. 248 Kramer (1990): 344. 
249 ibid. 
250 ibid. 
251 See Keohane (1986). 
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It is clear that predictability should be the primary goal of private intemational 
law. 252 State interests, either as part of traditional theory or as developed in 
comparative impairment or comparative regulatory advantage, are uncertain and 
therefore fail to meet this goal. Therefore, it should not be considered a 
satisfactory nonn. 
C. Private choice of law 
There has been a recent trend in the economic approach to move away from state 
interests and return to the interests of the parties. This began with Erin O'Hara 
and Larry Ribstein's article From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of LaWý53 
published in 2000 and continued with Michael Whincop and Mary Keyes who, 
with the publication of Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict ofLaws, 254 set out 
the most comprehensive and unified theory based on the parties private choice of 
law. 
(i) The limitations of the state interests approach 
Whincop and Keyes identified four limitations and problems with using State 
interests to detennine choice of law. 255 Firstly, they suggest that the unilateralist 
nature of "state interests" creates a pressure on jurisdictional rules by giving the 
party initiating the litigation a substantial advantage. This leads to excessive 
litigation as parties have an incentive to be the "first mover". However, the forum 
to which they move may not be wealth maximising (as the gains to the claimant 
may be smaller than the losses to defendant). 
252 Allen and O'Hara (1999): 104 1. 
253 O'Hara and Ribsten (2000). 
254 Whincop and Keyes (2001). 
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Secondly, the extension of state policies over territorial limits may lead to 
economically strong interest groups obtaining further advantages through the 
political process. This is based on the general principle that legislation generally 
has the effect of transferring wealth from citizens without political influence to 
those with such influence. 
256 
Thirdly, because interest analysis makes the selection of applicable law uncertain 
the legal rights and obligations in turn become uncertain. Finally, and most 
importantly, states may have an interest in encouraging or permitting a transaction 
without actually goveming its applicable law. Therefore, it may be that a state's 
interest can be ignored unless the legislation specifically proscribes a mandatory 
law. 
(H) Party autonomy 
The older private interest theories such as vested rights are, except perhaps in their 
evolution in the English Courts, generally hostile to the enforcement of applicable 
law and forum-selection contractual clauses. 257 This led O'Hara and Ribstein to 
propose a new theory, the basic premise of which is: 
k 
parties should be able to choose their governing law, subject to 
possible procedural protections designed to ensure that the choice is 
real ... courts should apply rules that facilitate parties choice ... the 
255 Ibid: 18-19. 
256 See n. 219 above. 
257 Solimine (2002): 217. 
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system relies on clear rules that enable the parties to determine, at 
low cost and ex ante, what law applies to given conduct. 258 
Their proposal only really extended to contractual and quasi-contractual 
disputes. 259 It will be suggested that this could be taken much further. However, 
before moving on, it is vital to understand the underlying methodology. Central to 
this methodology is the parties' ability to use choice of law to mitigate the effect 
of inefficient lawS260 (by opt out) and to minimise the social welfare loss by opting 
out of effi'dent laws; thus fulfilling the general efficiency rationale that parties 
should be free to agree which law applies to their dealings, subject to certain 
exceptions such as capacity, duress or fraud. 261 
However this choice must be made ex ante and not ex post. This is because before 
a dispute arises (i. e. ex ante) neither party is aware that it will arise and even if 
they suspect such a problem they' will not be sufficiently aware to choose a 
jurisdiction (or law) from which they are certain to benefit. They are likely to 
choose the "efficient" option, or that which produces the greatest mutual benefit. 
In contrast if the choice of law is made after the event (i. e. ex post) then the choice 
is likely to benefit the chooser and so it is less likely to be the efficient choice. 262 
It must be remembered that economists ascribe the parties' failure to select an 
258 O'Hara and Ribsten (2000): 1151. They suggest that a State should, following a clearly 
expressed legislative intent, be able to apply its law extra-territorially even if it directly contradicts 
a contractual provision on applicable law, but without such expressed intent, its laws should not be 
so applied (at 1184). 
259 They suggested that the default position in choice of law, where ex ante agreement between the 
parties was impossible, should be based on comparative regulatory advantage: ibid at 119 1. 60 There has been extensive work on why there are inefficient laws. Two possible reasons are: that 
legislators face incentives from interest groups; and that it is difficult to determine whether a 
particular law is Kaldor-Hicks efficient as the various burdens and benefits depend on the nature 
and changes in the market: O'Hara and Ribstein (1997). 
261 %incop and Keyes (2001): 22. 
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applicable law to high transaction costs. Therefore it is efficient to fill the gaps in 
the contract. 263 In relation to contract, efficient choice of law dictates that the 
court should select the applicable law by determining what the parties would have 
chosen at the time of making the contract: this choice should, of course, maximise 
the wealth of both parties. 264 
(W) Bundling 
One of the problems of basing applicable law on contractual choice is that the 
efficient laws will be "bundled" with the inefficient law (the good with the bad). 
The only advantage of bundling is that it stops well-informed parties, who know 
each individual law intimately, forcing a less informed party to agree to hand- 
picked disadvantageous laws. In other words, in cases of information asymmetry, 
265 it is better that one party is forced to take the good with the bad . Indeed, 
bundling lets the legal market determine choice of law because it will only be 
worth "exiting! ' from laws where they place a heavy burden on the parties. 266 This 
is because a person would only contract around laws that they know will be 
(mutually) disadvantageous. 
Vitally however, some laws have an internal balance. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in relation to intellectual property. It was explained how the correct 
balance was drawn between incentive and use. For example, the "fair use" 
doctrine (or the concept of fair dealing) is efficient because it reduces transaction 
262 0' Hara and Ribstein (2000): 1184. 
263 Whincop and Keyes (2001): 29. 
264 lbid: 22. This was the basic premise of the "proper law" approach. 265 0' Hara and Ribstein (2000): 119 1. 
266 Ibid: 1192-3. 
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costs. 267 Therefore, a licence is only appropriate where the transaction costs 
represent a reasonable proportion of the licence payment. It may, therefore, 
undermine the consistency and economic basis of intellectual property to allow 
the rights to be granted in one law, but the exceptions to be governed by 
another. 268 
(iv) gly party autonomy? 
O'Hara and Ribstein accept that there are two ways of reducing the effect of 
inefficient laws while preserving efficient regulation; the first is to allow the 
courts to determine which laws are efficient and the second is to let the parties 
affected decide. 269 The first of these propositions suffers from all the problems 
identified above (uncertainty etc. ) and so the second is more desirable, albeit there 
are still costs associated. These costs are caused by informational asymmetries 
(parties knowing different things), bargaining imbalance (particularly important 
when dealing with consumers) and judgment biases; however, such costs are 
balanced against legal certainty. One of the greatest problems of the state interest 
approach is the cost of legal uncertainty caused by the need to deten-nine which 
law applies on a case-by-case basis. This cost is completed eliminated if parties 
can make an ex ante choice of law. 
267 Of course, if there were no transaction costs, Coase's theorem would dictate that there would be 
no need to have exceptions: also see page 129 above. 268 For example, a high standard of originality often means that there are fewer copyright 
exceptions, whereas in countries with low standards of originality more exceptions are necessary: 
bundling is an appropriate resolution of this problem. 269 0' Hara and Ribstein (2000): 11634. 
An Economic Approach 161 
D. Recognition of foreign judgments 
Once a court has entered judgment it will have mechanisms to enable that 
judgment to be enforced locally. However, where the assets of the defendant are 
not within the court's jurisdiction, the successful claimant will need some 
mechanism to enforce the judgment in a country where the defendant has 
sufficient assets. 
Recognition of judgments is particularly important where jurisdiction or 
applicable law was agreed by contract. It may be that the parties are content to 
have their conduct governed by a foreign law (this is particularly likely if both 
parties are from different countries) and to have the same foreign courts determine 
any dispute. However, if the respective home courts of the two countries are 
unwilling to recognise the judgment of the "chosen" foreign court, then the parties 
are not going to allow that court to determine the matter (as the judgment would 
be worthless). In turn, this means that parties may not chose that law and so they 
may have to opt for a less efficient law. To avoid this problem it has been 
suggested that the two parties should be able to "contracf' for recognition. 270 
Game theory and recognition 
The recognition of foreign judgments can be considered in terms of game theory. 
This requires acceptance of a general proposition, namely the defendant is more 
likely than the claimant to be resident in the jurisdiction for which recognition is 
271 
sought. If this assumption is true, a forum has a number of incentives not to 
recognise a foreign judgment. Most notably, to recognise a judgment means that 
270 WhinCop (1999): 437-8. 
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the courts are acting to the detriment of resident defendants to the advantage of 
non-resident claimants. 272 Another potential advantage to non-recognition is that it 
creates an incentive to move assets to that jurisdiction to "guard" them. 
The advantages of recognition are more numerous. If a defendant knows that a 
judgment will be enforced in other jurisdictions there is no incentive to move 
273 
assets, thus avoiding potentially inefficient transfers. Further, recognition 
allows claimants to have a wider choice of potential forums, thereby encouraging 
each forum to be efficient to attract litigation (encouraging a "race to the 
bottonf "274 in costs). 
The prisoner's dilemma, recognised by Whincop, involves two states having to 
determine whether to recognise each other's judgments or not; the dominant 
strategy is not to recognise. This is because if both recognise judgments they 
receive the benefit of recognition, but incur the cost of having to recognise. 
However, if only State A recognises but State B does not, then State B obtains a 
benefit from its judgments being recognised but incurs no cost to itself-, whereas 
the recognising State A incurs the cost of recognition but receives no benefit in 
return. However, if neither State A nor B recognise the other's judgments they 
both incur no loss (albeit they also receive no gain). Thus, a state in a one-off 
situation has an incentive to "cheat" and not to recognise. However, even if this 
were true, the interplay of states is not a one-off game but a continuous 
271 Ibid: 42 1. 
272 ibid. 
273 Ibid: 422. 
274 This reduction is minimised. because of the costs of re-litigation. 
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(indefinite) game. Therefore states will move over time to being co-operative and 
the wealth maximising solution: recognising each other's judgments. 
This is not the end of the story. Whincop also acknowledges that States achieve 
some benefit from the recognition of foreign judgments, namely that foreign 
litigants do not need to re-litigate a dispute locally, particularly as the societal cost 
of re-litigation may be higher than the cost of recognition. This equally applies to 
the defendant who will have to bear the cost of re-litigation (now with a 
realisation that they are unlikely to win). Further, if a state's judgments are not 
recognised abroad then any costs "sunk" by the parties in domestic litigation 
would be wasted (as litigation is worthless without enforcement), in turn this 
means that to avoid inefficient litigation in the domestic forum it is advantageous 
to play the recognition game co-operatively. 
(H) Requiring the issuing court to have jurisdiction and refusing to recognise 
judgments on the ground ofordre public 
Most courts will only enforce a foreign judgment where the rendering court 
exercised jurisdiction on an acceptable basis. So, for example, most foreign states 
will not enforce a French judgment that is based solely on Article 14 or 15 of the 
French Civil Code or other similar extra-territorial jurisdictional bases. This 
limitation enables the forum court to "temper" the extra-territorial application of 
foreign laws where it thinks that such an application was inappropriate. 275 Indeed, 
an example of where this may actually have worked is the French abandonment of 
275 This could also be achieved by the use of "anti-suit" injunctions, which enjoin a party from 
starting or continuing a suit in a foreign jurisdiction (this term has been criticised as inaccurate by 
Lord Hobhouse in Turner v Grovit (2002) 1 WLR 107, he points out that these suits do not 
actually bind foreign courts but parties to such suits (at 117)). 
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the revision aufond, which followed (amongst other things) a continued German 
refusal to recognise French judgments. 276 
Furthermore, requiring an acceptable jurisdiction basis limits forum shopping 
because the claimant would only shop in forums where any judgment obtained 
will be acceptable to potential recognising courts. This is limited further by the 
refusal to enforce judgments that are offensive to local public policy. It is 
generally recognised that a court will not enforce a foreign judgment where to do 
so would be contrary to the ordre public (public policy). A good example of this 
policy in action is the consistent refusal by courts in the United States to recognise 
English libel judgments, 277 as to do so would be contrary to the first 
amendment. 278 The balance that must be struck is between the cost of re-litigating 
and the cost that would be imposed where, in a limited number of cases, the 
279 
public policy is circumvented. 
It is therefore possible to see that, with limited exceptions, it is efficient for States 
to recognise and enforce foreign judgments, both to ensure their own judgments 
are recognised (so that the litigation costs are not wasted) and to avoid domestic 
re-litigation. 
276 This refusal was possible on the basis of EGBGB §24. 277 For example, see Ajitabh Bachchan v India Abroad Publications (1992) 585 NYS 2d 661; 
Telivikoffv Matusevitch (Md, 1997) 702 A. 2d 230. 
278 This is mainly due to the requirement imposed by New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 
254 that libel laws will not protect a public figure unless the statement was made maliciously. 279 If jurisdictional requirements are a condition of enforcement, it is not possible for parties to 
consistently select foreign jurisdictions to avoid public policy restraints. This is because they will 
not be able to enforce the judgment locally. 
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VI. Concluding remarks 
The theories outlined at the end of this chapter place the emphasis squarely back 
on private parties, but only in contractual and market tort situations. Somewhat 
paradoxically, in non-market torts legal economists repeatedly suggest that the 
comparative regulatory advantage approach should apply. Therefore they are 
adopting policy interests as a default mechanism where private choice cannot 
apply; the use of intellectual property is, within these confines, a non-market tort 
and therefore by logical extension, according to their approach, should be based 
on those rules - this is not practical and a new approach needs to be adopted. 
4 
New Answers or New Questions? 
Chapter 2 set out the jumble that is the framework of private intemational law. 
This jumble has led a number of commentators to propose solutions to the 
problems caused by private intemational law and the Intemet. The earliest 
suggestions involved setting up an entirely new jurisdiction on the Internet, later it 
was proposed that a new "internef ' law or lex informatica could be applied to 
disputes on the Internet. However, in recent years, the radical ideas have been 
superseded by the mainstream, members of which have proposed a number of 
ways of reconciling private international law, intellectual property and the 
Internet. This chapter will examine those ideas beginning with the two most 
radical and moving on to proposals for reform that fit within the present 
intemational legal framework. 
1. Cyberspace - the new jurisdiction? 
The basis of a cyberspace jurisdiction is that: 
I 
Cyberspace will evolve to the extent that it is easier to develop [a] 
separate law than to work out endless conflicts that the cross-border 
existences will generate ... and a law o cyberspace will emerge as the )f 
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simpler way to resolve the inevitable. And repeated, conflicts that 
cyberspace will raise. ' 
A. The proposal 
This evolution has not happened and, without being too bold, this will not happen. 
However, there have been those who have argued, most notably David Johnson 
and David Post, 2 not only that it should evolve, but also that it must evolve in this 
way; so it is only right to consider their arguments. The centre of which is the fact 
that laws are territorial. They base the legislative jurisdiction of a law on four 
premises: power, effects, legitimacy an notice. 
The first of these, "power", demonstrates the outdated nature, at least from an 
American context, of the Johnson/Post argument. Their argument runs as follows: 
laws are limited to people over whom the courts have control and where a court 
exercises control over a person located in a foreign state that control would be 
impinging on that state's sovereignty. 3 This argument is not wrong. Indeed it is 
similar to that proposed by Manný and had it been proposed by a European scholar 
it would have been in accord with prevailing thought. 5 However, from an 
American perspective such a statement is incorrect as they are "in the grip of 
nineteenth century territorialist concept of how "real space' is regulated ... and 
resolved' 9.6 
1 Lessig (1996): 1407. 
2 See in particular Johnson and Post (1996). 
3 Ibid: 1369. 
4 See page 39 et seq above. 
5 However, many European Courts are now willing to accept that domestic legislation may not 
apply to foreign activities which have effects within the territory: see Mody (2001): 376-8. 
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Johnson/Post suggest that the "effects" of law, when limited to geographical 
space, should be limited to that space; 7 however, they point out that the Internet is 
organised logically rather than physically; 8 because neither an IP address nor a 
domain name necessarily indicates the location of the server. Tberefore Internet 
actions and controls only have "tenuous connection to physical location"9 and 
"frequently, users are unaware that they have 'crossed' a political border in the 
course of their virtual travels"10 so, they argue, it 'would be improper for a 
particular nation to regulate the local effects of the Internet where that regulation 
would have worldwide effect. 
It has been pointed out that despite a law being "applied" to foreign activities (i. e. 
net activities uploaded outside the relevant jurisdiction) it does not mean the law 
can be enforced internationally, as the vast majority of people who upload 
material on the Internet have no assets or presence outside their home jurisdiction 
and so only their local courts can effectively contain their activity. " This does, 
however, discount the willingness of most courts to enforce the judgments of 
foreign courts. 
The "legitimacy" required by Johnson/Post comes from the generally agreed 
concept that the law should only apply to those who have "consented to be 
governed". 12 Presumably they suggest this consent comes from participation in an 
election and possibly the voluntary "entry" into a country. This of course ignores 
6 Goldsmith (199 8b): 1205. 
7 Johnson and Post (1996): 1369. 
8 Ibid. 137 1. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Burnstein (1996): 82. 
11 Goldsmith (1998a): 480. 
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the reality both of the electoral process and of modem rules of jurisdiction. 
Finally, they suggest that a person should have "notice" of the laws that will apply 
to certain conduct. 13 
If one follows Johnson/Post it is necessary to accept that the Internet is so 
different from the "real world" that it would be wrong to apply real world laws to 
the virtual world. However, there is no doubt that much Internet activity is little 
different to more conventional undertakings14 or can be seen as selling "old wine 
in new bottles". 
Following the Internet's failure to address the four problems they pose, 
Johnson/Post suggest that states should refrain from regulating and the users of 
the Internet should be left to regulate cyberspace themselves. The basis of this 
courageous suggestion is that a "netiquette" has already developed, which they 
argue could evolve to cover other activities. 15 
B. The problems 
Permitting such evolution would avoid the problem of one nation monopolising 
the rule-making for the entire net; 16 although what is actually happening is the 
exact opposite: every nation's law is being applied. The Johnson/Post proposal 
that cyberspace should be self-regulated is based on other self-regulating bodies 
such as "churches" and "clube'; however the difference between a "club" and the 
12 Johnson and Post (1996): 1369-70. 
13 Ibid- 1370. 
14 For a discussion of the similarities between telegraphy, telephony and the Internet see Goldsmith 
(1998b): 1202-3. 
15 Johnson and Post (1996): 1388-9. 
16 Ibid: 1390. 
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Internet is that nobody in a "club" would seriously argue that they should not also 
be governed by the law of the nation within which the club operates. 
17 Another 
"leap of faith" in their proposal is that a sufficient number of States would agree 
to refrain from regulating the Internet; indeed it would need most countries to 
agree to such a framework. Yet why would a state so refrain? What do they have 
to gain? 
The Internet is not worked by each user in the same way. It can be accessed very 
passively Oust scrolling down a web page), through to an active use (material is 
downloaded), or interactively (where information is exchanged between a user 
and a site). If a person is purposely trying to evade a state's regulation, how is 
self-regulation going to work? Who is going to be able to "turn off' the person 
purposely acting illegally, without relying on court sanctions? 
Of course there have been suggestions that this could be addressed by on-line 
arbitrators, adjudicators, "virtuat magistrates" or even setting up the United States 
Court for the District of Cyberspace. 18 But such suggestions are at best overly 
optimistic, demonstrating that the Johnson/Post suggestion is either fifteen years 
too late 19 or hopelessly nalve. 
17 Of course there are clubs on the Internet which can regulate themselves, however this does not 
mean they are free of other regulation; nor does it mean that a court will not recognise the rules of 
a club when dealing with intra-club disputes. 'a A suggestion of Perritt (1996): 100; it is difficult to conceive that the rest of the world would 
agree to a US District being in charge of regulating US citizens conduct in cyberspace, even if it 
did appoint foreign judges as Perritt suggests (at 102). '9 It may have been acceptable to self-regulate when the Internet was almost the exclusive preserve 
of academic and research organisations who sent simple text at a very slow rate. 
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11. Lex Mercatoria for the Internet? 
The original lex mercatoria, or law merchant was a law created by merchants for 
merchants; 20 indeed the first English treatise on the subject was not written by a 
lawyer but by a merchant: Gerard Malynes. 21 Any disputes arising under the law 
merchant were usually settled by arbitration, with the panel including at least one 
experienced merchant. There were three important characteristics of the original 
law merchant: (1) it was universal amongst the mercantile classes around Europe; 
(2) it could be transported with the merchant; and (3) it was separate from the 
local and national laws of the states where the trade was occurring. 22 However, as 
the divisions between the- various states became clearer and the courts therein 
stronger the law merchant, which had provided some uniformity throughout 
Europe, died out. 
A. Lex informatica? 
Centuries after the death of the original law merchant, a new law merchant has 
begun to develop. This new law, like its medieval predecessor, relates almost 
exclusively to arbitration agreements. It only has force within the confines of such 
agreements, although any custom or practice required by the law merchant could 
be recognised by the courts. However, it is not of itself a new legal order. 23 
Notwithstanding, Berthold Goldman suggests the new law merchant would be 
upheld by (a) the insertion of relevant clauses in international contracts or (b) 
20 Holdsworth (1945): 130. 
21 Malynes (1622) (cited in Holdsworth (1945): 131-2). 
22 Garavaglia (1991): 37-8. 
23 Delaume (1989); also see Juenger (2000): 1135-6. 
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arbitration panels giving effect to those rules, 24 and so it should be considered to 
have some legal force. 
It has been proposed that a new law merchant, or le-x informatica, 25 could be 
applied to the Internet. Its source would apparently be the customs of the net (this 
is similar to self-regulation) with websites being set up to host debates by the 
users of the net, 26 allowing them to propose new "customs". Thus enabling the lex 
informatica to be dynamic and truly representative of the present customs of the 
Internet and to maintain "flexibility while removing uncertainty". 27 It is unclear 
how a law, which is more or less flexible, could be certain enough for a real legal 
environment. Furthermore, such an approach may lead to the tyranny of the 
majority as customs are adopted by the masses without regard to whether they are 
cffectivc or cfficicnt. 
This being the case, how could the lex informatica be extended to the Internet? 
The most obvious approach is simply by contractual agreements. 28 The Internet is 
a series of contracts, from the contract between the user and the service provider, 
to a suggestion that each "accepted" request for data is likely to be considered a 
legally binding transaction upon which additional duties can be attached. 29 Indeed, 
if one adopts Berthold Goldman's suggestion, this would enable the incorporation 
24 Goldman (1979): 479 et seq. 25 This term was coined as a system of conflict of laws by Van Boom and Van Erp (1996) and was 
used in its expanded sense as a whole system of law, by Mefford (1997). 26 Mefford (1997): 229-30. 
27 Ibid: 23 1. 
28 See Jaccard (1997). 
29 Ibid: 658. 
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of the lex informatica by simple attachment and avoid the necessity of applying 
choice of law rules. 30 
What initially appears to be a workable solution faces two intractable problems: 
public policy concerns and contractual problems. The law merchant is intended to 
regulate the dealings between merchants, not between merchants and consumers 
(indeed substantial protection for contracting consumers exists 
31). Further, it is 
very unlikely that the courts would enforce a contract on the basis of access alone 
or without the user having access to the terms of the contract before agreeing. 
There are also difficulties with enforcing agreements regarding the use of 
intellectual property by third parties. 32 Indeed the move to remove liability from 
service providers for the transmission of infringing material33 removes any 
incentive they had to come up with enforcing a contractual solution. 
There is of course no doubt that should two merchants using the Internet wish to 
rely on the law merchant this would be quite possible (or at least as possible as it 
would be in the real world environment). It is however unlikely that' a lex 
informatica would be generally acceptable for all dealings on the Internet. 
30 See Juenger (1998): 267 (arbitral tribunals are not really wedded to any particular national law 
of conflicts). 
31 Directive on on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Directive 93/13/EC); furthermore 
contractual choice of law clauses, when concluded with consumers, are subject to strict scrutiny in 
the United States: see Carnival Cruise Lines v Shute (1991) 499 US 585 at 595 (dissent at 600). 
32 This problem was acknowledged by Jaccard (1997): 657-60. 
33 Article 5(l) of the Information Society Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC) and section 512 
Copyright Act 1976, inserted by Title III of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
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B. The draft International Copyright Code: A lex mercatoria? 
A project, almost exclusively conducted by Professor Sterling, produced what 
may appear to be an ambitious and bold undertaking. In 2001 he proposed 
34 a 
draft International Copyright Code (ICC), 35 the basic proposition of which was a 
'one world" approach, or "universality". 36 Under his approach, 
"protection ... extends to every place, whether terrestrial or extra-terrestrial 
07 and 
is granted "irrespective of .. nationality, location, place of 
fixation 
or ... publicatiolf 
'. 38 
At first blush, this appears to be a radical solution to the problem of conflict of 
laws on the Internet (albeit confined to copyright and related rights) by using a 
combination of a new jurisdiction and a lex mercatoria. 39 It turns the whole world 
into one Jurisdiction with one law and, Sterling proposes, an International 
Copyright Tribunal consisting of judgeS40 from the signatory States, to administer 
that law. 41 It is self-evident that a specialised international tribunal would 
34 This original proposal has been supplemented by a number of other proposals dealing with 
related issues see Sterling (2003): [92-03 to 92-08]. 
35 It was proposed at the Eighteenth Herchel Smith Lecture, the text of speech is available as 
Sterling (2001); ftirther documentation is available on the QMIPRI website. Separately, Professor 
Sterling has proposed various conventions dealing with private international law and copyright, 
see Sterling (2002a) and the QMIPRI website. 
36 See Sterling (2002b): 284 (Part I). For a discussion of some of the underlying problems that are 
presently being faced: see Sterling (2000). 
37 Article 3(2). 
38 Article 3(l). Sterling argues the non-discrimination principle on the basis that the protection of 
authors is part of the international human rights mechanism: see Sterling (2002b): 285 (Part I); 
also see Torremans, (2004). However, despite Article 15 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, it is not universally accepted that the protection of 
expression is a human right. 
39 The US Committee on the Judiciar is considering how to promote a "world" patent (see 109, h 
Oversight Report, 2005-6 Session, 26 January 2005 at XII. C (at 17)). 40 Article 20. 
41 Sterling proposes an "E-Justice" system whereby most of the procedures take place over the 
Internet, with some support from video conferencing. Considering the length and complexity of 
many purely domestic copyright infringement cases (outside pure counterfeiting) it may be a little 
ambitious to conduct entire hearings over a video-link. 
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maximise efficiency, 42 firstly because it would ensure consistency of 
determinations and ffirther because it would eliminate any problems caused by 
forum shopping. However efficient such a tribunal may be to make it workable, as 
Sterling accepts, would require a simply code which must be compatible with the 
current international and regional laws. 43 
There are a number of potential problems with the ICC and its tribunal. Firstly, 
setting up a court built on universal jurisdiction; secondly, the status of 
proceedings in the court and the concept of parallel application; and finally the 
open nature of the ICC drafting. 
(i) Universality 
One of the central planks of the ICC is the court's "universal" jurisdiction. There 
is no doubt that a universal law is, in tenns of transnational disputes, likely to be 
wealth maximising. The cost of judicial error would be minimised and, if it were 
coupled with a universal jurisdiction, it would also reduce the need to commence 
multiple actions. Thus, the inefficiency could only come from the nature of the 
laws themselves; however, this problem is no worse (and is likely to be better) 
than that which occurs in national laws. 
The negotiation of a universal law, implemented by treaty, is comparable to that 
of a contract. Both a treaty and a contract involve consensual exchange, and so a 
42 See Moore and Parisi (2002): 1333; Posner and Landes (2004) found that the creation of the 
TS ecialised patents court has increased patenting activity. 
Sterling (2002b): 285 (Part I). He calls these international and regional instruments the "source 
instruments" and he includes the various Conventions as well as European Directives. 
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treaty, freely negotiated 44 between nations would be wealth maximising. 
45 
However, there are transaction costs associated with a treaty: first, the initial cost 
of negotiating the treaty, which increases with the number of parties present at the 
drafting convention; and secondly, the implementation costs which are discussed 
below. 
Notwithstanding, it is difficult to see how a tribunal with universal application 
would be acceptable to most States. One only has to look at the problems with the 
Community Patent Convention. 46 A central plank of the Convention was the 
"unity" of the Community patent, meaning that an injunction granted in one 
member State would be enforceable across the whole of the Community. This 
approach was resisted by member States. The new approach is to create a single 
European Patents Court (which would be part of the Court of Justice); this 
universal court is still controversia l47 and even now it looks unlikely that 
agreement will be reached in the near future., 
Thus, even within a small union of nine States" with substantially similar patent 
laws, 49 it proved to be very difficult to achieve sufficient agreement to form a 
44 The problem is, of course, that treaties are rarely Ereely negotiated. TRIPS is a perfect example 
of this problem, with the United States (who have a strong, if not, insurmountable bargaining 
position) able to dictate to many developing nations the terms of the agreement, which may be 
unfavourable (see generally: Mathews (2002)). 
45 Treaties normally do not contain any enforcement mechanism, therefore they are often thought 
to be different. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, game theory would suggest that a nation 
would have an incentive to play by the rules. 
46 The Community Patent Convention was intended to set up a "Community patent' 'which would 
mean that where a patent was sought at the European Patent Office for a patent in any member 
State a community patent would be granted (Article 3), although it would still be possible to opt 
for a national patent instead. 
47 There have been a number of other difficulties particularly in relation to translations. 
48 When the CPC was signed only Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, Italy, Ireland and the United Kingdom were members of the European Community. 49 Based on the European Convention on the Grant of European Convention and the Strasbourg 
Convention. 
New Answers or New Questions? 177 
Community Patents Court. It is therefore difficult to see an International 
Copyright Tribunal, able to determine all infringements in the world, being 
acceptable. Further, at present, there is no court dealing with private law matters 
that has universal jurisdiction, so that it is difficult to imagine a significant 
number of States being willing to grant any private tribunal worldwide 
50 jurisdiction. Indeed, Sterling acknowledges as much, so he proposes the 
principle of "parallel application7'. 
(H) Parallel application 
Integral to the ICC is the principle of parallel application, which means that a 
decision of the Tribunal would only be enforceable where the court of a particular 
jurisdiction confirms the decision; 51 meaning signatory States would have to 
52 
accept the rulings of the Tribunal. This principle means that a person will be 
able to rely on a right or exception granted under local law, but this would only be 
available within the jurisdiction of the local court. 
Likewise, where a ruling has been made by the Tribunal and the claimant moves 
to enforce the judgment, it will be possible for the defendant to challenge the 
ruling on the basis of local law, even where that local law conflicts with the 
53 
provisions of the Code. The right to "collaterally" challenge the Tribunal 
decision by incorporating new local law principles at the stage of enforcement 
undennines the entire purpose of the proposal by adding uncertainty and in turn 
costs. Indeed, it makes the Tribunal's decisions comparable to those of an 
50 Sterling (2001): 529 where he states, "international consensus is very hard to achieve in some 
areas, as we know from long and from recent experience". 51 Ibid. 
52 Sterling (2002b): 468 (Part II). 
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arbitration panel. When the ICC is looked at in such a light it becomes more and 
54 
more like the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). The 
UDRP has largely been a success. 55 It has enabled the resolution of domain name 
disputes cheaply and effectively-, however, it purposely does not oust the right to 
commence court proceedings. Article 4(k) of the UDRP allows the decisions of 
the Panel to be challenged in court; however, in practice, challenges in national 
courts have only occuffed on a "handful of occasions -)ý . 
56 
Thus, it might appear that the ICC's similarity to the UDRP is no bad thing. If the 
Tribunal were accepted as a glorified arbitration panel, with the ICC as a lex 
informatica, then maybe this would be an appropriate way forward. There are, 
however, a number of differences between the proposed ICC and the UDRP. 
Firstly, the UDRP is limited to transferring the registration of a domain name, 
there is no right to damages, costs or an injunction; whereas Sterling proposes that 
the ICC should possess the full range of powers. Secondly, the issues in domain 
name disputes are normally straight-forward and would almost never require 
extensive evidence, whereas this is not true of copyright cases (save maybe 
counterfeiting cases). Finally, enforcement of a UDRP Panel decision is 
conducted through a contract with an impartial third party (the registrar of the 
particular domain) who can enforce the ruling without involving the defendant; 
this is quite different to expecting local courts to accept the decision of the 
International Copyright Tribunal. 
53 Sterling (2001): 529; this idea is similar to the old French doctrine of revision aufond. 54 (October 24,1999) also see the accompanying Rules. 55 See Bettink (2002). 
56 Cornish and Llewelyn (2003): [19-103]. 
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(m) The drafting of the proposed International Copyright Code 
Michael Van Alstine 57 has identified five "transitiore' costs associated with the 
implementation of a treaty: (1) the learning costs associated with determining the 
content of new legal norms; (2) the uncertainty costs that arise from the absence 
of authoritative determinations about the meaning and effect of the new norms; 
(3) the costs of errors through mistakes in interpretation; (4) private costs 
associated with adopting to new legal norms; and (5) the public costs incurred by 
courts and others associated with contending with the new legal norms. 
It is true that international agreements with broad propositions may, in theory at 
least, be more efficient. This is because they allow courts to interpret, and 
reinterpret, the agreement over time to fit changing circumstances without having 
to re-negotiate the underlying treaty or agreement. 58 Such a cost is reduced by 
creating an authoritative tribunal, such as is proposed as part of the ICC. 
However, because the ICC does not include any exceptions to copyright (but 
leaves them to Signatory States)59 it does not address vital aspects of any 
infringement. 
However, more importantly, if the jurisprudence of the international court were to 
bind countries worldwide (so effectively modifying how authors are protected in 
57 See Van Alistine (2002b). These costs are based on those he originally identified in relation to 
law reform in his earlier article Van Alistine (2002a). 
58 See Posner (2003): 140-1. However, interpretation can also cover "holes" in agreements; for 
example, the words "not similar" were interpreted by the Court of Justice to mean "similar or not 
similar" to cover a perceived gap in the Trade Marks Directive (Directive 89/104/EC): Davidoff v 
Goj'kidd (2003) 1 CMLR 1039 (Case C-292/00) and Adidas v Fitnessworld (2004) 1 CMLR 448 
(Case C-408/01). 
59 Instead it simply requires that any exceptions relied upon comply with the "three-step test" 
(Article 10). Elsewhere, the author has suggested that the test was only accepted "because it could 
mean all things to all people": Johnson (2004): 265. In other words, the uncertainty and flexibility 
of the test is what makes it desirable and, ipsofacto, a wholly unsuitable test to use directly. 
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each signatory State), the states themselves would be interested in the decisions of 
the Tribunal; this is especially true if, as Sterling rightly expects, local laws 
increasingly approximated the Code. 60 Although it has been argued above that 
states are not really interested in the determination of legal disputes involving 
private rights, 61 it does not follow that states are not interested in the evolution of 
their own legal systems. Therefore, as decisions on the Code would elucidate the 
nature of provisions, it may be that signatory States would want to be involved in 
that process. In similar circumstances, the procedures of the Court of Justice 
acknowledge that member States should be free to intervene in cases between 
private parties on the interpretation of a community provision. 62 It is possible that 
a similar provision would be necessary in relation to proceedings before the 
Tribunal, which may in turn increase the expense and the controversy of rulings. 
The private adjustment costs created by adopting a universal code would be very 
high because all the old practices would have to be revised; also, because of 
ý parallel application the agreements would be far more expensive as they will have 
to accommodate both the universal code and the local laws. Similarly, national 
tribunals would have to try and accommodate both their own law and the 
universal code with its fluid interpretation, further increasing the costs faced by 
public authorities. 
(Iv) Suitability? 
The ICC would not provide a final solution to many of the problems presented by 
conflict of laws on the Internet; however, it may provide a good mechanism for 
60 Sterling (2002b): 469 (Part II). 
61 See page 77 et seq above. 
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international copyright arbitrations (i. e. where both parties consent to a 
determination). These decisions could be arbitral awards under the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. 63 
111. Private international law solutions 
a 
The various normative theories explaining conflict of laws have often been 
ignored when trýying to determine a solution to the problem of intellectual property 
on the Internet. This deficiency is not for want of activity as the area has attracted 
substantial amounts of research, particularly over the last decade. This started in 
1998 with reports to the World Intellectual Property Organisation by Andr6 
Lucas 64 and Jane Ginsburg, 65 which was followed up in 2001 by a WIPO Forum. 
This forum grew out of the Hague Conference's attempt to agree a treaty on 
commercial disputes in private international law. 
At the WIPO Forum Jane Ginsburg and Rochelle Dreyfuss presented a "Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property 
Matters', 66 (the Draft Convention). Although to date this project has not been 
taken further by WIPO, Professors Ginsburg and Dreyfuss joined Professor 
Dessemontet in the American Law Institute project "Intellectual Property: Draft 
62 Article 40 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice. 63 Article II(I), V(2) requires enforcement of these awards unless there is strong public policy 
reasons for not enforcing. 
64 Lucas (1998). 
65 Ginsburg (1998a). 
66 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2001) this was later published (in an updated form) as Dreyfuss and 
Ginsburg (2002b). 
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Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transitional 
Disputes"67 (the Draft Principles). 69 
In parallel with the ALI project, the International Jurisdiction project is being 
conducted by the Max Planck Institute (MPI) for Intellectual Property. 
69 In 
addition, the European Commission's draft Regulation on the Law Applicable to 
Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome 11)70 provides general rules on choice of law, 
with special provision for intellectual property. In contrast, Mirelle van Eechoud 
has set out how, using the allocation method, the applicable law might be chosen. 
Finally, the International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
(AIPPI) have passed resolution 174 on jurisdiction and applicable law in the case 
of cross-border infringement (infringing acts) of intellectual property rights, 
which is probably the only "complete" undertaking in this field so far. The 
purpose of this part is to discuss the various proposals 71 (to the extent that they 
available) and put them in an economic context. 
A. AIPPI: Resolution 174 
On 27th October 2003 the AIPPI adopted Resolution 174 on the Jurisdiction and 
Applicable Law in the Case of Cross-Border infringement (infringing acts) of 
Intellectual Property Rights. This Resolution did not set out a detailed approach 
67 The final draft is not going to be made public until it goes before the ALI Conference. Although 
an early draft was published Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002a), this draft is very similar to the Draft 
Convention. 
68 There is also a proposal for a European Patent Litigation Agreement (the most recent publicly 
available draft is the 16tb February 2004), which would create a separate European patent court 
ustem. 6 6 See Drexi and Kur (2005). 
70 COM (2003)427(22 nd July 2003). 
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on how private international law matters should be resolved; it simply sets out 
five proposals which deal with jurisdiction and applicable law. 
(i) Jurisdiction 
The main provision of the Resolution follows the traditional view of jurisdiction, 
namely the defendant's domicile should be the normal forum. 72 However, the 
recitals make it clear that "infringement may need to be looked at on a global 
basis and enforcement should be enhanced to become global or at least regional"73 
and "to achieve this goal it should be possible ... for courts of a country different 
from the country where the infringement ... (took place]" to hear the 
dispute. 74 
Thus, the wording of Article 1 (1) proclaims a general principle: 
The courts of a given country should be allowed to make a ruling 
over infringing acts regarding certain intellectual property right 
which have taken place in any other country 
It is unclear why the word "certain" is included, although recital (e) suggests that 
the rules "may also vary according to the nature of the intellectual property rights 
75 involved". Therefore, the resolution may only apply to certain types of 
intellectual property, although it is unclear which rights are included and which 
are not. 
71 There have, of course, been a number of other proposals; however most of these have normally 
not extended beyond a single article or paper: see for example Dinwoodie (2000), which proposed 
using a substantive law solution similar to that proposed by Van Mehren (see page 74 above). 72 Article 1(4). 
73 Recital (a). 
74 Recital (b). 
75 Also see recital (i) which makes it clear that the agreement is intended to only cover intellectual 
property rights and not tort law. Whether this means torts related to intellectual property (such as 
passing off and unfair competition) are excluded is unclear. 
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Even though the Resolution dictates that a court should generally be allowed to 
rule on extra-territorial acts, this general rule need not be followed where the 
particular intellectual property right in question has an impact on the public 
interest. 76 Furthermore, to avoid multiple suits a Us pendens rule was included in 
the Resolution, so where a dispute comes before a court which was not the first to 
be seized of the matter, it should consider staying the proceedings. 
77 
(H) Applicable law 
The Resolution does not actually present any new propositions, it mandates that 
(except in special circumstances) the general rule is that the law applied is that of 
the "place for which protection is sought' ': the lex protectionis. 
78 In contrast, the 
Resolution maintains the normal rule that the rules of procedure should be 
govemed by the lexfori. 
However, the Resolution does not clarify what amounts to "special 
circumstances", but it does suggest that in unusual circumstances it is possible to 
apply a law other than that for which protection is sought . 
79 However, special 
circumstances would not appear to include an everyday matter, such as a dispute 
involving the Internet, or even consolidation due to a trans-national dispute. 
76 See Article 1(2) and recital (d). This is also taken into account when enforcing a judgment see 
Article 3(2). 
77 Article 4(l). 
78 Article 2(2). 
79 See page 318 et seq below. 
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(W) Resolution 174 -another damp squib? 
The Resolution does not go very far towards providing a comprehensive solution. 
The proposals on jurisdiction simply reflect the normal policy and legal basis of 
jurisdiction in tort disputes. The rules on choice of law tend to reflect the general 
approach taken by national (and possibly international) courts, which have caused 
far too many problems in conflict of laws already without them being reinforced. 
It is unfortunate to conclude, but Resolution 174 only makes it clear that the 
normal rules of private international law apply to intellectual property disputes, 
which, in recent years, has never really been in doubt. 
B. "Rome 1111 draft Regulation on the law applicable to non- 
contractual obligations 
The European Commission's proposed draft on Applicable Law to Non- 
Contractual Obligations is meant to "finalis6" the project that was started in the 
1970s. It is intended to follow the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations (Rome 1) and to mesh with the Brussels and Lugano 
80 
Conventions (and (EC) Regulation No. 44/2001), on jurisdiction. The purported 
need for the Regulation is to avoid distortions of competition and forum 
shopping. 81 However, the Regulation is intended to have universal application82 
and therefore it applies to disputes involving third countries, as well as to disputes 
so There was an earlier proposal by the European Group for Private International Law on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (text adopted at the meeting at Luxembourg 25-27 
September 1998). This proposal had no special provisions for intellectual property. 
81 COM (2003) 427: 7. The European Parliament Legal Reform Committee has, in its Final 
Report, more or less rewritten the proposal (Final Report A6-2011/2005,27h June 2005). This 
report was adopted in the plenary session on the 60' July 2005. The Final Report was very heavily 
influenced by American scholars; indeed, the Rapportuer, Diana Wallis, invited a number of 
leading American, scholars to a seminar on 14"' March 2005. 
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involving activities within the European Community. The need for such a 
Regulation has been questioned 83 and so has its legal basis. 84 
The general rule under the Regulation is that of the le-x delicti commissi; 
85 
however there is a special provision for intellectual property, 86 based on the lex 
loci protectioniS, 87 which reads as follows: 
Article 8 
(1) The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arisingfrom 
an infringement of an intellectual property right shall be the law of 
the countryfor which protection is sought. 
(2) In the case of a non-contractual obligation arising from an 
infringement of a unitary Community industry property right, the 
relevant Community instrument shall apply. For any question that is 
not governed by that instrument, the applicable law shall be the law 
of the Member State in which the act of infringement is committed. 
The wording of paragraph (1) is based on the Berne Convention (Article 5(2)) and 
the Paris Convention (Article 2(2)). This presents two issues. Firstly, there has 
82 Article 2. This is the same as the Rome Convention. 
83 See House of Lords (2003-4); Mason and Roebuck (2003): 1-2. 
84 The legal base is Article 65 of the EC Treaty. The House of Lords (2003-4) questioned whether 
the Instrument, if made, would be intra vires (at [72]) as well as doubting whether there was a 
political mandate (at [64]); also see Roebuck and Mason (2003): 2 and Carruthers and Crawford 
(2004): 24. 
85 Article 3. 
86 The definition of "intellectual property" is found in recital 14. There is also special provision 
(Article 5) for unfair competition, which obviously has an impact on intellectual property. The 
Law Reform Committee of the European Parliament has, however, recommended that this 
rrovision should be omitted: Final Report: 2 1. 
7 Recital 14 suggests that "regarding [violations/infringements] of intellectual property rights, the 
universally acknowledged principle of the lex loci protectionis should be preserved". 
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been doubt about whether Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is actually a 
88 
choice of law provision. Secondly, every member State is a signatory to all the 
major international treaties; therefore, if choice of law rules are provided by those 
treatise then there is no need to "harmonisd" the applicable law because it is 
already harmonised . 
89 However, if the Court of Justice determines that the 
intellectual property conventions, which are partially within community 
competence, 90 do not contain a conflicts rule then the diverging rules of the 
member States may need harmonisation. 91 It has been suggested that Article 8 
"ignores the difficulties in intellectual property which [have] been extensively 
discussed. 02 This is unquestionably true and so it is surprising that Article 8 
remains in the draft. 93 
Article 10(l) allows parties the freedom to choose the applicable law. However, 
this rule specifically excludes obligations to which Article 8 applies, in other 
words, intellectual property disputes. The Commission paper suggests freedom of 
choice would not be appropriate for intellectual property, although it does not 
explain why. 94 Hausmann argues that this ban is a necessary consequence of the 
territoriality principle 95 and he continues by suggesting that "the parties cannot be 
88 For a fuller discussion see page 324 et seq. 
89 A similar point is raised by Drexel (2005): 157-8. 
90 The EC is a party to TRIP and has signed (and agreed to ratify: see Council Decision 
2000/278/EC) the WCT and WPPT. In addition the Court of Justice has held the Berrie 
Convention to partially fall within community competence: Commission v Ireland (2002) 2 CMLR 
10 (Case C-13/00) (this is based on Article 5, Protocol 28 of the EEA Agreement). 
91 For example, Article 63 of Greek Copyright Law dictates that the law of the country where the 
work was first made available to the public should apply. It appears that the Court of Justice may 
have held that the Conventions do not include choice of law rules see Tod's SpA v Heyraud 
(unreported) 30'h June 2005 (Case C-28/04). 
92 House of Lords (2003-4): [131] citing the evidence of Sir Lawrence Collins. 
93 Although most of the other special cases were removed by the European Parliament, the special 
rule for intellectual property remains. 94 COM (2003) 427: 22. The European Parliament proposes allowing such selection: Final Report: 
16-7. 
95 Hausmann (2003): 285. 
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permitted to elect as the applicable law the law of a country in which the injured 
party enjoys no protectiorf,. 96 Furthermore, mandatory rules 
97 and order public9s 
apply in the Draft Regulation as they do in Rome I. 
The proposed rule, particularly the restriction on contracting out of the inefficient 
application of rules, means that an act of infringement on the Internet may be 
subject to the law of not only every European jurisdiction, but to every 
jurisdiction in the world (due to the universality principle). 99 This proposal 
therefore adopts the worse case scenario. 
C. Van Eechoud's allocation method: "choice of law" 
Mireille van Eechoud in Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights: 
Alternatives to the Lex Protectionisloo suggests that modem allocation methods 
make it possible to assign the appropriate legal seat for each of the four aspects of 
a copyright dispute: 101 existence, scope and duration; initial ownership; transfer; 
and infringement. She proposes sound reasons why certain connecting factors 
should be adopted for each of these four aspects. In particular, she relies on a 
broad "functional allocatiorf' using her interpretation of the purpose and reasoning 
96 Ibid. 
97 Article 12; Article 12(l) matches Article 7(l) of the Rome Convention and allows courts to 
apply foreign mandatory rules. The United Kingdom chose to opt out of Article 7(l) because it felt 
it would "detract from the principles of certainty and uniformity which the Convention otherwise 
seeks to promote": see Contracts (Applicable Law) Bill, 12'h December 1990,513 Hansard HL (4h 
Series) column 1258 (effected by section 2(2) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990). 
Others member States took up this unhelpful option. 
98 Article 22. 
99 Mason and Roebuck (2003): 2-3. There has also been some lobbying to introduce a country of 
origin principle: see Roebuck (2002). This is, in relation to defamation, the suggestion of the 
House of Lords (20034): 130. The commission have made it clear that the country of origin 
principle will not be affected where it has been previously legislated. 
'00 Van Eechoud (2003). 
101 Although much of her reasoning could be extended to other intellectual property rights. 
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for copyright law (stimulating the production and dissemination of 
infonnation 102). 
(i) Thefailure of the lexprotectionis 
Her arguments suggest different laws should apply for each of these four aspects. 
For the first (existence, scope and duration) she suggests that the lex protectionis 
(the country where the intellectual property is used) should govem otherwise there 
"would not be sporadic, but continuous application of intellectual property law 
that is foreign to the place Of USes. 
103 
In respect of initial ownership, she proposes that for copyright works with a single 
author the law of the author's habitual residence should apply. 104 For works with 
joint authors, she recommends either a choice by co-contributors105 or some, 
arbitrary rule like the law of the place of publication. 106 In relation to employees 
she proposes that the law governing the employment contract applies. 107 For the 
third aspect: transfer, she suggests that the governing law should be that 
determined by locating where the characteristic-performance is to take place 108 or, 
where that is not clear, the law with the closest connection. 109 Finally, in relation 
to infringement she argues that the law should follow the traditional lex delicti 
(where there is no cross-border element), 110 but in cases of cross-boarder 
102 Ibid: Chapter 5 and 176. 
103 Ibid. - 178. 
104 Ibid: 185. 
105 Ibid. 186. 
106 Ibid: 188. 
107 Ibid: 192. 
log Ibid: 202. 
109 lbid. 
110 Ibid: 229. 
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infringement she recommends that the law can either be chosen by the parties III 
or should follow the "common habitual residence". ' 12 Where those rules cannot 
apply she proposes a number of possible connecting factors: 
a) where there is one place of use, the law of the place of use; 
b) where there are several places of use in different countries, 
- the law of the country in which the injured party (right owner) has 
his place of habitual residence or place of business, if that is also an 
effective place ofuse, or, if this is not the case: 
- the law of the country where the torffieasor (user) has his habitual 
residence or principal place of business, if that is also an effective 
place of use. 113 
She suggests how the place of use can be detennined: 
one should determine whether its inhabitants are a target audience 
of a communication or act of making available. Factors to be 
considered are, inter alia: 
- the use ofaccess-controlling techniques such as passwords 
on websites, encryption of signals, or IP-mapping; 
- the nature of the information offered (i. e. locally-oriented 
or not); 
- the language in which the communication takes place. 114 
111 Ibid: 213-4 and 229. 
112 Ibid. 214-5 and 229. 
113 Ibid: 229. 
114 Ibid: 229-30. 
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(U) Evaluation, 
It can be seen that certain elements of this proposal are certainly wealth 
maximising. In particular, the suggestion in relation to infhngement, that the 
parties can select the law that will govern their relationship. However, this does 
not relate to other matters such as subsistence and transfer. Thus, it is suggested 
that this proposal does not go far enough. Furthermore, it is quite clear that where 
there is no agreement between the parties the proposal is no clearer and no more 
certain than many of the long list of connecting factors proposed by others (such 
as the Restatement (Second)). This being the case, legal certainty disappears the 
moment that there is no agreement between the parties. It is also unclear whether 
her proposal fits the current law (in the European Community at least) or would 
require a whole-scale reform. 
In conclusion it is quite clear that certain aspects of this proposal should be 
welcomed, but like the others it does not go far enough and in many cases the 
outcome will not maximise wealth. 
D. ALI draft Principles on Jurisdiction and Recognition of 
Judgments 
The Draft Principles presented by the American Law Institute (ALI) have only 
been published as an early draft. 115 This draft is similar to the earlier work of 
... Published as Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002a). A Prelin-dnary Second Draft (January 2004) has 
been prepared and made available on a limited basis, but it is not publicly available and so will not 
be discussed here; also see Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2003). Similarly, Dessemontet (2002) 
discusses some of the provisions. 
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Professor Ginsburg and Professor Dreyfuss on their Draft Convention. 116 Thus 
both proposals will be considered together. The difference between the two is that 
the Draft Convention was intended to be an international agreement, whereas the 
Draft Principles are intended to serve merely as a guide to (American) judges. ' 17 
The Draft Convention also covers a number of matters such as legal aid and the 
extent of judgments which, although worthy of comment, go beyond the scope of 
this work. 
(i) Scope 
The rights covered by the Draft Principles are based on those granted by TRIPS" 8 
(possibly including sound recordings as well, although these are not covered by 
TRIPS, they are covered by the Phonograms Convention (Rome) and the WPPT). 
This provides some uniformity by adopting common values, which may, in time, 
provide a legal order. 119 However, some interesting points stem fr6m this 
approach; TRIPS includes references to rights granted by the Berne Convention 
and the Paris Convention, why then do the Principles not refer directly to those 
Conventions rather than to TRIPS? In addition, requiring signatories to these 
Principles to comply with these treaties ensures that minimum standards of 
protection for proprietors are afforded, but it does not protect users, potentially 
destroying the balance between the owner and user. 120 
116 There is also a parallel project the ALI are running with UNIDROIT on Draft Principles of 
Transnational. Civil Procedure, although covering a much broader remit the UNIDROIT document 
includes similar (much simplified) jurisdictional principles (see Study LXXVI - Doc 11, February 2004). 
117 Hellstadius and Meier-Ewert (2005): 316 (reporting comments of Richard Fentiman on the 
Draft Principles). 
118 Dessemontent (2002): 58-9. Article I (substantive scope) Draft Convention (DC) and Article I 
of the Draft Principles (DP). Also see Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): 1068-9 and 1090-1101. 119 Dessemontent (2002): 58-9. 
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The drafters of the Draft Principles accept that patents might need to be 
considered separately due to a number of objections which they set out. 121 The 
first objection is that the grant of a patent is an act of the State and one State 
should not interfere with the actions of another State. This view has been strongly 
criticised by Dessemontet. 122 He suggests that there is a traditional view that one 
state should not interfere with the acts of another; it should not be given too much 
weight. 123 Firstly, because TRIPS has now unified the differing political and 
economic justifications for patents and therefore historic concerns are now less 
pertinent. 124 Secondly, because the move towards specialised patent courts mean 
that there is less reason for stopping foreign courts (who are specialist) from 
determining the validity of a patent. 125 Where concerns remain, these could be met 
by requiring courts to have certain expertise before they are entitled to invalidate 
patents. 126 
The second objection is that the cost of obtaining patents is so high that should 
"information havens" exist they may invalidate a number of important and 
expensive foreign patents. 127 However, Dessemontent suggests that where 
minimum standards are set by TRIPS there is no chance of "information 
havens"128 coming into being. Furthermore, if courts are willing to accept the 
doctrine of international issue estoppel (or even resjusdicta) then two parties need 
only (and could only) litigate validity once; thus the cost of maintaining patents 
120 Petkova (2004): 182. 
121 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): 1097-8. 
122 Dessemontent (2002): 60. 
123 Ibid: 61; also see discussion in Chapter 6. 
124 Ibid: 60. 
125 ibid. 
126 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): 1097. 
127 ibid. 
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would be reduced worldwide. 129 However they point out that in some countries 
specialist courts deal with the validity of patents and other courts deal with 
infringement, 130 an arrangement that would have to be accommodated. 
The final objection is that the technical nature of patent infringement and the 
varying procedural differences (in particular disclosure) in patent law mean that 
normal courts could not handle them. 13 1 This objection could be avoided by 
requiring only courts with certain expertise to handle the dispute. 
Notwithstanding, the answers to these problems, Dreyfuss and Ginsburg argue 
that the problems with including patents in their Draft Convention are greater than 
the potential benefits. Therefore they propose excluding patents from the scope of 
the Draft Convention 132 (although they are in brackets in the Draft Convention 
and substantively in the Draft Principles). 
(H) Jurisdiction 
The approach adopted by the ALI project is similar to that of the now abandoned 
draft Hague Convention with its "black list" of unacceptable basis of 
jurisdiction 133 and a "grey lisf 'in favour of national basis ofjurisdiction. 134 
128 Ibid. It must be remembered that the transitional provisions for developing countries under the 
TRIPS arrangements end in 2005 (see Part VI of TRIPS). 
129 Although there are different tests for validity worldwide. 
130 This is also true of trade marks. 
131 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2000b): 1097-8. 
132 Ibid. This approach has been criticised by Hankin (2002). 
133 DC Article 16 and DP Article 14. 
134 This list is in DC Article 15 (it allows national jurisdictional rules unless they are on the black 
list), there is no "grey list" in Draft Principles, as published, although it is likely to be re- 
introduced; however, Dessemontent (2002): 61, questions its necessity. 
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The ALI proposes a general rule of jurisdiction based on the defendant's habitual 
residence (residence itself may be enough, although not presence alone 
135) and for 
legal persons the place of corporate establishment. 
136 Alternatively, jurisdiction 
may be based on contract 137 (including "clickwrap" licences 
138) or on the 
defendant's consent (by appearing and not contesting jurisdiction). 
' 39 The Draft 
Principles and the Draft Convention adopt the doctrine of lis pendens, 
140 thus 
where a court is "second seized" of a matter it should stay proceedings, unless the 
court first seized only had "special jurisdiction7'. 
This "special jurisdiction" is set out in Article 5 of the Draft Principles: 
141 
(1) A plaintiffmay bring an infringement action in the courts of- 
- any State where the defendant substantially acted 
(including preparatory acts) in furtherance of the alleged 
infringement, or 
- any State to which the alleged infringement was 
intentionally directed, including those States for which the 
defendant took no reasonable steps to avoid acting in or 
directing activity to that State, or 
135 DC Article 3 and DP Article 2. 
136 Dessemontent (2002): 61-2. 
137 DC Article 4.1 and DP Article 3. L 
138 DC Article 4.2 and DP Article 3.2. 
139 DC Article 5 and DP Article 4. 
140 DC Article 12 and DP Article 11. 
141 DC Article 6 is similar, although it also provides special provisions for Internet Service 
Providers in article 6.4. It was also inspired by article 10 of the 1999 draft Hague Convention and 
it is somewhat similar to article 5 of the Brussels Regulation. 
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- any State in which the alleged infringement foreseeably 
occurred unless the defendant took reasonable steps to avoid 
acting in or directing activity to that State. 
(2) Ifan action is brought in the courts ofa State only on the basis of 
the international direction of the alleged infringement to that State, 
then those courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury 
arising out of unauthorised use occurring in that State, unless the 
injured person has his habitual residence or principal place of 
business in that State. 
(3) If an action is brought in the courts ofa State only on the basis of 
the foreseeable occurrence of the infringement in that State, then 
those courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury 
arising out of unauthorised use occurring in that State. 
This approach presents a number of problems in the digital environment. 
Therefore, each of the three bases of special jurisdiction will be considered. 
"Here the defendant substantially acted (including preparatory acts) in 
furtherance of the alleged infringement" 
This provision is intended to catch those defendants based in one country but who 
make the infringing material available in another. 142 Even if this provision were 
only limited to such circumstances, it would still be very wide reaching. It begs 
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the question: where exactly is a website located? 143 Is it simply located where the 
server is based? If this is the case then many website "owners" would be subject 
to the laws of a country with which they had no purposeful contact. Furthermore, 
jurisdiction on this ground is not limited to infringement within the particular 
forum. 
if, however, this provision is only intended to cover "real world" acts (i. e. those 
over which a person has direct control) then it is unclear what "substantially 
acteV should mean. Is it limited to the location of "upliff"? The answer would 
appear to be no, as "preparatory acts" are included. Therefore, unless the uplift is 
intended to be the preparatory act, this provision must include conduct before 
uplift (however, if the uplift is the preparatory act what are the substantive acts? ) 
Is the purchase of a computer from another jurisdiction a preparatory act? Is 
entering a contract with an Internet Service Provider such an act? 144 
These unanswered questions would make this rule, which at first blush seems 
reasonable, very difficult to implement and, bearing in mind the requirement for 
national implementation, it would lead to widely different approaches to 
establishing jurisdiction. 
142 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): 1108-9. 
143 There is also no provision for "mirror sitee', where the service provider moves popular website 
material around the Internet for the purposes of better management. 
144 This would then lead to an underlying question of the situs of any contract between service 
providers and users, thus creating a whole new problem. 
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"Any State to which the alleged infringement was intentiOnally directed, including 
those Statesfor which the defendant took no reasonable steps to avoid acting in or 
directing activity to that State " 
This provision is intended to cover situations where the defendant "sought to 
communicate the allegedly infringing content to [the) State, or at least did not turn 
away customers who responded to the availability of the communication in that 
State". 145 It is meant to address the problem of "forum manipulatine' by a 
defendant who locates themselves in an "information haven7'146 (presumably a 
State which is not signatory to TRIPS or possibly the Draft Principles). It is 
difficult to argue that someone who deliberately acts in a state, but at the same 
time tries to circumvent its laws, should not be brought to account. 
However, the second limb of this provision (with the drafters' explanation) is far 
more concerning. The word "including! ' suggests that "intention" in this case is 
not what it would normally be understood to cover. It is unlikely that the use of 
the word in this context means "intentional" in the English law sense, whereby the 
act is only intentional where it was the actor's purpose to do something or that 
something was a virtually certain outcome from the actor's conduct; 147 but rather 
in the sense of "general intenf' used in the United States, which is simply a 
general awareness of the relevant factors. 148 Indeed, even the majority US 
standard may be higher than the drafters intended; the second limb's reliance on 
"reasonable steps" suggests that someone acting in a reckless fashion may be 
145 DreyfuSs and Ginsburg (2002b): 1109. 
146 Ibid. 
147 See Rv Woollin (1999) 1 AC 82. 
148 The meaning of intent is a State matter see LaFave (2000): 237-239. 
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sufficient. Thus, the ignorant may be safe, but someone who is aware of this risk 
and takes some steps that prove inadequate (or insufficiently reasonable) would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of every signatory State. 
"Any State in which the alleged infringement joreseeably occurred unless the 
defendant took reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity to that 
State. " 
This basis of jurisdiction is very weak; indeed it may have been intended to 
simply protect passive service providers. 149 As Ginsburg concedes elsewhere, 
once something is posted on the Internet it is foreseeable that it can be accessed 
anywhere else in the world. ' 50 Taken at her word, this means that a person will be 
subject to jurisdiction in every signatory State (albeit limited to infringement 
within its borders) unless they take reasonable steps, whatever these steps might 
be. 
However, the Internet's ubiquity has been criticised as being too SiMpliStiC; 151 the 
fact that it is possible to access material abroad does not mean that it is 
foreseeable that the material will be accessed, particularly if there are linguistic 
differences or a regional element to contents of the website. This criticism is, in 
itself, somewhat simplistic. Primary infringement of intellectual property rights is 
normally based on strict liability-, therefore all that is required, in theory at least, is 
that a person stumbles across a website which they may, upon reading, not wish to 
149 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): II 11. 
150 Ginsburg (1998b): 295. 
151 Reindl (1998): 828. 
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have accessed. The nature of the Internet means that this "accidental stumbling! ' is 
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of making a website available. 
Furthermore, the "reasonable foreseeablity" test may preclude a particular court 
from exercising jurisdiction in relation to a dispute, but it does not preclude an 
intellectual property proprietor from recovering for damage within that 
jurisdiction for infringement. The proprietor simply must sue for the damage in a 
court that does have jurisdiction. 152 
It would therefore appear that two of criteria granting special jurisdiction are 
heavily dependent on what amounts to reasonable steps. At present it is difficult to 
"lock-ouf 'jurisdictions 153 and only the most technically sophisticated are able to 
take such action, everyone else is compelled to take a site down. Indeed, should 
"territorial" borders be resurrected by technical means the benefits provided by 
the information age may well be lost. 
Therefore, although the general bases of jurisdiction suggested by the Draft 
Principles and Draft Convention are entirely sensible, it appears that they are 
substantially undermined by the rules on special jurisdiction. If the proposals were 
adopted, the Internet would not become more certain for users or for intellectual 
property owners. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the cost and the lower the 
value of intellectual property. Therefore, this approach can never maximise 
wealth. 
152 It must be remembered that the central piece of this proposal is the consolidation of claims and 
the court of the defendant's habitual residence may be able to consolidate claims to include those 
from jurisdictions where the activity was not reasonably foreseeable. 153 Although this is likely to be possible in the future see Geist (2001). 
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(M) Consolidation 
One of the other central propositions of the ALI proposal is that claims should be 
subject, in certain conditions, to consolidation. 154 This meets the important 
objective of reducing the number of concurrent proceeding and with it the cost 
associated with civil litigation for both the parties and the public purse, ' 55 but 
without consolidation "courts will likely make up for the shortfall by finding that 
local law covers distant activity". 156 
Firstly, the Draft Principles suggest that a court should only pennit consolidation 
if the jurisdiction was the economic centre of gravity 157 and the court had subject 
matter jurisdiction. ' 58 Secondly, the court should "consider" contractual issues. 159 
Finally, they require that challenges to a court's jurisdiction to consolidate have to 
be raised prior to the first hearing on the merits. 160 As discussed above, 161 the 
most important and practical issue is how to determine the applicable law. Should 
a court consolidate all the claims with a plethora of different laws being 
applicable? Or should there be a single applicable law? Notwithstanding, 
Professors Dreyfass and Ginsburg suggest, with which it is easy to agree, that the 
problems with consolidation can be reduced sufficiently to be outweighed by the 
associated benefits. 
162 
154 DC Article 13 and DP Article 12. 
155 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): 1117. 
156 ibid. 
157 DP Article 12.4(a); the Draft Convention is not as complete in this respect. 158 DP Article 12.4(b); this is based on the current subject matter rules of states, it is not proposed 
to have a new general rule on subject matter jurisdiction: see Drefuss and Ginsburg (2002a): 130. 159 DP Article 12.4(c). 
160 DP Article 12.4(e). 
161 See page 140 et seq above. 
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(iv) Enforcement ofjudgments 
The Draft Principles and the Draft Convention are conventions mixed. A 
convention simple, which generally forms the enforcement regime in most 
treaties, is based on indirect jurisdiction; thus judgments, which are founded on a 
certain agreed basis will be enforced by other contracting countries, but those 
which are not founded on that basis will not be enforceable. In contrast a 
convention double (such as the Brussels Regulation 163) is based on rules of direct 
jurisdiction, whereby the signatory States agree a certain basis of jurisdiction and 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction on any other ground. So where a court is 
enforcing the judgment of another signatory State it is forbidden from examining 
the claim's jurisdictional basis. Whereas, a convention mixed is half way between 
a simple and double convention, it includes certain grounds upon which a 
judgment must be enforced and grounds upon which a judgment must not be 
enforced; however, judgments that are based on other grounds of jurisdiction can 
be enforced at the discretion of national laws. 164 
There are a number of grounds for refusing to recognise a judgment under the 
Draft Convention and the Draft Principles, 165 including where recognition or 
enforcement would be contrary to the State's public policy. 166 However, the Draft 
Convention also allows a court to refuse to recognise a judgment where the 
"choice of law" was arbitrary or unreasonable, for example where the applicable 
law lacked a sufficient relationship to the dispute. 167 
162 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): 1120. 
163 See Chapter 6. 
164 DC Article 22. 
165 These are set out in DC Article 25 and DP Article 17. 166 DC Article 25(l)(g) and DP Article 17(2)(e). 167 DC Article 25(l)(h). 
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(y) Applicable law 
The Draft Principles and the Draft Convention, as published, do not deal with 
issues of applicable law (outside the scope of enforcing judgments). The 
unpublished version, however, does include such rules. 
168 Notwithstanding the 
absence of any provisions in the published drafts, Professor Ginsburg has 
previously discussed how the applicable law should be determined; 
169 this 
discussion is mentioned in the accompanying notes to the Draft Convention 
170 
where it is argued that a judgment which is based on certain choice of law 
principles, should be presumptively reasonable and enforceable. 
Professor Ginsburg suggests, in relation to copyright, the 'applicable law for 
ownership should presumptively be the source country for ownership. 
17 1 Ginsburg 
and Dreyfus argue that this rule is fair because the rights owner will effectively 
"have chosen that country as the state of the work's nationality". 
172 For transfers, 
the applicable law should be that selected by the parties, 173 or where there is no 
selection then the law should be that of characteristic performance. 174 However, 
where a State expresses a strongly protective public policy, it may apply its law as 
a "mandatory ruld". 
175 
168 This is described in Dreyfus and Ginsburg (2003). 
169 See Ginsburg (2001); this is an update of Ginsburg (1998a); she presented an even simpler 
example in Ginsburg (1995): 337-338. 
170 Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): 1145. 
171 Ginsburg (1998a): 334; Dreyfus and Ginsburg (2003): 37. 
172 Dreyfus and Ginsburg (2003): 37. 173 Aid: 37-8. 
174 Ibid: 38. The problems with the characteristic performance test are described at page 330 et seq 
below. 
175 For a discussion of this point, in relation to copyright, see Ginsburg (1998b): 370-373. 
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She suggests that where this does not apply the rules for infringement should be 
detennined as follows: 
(1) The law applicable to the entirety of a defendant's alleged 
Internet infringement is determined asfollows: 
- If the alleged infringing content is found on a website, the 
law of the country in which the operator of the website has 
its residence or principal place of business, or 
- If the allegedly infringing content is not found on a 
website, such as through file sharing, the law of the country 
of the residence or principle place of business of the person 
or entity that initiated the communication. 
(2) Notwithstanding W, if a third country is shown to have a more 
significant relationship with the controversy -for example, if a third 
country is shown to have been the principal target of the infringing 
communication - then the law applied to the entirety of the 
defendant's alleged Internet infringement is the law of that third 
country. 
(3) Notwithstanding ##l and 2, if the infringing communication was 
intentionally directed to a multiplicity of countries, in such a way 
that the country of initiation lacks a significant relationship to the 
dispute, but no single third country can be shown to be the principal 
target, or to have the most significant relationship to the dispute, 
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then the laws of each country to which the communication was 
intentionally directed are applicable to that portion of the 
infringement occurring within each territory. 
176 
"The law of the country in which the operator of the has its residence orprincipal 
place ofbusiness " 
This approach is based on that adopted by the Satellite and Cable Retransmission 
Directive. 177 This directive mandates that the communication to the public of a 
satellite broadcast only occurs in the country of , Uplift,,. 178 This approach has 
been broadly accepted within the European Community and would, therefore, 
appear to be a sensible starting point. 
However, there is a real difference between communications to the public by 
satellite and other acts. To broadcast a signal from a satellite is not only expensive 
but it is limited to a very small group of broadcasters. Therefore having a single 
country regulating that broadcast is practicable and easy to enforce as there are 
few people involved and the locations and nature of transmissions are well 
established and limited. Furthermore, the "footprinf' of each transmission is 
limited to a small number of countries and so regulation for right holders is 
relatively straightforward. In contrast on the Internet material can be uploaded on 
any computer and thereafter it can be transmitted anywhere in the world. 
176 These are set out at Dreyfuss and Ginsburg (2002b): 1145. 177 Directive 93/83/EEC. 
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Another concern is that there is a real risk of a person locating their websites in 
"information havens"; however, it must be remembered that a law would only be 
applicable if the relevant country was a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement. 
179 
This reduces, if not eliminates, the risk of creating such havens. However, if the 
claim is consolidated a website operator would still be able to establish 
themselves in a jurisdiction where the conduct was permitted. Thereby potentially 
undermining the interests of right owner, who will have no input or ability to 
control the use of information once it is uplifted onto the Internet. This approach 
would significantly weaken their intellectual property rights. 
"A third country is shown to have a more significant relationship with the 
controversy , 180 
The problems with using "significant relationship" to determine the applicable 
law have been discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to the Restatement (Second) of 
the Conflict of Laws and they will not be rehearsed here. 
"The laws of each country to which the communication was intentionally directed 
are applicable to thatPortion of the infringement occurring within each territory " 
178 Article I of the Directive. 
179 The proposal was previously limited to countries which are signatories to the Berne 
Convention, TRIPS and the WCT. It also included a catch all, so that where the relevant country 
was not a signatory the lexfori would be applied: see Ginsburg (2001): 12. 
180 Dreyfus and Ginsburg (2003): 37, appear to have divided up this factor into (a) "any country 
whose market is significantly impacted by the alleged conducf'; and (b) the law of the "country 
with the greatest connection to the claim as a whole". The problems with the new (a) are obvious. 
What is a significant impact on the market? How do you define a market? (does it include the 
market for the particular patent or copyright work or something else? ) 
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This would make consolidation of a claim very difficult. It leads to a result which 
is both inefficient and uncertain for all parties involved. This uncertainty arises 
because the rights owners may simply "cherry pick" the lucrative jurisdictions, 
leaving the user to make decisions that are the most favourable to the right 
holder 181 to avoid having to litigate in some jurisdictions. 
E. Max Planck Institute jurisdiction proposal 
The Max Planck Institute (MPI) proposal is also intended to carry forward the 
work of the Hague Convention. Like the Hague Convention, it takes a holistic 
approach and applies to all civil and commercial matters; only Article 12a 182 
applies to intellectual property. The MPI proposal copies certain aspects of the 
Draft Principles, in particular the general rule of jurisdiction is that of the 
defendant's habitual residence and it takes a similar approach to upholding choice 
of court clauses. Further, paragraph 6 of Article 12a of the MPI proposal is very 
similar to Article 5 of the Principles. It is, therefore, not worth re-considering the 
merits of this approach. 
183 
(i) General rule 
The general rule, set out in paragraph 3 of Article 12a, is that only the State where 
the right is registered or has otherwise acquired protection should have 
jurisdiction. In addition the State where the defendant has their habitual residence 
and any court selected by the party may also exercise jurisdiction. These courts 
have jurisdiction over everything, including invalidity. 
"' See page 138 above. "2 Kur (2005). 
New Answers or New Questions? 208 
(H) Ruling on validity 
The substantial difference between the MPI proposal and others is that it permits, 
in some circumstances, a court to rule on the validity of foreign intellectual 
property rights. The general rule, set out in paragraph 1 of Article 12a, is that the 
courts of the state where the right is registered have exclusive jurisdiction, "unless 
the judgment would only become effective inter partes". The effect of this is that 
where the registered right would be terminated by the court's judgment then the 
courts of the country of registration would have exclusive jurisdiction, but a court 
can hear a matter if the determination of validity only has effect between the 
parties. This, it has been suggested, means that the freedom to grant a particular 
court jurisdiction does not prevail over the public interest, when only the 
registering state should have jurisdiction. 184 Finally it should be noted that those 
proposing inter partes validity rulings accept that their proposition may not be 
acceptable to the intellectual property community. 185 
Notwithstanding, foreign courts would always have jurisdiction to determine 
invalidity as an incidental question (paragraph 2 of Article 12a), but not even the 
parties are bound such a detennination. This approach enables foreign courts to 
determine validity, facilitating litigation in the most efficient forum (which will 
not necessarily be the country in which the right is registered). The only drawback 
of this proposal is that others will not be aware of the decision (particularly where 
183 Paragraph 7 of Article 12a deals with the problems arising from multiple ownership and res 
judicata, this provision will not be discussed here as it is still tentative and the present draft is 
somewhat confusing. 184 Peukert (2005): 74. 
185 Kur (2005): 319. 
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judgments are not routinely reported) and so may avoid using an invention or 
mark, which to all intents and purposes is not protected. 
(iii) Consolidation 
Like the Draft Principles the MPI Proposal provides for the consolidation of 
infringement actions in a single court. ' 86 However, in contrast to the general 
provision in the Draft Principles, the MPI only allows consolidation where the 
infringement took place on the Internet. Such consolidation is only allowed where 
an "essential parV of the activities took place in the forum and the defendant's 
activities were not aimed solely at the domestic market. 187 
An "essential parV' of an activity takes place in the forum if either the activities 
causing the infringement occurred in the forum, or activities caused a "substantial 
number of infringements, or caused substantial harm in the forum state'. 
188 It is 
difficult to know what a "substantial number of infringements" means. Any 
Internet activity may lead to a number of unconnected third persons downloading 
a particular item. Does this amount to a substantial number of infringements? In 
other words, do the infringements have to be committed by the potential 
defendant? Is it enough if the defendant is a secondary infringer, or knows about 
the primary infringement, but does not qualify as a secondary infringer? 189 
Is printing out 10 copies of a book a substantial number of infringements? What 
about 1000 copies? What if the expected circulation of the book is very low, does 
& 
186 Article 12a(5). 
187 Kur (2005), see explanatory note on the proposal at 329. 188 Ibid. 330. 
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10 copies become substantial? The problem with a "substantial" test is that it will 
be interpreted differently by different states. Those courts, in particular in 
Germany, which have tended to use statistical tests are likely to come to very 
different views to the more permissive courts in England. 
Similar questions arise in the application of a "substantial harm" test. Han-n to 
whom? Presumably the claimant, but what if the claimant has not entered a 
particular market? Is any harm suffered? Does the harm have to be economic? Or 
should it include moral rights? What if substantial harm may be caused in the 
future? 190 Is that sufficient? This leaves an obvious problem, how can one know 
the extent of any harm before it is caused? These questions emphasise the 
uncertainty that result from this sort of test; such uncertainty is obviously 
undesirable and cannot maximise wealth. 
IV. Concluding remarks 
It can be seen that although many of these proposals discussed above add much to 
scholarship in this field, none satisfactorily address the problems discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 3; in particular, none of these proposals provide sufficient ex ante 
certainty. The next chapter sets out ten propositions, which fit within the 
framework of wealth maximisation and efficiency. 
189 For example, if someone could be enjoined under the implementing provisions for Article 8(3) 
of the Information Society Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC). 
190 Common where an injunction is sought. 
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Intellectual Property Meets Private 
International Law: A New Proposal 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters set out the theoretical aspect of intellectual property and 
private international law. It was suggested in Chapter 3 that the most efficient 
approach to the proper selection of jurisdiction and of applicable law was working 
within a contractual paradigm. That paradigm can be divided into two types of 
agreement: those stemming from bilateral negotiations and those resulting from a 
unilateral offer; these will be called respectively the bilateral paradigm and the 
unilateral paradigm. 
This chapter will set out in more detail the theory of efficiency for both the 
bilateral and the unilateral paradigm and within that framework a number of 
propositions will be made. Each Proposition will be justified within the theories 
of both efficient contract law and efficient choice of law. 
In the following chapters each of the propositions set out in this chapter will be 
assessed to determine its compatibility with international treaties; regional laws; 
211 
Intellectual Property Meets Private International Law: A New Proposal 212 
and the laws of the four target jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, the United 
States, France and Gennany. 
11. The bilateral paradigm 
In Chapter 3 it was discussed how a consensual contractual agreement would 
always maximise wealth and efficiency, and how wealth maximisation is not 
based on the state ordering parties to act in an efficient fashion but on an incentive 
to act out of self-interest., Thus, contract law does not provide for efficiency 
directly, instead it provides incentives for acting efficiently in the future. ' 
Fundamentally, an exchange is efficient because both parties get something they 
want in exchange for something they did not want as much. Therefore, if 'A' has 
a cat and 'B' a dog and they swap; provided 'A' wants a dog more than a cat and 
'B' wants the cat more than the dog, both will be better off. The maximising 
nature of exchange is only satisfied when the parties are bargaining co-operatively 
and the enforcement of the contract has no impact on outside parties. 2 
However the efficiency of consensual exchange does not preclude an efficient 
compulsory exchange. Thus, at first blush, if 'A' values the cat at ES, but 'B' 
values it at E10, the compulsory taking of 'A's cat and giving it to V will 
increase the overall societal wealth by j5.3 
1 Smith (2004): 109; It is outside the scope of this work to set out and explain contract law in turns 
of efficiency, for a detailed discussion see Kronman and Posner (1979) and Smith (2004). 2 Polinsky (2003): 29 n. 16. 3 The efficiency of compulsory transfers is one of the arguments used by Dworkin to criticise 
wealth maximisation: see Dworkin (1986): 242-6. 
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However, if compulsory taking were permitted in such circumstances, on the 
whole it would not maximise societal wealth. Firstly, if a person has something 
which is worth E5 to them, which they know may be compulsorily taken, then 
they will spend up to E5 (the value of the goods) to try and prevent that taking. 
This in turn means that exchange only maximises wealth if the value to the 
acquirer is greater than EIO. However, this then unravels, as the first acquirer 
would spend up to ElO to protect the thing. However, if they have to spend more 
than E10 to protect the thing, they would not acquire it in the first place (as it 
would cost more to acquire and keep it than it is worth to them). Similarly, if they 
do acquire it and someone else values the object at E20, they would acquire it and 
the whole problem starts again. However, by this point, the cost of protecting the 
thing would be E35 (f5 + LIO + E20) for something which is only worth E20. In 
other words, only if something were not further acquired after the compulsory 
acquisition would such a transfer remain efficient. 
Secondly, allowing the compulsory acquisition in a particular case where it 
increases social welfare would, in the long run, mean an overall societal waste. If 
the compulsory acquisition were by means of "self-help" then in many cases the 
acquirer would take the thing - when in fact it did not increase wealth; or if it 
were by means of State action then the cost of assessing whether a compulsory 
exchange is efficient would make the exchange overly expensive and often 
inefficient. 
The belief that exchange increases wealth does not necessarily mean that the 
principles of contract law actually increase wealth. The nub of efficient contract 
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law is ensuring that an agreement is mutually beneficial: an agreement is mutually 
beneficial if the parties voluntarily agreed to it and did so on the basis of good 
information. 4 Thus, the rules of contract law, according to efficiency theory, are to 
ensure that agreements falling within that category are enforced. This protection 
will create incentives for wealth maximising agreements to come. into being and to 
5 
ensure such agreements are kept. 
111. The propositions applicable to the bilateral 
paradigm 
Now that the theory of a bilateral contractual paradigm has been further explored, 
it is appropriate to'start working through the various propositions. 
000 First Proposition 
Parties should befree to select thejurisdiction that will adjudicate any 
intellectual property dispute. 
In Chapter 3 it was explained how a person would always chose to litigate in the 
jurisdiction which they believe would be most advantageous to them. ' It was also 
explained how such a choice may not be the most efficient forum (that being 
where the overall cost to both parties is minimised). But an ex ante decision, with 
full information, freely reached between two parties, promotes a wealth 
4 Smith (2004): 113. 
5 The method used by contract law, damages, is only one possible solution, but in theory it would 
be possible to use other methods such as fines or criminal sanctions. The argument against this is 
that damages minimise efficiency loss between the parties, whereas a fine may have the same 
overall societal effect on efficiency, but would leave one party potentially suffering. 
6 See pages 137 and 157 et seq above. 
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maximising solution. 8 As part of this decision, any disadvantage arising from that 
jurisdictional choice can be accommodated as pad of a jurisdiction trade. 9 
Alternatively, agreement can be reached ex post in the form of submission to a 
forum's jurisdiction. 
Thus, it is clear that should two parties negotiate a settlement before any dispute 
arises (i. e. ex ante) they are likely to select the most efficient jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, should a jurisdiction give a benefit to one party (for example, 
because it is in their home jurisdiction) they may have to give something in return. 
Thus, following the principles set out in Chapter 3, the First Proposition is 
efficient. 
However, it is necessary to make it clear that the agreement must be freely entered 
into. If one party can compel another party to enter into the agreement, by reasons 
of duress, undue influence, fraud or otherwise, then that would not be an 
"agreemenf' which is freely reached by the parties. Such an agreement would 
neither be efficient nor fall within the First Proposition. 
Indeed, this Proposition fits within the traditional frameworks as well; 10 according 
to the power theory, where two parties have contracted that a particular court 
should have jurisdiction then their submission grants the court the necessary 
power. Similarly, the fairness theory, which requires the court to find a sufficient 
number of "contacts" to grant jurisdiction, considers a contractual clause to be, of 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9'See page 147 above. 
10 Except the almost defunct allegiance theories. 
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itself, a significant contact. Therefore, the First Proposition does not conflict with 
the traditional theories of jurisdiction, although it does give greater weight to an 
agreement between the parties than is usually given by the proponents of those 
theories. 
Second Proposition 
Parties should befree to select the applicable law that will govern any intellectual 
property dispute. 
The arguments in support of the Second Proposition are similar to the first. As set 
out in Chapter 3, allowing the parties to select the law applicable to their contract 
mitigates the effects of inefficient laws. " This means the parties can contract 
around inefficient rules and so minimise the societal loss they cause. 12 It was also 
made clear that the selection of the applicable law must be ex ante and not ex post; 
ensuring that the parties chose the rules that, on balance, are most likely to benefit 
both of them. 
Using this basic premise it is proposed that the law governing the intellectual 
property itselfshould be selected by the parties. For example, X wishes to licence 
their invention, which is patented in most countries of the world, to Y. It would be 
efficient if X and Y agree in the patent licence that US patent law governs the 
invention's working, irrespective of where it actually is worked. Thus, if after this 
grant X, who worked the invention in France, goes outside the scope of their 
licence then the application of US law would determine whether the patent had 
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been infringed (or was valid). 13 This would be irrespective of which court heard 
the dispute or the fact that all the relevant activities took place in France, where 
the French patent (brevet d7nvention) was in force. Further, if a person in United 
Kingdom (where there is no patent) uses the patent on the Internet they would be 
liable for infringement abroad, but not in the United Kingdom; they can only 
avoid liability if they are not infringing US law or alternatively their invention 
cannot be used (the relevant website accessed) in a country where the patent is in 
force. 
It is likely to be wealth maximising where two parties freely agree that a particular 
law will govern the extent and working of some intellectual property. The starting 
point for the property owner would be to select the law that gives the widest 
property right and awards the highest level of damages for infringement. For the 
licensee, it would be the law that grants the narrowest property right and the 
lowest level of damages for infringement. Despite the "monopolistic nature" of 
intellectual property it may have a close market substitute 14 and so the two parties 
would both have an incentive to compromise. This being the case the parties will 
negotiate until they select an applicable law that provides the greatest mutual 
benefit. 
(i) Bundling 
It has been discussed how good laws are "bundled" with the bad and that only 
where a particular law places a heavy burden on someone will the parties contract 
11 Seepage 158 above. 
12 Ibid. 
13 In many ways this could be considered to be similar to the old English fiction (see page 83 
above). 
Intellectual Property Meets Private International Law: A New Proposal 218 
around it-15 The problem of bundling is greatest where it includes different, 
unconnected, laws. However, intellectual property, unlike many other areas of 
law, is pre-bundled. In other words, each country's intellectual property laws 
create an internal balance between the user and the proprietor; 16 therefore, the 
problems of pre-bundling are minimised. However, should a particular rule from 
one intellectual property statute be unusually inefficient (for example the US 
patent rule which grants triple compensatory damages17) parties can contract 
around it. 0 
This "property selecting' approach means that those jurisdictions which are 
inefficient would either have to change their laws, or find that they are being used 
to govem less and less of the transactions that occur within their territory. A 
complete freedom of selection would, eventually, lead to increasing global 
harmonisation of intellectual property law. 18 This would occur both for theoretical 
and practical reasons. 
14 See Van den Bergh (1998): 25-26. 
15 See page 159 above. 
16 A particularly good example of this relates to the clash between copyright and freedom of 
speech. Courts both sides of the Atlantic have had problems trying to reconcile the two. Yet courts 
have suggested that, in all but the most extreme case, the balance is already within the statute (for 
a fuller discussion of the internal balance within the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 see 
the author's discussion of the public interest defence: Johnson (2005)). 
17 See US Patents Act (1994) §284 permits the recovery of triple compensatory damages if the 
infringement was wilful. Triple compensatory damages are inefficient because they encourage 
patent proprietors to delay commencing proceedings. To demonstrate, imagine a third party's 
infringement of a patent was costing the patent proprietor E50 per day. If compensatory damages 
were paid the proprietor would receive E50 for each day of infringement; but if triple 
compensatory damages are paid they receive E150 for each day of infringement, so making a profit 
of flOO per day as long as infringement continues. The proprietor, therefore, has an incentive to 
wait until the last moment before starting proceedings (i. e. just before the end of the limitation 
period): this explanation is modified from an anti-trust example in Posner (2003): 330 and a 
similar example in Spiller (1986). 
18 This aspiration is similar to Von Savigny's, indeed like him it may be possible to see a time 
when property selection is no longer necessary as all laws are functionally the same. 
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(H) Evolution ofintellectual property law 
Imagine the patent laws of the United Kingdom were found to be, in terms of 
validity and infringement, the most efficient. Over time parties would become 
aware of this efficiency and so more and more parties would select UK law as 
being the applicable law. If other countries do not want their laws to become a 
dead letter they would select the efficient parts of UK law and incorporate them 
into their own law. If one of those countries' laws became more efficient than the 
UK then, in time, the UK would take similar steps. This would gradually lead to 
an efficient intellectual property law evolving. 
The common law went through similar "evolution" or, as the Solicitor General 
(the future Lord Mansfield) suggested in Omychund v Barker, 19 "the common 
law... works itself purd'9.20 There are three theories, which are mutually 
supporting, why the common law has become efficient: demand theories, supply 
theories and the judicial theory. 
The demand theories 21 suggest that the inefficient laws are more likely to be 
litigated either deliberately (to create an efficient precedent) or simply because the 
rule is more costly. Thus the higher incidence of litigation involving inefficient 
rules means that they are more likely to be honed or even changed than efficient 
rules and so in time the system becomes efficient. The supply theories 22 are based 
19 (1744) 1 Atk. 21,26 ER 15. 
20 Ibid at 23. 
21 See Rubin (1977); Priest (1977). 
22 See Zywicki (2003). 
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on the "competition7 between suppliers of law (the courts), 23 each supplier 
ensuring that it is efficient to attract business. 
Finally, and unconvincingly, Richard Posner, argues that the common law is 
efficient because the judges may as well decide cases in terms of efficiency as 
they have no other criteria to use. 24 
Aside from this abstract evolution theory, if courts outside the UK started to apply 
a foreign (selected) law more than domestic law, local expertise would increase in 
the foreign law and diminish in the domestic. Over time this would lead to 
pressure from those in the professions to ainend the law so that they were able to 
apply the familiar foreign rules as routine domestic rules. 
(W) Procedural and substantive rules 
The Second Proposition only extends to the selection of the substantive law. It 
does not cover the selection of procedural laws (although it should be possible to 
select an individual rule: such as disclosure). This is because requiring a court to 
follow completely alien procedures would be very slow and cumbersome (as 
foreign law experts would be required) not to mention prone to error (as the 
advocates and the judge would stumble blindly). One only needs to imagine an 
American adversarial jury trial being transformed into a German inquisitorial 
hearing to see what the problems might be. The procedures of any local court are 
23 In England the competition was between Kings Bench, Chancery, Star Chamber, High 
Commission, Admiralty and so forth: Berman and Reid (1996); in the United States the decision of 
Swift v Tyson (1842) 41 US I meant that the Federal common law "competeV with the states' 
common law. This competition ended with Erie v Tompkins (1938) 304 US 64, where the Supreme Court decided that there was no Federal common law. 24 Posner (2003): 533-4. 
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very complicated, ranging from time limits to case-management and from 
advocacy style to the role of the judge. Therefore, to minimise judicial error the 
lexfori should determine procedural requirements. This may increase uncertainty 
as the result of a legal dispute often turns on procedure rather than on substantive 
law '25 but it is a cost worth incurring. Further, when the jurisdiction is selected 
under the First Noposition, the parties are selecting the lexfori, and with it the 
procedural law, thus it is still likely to be the most efficient choice. 
On a point of classification, there are always doubts about whether a particular 
rule is procedural or substantive, for example is a limitation period procedural or 
substantive? What about disclosure? This problem could be solved either by 
waiting for precedent to evolve (which again leads to some uncertainty), or 
alternatively a state could create "official" lists of certain procedural requirements 
which attach to their substantive law. Thus, if a person selects US law they may 
also have to comply with the disclosure requirements at the same time. 
(N) The traditional theories 
The Second Proposition does not fit within the traditional theories that consider 
state interests to be the normative basis of selecting the applicable law. Obviously, 
if an infringement took place in France it would be difficult to argue that it is in 
the French State's interest (or comparative impairment) to have US law applied. 
Similarly, it would be difficult to treat France as having a less significant 
25 See Jacob (2000): 507. 
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relationship with the dispute than the United States. 
26 There would also be logical 
problems applying vested rights 27 or comity theories to the Second Proposition. 
In contrast, the political rights approach would permit a law to be applied to a 
28 
person where they have consented (by contract). Similarly, theories based on 
reasonable expectations would permit a contractual clause to determine applicable 
law. 29 Allocation theories are not averse to allowing contractual selection clauses, 
but although approaches vary from country to country, it would be contrary to 
most allocation rules to apply such a clause in relation to intellectual property 
disputes. 30 Finally, and unsurprisingly, English pragmatism widely supports 
contractual freedom. Therefore, on balance, it appears that the Second Proposition 
would be contrary to some, but not all, of the traditional theories. 
Third Proposition 
Only one law may be selected and that law should have universal effect. 
The Third Proposition is, in effect, only an extension of the Second Proposition; 
however, it is of such import that it warrants separate explanation. "Universal 
effect" should be qualified. It is not proposed that a person should be able to 
obtain a French patent and then enforce it in other jurisdictions without applying 
26 See § 187 of the Restatement (Second). 
27 The Restatement (First), expressly forbids such selection, although Dicey permitted parties to 
choice the applicable law of a contract: rule 149, sub-rule 1 in Dicey (1896): 567. 
28 See page 83 above. 
29 See page 81 above. 
30 Although it is compatible with the "modern! ' method promoted by Van Eechourd. 
Intellectual Property Meets Private International Law: A New Proposal 223 
for a patent therein. 31 However it is proposed that, if a person has a patent in force 
in France, the UK and the US, but not in Italy then they should be able to apply 
French law to the dispute in France, the UK and the US, but there would be no 
infringement in Italy (because there was no patent). 32 
Why notpropose a universal law? 
In the first part of this chapter it was explained why consensual exchange is 
wealth maximising. This applies equally to exchange between states, in the form 
of treaties, as it does to exchange between individuals 33 and to multi-party 
contracts as it does to multi-lateral treaties. Therefore, if a compromise could be 
reached between the various nations of the world on substantive intellectual 
property law, it would, at first blush, be wealth maximising (at least in respect of 
the State's interests). 
The reason this approach may not be wealth maximising (totally ignoring the any 
cultural and political problems) are the high transaction and transition CoStS. 34 The 
extent of these costs is such that a universal law is too expensive to be 
acceptable. 
35 
31 This also means that domestic law would apply in relation to the grant of a registered right, 
although not for invalidity or infringement. 
32 Problems may arise in relation to differing patent claims as different claims may be set out in 
different patent specifications across the globe. 
33 States may be made up of a number of individuals with varying interests, however organisations 
and individuals also have multiple motivations. Therefore it is entirely consistent to consider 
treaties as contracts between states: Posner (2003): 13 64 1. 
34 See page 179 above. 
35 In the long run, the costs may be lower, but quite how long that long run will be is quite a 
different matter. 
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(H) Consolidation 
The advantages of consolidation were discussed above. 36 The Third Proposition is 
the basis for this consolidation. If a chosen law has universal effect then it means 
that there is no need to consolidate claims legally but onlyfactually. This needs 
further elucidation. If an infringement case involves infringement in a number of 
different states, following the Third Proposition it would make no legal difference 
whether that infringement only occurred in one state, ten states or one hundred 
states. This is because wherever the infringement occurred it would be governed 
by only one law: the law selected by the parties. However, factually it would still 
be necessary to examine each act of infringement; using this information, 
daffiages could be assessed globally. 37 
(W) Certainty 
The second part of the Third Proposition means that, in practice, there is no need 
to determine the applicable law, as it would be pre-determined by contract. 
Universality results in certainty. The economic advantages of certainty are 
obvious. First, it means that enforcement costs would be lower, as cases only have 
to be determined according to one legal regime. This is not only true if the claims 
are consolidated in one court (although the saving is greatest in such a case), but 
even when they are not consolidated there are non-duplication savings. If a 
decision is made in one court according to one law then the parties have an 
indication of the likely outcome of the dispute in another jurisdiction - after all 
the law applied would be same - thereby encouraging settlement and avoiding 
duplicated litigation. 
36 See page 140 above. 
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Further, universality means both parties would be able to predict in advance the 
extent 38 of the relevant property right. This enables them to make more informed, 
and so more efficient, choices about their use of intellectual property. In other 
words, it would reduce access costs 39 and in some cases search CoStS. 
40 
(N) Permitting territorial division is inefficient 
The Third Proposition appears to be at odds with the Second Proposition, which 
would suggest that the parties should be free to agree to divide the world into 
different areas (e. g. activity in the Americas governed by US law, activity in 
Europe governed by French law). However, one of the arguments in favour of 
consolidation is that it would minimise the cost of legal error. This was explained 
in Chapter 3 in terms of the cost of proving foreign law; 41 although obvious, it is 
important to reiterate that the greater the number of laws that have to be applied 
by a court the more likely it is to make mistakes. These mistakes involve a cost 
both to the parties and to society. Judicial error means the parties would have to 
pay the legal costs for the appeals and re-trials, and society has to pay the cost of 
running the tribunals who hear these matters. 
Using the "rules" approach rather than judging each individual "act", " it is 
arguable that globally applying a single law is more efficient than allowing 
multiple law selection. This is because of the reduced costs associated with 
37 In many intellectual property disputes an injunction is a far more important remedy than 
damages. The enforcement of the injunction would be possible under the Fifth Proposition. 
39 It is impossible to be aware of the exact extent of any property right, even when the applicable 
law is known. 
39 See page 129 above. 
40 Seepage 131 above. 
41 Seepage 139 above. 
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judicial error and complex procedural requirements, but of course this Proposition 
does not prohibit parties agreeing to "turn off' a particularly inefficient legal rule. 
(y) Particular issues 
The scholarship in this area suggests that there are four matters that should be 
considered in relation to choice of law and intellectual property: existence of the 
right; its scope and duration; initial ownership; transfer and infringement. These 
will briefly be considered in relation to the Third Proposition. 
Of these four matters most are easy to put into the context of the Third 
Proposition. In relation to scope, transfer and infringement, the single applicable 
law would govem all matters. The selected applicable law would not apply to the 
existence of registered rights as this would be detennined by national registries. 
However, in relation to unregistered rights (e. g. copyright) problems do exist. If 
the proprietor selects an applicable law where the unregistered right would not 
exist (because it was not original enough) then it would be fair to apply that 
standard across the world and so detennine that the right exists nowhere (even 
though it may have existed in other countries had their law been selected). This is 
because, as a general rule, this approach promotes wealth, even if an individual 
erroneous selection may not maximise wealth. 
In contrast, if a person selects a universal law with a low level of originality then 
it may grant copyright protection in countries with higher standards of originality, 
where copyright would not nonnally exist. Allowing protection to be granted in 
42 See page 97 above. 
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relation to such countries would conflict with the suggestion above that - in 
relation to registered rights - the right cannot be enforced where it does not exist. 
However, if subsistence of copyright needed to be assessed individually for each 
relevant country then this would lead to uncertainty (in contrast to registered 
rights where existence or non-existence of a particular right is abSolUte43 and the 
cost of proving that existence is minimal (official records are easily accessible). 
Tbus, a court would have to determine whether or not an original work was 
created in accordance with each relevant law. This determination attracts 
substantial costs associated with both multiplicity and judicial error. In any event, 
in relation to the most valuable works (books, films, music and computer 
software) the standard of originality is nonnally not likely to be at issue. 
Furthermore, the overall global societal cost of requiring users to determine 
whether the work is sufficiently original in terms of each national law would 
greatly outweigh the cost to users who have to comply with copyright restrictions 
in countries where, but for the selection of the relevant law, there would be no 
copyright. Finally, the bundling of rights generally means that laws with low 
ongin ty standards normally include a greater number of copyright exceptions. 
On balance, therefore, allowing copyright to have effect in countries with higher 
standards of originality (where the work does not meet that standard) maximises 
wealth. 
In contrast to initial subsistence, the duration of unregistered rights is easy to 
determine. As duration is absolute there would be only minimal costs associated 
43 Of course, a right may have been registered which is in fact invalid. 
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with determining whether copyright exists in a particular State and so there is 
little room for judicial error. 
The only real problem with this approach is initial ownership, although it is more 
of a problem in relation to the unilateral paradigm. It is a problem because it has 
to be clear who can contract with other parties in the first place. However, it is 
possible to argue that the selected applicable law should govern ownership and 
any disputed ownership can be dealt with by way of a separate action between the 
real owner and the purported owner. Indeed, ownership disputes would normally 
be between an employer and the employee and therefore the employee's contract 
should be able to deal with any acquired intellectual property rights (although, in 
practice, this is likely to be limited to copyright). 
(vi) Traditional theories 
There is no point considering any traditional theories as the Third Proposition is 
completely incompatible with every theory as, in effect, it removes the need for 
actually choosing which law applies. Indeed, to many traditional lawyers this sort 
44 of approach would be considered deeply subversive. 
Fourth Proposition 
No aspect of intellectual property law can be considered to be a mandatory rule 
for the purposes ofprivate international law. 45 
44 Fentiman (2005): 143. 
45 This Proposition also applies to the unilateral paradigm. 
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In Chapter 3 it was explained how it would be contrary to economic principles to 
overturn a party's choice of law 46 because such choices are usually wealth 
maximising. It was also explained that parties might avoid mandatory rules, if 
they so chose, by selecting an appropriate jurisdiction. 47 Notwithstanding, the two 
economic justifications for mandatory rules are: where the parties agreed to 
contractual tenns that were against their interests; and where the legislators are 
better judges of preferences than the parties. Thus, mandatory rules are there to 
protect a party when they cannot protect themselves. 
It cannot be denied that authors, inventors and other creators of intellectual 
property may need protecting from the publishers and producers' because creators 
may have little or no bargaining power . 
48 However, on the whole, those who 
exploit intellectual property are not the creators but significant market players. 49 
Therefore, in relation to consensual agreements between the exploiter of 
intellectual property and the user, there is no need for any mandatory rules to 
trump the applicable law selection. 
The existence of mandatory rules makes it uncertain whether a particular law 
would be applied to a dispute. It was mentioned above5o that where the application 
of laws becomes uncertain the deterrent effect of those laws diminishes and it 
becomes difficult for parties to balance the incentives and disincentives. Indeed, 
it is self-evident that the Second and Third Propositions would be substantially 
46 See page 154 above. 47 ibid. 
48 See for example: Panayiotou v Sony (1994) EMLR 229; Elton John v James (1985) [1991] FSR 
397. 
49 Even in Germany, where the author's economic rights cannot be assigned, the exploitation is not 
undertaken by an author, but by their "exclusive licensee". 
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undermined if mandatory laws could be used to trump the selection of the 
universal law. In other words, the Second and Yhird Propositions are dependent 
on the Fourth Proposition. Indeed, the application of the First and Second 
Propositions would create a mechanism to the parties to avoid mandatory rules, 
removing any need for them to take extra-judicial steps to avoid the application of 
those rules. 51 
Few, if any, of the traditional approaches would be compatible with this 
proposition. The various state interests approaches require the local law to be 
balanced with the foreign law, which this proposition expressly prohibits (even 
where an important state interest is involved). The allocation approach prohibits 
the application of a law which a state considers to be repugnant to public policy, 52 
which would be contrary to the Fourth Proposition. Indeed, only the English 
pragmatists would provide any support for the Fourth Proposition. 
Although this may appear to be in conflict with almost all traditional approaches 
the conflict is mitigated by the globalisation of intellectual property and, in 
particular, the TRIPS agreement. This globalisation means that intellectual 
property laws are converging and so fewer and fewer mandatory laws should ever 
need to be applied. 
50 At page 136 above. 
51 See page 154 et seq above. 
52 Including mandatory laws or lois de police. 
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Fifth Proposition 
Any properjudgment made on the basis of these propositions shall be enforceable 
in every State and shall not be subject to challenge on its merits. 53 
The Fifth Proposition promotes efficiency: firstly, by increasing jurisdictional 
choice, secondly by reducing duplicated legislation, and finally by avoiding 
inefficient transfers. The limitation of the Fifth Proposition to "proper judgments" 
means that judgments obtained in an improper jurisdiction (e. g. one not chosen by 
the parties) or obtained by fraud are not included. 
The First Proposition makes it clear that the parties should choose the jurisdiction 
in which to litigate. This only has real meaning where a judgment obtained in a 
chosen jurisdiction can be enforced elsewhere. Therefore, the Fifth Proposition 
supports the first by encouraging efficient jurisdictional choice. Similarly, 
prohibiting challenge on the merits ensures that re-litigation is minimised; thereby 
minimising the cost of enforcement. This cost cannot be entirely eliminated as it 
would still be possible to challenge the jurisdictional basis of the judgment or to 
argue the judgment was obtained by fraud. This cost would be minimised, firstly 
because the jurisdictional basis is likely to be based on an express choice by the 
parties, 54 which makes it very clear whether a particular court had jurisdiction; 
and secondly, because arguing a judgment was obtained by fraud is, at best, 
difficult to establish. 
53 This Proposition also applies to the unilateral paradigm. 54 or, in relation to the unilateral paradigm, on habitual residence. 
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The final efficiency saving is obtained by minimising inefficient property 
transfers. If a person is aware that a court would not enforce a foreign judgment 
then they would have an incentive to transfer their assets to that jurisdiction "to 
protecf' them. The moving of assets in this fashion is often inefficient and 
therefore the enforcement of a judgment would prohibit such transfers. 
The Fifth Proposition is generally consistent with the traditional theories of 
recognition and enforcement. It provides a balance between correctness and 
repose; by mandating that an improperly obtained judgment is not enforceable, 
but otherwise it leaves the determination of any matter of substance to the 
originating jurisdiction. 
IV. The unilateral paradigm 
The unilateral paradigm is loosely based on the theory of unilateral offers which 
lead to contract (unilateral contracts). A bilateral contract is an exchange of a 
promise for a promise, or an act for an act; in contrast a unilateral contract is an 
exchange of a promise for an act. 
A unilateral contract is not an "agreement" in the same way as a bilateral 
contract, 55 but it can still be wealth maximising; as Posner explains: 
I offer $20for the return of my lost cat. There is no negotiation with 
potential finders, no acceptance of my offer in the conventional 
sense. Yet someone who hears of the reward and returns my cat has 
55 Tiersma (1992): passim. 
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a legally enforceable claim to the reward; his compliance with the 
terms of the offer is treated as an acceptance. This is correct because 
it promotes a value-maximizing transaction. The cat is worth more 
than $20 to me and less than $20 to the finder, so the exchange of 
moneyfor cat increases social welfare. 56 
Thus, the problem with unilateral contracts is not that the exchange is not wealth 
maximising, but that the requirement of performance is inefficient. Indeed, this 
requirement has been criticised 57 because of the requirement that the accepter 
must complete performance before the promise must be satisfied. Or as 
Llewellyn, in his poetic diatribe points out, acceptance in a unilateral contract 
occurs "only after [the offeror] has received the uttermost jot of everything 
bargained f0t,,. 58 However, this aspect of unilateral contracts is irrelevant to the 
present discussion. 
The 
paradigm 
propositions relevant to the unilateral 
Many of the points raised in relation to the bilateral paradigm apply equally to the 
unilateral paradigm. The bilateral paradigm has greater impact where the 
intellectual property in question is specialised, where there would be substantial 
use of the property or where both parties have similar bargaining power. 
Otherwise, it may not be cost effective for the owner of intellectual property to 
56 Posner (2003): 102. 
57 In the United States performance only needs to be commenced to accept the contract 
(Restatement (First) of Contract §45); in Germany a unilateral offer is binding from the time it is 
made (BGB Art. 257). 
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negotiate with individual users because the cost of undertaking such negotiations 
would be prohibitively high. Further, the user would face search costs associated 
with identifying the owner of the intellectual property, and once the parties have 
found each other, there would be a cost associated with negotiating the agreement, 
which may be greater than the actual value of the use. Indeed, to require such 
negotiation would create a further type of access cost. 59 Finally, if only the 
bilateral paradigm were followed, intellectual property owners would either havp 
to face administrative costs associated with owning intellectual property under a 
wide range of differing applicable laws, or require everyone to deal with , 
intellectual property under one law (in other words removing choice). 
Sixth Proposition 
Where transaction costs are prohibitively high, thereby prohibiting agreement, 
the courts of the defendant's habitual residence should havejurisdiction 60 
It must be made absolutely clear that the Sixth Proposition requires no link 
between jurisdiction and applicable law; indeed it only works where the basis for 
selecting the applicable law is totally separate from the determination of 
jurisdiction. Further, the First Proposition can trump the Sixth Proposition, in 
other words should the parties wish to negotiate an appropriate forum either ex 
ante or ex post they should be free to do so. This proposition only represents the 
"default" position. 
58 Llewellyn (1938): 33 (Part I). 
59 See page 129 above. 60 Including jurisdiction over provisional and protective measures. 
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It was argued above that the ideal case would be where neither party could choose 
the forum in advance. 61 Further, that allowing only one party to select the forum 
would precipitate a race to court. 
62 Indeed, as discussed in relation to the First 
Proposition, where the parties can agree the jurisdiction ex ante these problems 
are mimmised. However, sometimes ex ante agreement is impossible or at least 
prohibitively expensive. 
When negotiation is impossible an alternative needs to be proposed; this 
alternative would, by definition, not be as efficient as ex ante choice. There are 
two possibilities: one of the parties could choose the forum in which the dispute 
would be heard or an objective factor could be used. The problem with allowing 
one party a totally free choice is that they will always select the jurisdiction that 
would be most advantageous to them: which is unlikely to be efficient. 63. 
An obvious objective factor for determining jurisdiction would be the situs of the 
damage. However, locating the damage caused by online intellectual property 
infringement is problematic; if damage has been suffered in two or more 
jurisdictions, how would one determine between two competing jurisdictional 
claims? Suchan. approach would require subjective determinations such as "most 
significant connectioW' or "comparative regulatory advantage", which are, to a 
greater or lesser degree, unascertai4able in advance and so make it difficult for 
both parties to plan their actions efficiently. An associated problem would be the 
61 See page 137 and page 157 et seq above. 
62 ibid. 
63 Ibid. In contrast to applicable law a selection by the proprietor (which could be set aside by a 
bilateral agreement) is not likely to be efficient. Firstly, because if the forum is different from the 
defendant's habitual residence there will be an additional cost of enforcement; secondly, the 
likelihood of the forum being unduly expensive for the user is such that the user would almost 
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unnecessarily high litigation cost, which would arise due to the fact that both 
parties may have to litigate abroad. Finally, where a claimant obtains judgment 
against the defendant, a cost would be associated with trying to enforce that 
judgment in the defendant's jurisdiction. This "objective" factor would, therefore, 
preclude effective ex ante determination and increase procedural costs. 
A natural alternative would be selecting the jurisdiction on the basis of where the 
claimant or defendant is habitually resident. Where the jurisdiction is selected on 
the basis of residence, one party is always going to obtain a benefit from a "local 
resolution". It has been argued that basing jurisdiction on a defendant's residence 
(although this applies equally to a claimant's) is inefficient because of virtual 
"costless" relocation. 64 This point, although not without merit, is considerably 
overstated. Initially, ignoring information asymmetry, a party is only going to 
move forum if the cost of moving65 is lower than the additional cost of litigating 
in their home jurisdiction. In relation to individuals and almost all corporations 
the cost of physically moving abroad is too high to ever act as a counterweight to 
the additional costs of local litigation. 66 Even in the virtual world (where a 
business's only link with the world is on-line) the costs of relocation are high: 
staff may not be willing to move abroad and ancillary regulation and taxation 
issues may need to be resolved. Indeed, a prohibition on "sham" presence should 
protect the other party against most improper relocations. 
certainly wish to negotiate with the proprietor. In turn this will substantially increase the 
transactions costs associated with the plethora of negotiations necessary. 
64 See Moore and Parisi (2002): 134 1. 
65 This includes the cost of physically moving as well as the disruption to business that would 
result. 
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Information asymmetry would also mean that it is less likely for the defendant to 
move forum than for the claimant to do so. The defendant, even if they know the 
activity is illegal, is not going to know at what point the claimant would start the 
proceedings. However, if there were doubt which party would be claimant and 
which defendant (e. g. whether the action is one for infringement or a declaration 
of non-infiingement) then both parties would be unsure when they are likely to 
face an action and so, if there were advantages in moving, this would precipitate 
an ex ante relocation. 
Indeed, right up until an action is commenced a potential claimant may suddenly 
find themselves as a defendant in a "reverse" action. 67 However, it is undeniable 
that at the time of launching proceedings the defendant has less choice than the 
claimant over their habitual residence. Between these two parties it would be 
more difficult for the defendant to situate themselves in a favourable forum than 
for the claimant to do so; thus the defendant's forum is more likely to benefit the 
parties more evenly. 68 
In addition, if a judgment were obtained against the defendant in their home 
jurisdiction then its enforcement would not involve any additional "recognition" 
costs. Thus, the next best thing, from an efficiency perspective, after an ex ante 
66 Particularly as any jurisdiction where litigation is excessively expensive is unlikely to attract 
much investment. 
67 A perfect example of this are "threats" actions in the United Kingdom: Patents Act 1977 s. 70; 
Trade Marks Act 1994 s. 21; Registered Designs Act 1949 s. 26 and Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988 s. 253 (unregistered designs). 68 Furthermore, a defendant may wish to be a claimant in an unrelated action, particularly if they 
are a repeat player. Therefore they have little incentive to move forum for a particular action 
(which they are unsure will ever occur) whereas a claimant knows that the action will commence 
and so they have a greater incentive to move. 
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agreement on jurisdiction, is that the forum of the defendant's habitual residence 
should have jurisdiction. 
Where there are multiple defendants, and each one is resident in a different 
jurisdiction, it is not possible for all the defendants to be sued in their own 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the simplest rule would be that the courts of the State, 
which contains the most defendants, should have jurisdiction and where two 
jurisdictions have the same number of defendants, then the claimant can chose 
between them. 69 
The Sixth Proposition fits squarely within the traditional framework; indeed it is 
more or less a restatement of the traditional maxim actor sequiturforum rei. It is 
also compatible with the allegiance theory and the power theories, because the 
defendant's court has power over them. Similarly, the requirement fits within the 
fairness theory, although it is considerably more restrictive, as nobody has ever 
suggested that it would be unfair for defendants to be sued in their home forum. 
Seventh Proposition 
fflere transaction costs are prohibitively high, thereby prohibiting agreement, 
the applicable law should be nominated ex ante by the proprietor of the 
intellectual property right 
The Seventh Proposition is central to the unilateral paradigm; it is also likely to be 
the most controversial. Like the Second Proposition it is limited to substantive 
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law and does not cover procedural requirements. It has been argued that universal 
application is efficieneo and obviously, in many cases ex ante bilateral agreement 
is impossible, therefore an alternative method for selecting the applicable law is 
required. The Seventh Proposition sets out this method: nomination. A method 
that enables both parties to be aware of the selection of applicable law ex ante. 
The problems with locating the activity, for the purposes of selecting the 
applicable law, have been discussed in relation to the Sixth Proposition and will 
not be repeated here. The determination of the applicable law could either be on a 
case-by-case basis or by using a single constant objective factor. Case-by-case 
determinations would have to determine where the damage was caused; so if the 
damage was caused in more than one jurisdiction, either a different applicable law 
would be necessary for each jurisdiction 71 or an applicable law would need to be 
selected arbitrarily. Another possibility would be using the lex fori as the 
applicable law, however this would just mean that the jurisdiction selected by 
either the claimant or (if based on the defendant's residence) the defendant, would 
determine the applicable law ex post, which is obviously inefficient. In effect this 
would amount to the applicable law being "nominated" by the claimant (by 
starting proceedings) or by the defendant (by selecting'their home forum). 
An objective assessment could be based on nationality or first publication72 (or - 
filing). If the law was based on nationality this would lead to corporations re- 
69 This may not be practical in relation to provisional and protective measures, in which case, the 
courts of the habitual residence of each defendant may need to have jurisdiction. 70 See the justification for the Third Proposition at page 223 above. 71 This would be the lexprotectionis. 
72 In relation to copyright it could be based on fixation, although this also presents problems, for a 
discussion of these see Kaplan (2000): 2066-9. 
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incorporating in more restrictive jurisdictions and authors emigrating (should the 
cost be worth while). 73 This would, in effect, be similar to a nomination but would 
impose external costs associated with the selection (such as relocation costs). 
Similarly, selecting the applicable law based on the country of first publication (in 
copyright)74 or of first filing (for registered rights), 
75 is little different from the 
proprietor nominating the applicable law as it is the publisher who would select 
the country of first publication or first filing. The process of express nomination 
circumvents those unnecessary complications and costs. 
instead of a case-by-case assessment or relying on an objective factor, the 
proprietor or the user could make the nomination. If the user selected the law, they 
would either have to notify the proprietor (which increases transaction costs) or 
they would be the only person who knew the applicable law at the time of the 
action. In contrast, nomination by the proprietor means that potentially both 
parties would know the applicable law ex ante. However, the proprietor would 
select the law that they consider to be most advantageous to them. Thus, this 
approach is only efficient if the cost of having one law, universally applicable, is 
lower than the costs associated with multipld laws, namely judicial error and 
procedural CoStS. 76 
73 There are also problems where people have dual citizenship or where someone is a stateless 
erson 
4 The internet provides a number of problems in relation to first publication because when a work 
is uploaded it could be considered to have been "published" in every country in the world. 
75 Normally the application from which priority is claimed. 
76 See page 135 et seq above. 
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The proprietor would select the applicable law they believe would grant them the 
widest rights. This would lead to an increase in users' access costs 77 and so 
increase transaction costs. 78 This particular problem is addressed by the Tenth 
Proposition. Further, the uncertainty as to applicable law leads users into making 
decisions that are favourable to the proprietor, the effect of the Seventh 
Proposition would not change the situation significantly as only one law can be 
selected (and this is unlikely to be the most restrictive law in every way). 
(i) Re-nomination 
Laws change and few more than intellectual property. 79 Further, intellectual 
property lasts a long time, patents last 20 years, copyright life plus 70 years and 
trade marks indefinitely; therefore a sensible nomination at one point in time may 
no longer be desirable (or efficient) in the future. Furthermore, ownership of 
intellectual property can change and a subsequent owner may wish to exploit it in 
a different way to their predecessor . 
80 Thus, it should be possible to re-nominate 
an applicable law after an initial choice. Such a nomination would not, of course, 
have retrospective effect. Where the same (or an equivalent) right has multiple 
owners in different jurisdictions, then only where all the owners act together 
should it be possible to re-nominate a new law. To facilitate this process the initial 
assignments could include a requirement to re-nominate when a particular owner 
C'root") wishes to re-nominate. 
77 See page 129 above. 78 See page 121 and page 129 above. 79 Jeremy Phillips described activity in the intellectual property field as "frenetic": Phillips (2003): 
Preface. 
so It could, of course, be argued that where a purchaser buys a patent governed by Spanish law, the 
right to re-nominate allows them to change the nature of what was purchased. However, the 
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(H) Failure to nominate 
If a proprietor fails to make a nomination it is still necessary for a law to apply to 
an activity. Presuming that a single applicable law is desirable, where the 
proprietor fails to nominate a law it must necessarily fall to another factor. To 
ensure efficiency there are two possibilities: either the defendant nominates or 
their habitual residence nominates. There are certain efficiency advantages in 
selecting the law of the defendant's habitual residence, which would be the lex 
fori, as the cost of judicial error would be low. Therefore, the lexfori should 
apply. Obviously, the defendant could chose to relocate their habitual residence to 
affect the law applicable, but it is likely to be more efficient for them to negotiate 
with the proprietor to select an applicable law (and so moving within the bilateral 
paradigm). 
The Seventh Proposition, like the Third Proposition, is completely incompatible 
with every choice of law theory because, in effect, it removes the need for actually 
choosing which law applies. Indeed, it could be argued that it creates a substantive 
law proposition. 81 
E090 ighth Proposition 
Any nomination should be made available in the most conspicuous way possible 
If a nomination is made under the Seventh Proposition it is vital that the user 
should be aware of it in adva nce of their use (ex ante); otherwise they would 
proprietary nature of intellectual property would suggest subsequent acquires should have the 
same rights as initial owners. 
81 See page 74 above and page 362 below. 
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make decisions about their use of the intellectual property that are most 
favourable to the proprietor. 82 
An additional problem with permitting an inconspicuous nomination of applicable 
law is that it would increase the user's search costs. 83 The user, if they knew a 
nomination had been made, would search for a record of that nomination and the 
more difficult it is to find the longer the search would take. A long search is, in 
itself, expensive;, however if the search were prohibitively expensive the user 
would start use without discovering which law was nominated (leading to pro- 
proprietor use) or a mistaken belief that there is no nomination (leading to 
potential infringement). This in turn means a proprietor has an incentive to 
conceal their nomination, thus the Eighth Proposition nullifies that incentive. 
The Eighth Proposition has no parallel outside the scope of these propositions and 
therefore no comparison can be made with traditional legal concepts. However, 
from a practical point of view, each registered intellectual property right must, by 
its very nature, be included in a record and so there is no reason why a nomination 
v skOu 1, Id not also be included. In contrast, certain international copyright obligations 
require certain "formalities" to be satisfied before national treatment is granted; 84 
these formalities could be extended to include a nomination. 
82 See page 136 above. 13 For an explanation of search costs see page 132 above. 84 UCC Article III(I); formalities are not required between members of the Berne Union: Article 
5(2). 
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N9 inth Proposition 
Any nomination should have universal effect, except where the second proposition 
applies 
The Ninth Proposition is essentially the swne as the Third Proposition. If a 
nomination is made it should apply universally. The justification for the Ninth 
Proposition is the same as for the Third Proposition, but is more emphatic. 
Indeed, if different nominations were allowed for different countries, or different 
classes of people, this would undermine the Eighth Proposition. This is because it 
would reduce the certainty of each nomination and so increase search costs. These 
costs would be further increased if the nomination were either limited or 
uncertain. 
(i) Search costs 
A limited nomination would mean that a user who found one nomination would 
have to continue searching for other nominations, until they found one that they 
were confident applied to them. Similar nominations make the search costs higher 
as it is more difficult to differentiate between similar things than different things. 
Further, if a nomination were ambiguous or it was uncertain to what or where it 
ap lied, then a user would have to continue their search looking for other . rp 
nominations, potentially searching for something that does not exist. There is no 
better example of wasted costs. 
Finally, a universal nomination means that a proprietor is limited to making one 
choice to cover all uses in all places; this inflexibility means that they cannot 
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optimise their returns (and undermine the users) by selecting different laws. 
However, on the other hand it means that provided the chosen law has the 
necessary internal balance the user would be able to obtain benefits by 
undertaking activities that may be outside the main area of exploitation. 
85 
(U) Initial ownership 
As discussed in relation to the Third Proposition, there are four matters that 
should be considered in relation to choice of law and intellectual property: 
existence of the right, its scope and duration; initial ownership; transfer; and 
infringement. In relation to these issues only initial ownership raises different 
arguments to those discussed in relation to Third Proposition. 
The problems arise where the person giving nomination only owns the copyright 
in some countries and not in others (once more this will not really apply in 
relation to registered rights or most other unregistered rights). This problem is not 
new Article III(l) of the Universal Copyright Convention states that protection 
would only be afforded under the convention where the copyright proprietor's 
name has been included on the publication. To overcome this problem, in relation 
to that Convention, it has been suggested that the test should be that sufficient 
infonnation is provided to enable the prospective user to contact the right 
holder. 86 This is equally appropriate to the Ninth Proposition. 
85 A proprietor is obviously going to select the law they consider most beneficial for the expected 
exploitation. Thus, someone working outside the expected area of exploitation is more likely to 
have greater freedom under the chosen law. 
86 See Stewart (1989): 154. 
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In most cases the problems of ownership can be sorted out between the owner and 
purported owner (who would probably be the employer), leaving third parties to 
act within the confines of the present nominated law and when the ownership 
dispute is settled the (new) proprietor can re-nominate if necessary. Where the 
ownership is not set out by contract (so the copyright is owned by the employer in 
some countries, but the employee in others), then the first person (employer or 
employee) to nominate would bind the other as far as third parties are concerned. 
Ownership would ultimately, however, have to be determined in accordance with 
the employment contract. Where it was not governed by contract it is probably 
appropriate that the choice of law rules on employment agreements should 
determine ownership. Where there are joint authors (and so joint owners) then a 
nomination would have to be made by all owners; and where only one owner 
makes a nomination it should bind the others (to ensure certainty) but the 
nominating owner could, possibly, be liable to their co-owners. 
The Ninth Proposition, like the Third Proposition is completely incompatible with 
every theory as, in effect, it removes the need for actually choosing which law 
applies. 
Tenth Proposition 
Non-proprietary users of intellectual property should be granted minimum rights 
(i) Race to the top 
Assuming that States "compete" to have their law selected by proprietors they 
would reform their law to make it more desirable; in turn leading to more 
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protective and pervasive laws. This would create a race to the top. To avoid the 
transaction costs associated with making new laws 87 large steps would be taken in 
favour of right holders. As that race progresses, the access costs would increase 
until the race is over (when all laws are as protective as possible). At this point the 
access costs would be exorbitant. This would increase transaction costs to such an 
extent that the Seventh Proposition would be, more or less, self-defeating. 
88 To 
avoid this race it is necessary to ensure that users have minimum rights (e. g. "fair 
use" in copyright, domestic exemptions for patent users or precluding "non-trade" 
use of trade marks) so that when any race ends it does not undermine these 
Propositions. 
(U) "Local exceptions" 
Allowing "local exceptions"89 to apply to intellectual property use would lead to 
many different problems. First, it would mean that the exceptions would not fit 
with the subsistence of the right, this problem was explained in relation to 
bundling. 90 Second, it would require courts to apply a multitude of different laws 
(i. e. the exceptions from each relevant country); thereby increasing the chances of 
judicial error. Finally, it would mean that there would be little ex ante certainty for 
anyone. How is a person who is intending to upload information onto the Intemet 
expected to know all the different exceptions to intellectual property rights around 
the world? Therefore, instead of allowing local exceptions to apply, the Tenth 
Proposition requires states to guarantee minimum rights, leaving the proprietor to 
87 See page 179 above. 
8' If the proprietor could prohibit all use of their intellectual property then every potential user 
would have to contact them for access. These transaction costs would either preclude use or 
alternatively lead to negotiations being undertaken under the Second Proposition. 
89 Also see the discussion of parallel application at page 177 above. 
90 See page 159 above. 
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select an applicable law, which obviously would include those minimum rights 
(albeit they would still select the most restrictive). 
From a broader perspective the Tenth Proposition ensures constitutional and 
fundamental rights are protected. For example, the balance between freedom of 
speech and copyright would be maintained if the appropriate minimum standards 
were guaranteed. 91 
VI. Trade marks and universality 
The proposal of universality is not as convincing for trade marks as it is for other 
intellectual property rights. There are two reasons for this: similar trademarks do 
not necessarily have the same origin; and the justification for copyright, patents 
and related rights is creating an incentive, but for trademarks it is reducing search 
costs. 
All intellectual property rights, aside from trademarks, must (more or less) have a 
common "roof'. It is true that the copyright or patent may be owned or used by 
different people in different jurisdictions, but the original owner 92 or licensor has 
a link to all subsequent owners and licensees, giving them the ability to ensure the 
continuity of law across the world. So when the property is licensed or sold for the 
first time, conditions of use can be attached between those parties. Further, in any 
91 These rights, it must be remembered, can be explained in economic terms as well as "rights" 
terms: see for example Posner (19 84). 
92 As discussed above, the determination of the original owner in relation to copyright may be 
quite difficult to ascertain because each country has different rules for initial ownership. 
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transnational litigation between the owners of the'property and the users it would 
be possible to litigate the dispute in a single court. 93 
In contrast, trade marks do not necessarily have the same root. The owner of a 
mark in one jurisdiction does not necessarily own or even have any connection 
with the owner of the mark in another jurisdiction because they may have both 
independently developed it. This independent creation 94 precludes them from 
negotiating before licensing or commencing use of the mark (this is particularly 
problematic with regard to unregistered marks or in "use" jurisdictions, such as 
the United States). It may also be illogical to require unconnected users to litigate 
together. 
Secondly, the economic justification for trade marks is to lower search costs; but 
this proposal does not address lower search costs as effectively as maintaining 
incentives. The propositions set out in this chapter relate to resolving the legal 
issues, not the factual issues such as locating a situs. In relation to most 
intellectual property rights the proposals minimise the need to worry about 
locating where the damage actually occurred, but simply require global damages 
95 
to be assessed. Indeed, in relation to global brands this is equally true in respect 
of trade marks, but in relation to similar local brands it may still be necessary to 
divide up the world into local jurisdictions. 
93 An example of a copyright/licensee provision which could be used as a model is section 10 1 (or 
section 101A) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 94 Of course to independently create a copyright work does not infringe another identical work. 
However, this applies internationally and so any defence run on this basis need not be concerned 
about territorial boundaries. 
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There is, therefore, not only a potential conflict of laws but also a conflict of 
rights. For example, imagine the trade mark "DOG" was used by two 
unconnected firms each owning a trade mark in forty different countries. If either 
firm uses the mark on the Internet they would potentially be infringing the other's 
mark. However, they would have to be governed by different laws, 96 although this 
in itself may provide some demarcation and so reduce search costs slightly (as the 
nomination has to be conspicuous) it does mean third parties would have to 
comply with "two" sets of laws. It cannot be disputed that there are problems in 
connection with small local users of marks, but these proposals still provide some 
assistance in multinational litigation and for that reason alone they provide a 
benefit. The evidential problems that must be solved in relation to determining the 
damage caused by a trade mark on the Internet is a different problem and one that 
must be investigated in some detail; however, this is beyond the scope of this 
work. 
97 
VII. Conclusion and next chapters 
The ten propositions set out in this chapter provide the essential wealth 
maximising requirements of any system - they do not provide a complete code. 
The next chapter considers the propositions relating to jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of those judgments. Thereafter, Chapter 7 examines the proposition 
on applicable law and ancillary matters. These chapters have two purposes; firstly 
95 If there are multiple claimants then the court would need to divide damages between them, but 
this would be something that would either be agreed between the parties or could be the subject of 
separate hearings (thus reducing the defendants costs). 96 As it would be contrary to the Second or Seventh Proposition to allow someone to select a 
jurisdiction for which they do not own the intellectual property. For example, if X owns the US 
mark and wishes to select US law then they can do sý; however Y cannot also own the US mark 
and therefore they cannot select US law thus the two marks cannot be governed by the same law. " See WIPO (2001). 
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to examine if the propositions are compatible with international law, regional laws 
and national laws; 98 secondly, to examine any issues that require practical rather 
than theoretical solutions. 
98 It has also been suggested that a "rule which as such does not properly reflect the public policy 
of the countries concerned, will invariably fail and have no chance of being universally adopted": 
Dreier (2004): 124. This point is, at some level, true; but as discussed above there is a move 
towards states refraining from regulation in other areas of the law (e. g. television broadcasting, 
which has similar cultural implications) and there is no reason why intellectual property should be 
any different. 
6 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments 
This chapter will examine the rules for determining the jurisdiction of the courts 
and the enforcement of judgments. It will look at three levels of laws - 
international, regional and domestic - to assess whether or not they are 
compatible with the relevant propositions set out in the previous chapter. These 
propositions are: the First Proposition (parties should be free to select the 
jurisdiction that will adjudicate any intellectual property dispute), the Sixth 
Proposition (where transaction costs are prohibitively high, thereby prohibiting 
agreement, the courts of the defendant's habitual residence should have 
jurisdiction) and the Fifth Proposition (any proper judgment made on the basis of 
these propositions shall be enforceable in every State and shall not be subject to 
challenge on its merits). 
1. International law 
There are two sources of international law where the rules of jurisdiction might be 
found: treaty and customary law. The second of these, custom, has a very close 
link with jurisdictional theory and was discussed at some length in Chapter 2. It 
252 
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was concluded that despite the traditional view, exposed by Dr Mann, 
' that a 
court's jurisdiction is set by international law, in fact the jurisdiction of any state's 
court is a matter of domestic law. 
A. Personal jurisdictional rules 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law was set up to try to 
harmonise the rules on private international law. Its membership was originally 
confined to the countries in civilian Europe; however in 1951, after a Charter set 
up the conference on a permanent basis, its membership expanded to include 
common law countries. 2 
This conference has produced a number of conventions and some draft 
conventions. In 1999 a Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 3 (DCFJ) was promulgated. This 
project was described at the time as one of the most ambitious international legal 
instruments being negotiated. 4 Therefore, unsurprisingly, that draft has not 
progressed. Instead a number of separate, less controversial projects are being 
pursued. 5 Despite the failure of the draft, it is worth considering its proposals in 
relation to jurisdiction as to date it is the only attempt to reach any international 
consensus on civil and commercial matters. 
1 Other eminent scholars, aside from Dr Mann, traditionally asserted that jurisdiction was a matter 
of international law. For example, see Lawrence (1925): principle 93 at 199. 
2 Membership now totals 65. 
3 This version was adopted on 306' October 1999, however a later version was proposed dated 20 th 
June 2001; all reference are, unless otherwise indicated, to the earlier version. One of the most 
hotly contested matters was the inclusion of intellectual property. Indeed, the second version of the 
agreement included a wide range of proposals relating to intellectual property. 
4 Petkova (2004): 174. 
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(i) Generaljurisdictional rules 
Article 3 of the DCFJ prescribes a general jurisdictional rule: that the defendant 
may be sued in the courts of their habitual residence (there are four connecting 
factors set out which determine the habitual residence of legal persons). 
6 
However, in contrast to the similar provision in the Brussels Regulation, Article 3 
is not pre-eminent, in that the other grounds of jurisdiction are not derogations 
from, but alternatives to, the general principle. 7 Notwithstanding, this rule 
conforms to the Sixth Proposition. 
(U) Permissive grounds ofjurisdiction 
There were a number of permissive grounds of jurisdiction proposed in the DCFJ, 
the only ground relevant to intellectual property is Article 10 (torts and delicts). 
This Article follows the "normal proposition7' that the forum where the wrongful 
8 act was committed has jurisdiction. However, the draft Convention goes further 
by permitting the claimant to sue either at the place of injury (provided the injury 
was foreseeable) or at the place of the act or omission. 9 However, where 
jurisdiction is based on the place of injury, recovery is limited to damage caused 
within the jurisdiction. In later drafts, a further restriction was proposed, which 
limited a state's jurisdiction where the defendant had taken reasonable steps to 
avoid acting therein. 10 The problems identified with this type of provision have 
been outlined in relation to the Ginsburg/Dreyfuss Convention. " In short, Article 
5 For a discussion of these issues see Hague Conference Permanent Bureau (200 1). 
6 Agreement was reached on this proposition, see n. 16 of the 20 June 2001 draft. 7 Nygh and Polar (2000): 38. 
8 Pocar (1985-6): 71-80. 
9 Article 10(l). 
10 This was included as Article 10(3) of the 2001 Draft. 
11 Seepage 191 above. 
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10 is more permissive than, and so incompatible with, the First and Sixth 
Proposition. 
(W) Choice of court clause 
The DCFJ, in Article 4, provides that a court should have jurisdiction in 
pursuance to a choice of court agreement either by contract 
12 or submission. 13 The 
original provision was very wide, as it applied whether or not the dispute had "an 
international character". This breadth caused concern among delegates and so 
choice was limited to international disputes. 14 Importantly, Article 4 included no 
requirement that the contract be connected to the forum selected; 
15 indeed, only 
where another court has exclusive jurisdiction should a choice of court. clause be 
ignored. 16 
When the DCFJ collapsed, work continued on clauses in relation to exclusive 
choice of court. To this end a Convention on Exclusive 17 Choice of Court 
Agreements (CECC) was produced and was finally adopted on the 3& June 
18 2005. The CECC carried over the final version of Article 4 of the DCFJ, but its 
scope is now clearly limited so that it only applies to "international cases". 19 This 
means that national law applies where two parties to the contract are both resident 
1 20 in the same State. 
12 Article 4(4) of the 2001 Draft; also see Nygh and Polar (2000): 43. 
13 Article 5 of the 1999 Draft; Article 27A of the 2001 Draft. 
14 See Article 2(a) of the 2001 draft. , 15 Article 4(l); it was also not permissible for a selected court to decline jurisdiction on the 
fr ds offorum non conveniens: Nygh and Polar (2000): 43. 6 
Mcle 
4(3) of the 1999 Draft; Article 4(5) of the 2001 Draft. 
17 It does not cover permissive jurisdictional agreements: Article 3. 
18 No state has yet signed the CECC. There was a Convention on the Choice of Court concluded 
on 25th November 1965, but it has yet to come into force (only Israel is a signatory). 
19 Article I (I). 
20 See Article 1(2) and commentary of Dogauchi and Hartley (2004): 7. 
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The central requirement of the CECC is that courts shall refuse to hear a matter 
where the parties have agreed to a different forum. 21 There are exceptions to this 
general requirement, but they are limited. Leaving -aside the more obvious 
conditions - capacity and invalidity of the contract - the most significant 
exception is where "giving effect to the agreement would lead to a very serious 
injustice or, would be manifestly contrary to fundamental principles of public 
policy of the State of the court seised. q122 This provision may, depending on the 
way it is interpreted, 23 interfere with the Fourth Proposition (as an indirect way of 
applying a mandatory rule). Except for this shortcoming, and subject matter aside, 
the CECC is compatible with, and promotes, the First Proposition. 
B. Special subject matter rules 
There are certain international conventions (and drafts) that may create subject 
matter specific rules; firstly those conventions relating to intellectual property and 
I 
secondly, the draft and adopted Hague Conventions (DCFJ and CECC). 
(i) The Intellectual Property Conventions 
Traditionally, it was argued that the principle of national treatment found in the 
Paris Convention, 24 the Berne Convention, 25 the Phonograms Convention 
(Rome) '26 TRIPS, 
27 and the WPPT, 28 should be extended so that no court may 
determine foreign intellectual property rights. The provision in Paris is exemplary: 
21 Article 6. 
22 Article 6(c). 
23 Dogauchi and Hartley (2004): 29. 
24 Article 2(l). 
25 Article 5(l). Also see the UCC Article III(I). 
26 Article 4. 
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Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the 
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of 
the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant... to 
nationals 
This principle, it has been argued, should be applied to all matters related to 
29 30 intellectual property, including all aspects of private international law. It was 
this view that led authors to suggest a strictly territorial approach to jurisdiction. 
31 
As Ulmer suggested: 
the question is ... whether... a limitation of international jurisdiction 
must be accepted in the sense that legal protection may be claimed 
only before national courts on the basis of the national copyright or 
industrial property right. Such a limitation of international 
jurisdiction has been accepted in the past ... More recent 
developments, however, make this limitation appear outdated. 32 
27 Article 3. 
28 Article 4. 
29 This cannot be accepted; such a rule would cause problems where nationality is a relevant 
connecting factor (either in terms of jurisdiction - see Article 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code - 
or applicable law as it is in most civilian country). It would also create problems with other, 
unrelated, issues such as double-taxation (it would mean an author's royalties are taxed as a 
national, but also have to be taxed in their domicile in the normal way). 
30 See Ladas (1938): 268 (Berne "provides that 'authors' shall enjoy all rights granted to nationals, 
irrespective of whether such rights are granted by the general copyright legislation or by special 
laws"). 
31 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 12. Other provisions in those conventions have rarely been used 
to support this construction: e. g. Paris Article 4bis (1) and Article 6(3) which dictate the separate 
nature of each right. 
32 Ulmer (1978): 10. 
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What this traditional approach would actually mean is that, in relation to 
intellectual property rights, the granting state would have exclusive jurisdiction. 
33 
It is unsurprising that this proposition has been rejected. 34 Not only are there 
provisions suggesting against this line of reasoning: for example, Article 2(3) of 
the Paris Convention, 35 but as Cornish points out national treatment only relates to 
the applicable law, 36 a view supported by earlier drafts of the Conventions. 
37 
Therefore, looking at the Conventions, it is easy to agree with Fawcett and 
Torremans: 
the role which the provisions of the international intellectual 
property conventions can play in relation to the determination of the 
court that can take jurisdiction ... seems almost negligible or non- 
existent. 38 
This being the case, it is quite clear that nothing in those conventions conflicts 
with either the First or Sixth Proposition. 
(U) The Hague Convention on Civil and Commercial Matters 
The DCFJ originally stated in Article 12(4) that the country of origin shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of registered rights. It was 
suggested, "the desirability of exclusive jurisdiction for proceeding relating to the 
33 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 12 and Stewart (1989): [3.28]. 
34 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 12. It was also rejected by the Court of Appeal in Pearce v Oie 
Arup Partnership (2000) Ch 403 at 442 (Berne does not seek to confer jurisdiction on the courts of 
one country to the expense of another). 35 This provision expressly reserves matters ofjurisdiction and procedure to the signatory states. 36 Cornish (1996): cited Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 12. Although see the discussion in 
Chapter 7 below. 
37 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 13. 
38 ibid. 
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validity of the rights is beyond debate"39 whereas "it is not certain that [exclusive 
jurisdiction] is equally desirable for proceedings concerning infringement of these 
rights". 40 However, the original draft of Article 12(4) attracted criticism, debate 
and lobbying and by the 2001 Preliminary Draft there were a large number of 
options on offer. Yet even these were not enough to stem the critics. The 
proposals in the later draft are such that considering them in their present state is 
fatile; 41 particularly, as many of the issues have re-emerged in the Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. 
(W) The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
The provisions of the CECC dealing with intellectual property were difficult to 
settle. Right up until the Convention was adopted it was unclear what would 
actually be agreed. Eventually it was decided that the Convention should only 
apply to intellectual property rights other than copyright or related rights where 
those rights relate to a breach of contract. Thus, copyright is fully within the 
convention, 42 but other intellectual property rights are only within it where the 
matters relate to contract. 43 Therefore, intellectual property licences, when 
contractual, fall within the convention. However, a choice of court clause is only 
likely to arise where there is a licence and so in many cases this bar will have little 
impact. 44 
39 Nygh and Polar (2000): 67. 
40 ibid. 
41 For a general discussion of these proposals see: Fawcett (2002). 
42 Dogauchi and Hartley (2004): 12-3. 
43 To avoid characterisation, all intellectual property licences are included whether or not a country 
characterises it as a matter of contract or tort (ibid). 
44 Ibid. 
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However, matters of validity were, at the last minute, excluded from the 
Convention. Article 2(2)(n) states that the CECC does not apply to matters 
relating the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright or related 
rights. 45 
It can therefore be seen that, within its scope, the CECC goes a long way towards 
satisfying the requirements of the First Proposition; however, much of this is lost 
by the strict prohibition on courts considering the validity of foreign registered 
rights. 
C. The act of state doctrine 
The "act of state doctrine" dictates that "the courts of one state do not, as a rule, I 
question the validity or legality of the official acts of another sovereign state,. 
46 It 
has particular significance in relation to intellectual property as it forbids one state 
from challenging another's decision to register a particular patent or trade mark. 
The purpose of all the Propositions is to allow a court to determine the validity of 
registered rights under a number of legal systems. It is therefore vital to assess 
whether this doctrine is part of international law. It is quite clear that it is not, as 
yet, incorporated into any treaty. 47 There has also been considerable doubt about 
whether this doctrine is part of customary public international law or whether it is 
purely a domestic matter. 48 
45 Previously, validity could be considered as part of an incidental question. 
46 See Oppenheim. (1992): 365. 
47 Although there is a European Convention on State Immunity (1972) it does not deal with acts of 
state. 
48 Ibid: 369; Akehurst (2001): 122 and Akehurst (1973): 240 et seq. 
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It is always difficult to assess whether a matter is customary intemational law or 
not, particularly where there is probably no international judicial authority on the 
matter. 49 In such situations one can only turn to national courts to see whether 
they consider the doctrine to be a matter of international law, but this leads to 
contradictory results. 50 In the United States it was originally suggested in the New 
York case of Hatch v Bae? that "by the... established rules of international law, 
the courts of one country are bound to abstain from sitting in judgment on the acts 
of another State done within its own territory". 52 Similarly the US Supreme Court 
stated in Underhill v HernandeZ53 that: 
Every State is bound to respect the independence of every other 
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit injudgment 
on the acts of the government ofanother, done within its territory. 54 
However, it subsequently held, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 55 that the 
act of State doctrine is not a matter of international law. Similar inconsistency can 
be seen in French law where some cases and commentators have considered the 
doctrine to be a rule of international law 56 but most do not. 57 Unfortunately similar 
inconsistency exists in Germany. 58 
49 pe im (1992): 3 69. 
50 Akerhurst (1973) discusses a number of cases on this point and concludes as such. 51 (1876) 7 Hun 596. 
52 Ibid at 599. Other cases also found that it was a rule of international law: e. g. National Institute 
ofýgrarian Reform v Terry Kane (Fla App, 1963) 153 So 2d 40. 54 (1897) 168 US 250. 
5 Ibid at 252. 
55 (1964) 376 US 398. 
56 Lafuente v Vaguno y Duranona (193 8) Annual Digest 1938-40, p. 152 and Larrasquitu and the 
Spanish State v Soci&i Cementos Rezola (1937) Annual Digest 1935-37, p. 196; see Mayer and 
Herz6 (2004): [315]. 
57 Akerhurst (1973): 247. 
58 Ibid. 
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A Enforcement of judgments 
It was once suggested, in Cottington's Case'59 that enforcing a foreign judgment 
was required by the law of nations. However, it is now clear beyond peradventure 
that this is not the case (treaties aside) and the enforcement of judgments is merely 
a matter of domestic law. Almost every jurisdictional treaty requires that 
judgments rendered in accordance with its provisions should be enforced in other 
signatory states. It is futile to consider these provisions individually. Indeed, even 
the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial MatterS60 only requires enforcement when the judgment 
was given on certain approved bases. 61 Thus, there is nothing inhibiting the Fifth 
Proposition in terms of international law, in fact it would be quite normal to 
include enforcement and recognition provisions in any convention implementing 
the Propositions. 
11. Regional laws: the Brussels Regulation 
There are number of agreements relating to jurisdiction, but most are bilateral 
agreements and so are too esoteric to be worth considering. However, it is vital to 
discuss the agreements between the member States of the Europe Community, in 
particular the Brussels Regulation. This Regulation superseded the Brussels 
Convention (except in relation to Denmark) and it compliments the Lugano 
59 (1678) (cited in Kennedy v Earl of Cassillis (1818) 2 Swan 313,36 ER 635 at 640). 60 1" February 1971. This treaty is not in force having only four signatories: Cyprus, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Kuwait. 
61 Article 10. 
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Convention (which applies between members States of European Free Trade Area 
and the European Community). 
A. Scope of the Regulation 
The Regulation, 62 according to Article 1, only applies to "civil and commercial 
matters". This term has an autonomous meaning, 
63 but it is almost certain that the 
Regulation applies to intellectual property rights after they have been granted. 
64 
This is evidenced by the existence of Article 22(4): if intellectual property were 
generally excluded from the Regulation then this provision would be unnecessary. 
Indeed, the application of the Regulation to intellectual property matters has been 
confirmed by national courts on a number of occasions: for example the English 
courts in Fort Dodge v Akzo Nobel. 65 
The Brussels Regulation is limited to international matters, thus it does not apply 
where proceedings involve parties who are all domiciled in one member State. 
66 
Until recently there was doubt over whether the Brussels Convention (and hence 
the Regulation) applied where the defendant was domiciled in a member State and 
the claimant was not, 67 but it is now clear that it does apply. 68 The Regulation 
does not, however, apply (except in relation to choice of court clauses) where the 
defendant is not domiciled in any member State. In which case that member 
62 The scope of the Regulation is identical to that of the Convention. 
63 This is necessary because, as was noted by Schlosser (1979): 82, these terms have absolutely no 
meaning under the common law. 
64 The argument that it does not apply is based on the case of LTU v Euroconfrol (1977) 1 CMLR 
88 (Case 29/76) where the Court of Justice held that the Brussels Convention did not apply to the 
situation where a public authority (e. g. a Patent Office) was acting in exercise of its powers: see 
Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 30-1. 
6S (1998) FSR 222. 
66 Jenard (1979): 8. 
67 This is as a result of In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd (1992) Ch 72. 
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State's traditional rules of jurisdiction apply. There are also other limitations on 
the scope of the Regulation, because of pre-existing jurisdiction conventions 69 or 
because of matters specifically excluded . 
70 These are, however, too specific to be 
considered here. 
B. General jurisdiction 
(i) Domicile 
The general rule of jurisdiction, set out in Article 2, states that "persons domiciled 
in a member state shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that 
member state". The provision does not specifically mention the defendant, ut it is 
quite clear that the person identified actually is the defendant. 71 The defendant's 
domicile is determined at the time of issuing process, rather than when they are 
notified of the same. 72 A person's domicile is determined according to the law of 
the member State concerned; for example to assess whether a person is domiciled 
in the United Kingdom, UK law applies; in respect of French domicile, French 
law applies and so forth. 73 However, the rules for determining domicile are 
complicated and beyond the scope of this work. It is, however, clear that a court 
68 See UGIC v Group Josi (200 1) QB 68 (Case C412/98) and Owusu v Jackson (unreported) 30'h 
April 2005 (Case C-281/02). In relation to the Brussels Regulation also see recitals 8 and 9. 
'59 Article 67. It should be noted that the continuation of pre-existing conventions only applies 
where the convention is between a member State and a non-member State (Article 68 and 69). It 
has been argued, unsuccessfully, that the Berne Convention was such a convention (see Pearce v 
Ovp, supra) and similarly the European Patent Convention (see Boston Scientific v Cordis (2000) 
ENPR 87 at 9 1). 
70 Set out in Article 1(2). 
71 See Jenard (1979): 18-9; also see SA Consortium General Textiles v Sun and Sand Agencies 
(1978) QB 279 at 295 and Citadel Insurance v Atlantic Union Insurance (1982) 2 Lloyd's Rep 543 
at 549. 
72 This can be determined from examining the lis pendens provisions. This is because the 
defniition of a court first seised of a matter makes it clear that this is determined by the issuing of 
the proceedings: Article 30(l). Under the Convention this was made clear, in the English context, 
by the case of Canada Trust v Stolzenberg (No. 2) (2002) 1 AC 1. 73 Article 59. 
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of one member State may need to determine whether a person is domiciled in 
another member State in accordance with that State's laws. 
In contrast with the provisions granting special jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is 
granted under Article 2 matters may be consolidated in a single court. Thus, it is 
clear that Article 2 is very close to being on all fours with the Sixth Proposition, 
except that the Proposition bases jurisdiction on "habitual residence" rather than 
domicile. 74 
(H) Choice of court agreements 
The Brussels Regulation includes a choice of clause provision at Article 23,75 
which gives a court exclusive jurisdiction where the parties agreed as such. 
76 
Intellectual property licences will often include a choice of court clause relying on 
this provision. Unlike other provisions in the Regulation, Article 23 applieS77 
where any one party is domiciled in a member State. 78 It is, however, unclear 
when they must be so domiciled, but it is probably either at the time of making the 
contract or at time of commencing the proceedings. 79 
74 These terms certainly have a different meaning in the context of the Regulation because the term 
"habitual residence" is contrasted to "dornicile': see Article 5(2). 
75 This was formerly Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. 
76 Like so many other words in the Regulation "agreement" is meant to be given an autonomous 
meaning: Powell Duffryn v Petereit (1992) ECR 1-1745 at 1774 (Case C-214/89). 
77 Article 23 only requires the contract to be valid in form, f6r example it has to be evidenced in 
writing. Other requirements as to form, which may be required by a member State, are no longer 
qrmitted: e. g. Elefanten Schuh vJacqmain(198 I) ECR 1671 (Case 150/80). 
This is because Article 23 is excluded from Article 4 (which leaves matters of jurisdiction to 
member States when a defendant is not domiciled in a member State). The Brussels Convention 
did noi specifically exclude the equivalent Article, although see Advocate-General's opinion in 
Brenner andNoller v Dean Witter (1994) ECR 14275 at 4280 (Case C-318/93). 79 Briggs and Rees (2003): 92. 
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In addition, it is possible for a party to submit to a jurisdiction under Article 24, 
even in contravention of an exclusive choice of court clause. This provides some 
flexibility for ex post agreements. 80 This flexibility must be contrasted with the 
special provisions that apply to consumer contracts (section 5 of the Brussels 
Regulation), these provisions invalidate all jurisdiction agreements involving 
consumers, except those made after the dispute has arisen. 81 This restriction is 
contrary to the First Proposition. 
It can be seen that Article 23 (in combined with Article 24) is almost totally 
compliant with the First Proposition, save where a court is granted exclusive 
jurisdiction under Article 22. Thus, it can be seen that the Brussels Regulation has 
completed the groundwork for implementing the propositions in the European 
Community. 
C. Special grounds of jurisdiction 
The Brussels Regulation includes certain grounds of special jurisdiction, which 
are derogations from the general rule, 82 two of which are of import. The first 
ground is in matters relating to contract (Article 5(l)) and the second, in matters 
relating to tort (Article 5(3)). The relevant parts of Article 5 state: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another member 
State, be sued 
go For example where the earlier agreement is inefficient. 81 Article 17(l). 
82 See Rjunion Europ9ene (2000) QB 690 at 713 (Case C-51/97). As a derogation, these 
provisions should be interpreted narrowly. 
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ffl(q) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of 
performance of the obligation in question 
(3) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courtsfor 
the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur. 
(i) Matters related to contract 
A "matter relating to contracf ' has been given a Community meaning83 and 
includes relationships which involve an obligation freely assumed by one party 
towards another. 84 This must include intellectual property licences whether they 
are contractual or otherwise. 
The Brussels Convention gave no indication of how to determine the place of a 
contract's performance, leaving the matter to national courts. 85 However, the 
Regulation indicates two alternatives (where there is no express agreement) for 
this determination. In relation to the sale of goods, the place of performance is the 
place where the goods should have been delivered; in relation to the provision of 
services it is the place where the services should have been provided. 
The location of this performance has been considered in relation to intellectual 
. property licences and it was suggested, prior to the * adoption of the two new 
alternatives, that the place of obligation would be the place where the royalties 
83 peterS v ZNA V (19 83) ECR 987 (Case 34/82). 
84 Jakob Handte & Co v Trailements Mecano-Chimiques des Surfaces (1992) ECR 1-3967 (Case 
C-26/91) at 3994. Indeed, the Court of Justice has made it clear that the provision can still apply 
even where it is disputed that there is an agreement: Effer v Kantner (1982) ECR 825 (Case 
38/81). 
85 Industrie Tessili v Dunlop (1976) ECR 1473 at 1485 (Case 12n6). 
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were due, namely where the licensor resides. 86 Alternatively, where no licence is 
actually granted in contravention of an agreement, specific performance may be 
necessary to agree the licence; thus the place where the document was produced is 
likely to be the place of obligation. 87 Similar arguments can be applied to other 
types of agreement. 88 
Thus, it can be seen that Article 5(l) may have a very broad application to 
intellectual property licences, distribution agreements or other types of contracts. 
Allowing jurisdiction on this basis is inefficient and would, at least to some 
extent, undermine the First and Sixth Proposition because it would permit a court, 
other than that of the defendant's habitual residence or that chosen by the parties, 
to have jurisdiction. 
(H) Matters related to tort 
The other relevant ground of jurisdiction is set out in Article 5(3). It is not 
surprising that whether a matter relates to "tort, delict or quasi-delicf' should be 
determined according to an autonomous Community meaning. 89Thus, a matter 
relating to tort is a matter which seeks to substantiate the liability of the 
defendant. 90 Although the Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the matter, 
domestic courts have repeatedly held that the infringement of intellectual property 
rights falls under Article 5(3). 91 A particular problem arises in relation to 
86 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 79; c. f Rank Film Distributors v Lanterna Editrice (1992i ILPr 
58 at 67 (where a guarantee under a contract was held to be performed where the money was due). 87 Ibid at 80; Olympia Productions v Cameron Mackintosh (1992) 12 ILRM 204 at 207-8. 
88 See Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 79-89. 
89 Kaltelis v Schroder (1988) ECR 5565 (Case 189/87). 90 Ibid at 5585. 
91 In the UK: Molnlycke v Procter & Gamble (No. 4) (1992) 1 WLR 1112 at 1117; Pearce v Ove 
Arup Partnership (1997) Ch 293 (reversed on different grounds (2000) Ch 403) and Fort Dodge v 
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concurrent tort and contract claims. It has been argued that the Court of Justice, in 
Kaffielis v Schroder, indicated that Article 5(l) and 5(3) are mutually exclusive. 
92 
Thus, the matter has to be classified as either one relating to tort or contract, but 
not both. 93 A more liberal interpretation is also possible, if the various matters are 
divided up between the different jurisdictional bases. However, at present the 
English Courts, at least, have not adopted the liberal view. 94 
The most important question, when considering Article 5(3), is determining where 
"the harmful event occurred". The Court of Justice, in Bier BVv Mines de Potasse 
D'Alsace, 95 made it clear that this covers both the place where the event giving 
rise to the damage occurred and the place where the damage itself occurred, 96 So 
giving the claimant a choice between the two forums. The Court of Justice re- 
affirmed this approach in Shevill v Presse AllianCe, 97 a defamation case. In that 
case the court also held that where jurisdiction is based on damage within the 
jurisdiction, the court could only hear those parts of the matter that relate to that 
98 damage. Thus, a claimant has two choices, they can rely on Article 5(3) and sue 
in each member State where damage was suffered, or they can sue in the 
defendant's domicile and recover for all the damage caused by the tort. 
Akzo Nobel, supra; in France: Wegmann v Elsevier Science (1997) ILPr 760; in Germany: Re 
Jurisdiction in Tort and Contract (1988) ECC 415. 92 This is based on a key passage in the judgment which reads "a court which has jurisdiction 
under Article 5(3) over an action in so far as it is based on tort or delict does not have jurisdiction 
over the action in so far as it is not so based" at 5585; see Briggs and Rees (2003): 149. 93 Cheshire and North (1999): 214. 
94 Source Ltd v TUV Rheinland Holding (1998) QB 54. This has been complicated by the 
subsequent case of Kleinwort Benson v Glasgow City Council (No. 2) (1999) 1 AC 153 which 
9 
appears to give a different interpretation of "matters related to contract' 'to the Kalfelis case. 9 (1976) ECR 1735 (Case 21/76). 
96 Jenard (1979) originally left this open on the basis the wording had been used in certain pre- 
existing conventions between member States (at 26). 
97 (1995) 2 AC 18 (Case C-68/93). 
98 Ibid at 62. Also see Wegmann v Elsevier Science (1999) ILPr 379. 
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There are real problems identifying where the damage caused by infringement 
occurred. It has been suggested that damage should be assessed on the basis that 
intellectual property rights could only be infringed where they are protected. 
99 
Thus, an English court cannot hear a dispute, under Article 5(3), where it involves 
a foreign intellectual property right. 100 This approach has been criticised'01 on the 
basis that it mixes up liability with jurisdiction and leaves unanswered the 
question of what amounts to the "damage" caused by infringement. 
102 In any 
event, infringement is thought to occur wherever an Internet site, containing 
intellectual property, is accessible. This accessibility enables jurisdiction to be 
103 exercised under Article 5(3). 
The concept and principles behind Article 5(3) have already been discussed in 
relation to a similar proposal by Ginsburg/Dreyfuss'04 and have been shown to 
lead to very uncertain and inefficient results. Furthermore, this permissive ground 
of jurisdiction is directly in conflict with the First and Sixth Proposition. 
(W) Multiple defendants 
Article 6 of the Brussels Regulation states: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: (1) where 
he is one ofa number ofdefendants, in the courtsfor the place where 
99 Jooris (1996): 140; also see Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria (1995): [24.19] (this point was not 
repeated in Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria (2000)). 
100 Jooris (1996): 140. 
101 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 164. 
102 Ibid. This has led Fawcett and Torremans to suggest that a sui generis rule should be adopted 
by the Court of Justice to locate the damage (at 168-9). 
103 See Dreier (2004): 126-7; the contrary more restrictive view was taken by the German court in 
Re The Martim Trademark (2003) ILPr 17. 
104 See page 195 above et seq. 
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any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to 
avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings. 105 
The application of the Sixth Proposition to multiple defendants is similar to the 
approach of Article 6(l). A number of authorities have considered when 
intellectual property decisions are irreconcilable for the purpose of Article 6. 
Judgments can be considered irreconcilable where they involve contradictory 
findings of facts, or contradictory legal conclusions drawn from those facts, or 
contradictory remedies. 106 In intellectual property litigation, it is possible to have 
contradictory findings of fact as a result of the different procedures for finding 
facts in each State; 107 similarly, different legal conclusions could be drawn from 
the facts, for example whether or not something amounts to an insubstantial part 
or whether it infiinges a patent. 108 
A more pertinent question is whether actions are sufficiently "closely connected" 
where they are based on parallel intellectual property rights. 109 It has been 
suggested that the "better" view is that the essence of the rights is the same and so 
the cause of the action is the same. 110 However, in Coin Control v Suzo 
105 The earlier Article 6(l) of the Brussels Convention has been expanded to include certain 
requirements imposed by case law. In particular, in relation to irreconcilable judgments, see 
Katfeis v Schroder, supra. 
106 Gascoine v Pyrah (1994) ILPr 82 at 93-5; also see Fawcett (1995): 752. 
"' Chiron Corp v Organon Teknika (No. 10) (1995) FSR 325 at 338. 
108 As happened in the Epilady litigation: see Chapter 1. 
109 For a discussion of whether the inEringement of parallel intellectual property rights amounts to 
the same cause of action see Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 135-137. 
110 Ibid: 173. 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments 272 
International, "' the English High Court considered the matter and concluded that 
actions for the infringement of parallel rights are distinct and so the two 
judgments would not be irreconcilable. 112 
The argument that parallel rights are distinct is more difficult in relation to 
I 
European patents as they are based on the same substantive law: the European 
Patents Convention. In Coin Control it was suggested that two unamended 
European patents were identical and were related for the purposes of Article 
6(l). 1 13 The Dutch Courts, in Chiron Corp v Akzo Pharma, 114 actually held as 
such. However, the English Court of Appeal, in Fort Dodge v Akzo Nobel, ' 15 held 
that different judgments on the same European patent would not be 
irreconcilable. 116 'mismatter has been raised again in the Dutch Hoge Raad and a 
reference has been made to the Court of Justice. 117 
There is no antinomy between Article 6 of the Brussels Regulation and the Tcn 
Propositions; this is because of the uniform applicable law, which means any two 
decisions made by different tribunals would, by that very fact, be irreconcilable. 
Therefore, there should never be two hearings relating to the same infringement. 
In other words, the doubts expressed above are no longer relevant. 
111 (1997) FSR 660. 
112 Ibid at 666-7. Also see O'Sullivan (1996): 661-2. However, the US Courts have considered a 
Belgian decision on validity on a Belgian patent to be resjudicata in relation to the equivalent US 
patent: Northlake Marketing & Supply v Glaverbel (ND 111,1997) 986 F. Supp 471; although in 
Cuno v Pall (ED NY, 1989) 729 F. Supp 234 it was suggested that collateral estoppel in relation to 
foreign decisions is not appropriate; also see McGarrigle (1998). 113 Coin control, supra at 678. 114 The Hague District Court, 22 nd July 1994,1994 IER No. 24,150. 
115 Supra. 
116 This question was originally referred to the Court of Justice (Ibid at 247), but the reference was 
withdraw as the case was settled. 
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(N) Lis pendens 
The doctrine of lis pendens stops dual proceedings being litigated in two different 
forums. A specific provision is included in the Brussels Regulation to stop such 
proceedings! 18 However, this doctrine is unnecessary when applying the Ten 
Propositions. This is because there are two exclusive bases of jurisdiction: the 
First and Sixth Propositions. If a case is not covered by the First Proposition it 
must be covered by the Sixth Proposition; both propositions suggest only one 
forum and therefore the doctrine of lis pendens is unnecessary. 119 
D. Exclusive jurisdiction 
The Brussels Regulation mandates that in specific areas exclusive jurisdiction be 
granted to certain courts. Article 22 of the Regulation sets out five different 
grounds of exclusive jurisdiction: immovable property, existence of legal persons, 
validity of entries in public registries, validity of registered intellectual property 
rights and enforcement of judgments. 
(i) General 
There was an argument raised that intellectual property is immovable'20 and 
therefore falls within Article 22(l). 121 However, this view has been heavily 
criticised, 122 mainly because specific provision has been made by Article 22(4) for 
registered intellectual property rights and it would be illogical for intellectual 
117 Roche Netherlands v Primus and Goldberg (Ref C-539/03). 118 See Section 9 of the Regulation. 
119 The one exception to this is where an equal number of defendants are in two different 
jurisdictions, when it would be possible to start proceedings in either jurisdiction and be in accord 
with the Sixth Proposition. 
120 This was originally proposed by Arnold (1990) and he re-iterated it in Arnold (1999). 121 Article 16(l) of the Convention. 122 See Austin (1997); Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 34-35. 
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property to have two separate provisions in the sarne Article; but also because the 
Jenard and Schlosser Reports both appear to treat only land as immovable. 
123 
The relevant parts of Article 22 state: 
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of 
domicile ... (4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or 
validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights 
required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Members 
States in which the deposit or registration has been appliedfor, has 
taken place or is under the terms of a Community instrument or an 
international convention deemed to have taken place. 
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction o the European Patent OJfIce )f 
under the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, signed at 
Munich on 5 October 1973, the courts of each Member State shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile, in proceedings, 
concerned with the registration or validity of any European patent 
grantedfor that State. 124 
The Jenard Report suggests that Article 22(4) is necessary because the grant of "a 
national patent is an exercise of national sovereignty", 125 but infringement of 
123 Jenard (1979): 34-5; Schlosser (1979): 121-2. 
124 The second paragraph was not included in the Brussels Convention. 
125 Jenard (1979): 36. 
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those patents is governed by the general rules of the Convention. 126 It has also 
been suggested that the rules of exclusive jurisdiction are set out to ensure that 
"matters, which, because of their particular difficulty or complexity, require that 
the court having jurisdiction should be particularly familiar with the relevant 
,, 127 128 national law... and in Duynstee v Goderbauer the Court of Justice 
suggested that conferring exclusive jurisdiction: 
upon the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or 
registration has been applied for is justified by the fact that those 
courts are best placed to adjudicate upon cases in which the dispute 
itself concerns the validity of the patent or the existence of the 
deposit or registration. 129 
This is more or less suggesting that it is a matter of litigation convenience. 130 
Christopher Wadlow has attacked this suggestion and argued that the rule is a 
matter of public policy. 131 
The meaning of the term "registration or validity" in Article 22(4) was clarified in 
Duynstee. The case related, indirectly, to a dispute between an employee and 
employer over the ownership of a patent. On ruling that such disputes fall outside 
the scope of Article 22(4), the court held that the expression "registration or 
116 Ibid. Also see Fawcett (2002): 145, where he suggests that because issues of infringement 
commonly raise issues of validity such cases fall outside the scope of Article 22(4). 127 Advocate General Lenz in As-Autoteile Service v Malhe (1985) ECR 2267 at 2271 (Case 
73/77). 
128 (1985) 1 CMLR 220 (Case 288/82). 
129 Ibid at 235. 
130 Tritton and Tritton (1987): 350. 
131 Wadlow (1985): 3 10-1. 
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validity" must have an independent Community meaning, 
132 which did not 
include ownership of patents, as that did not relate to the validity of the 
underlying patent. 
(H) "Principally concerned" 
Article 22(4) must be read in con unction with Article 25, which dictates that a i 
court of another member State must decline jurisdiction where a claim is 
"principally concerned" with a matter over which another court has exclusive 
jurisdiction under Article 22. Thus, much has turned on whether or not 
proceedings are principally concerned with registration or validity. 
It is unclear what "principally concerned" means. The Jenard Report stated that 
this excludes a matter which is raised as a "preliminary or incidental mattee,. 
133 
The problem, however, has always been that invalidity and infringement are as Mr 
Justice Walker states in Chiron Corp v Evans Medical Ltd, 134 , tWo sides of the 
same coin" (or 44two jaws of the same squeeze"). 135 Thus, when someone alleges 
infiringement of a registered right does a defence based on the invalidity of the 
relevant right mean that the granting state has exclusive jurisdiction? Mr Justice 
Laddie held in Coin Controls v Suzo InternationaII36 that: 
once the defendant raises the validity the court must hand the 
I 
proceedings over to the courts having exclusivejurisdiction over that 
issue. Further, since Article [25] obliges the court to decline 
132 Duijnstee, supra at 235. 
133 Jerwd (1979): 39. 
134 (1996) FSR 863. 
135 lbid at 872. 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments 277 
jurisdiction in relation to claims which are "principally" concerned 
with Article [22] issues, it seems tofollow thatjurisdiction over all of 
the claim, including that part which is not within Article [22], must 
be declined. 137 
The English Court of Appeal endorsed this view in Fort Dodge v Akzo Nobel 
138 
by suggesting: 
when there is a bona fide challenge to the validity of a ... patent, any 
proceedingsfor infringement must ... 
be "concerned with " the validity 
of the patent. 139 
Belgian Courts 140 and Spanish Courts 14 1 have reached similar decisions, namely 
that once validity of a foreign registered right has been raised the court must 
decline jurisdiction. The Dutch Courts, in interlocutory hearings (commonly 
called "kort gedine'), 142 have been far more liberal and allowed matters of 
validity to be considered incidentally. 143 The German court took a similarly robust 
line in GAT v Luk, 144 where it considered that where a court had jurisdiction over 
the parties it could consider matters of validity as well as infringement. 145 This 
136 sUpra. 
137 Ibid at 676. 
139 Supra. 
139 Ibid at 244. 
140 RZ; hm En2yme (2001) 32 IIC 571. 
141 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale (1981), p. 913; D Series 1-16.4 - B3 
(cited in Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 207). 
142 See Brinkhof (1994): 361. 
143 This was however restrained by the ruling in Expandable Grafts v Boston Scientific (1999) FSR 
352. 
144 (2003) ILPr 5. 
145 Ibid at 61-2. 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments 278 
case has now been referred to the Court of Justice. 
146 In his opinion the Advocate- 
General suggested: 
[Article 22(4) of the Brussels Regulation] determines the competence 
of a court when a procedure concerning the validity or the nullity of 
a patent or other industrial Property right is raised. This article 
applies when, in proceedings concerning infringement, the defendant 
or, in proceedings concerning non-infringement, the plaintiff argues 
that the patent is invalid or a nullity. 147 
It has been suggested 148 that such a restrictive view is inappropriate and a more 
flexible approach should be adopted on the basis that "principally" means 
"mainly". 149 Thus, a claim for infringement in which validity is raised as a 
defence is mainly (or principally) concern with infringement and not validity or, 
at best, it is equally concerned with both infringement and validity. 
"' It is 
unlikely that this view will be adopted until a mechanism is created for dealing 
with a foreign judgment that found a (domestic) registered right to be invalid or 
partially so (after all, an order to amend a patent is a common outcome of 
hearings). 
146 See GAT v Luk (2002) ILPr 41 (Case C-4/03). Another similar reference was made by another 
German court: MTD (2004) 35 IIC 325. 
147 GAT v Luk (unreported) 16th September 2004 (Case C-4/03) (AG Opinion): Author's translation. 
149 Prior to the GAT v Luk reference. 149 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 203. In contrast Briggs and Rees (2003) suggest that the 
English approach has the correct balance because it has the "merit of practical wisdom about it, for 
it combines respect for article 22(4) with the need to obtain a quick and efficient resolution of all 
limbs of the dispute" (at 7 1). 
150 Fawcett and Toffernans (199 8): 203. 
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Alternatively, Christopher Wadlow has argued that Article 22(4) does not 
preclude a decision on validity, inter partes, where the issue is raised as a 
counterclaim. 151 The basis of this approach is the Court of Justice's decision in 
Davaern v Otterbeck, 152 where it was held that as long as a separate judgment was 
not applied for on a counterclaim, the defences available under national law 
should all be available. In other words, someone can raise the defence of 
invalidity, but they cannot actually get an order declaring the right to be invalid. 
He suggests that this approach would have been within the contemplation of the 
draftsmen of the original Convention. 153 Assuming he is correct, this approach 
would also be compatible with the various propositions. 
It is quite clear that the majority view is in conflict with the First and Sixth 
Propositions. This is because Article 22(4) prohibits a party from challenging the 
validity of any foreign registered intellectual property rights before a court. Thus, 
a court that has jurisdiction under the First or Sixth Proposition would, by reason 
of Artiqle 22(4), be precluded from determining transnational infringement 
(invalidity) hearings. Thus, Article 22(4) is incompatible with those propositions. 
(M) European Patent Convention and the Litigation Agreement 
Article 22(4) acknowledges the rules in the European Patent Convention, in 
particular in the Protocol on Recognition. This Protocol deals with the right to be 
granted a European patent; it does not deal with validity or infringement. It 
therefoie falls outside the scope of this work because such dispute is only likely to 
151 Wadlow (1998): [3-132 to 3-147]. 
'5' (1995) ECR 1-2053 (Case C-341/93). 
153 Wadlow (1998): [3-137 to 3-140]. 
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involve the European Patent Office and applicants. 154 There is, however, a 
proposal for a European Patent Litigation Agreement, which would centralise 
European patent litigation. ' 55 This proposal, which would require the issues 
surrounding Article 22(4) to be addressed, demonstrates the negotiating parties' 
willingness to allow the validity of patents to be adjudicated outside their 
domestic courts. Indeed, member States have already agreed to unitary rights 
being invalidated by courts in other member States (Community Trade Mark 
Courts and Community Design Courts). 
E. Recognition and enforcement of judgments 
The Brussels Regulation mandates that a judgment, "' which comes within the 
scope of the Regulation, ' 57 shall be recognised in other member States without 
any special procedure being required. 158 It is not limited to final judgments and so 
provisional orders are entitled to recognition. 159 Nor is recognition limited to 
money judgments, injunctions and specific performance may be recognised with 
160 the same penalties for disobedience. 
The recognition of a judgment can arise in a number of ways. First, where a 
person wants to enforce the judgment it is necessary, as a preliminary step, to 
I 
154 For a more detailed analysis see Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 52-61. 
155 This is a proposed as an alternative to the Community Patent Convention. The EPLA allows 
litigation of a number of national rights (granted as European patents), whereas the CPC creates a 
unitary right. 
156 Defined in Article 32 as "any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, 
whatever the judgment may be called . ..... 157 Indeed, many of the decisions on the scope of the Brussels Convention were related to 
recognition rather than the primary jurisdiction: Cheshire and North (1999): 485. 158 Article 33(l). 
159 See Schlosser (1979): 126 and De Cavel v De Cavel (1979) ECR 1055 (Case 143/78). 
However, orders without notice (ex parte) are not included: Denilauler v SNC Couchet Freres 
(198 1) 1 CMLR 62 (Case 125/79). 
160 Schlosser (1979): 132. 
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recognise it; second, it is relevant where someone wishes to defend an action on 
the basis of res judicata; and finally, it can be relevant to establishing title to 
goods or for a set off. The Regulation's prohibition on any special procedure for 
recognition means that it should be more or less automatic. 
161 However, there are 
a number of defences to recognition set out in Article 34 of the Regulýtion, only 
one of which needs to be considered here: 162 
A judgment shall not be recognised... if such recognition is 
manifestlY163 contrary to public policy in the Member State in which 
recognition is sought. 
The meaning of "public policy" is somewhat unclear. The Jenard Report indicates 
that it should only be used in exceptional cases and never to criticise the decision 
of the court which gave the judgment; but o. nly the judgment itself. 164 The 
Schlosser Report went fixther by indicating that, in some cases, fraud can come 
within the public policy exception. 165 It is also clear that it is improper to refuse to 
recognise a judgment on the basis of the rules of private international law used by 
166 167 the court giving judgment or on the basis that there were errors of fact or law. 
161 Jenard (1979): 74. 
162 The other exceptions: "natural justice" and conflicts with judgments of the recognising state or 
another are discussed at length in the textbooks: Cheshire and North (1999): 497-505; Briggs and 
Rees (2003): 440-8 and Dicey and Morris (1999, Supp): [S14-206-SI4-227]. 
163 The word manifestly was not included in Article 27(l) of the Brussels Convention. 
164 Jenard (1979): 44. The limitation to exceptional cases was followed in Hoffmann v Krieg 
(1988) ECR 645 (Case 145/86) and Hendrikman v Magenta Druck & Verlag (1997) QB 426 at 
442 (Case C-78/95). 
165 Schlosser (1979): 128. This would not include situations where fraud had been raised and 
dismissed in the court which gave judgment because this would amount to questioning the 
decision of that court: Cheshire and North (1999): 496. On a different basis it has been suggested 
that it would also be inappropriate to raise fraud where it was known about during the proceedings: 
Interdesco SA v Nuffifire (1992) 1 Lloyd's Rep 180. 166 Jenard (1979): 44; although compare Forde, (1980): 272-3. 167 Article 36 makes it clear that "Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as 
to its substance". 
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It is therefore necessary to examine the impact of the public policy proviso on 
intellectual property judgments. The territorial nature of intellectual property has 
led to the assumption that the granting country must have exclusive jurisdiction. 
Therefore, following this argument, where a court of another country adjudicates 
on those rights, in particular in relation to infringement, the granting state may 
refuse to recognise the judgment on the grounds that another court has exclusive 
jurisdiction and so enforcing the judgment would be contrary to public policy. 168 
The Regulation specifically provides that a court need not recognise a judgment 
which conflicts with Article 22.169 
However, Fawcett and Torremans argue convincingly that a court should 
recognise a foreign judgment relating to its own intellectual property rights. The 
basis of their argument is that only in exceptional cases should a judgment not be 
recognised on the grounds of public policy and further, it is clear, that Article 34 
cannot be used to check whether the foreign judgment is reconcilable with 
domestic public policy. 170 Furthermore, a French court had already adopted this 
approach, when they recognised. a Dutch decision on a French intellectual 
property matter. 171 
168 Fawcett and Torremans (199 8): 729; Wadlow (199 8): [8-127]. 
169 Article 35(l). 
170 See Article 36 and SISRO vAmpersand Software (1994) lLPr 55. 171 Braillecellen II (1995) EIPR D-73. 
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Once a judgment has been recognised it is necessary for it to be enforced. The 
procedure for enforcement is set out in Chapter III of the Regulation, however it is 
not intended to discuss it here. 172 
It can be seen that, with a restrictive interpretation of the public policy exception, 
the approach taken in the Brussels Regulation is in accord with the Fifth 
Proposition. Indeed, it provides a good model to use for any convention 
incorporating that proposition. Notwithstanding, the provisions in the Brussels 
Regulation have not been without their critics. The basis of this criticism is that 
judgments obtained against defendants (not domiciled in Member States) using 
exorbitant rules of jurisdiction are enforceable throughout the Community. 173 
However, this criticism would not apply to the Fifth Proposition as it is limited to 
judgments founded on jurisdiction under the First and SUM Propositions: neither 
of which are exorbitant. 
111. National law 
In this section the First, Fifth and Sixth Propositions will be placed in the context 
of the national legal systems of the four target jurisdictions: England and Wales, 
the United States, France and Germany. However, three of the states are members 
of the European Community and are bound by the Brussels Regulation. Therefore, 
the examination below will only consider those jurisdictions' "traditional rules", 
or those rules which apply when the Brussels Regulation (or the related 
Conventions) do not apply. 
172 For a full discussion see Briggs and Rees (2003): 451-6 and Cheshire and North (1999): 489- 
506. 
173 See for example Von Mehren (1981). 
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A. England and Wales 
The English traditional rules of jurisdiction permit jurisdiction over a defendant 
where they are served with process within the jurisdiction. 
174 Where a person 
cannot legally be served, a court has no jurisdiction over them. 
175 
In certain circumstances, the English courts also permit process to be served 
outside the jurisdiction, 176 which is equivalent to granting additional special 
grounds of jurisdiction. Such service is permitted where the tort is committed, or 
damage is sustained, within the jurisdiction; 177 where a contract was made 
178 in 
the jurisdiction, 179 where the contract is governed by English law; 
180 or where the 
breach is committed within the jurisdiction. 181 
It is quite clear that basing jurisdiction on service alone, or permitting service 
abroad, means that jurisdiction can be based on grounds other than habitual 
residence. This would be contrary to the Sixth Proposition. However, of course, 
English law permits service on a person habitually resident within the jurisdiction; 
thus all that is required is that service is limited to such persons. 
174 A claim is started by the issue of a claim form (CPR 7.2) which must be served within four 
months (CPR 7.4); this principle is set out in rule 24 in Dicey and Morris (1999): [11 R-0761. 
175 Although, English courts now allow what is called substituted service at an address for service: 
see CPR 6.5; Companies Act 1985 s. 725. 
176 These grounds are set out in CPR 6.20. 
177 CPR r. - 6.20(8); this provision is intended to mirror that in the Brussels Regulation: Sime 
(2004): 127. In relation to patents the action must be put into effect in the UK, it is not enough that 
the "effect occurs" therein: see MBM v William Hill (2003) RPC 31 at [24-9]; in relation to 
copyright Copinger (2005). 
178 This is based on normal contractual principles: Brinkibon v Stahag Stahl (1983) 2 AC 34. 179 CPR r. 6.20(5)(a). 
180 CPR r 6.20(5)(c). 
181 CPR r. 6.20(6). This is similar to Article 5(l) of the Regulation. 
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The English courts are also willing to accept jurisdiction over a dispute where the 
parties have agreed that the court should have exclusive jurisdiction! 
82 Further 
flexibility is provided by the possibility of parties submitting to the jurisdiction. 
183 
The courts have recently made it clear that this willingness extends to intellectual 
property litigation. 184 Similarly the court will stay domestic proceedings that are 
instituted in breach of any such agreement. 185 This flexibility means that the 
English traditional rules are compatible with the First Proposition. 
(i) Restrictions onjurisdiction 
Despite having personal jurisdiction over a case the traditional rules include some 
subject-matter restrictions. The House of Lords held in British South Africa v 
Companhia de Moqambiquel86 that English courts have no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on foreign immovables. This rule was abrogated by statute'87 and now 
it only applies to questions of title or possession of such immovables. 
In English law, intellectual property is not an immovable; indeed the statutes 
specifically state that it is moveable. 188 However, although intellectual property 
has not been classified as immovable property, it has been said to be analogous to 
such property. It was an Australian court that first drew this analogy in Potter v 
Broken Hill ptY189 where it was held that the court had no jurisdiction over foreign 
182 Rule 32 of Dicey and Morris (1999): [12R-074]; CPR r. 6.20(5)(d). 
183 This can be achieved by contesting the case on the merits (see Marc Rich v Societa Italiana 
(No. 2) (1992) 1 Lloyd's Rep 624) or instructing a solicitor within the jurisdiction to accept service 
(see Manta Line v Soflanites (1984) 1 Lloyd's Rep 14). 184 Celftech R&D Ltd v Medimmune (2005) FSR 21. 185 See Gienar v Meyer (1796) 2 Hy. BI 603,126 ER 728; The Mahkutai (1996) AC 650. 186 (1893) AC 602. 
197 Section 30(l) Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. 188 Trade Marks Act 1994 s. 22; Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988 s. 90(l); Patents Act 
1977 ss. 30 and 3 1. 189 (1905) VLR 612. 
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intellectual property rights because such actions were purely local. However, 
when the decision was upheld by the High Court'90 it was on a different basis: the 
grant of a foreign patent was an act of state. 191 The High Court's approach was 
followed in Norbert Steinhardt and Son v Meth and Another 192 where Justice 
Fullagar noted: 
no action could be maintained in Englandfor an infringement of an 
Australian patent, or in Australia for an infringement of an English 
patent... 
193 
This line of reasoning is still supported by some academic commentators. 
194 
However, in England the matter has now been considered by the courts on a 
number of occasions. In Tyburn Productions v Conan Doyle'95 Mr Justice 
I 
Vinelott' 96 ruled that the distinction between local and transitory actions was 
essential to the MoVambique decision and that infringement of all intellectual 
property rights are local actions. Therefore the English courts had no jurisdiction 
over foreign copyright disputes. This rule was then extended to trade marks in LA 
Gear v Gerald Nelan & Sons. 197 However, the Court of Appeal in Pearce v Om 
Arup Partnership 198 suggested that the ruling in Tyburn should be confined to the 
facts of that case; although, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether 
19 
1 
(1906) 3 CLR 479. 
19 O'Connor J at 513; Griffiths CJ at 496; Barton J at 500-3. 
192 (1960) 105 CLR 440. 
193 Ibid at 443. 
194 Arnold (1999). 
195 (1991) Ch 75. 
196 In the earlier case of Librarie du Liban v Pardoe Blacker (unreported), 21" December 1983, he 
held that an English court could restrain a person from infringing a foreign copyright where the 
F ies submitted to jurisdiction. r(1991) 
FSR 671. 
198 (2000) Ch 403 at 439-40. 
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the particular action was justiciable in the English courts. The ruling in Tyburn 
has been criticised by a number of commentators 199 and recently Peter Prescott 
QC, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, in Griggs and Others v Evans and 
Others, 200 stated that the English court's traditional rules of jurisdiction should be 
similar to those under the Brussels Regulation. 201 Therefore, only where validity 
is at issue should the English courts decline jurisdiction; otherwise it should be 
free to determine matters of foreign infringement. 
In addition to this (possibly defunct) limitation there is also a second restriction. 
This restriction stems from the case of "Morocco Bound" Syndicate v Harris 202 
where it was held, once more, that infringement of a foreign intellectual property 
right (German copyright) is not actionable in England. The rationale for this 
decision was that the foreign decision could not be enforced as it would be 
applying "German law" in "Germany" and this was a matter for the German 
courts. In Def Lepp Music v Stuart-Brown 203 the Vice-Chancellor thought that 
Morocco Bound was a "puzzling case', 204 but despite this, he still made a number 
of suggestions indicating that an English court had no jurisdiction over foreign 
infringement. 205 However, the restriction established in Def Lepp case pre-dates 
Tyburn, and in Griggs Peter Prescott QC held that it no longer applied because it 
related to the now defunct double actionability rule. 206 it therefore appears that 
199 Fawcett and Torrenians (1998): 286-90; Cheshire and North (1999): 386-7. 200 (2004) FSR 48. This decision was appealed, however, this aspect of the appeal was not 
pursued: Griggs v Evans and Others (2005) FSR 31 at 708. 
20' Although he discussed it in tems of the Convention. 202 (1895) 1 Ch 534. 
203 (1986) RPC 273. 
204 Ibid at 277. 205 Ibid at 276-7. 
206 This was a rule introduced by Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1, which required a tort to be 
actionable both in England and in the foreign jurisdiction. By the very nature of intellectual 
property it used to be thought that because each property right was territorial it must fall foul of the 
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foreign intellectual property rights can now be adjudicated in English courts under 
the traditional rules. 
(ii) The act ofstate doctrine 
The act of state doctrine in England stems from a seventeenth century case where 
the court refused to review a foreign trading patent. 
207 Its recent history begins 
208 
with the House of Lords decision in Buttes Gas and Oil v Hammer. Their 
Lordships, after considering the old cases and those of the United States (which 
are discussed below), opined that the act of state doctrine exists. Thus, a court 
should not consider the validity of a foreign registered right on the basis that to do 
so would be judging the validity of an act of state. It appears, therefore, that where 
an English court would have restricted jurisdiction by reason of article 22(4) of 
the Brussels Regulation, the "traditional" rules will impose a similar restriction by 
reason of the act of state doctrine. 209 
(M) The recognition ofjudgments 
The common law rules dictated that a final and conclusive judgmene 10 for a fixed 
sum (i. e. a money judgmene") obtained abroad creates an obligation that is 
actionable in England, but the judgment itself was not entitled to recognition. 
212 
Therefore, a new action needs to be started for the judgment to be satisfied; this 
double actionability rule. However, this rule was finally abolished by Part 3 of the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
207BIad vBamflield (1674) 3 Swan App 604,36 ER 992. 
208 (1982) AC 888. 
209 However, the Court of Appeal in Apple, Corp v Apple Computer (1991) 3 CMLR 49 did not rule 
out the possibility of investigating the validity of various foreign trade marks (at 69-70). 210 In other words it must be resjudicata in the state of origin. It does not mean there should be no 
right of appeal. Indeed, even with an appeal pending it may be actionable: see Scott v Pilkington 
(1862) 2B&S 11,121 ER 978. 
211 Injunctions and specific performance are excluded. 
212 Cheshire and North (1999): 407; Dicey and Morris (1999): [14-009]. 
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requirement is less onerous than it seems because it is possible to obtain summary 
judgment on the grounds that there is no arguable defence. Therefore, at common 
law, what is relevant is that a judgment provides an actionable obligation. 
An obligation is actionable only if the rendering court assumed jurisdiction on a 
213 basis acceptable to English law. In particular, the English courts refuse to 
recognise any decision on the title to English immovable property. 214 It is, 
therefore, almost certain that they would refuse to recognise a judgment on the 
title of intellectual property. (although there may be more flexibility with 
copyright than registered rights) .2 
15 The common law considers foreign judgments 
to be conclusive and therefore it is prohibited, with limited exceptions, to 
challenge the decision even where a foreign court, when applying English law, 
makes a mistake. 216 The exceptions include similar provisions to those set out in 
the Brussels Regulation. 217 
The common law rules have been supplemented by a statutory regime. Part of this 
regime deals with enforcement under the Brussels Regulation and enforcement 
between the different jurisdictions in the United Kingdom. However, it is the 
regime under the Administration of Justice Act 1920 (the 1920 Act) and the 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (the 1933 Act) that will 
be outlined here. 
213 For a discussion of such grounds see Cheshire and North (1999): 408-23. 214 Boyse v Colclough (1854) 1K&J 124,69 ER 396. 21 5 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 737; argue, on a related point, that they should not be 
recognised. 
216 Castrique v Imrie (1870) LR 4 HL 414. 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments 290 
The 1920 Act allows a person who has obtained a judgment under which money is 
payable218 from a Superior Court in a Commonwealth country"9 to register it in 
the United Kingdom . 
220 The court will decide whether it is just and convenient for 
the judgment to be enforced within the Kingdom . 
221 The court is prohibited from 
registering a judgment of a court that was without jurisdiction (under the common 
law rules 222) , but once a judgment 
has been registered it has the same effect as if 
the registering court had given it. 
The 1933 Act was intended to supersede the earlier the 1920 Act as it applies to 
both the Commonwealth and to other countries. The 1933 Act, as its name 
suggests, requires reciprocity and where it is clear that such reciprocity has been 
afforded an Order in Council may be made to extend the application of the Act to 
those countries. The 1933 Act is more liberal than the 1920 Act in that it does not 
require judgment to be from a Superior Court. Further, it also pen-nits arbitration 
awards, which have been recognised by a foreign state, to be registered. It 
requires, like the common law, that the judgment is final and conclusive, but it 
leaves no discretion to the registering court. Notwithstanding, once registered a 
judgment must be set aside where the court issuing it lacked jurisdiction or where 
other grounds are satisfied (these grounds are very similar to those under the 
223 
commonlaw). However, a judgment which could be recognised (whether or not 
217 For a more detailed discussion see Cheshire and North (1999): 441-459; Dicey and Morris 
(1999): [14R- 118-14-158]. 
218 Section 12. 
219 The Act requires reciprocity and it only applies to a country if it has been applied by an Order 
in Council. 
220 Although a person may still sue at common law for their right obtained under the foreign 
judgment: Yukon Consolidated Gold v Clark (1938) 2 KB 241 at 252; however, they will not be 
entitled to their costs if the judgment was successfully registered. 221 Section 9(l). 
222 See Cheshire and North (1999): 463. 
223 Section 4(l). 
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is has been) is considered to be conclusive between the parties, except where 
registration should be set aside. 224 
It can be seen that that the English rules on the enforcement of judgments are far 
more restrictive than that mandated by the Fifth Proposition as they are limited to 
money judgments. Notwithstanding, the courts are used to enforcing judgments on 
the basis of the Brussels Regulation and therefore adopting the Fifth Proposition 
would be quite straightforward. 
B. United States 
The jurisdiction of the courts of the several States of the United States is 
determined by the rules of each State. Intellectual property, however, is a federal 
matter and so the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction. 225 Federal courts 
may only, however, have jurisdiction over a person where they could "be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which 
,, 226 the district court is located... Thus, the detennination of whether a State has 
jurisdiction is important. In effect, the federal courts adopt the "long-arm" statutes 
of the states, 227 they also have their own long arm statute that grants a federal 
court jurisdiction where it would be compatible with the Constitution and no other 
court has such jurisdiction. 
228AII 
courts, whether federal or state, must comply 
224 Section 8. 
225 Some related torts are not federal, such as unfair competition, trade secrets and so forth. 
Further, it has been suggested that there is no subject matter jurisdiction in relation to foreign 
intellectual property rights: Bridgeman v Corel (SDNY, 1998) 25 F. Supp 2d 421 at 430. 226 FRCP Rule 4(k)(1)(A). 
22' Some statutes, such as California's grant jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the 
Constitution7 (California Code Civil Procedure §4 10.10). 
228 FRCP Rule 4(k)(2). 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments 292 
with due process requirements of the fifth amendment (federal) and the fourteenth 
amendment (state). 
(i) Due process requirements 
It was the case of Pennoyer v Nef? 29 that first introduced due process notions into 
the jurisdictional requirements. 230 The modem due process standard was first 
enunciated in International Shoe v Washington 231 which dictated a standard based 
on "certain minimum contacts" with the forum in order "not [to] offend 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice', %. 232 Therefore, the court 
indicated that there must be sufficient "contacts... as make it reasonable... to 
require the [person1233 to defend the particular SUirs. 234 
It is unclear what amounts to "minimum contacts": "systematic and continuous" 
contacts are clearly enough ; 235 and "single or occasional acts" may be enough if 
connected to the suit. 236 Notwithstanding, doubt remains and the deluge of 
litigation on the point has not provided an answer. 237 This test has lead to a 
"haphazard jurisdictional doctrine" with the Supreme Court steering "an erratic 
course that confuses court, counsel, academics and often the Justices as well's . 
238 
229 (1878) 95 US 714. 
230 There is actually some doubt about whether Pennoyer introduced this requirement, but the 
majority view is that it did: Scoles and Hay (2004): 285 (n. 3). 
231 (1945) 326 US 310. 
232 Ibid at 316. 
233 Originally it was thought that International Shoe applied only to corporations, but Shaffer v 
Heitner (1977) 433 US 186 makes it clear that it applies generally. 234 International Shoe, supra at 317. 
235 Ibid at 320. 
236 Ibid at 318. 
237 Weintrub (1995): 531-2: n. 5; where it is noted that there were 2,321 reported decisions on what 
amounts to "minimum contacts" in the period between V' January 1990 and 22 nd February 1995. 238 Borchers (1992a): 122. 
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These minimum contacts are subject to a "reasonableness tesf'. This first became 
clear in World-Wide Volkswagen v Woodson. 239 This test was applied in Asahi 
Metal Industry v Superior Court of California, 240 where the Supreme Court held 
jurisdiction was unreasonable and so could not be exercised. The court also made 
it clear that the "minimum contacts" test should be applied to the exercise of 
jurisdiction in international cases as well as those of a domestic nature. 
(U) Habitual residence 
If a person is, domiciled in a particular state they obviously have significant 
contacts with it. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court, in Milliken v 
Meyer, 241 ruled: 
one... incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even 
during sojourns without the state ... 
242 
Even where domicile is purely technical and does not represent actual residence it 
is still possible to use it to ground jurisdiction. 243 The Restatement (Second) goes 
as far as to suggest that residence'is sufficient to found general jurisdiction unless 
the link to the state is too slight. 244 The middle concept of "habitual residence" is 
almost certainly sufficient to found jurisdiction. 243 It is therefore quite clear that 
the Sixth Proposition is compatible with US Constitutional standards. 
239 1980) 444 US 286, particularly at 292. 240 (1987) 480 US 102. 
24 '(1940) 311 US 457. 
242 ]bid at 464. 
243 Scoles and Hay (2004): 3434. 244 Restatement (Second) §30. 
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(W) Choice of court clauses 
It is also clear that choice of court clauses can give a court jurisdiction. It was the 
decision in Pennoyer v Neff 46 that acknowledged that the due process clause 
permits extra-territorial jurisdiction where it was based upon consent. This was 
extended to choice of court clauses in National Rental v Szukhent. 
247 However, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that overweening bargaining power may affect the 
validity of an agreement, implying that such clauses could not bind consumers. 
248 
Despite this the Court appears content to uphold such contracts provided they 
were not obtained by fraud or duress. 249 Each clause, however, must be judged on 
its own terms to detennine whether it applies to the particular dispute. 
250 This 
latitude means the First Proposition is compatible with US law both 
constitutionally and federally. 
(N) Intellectual property: speciaijurisdiction 
In relation to copyright and trade mark disputes the US Courts have been very 
liberal in their assumption of jurisdiction. To date, the Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed when it is appropriate to accept specific jurisdiction in an infringement 
action. However, it has been suggested that it woVid adopt a similar approach to 
that used for defamation. 251 In Keeton v Hustler Magazine252 and Calder v 
245 Cavers (1972); also see Trautman and Von Mehren (1966): 1137 and 1179; and Restatement 
(Second) §79. 
246 Supra at 735-6. 
247 (1964) 375 US 311. However, some lower courts have held that it is still necessary for there to 
be some provision in statute to permit jurisdiction: McRae v JDIMD (Fla. 19 87) 511 So. 2d 540. 
248 This argument is based on the case of The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore (1972) 407 US I at 12, 
which related to federal jurisdiction. 
249 This flexibility can be demonstrated by Carnival Cruise Lines v Shute (1991) 499 US 585, 
which involved an adhesion clause printed on the back of a ticket in very small type; also see 
Scoles and Hay (2004): 336 and Restatement (Second) §32. 
250 Omron Healthcare v Maclaren Exports (7h Cir, 1994) 28F. 3d 600 at 602. 
251 Scoles and Hay (2004): 409. 
252 (1984) 465 US 770. 
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Jones 253 the Supreme Court indicated that the claimant could bring suit in any 
court where the defamatory material had been distributed. Like in defamation, the 
I 
j 254 distribution causes the intellectual property claimant in ury. Indeed, this is the 
approach that has been adopted by lower courts. 255 
In relation to patent infringement the jurisdictional requirements are more 
liberal. 256 Nonnally, foreseeable and substantial sales of the infringing product 
within the forum are sufficient minimum contacts to establish jurisdiction over the 
infringer. 257 However, mere offers to sell allegedly infringing products has been 
considered to be sufficient for jurisdiction 258 and unwanted (although foreseeable) 
sales of "bootleg" products in the forum may also be a sufficient purposeful 
connection. 259 So it appears that the connection only needs to be slight and only 
260 
where the activity is unforeseeable or trivial will jurisdiction not be established . 
(y) Internetjurisdiction 
There have been a number of cases where US Courts have assumed jurisdiction 
based upon activity taking place on the Internet. Initially, the courts heard cases 
261 based solely on the accessibility of the website; now most courts will not grant 
253 (1984) 465 US 783. 
254 Scoles and Hay (2004): 409. 
255 See CablelHome Communications v Network Prods (110, Cir, 1991) 902 F. 2d 829; 
Stabilisierungsfonds far Wein v Kaiser Stuhl Wine (DC Circ, 1981) 647 F. 2d 200; Johannsen v 
Brown (D. Or, 1992) 788 F. Supp 465. 
256 The divergence has grown up because all patent appeals are heard by the Federal Circuit, 
whereas copyright and trade mark appeals are heard by the regional appeal circuits. 257 Beverly Hills Fan v Royal Sovereign (Fed Cir, 1994) 21 F. 3d 1558 (cert dismissed 512 US 
1273). 
258 3D Systems Inc v Aarotech Laboratories (Fed Cir, 1998) 160 F. 3d 1373. 259 Home v Adolph Coors (3d Cir, 1982) 684 F. 2d 255. 260 Scoles and Hay (2004): 412. 261 See CompuServe v Patterson (6h Cir, 1996) 89 F. 3d 1257. 
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jurisdiction where the only connection is through a "passive" webSiteý62 and it is 
becoming clear that: 
the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally 
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of 
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. 263 
Thus, there is a "sliding scale' of contacts 264 and depending on how the Internet is 
utilised will determine whether those contacts are sufficient. 265 It can be seen that 
the permissive nature of "minimum contacts" means only very limited contacts 
are actually needed for jurisdiction to be constitutional. These pennissive grounds, 
which would allow jurisdiction to proliferate uncontrollably, conflict with the 
Sixth Proposition. This is aptly deMonstrated by Playboy v Chuckleberry 
Publishing, 266 a trade mark infringement case, where the court only agreed not to 
enjoin activity in Italy if the defendant made it impossible to access the site from 
the US. It refrained from requiring the Italian website to remove the infringing 
material as: 
to hold otherwise, would be tantamount to a declaration that this 
Court, and every other court throughout the world, may assert ' 
jurisdiction over all infonnation providers on the global World Wide 
262 See Cybersell v Cybersell (9b Cir, 1997) 130 F. 3d 414; Bensusan Restaurant v King (2d Cir, 
1997) 126 F. 3d 25. 
263 Zippo Manufacturing v Zippo Dot Com (WD Pa, 1997) 952 F. Supp 1119. 264 ALS Scan v Digital Service (4h Cir, 2002) 292 F. 3d 707 (cert dismissed 537 US I 105). 265 See Toys `R' Us v Step Two (3d Cir, 2003) 318 F. 3d 446 suggesting that directly targeting, 
knowingly interacting with residents or other related contacts are sufficient (at 454). 266 (SDNY, 1996) 939 F Supp 1032. 
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Web such a holding would have a devastating impact of those who 
use this global service. 
267 
(vi) Multiple defendants and consolidation 
The US Courts are sometimes willing to take jurisdiction for reasons of 
necesSIty. 268 The Supreme Court authority for this is Mullan v Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust. 269 This case does not expressly state that jurisdiction could be 
r 
granted on the grounds of necessity, but the court held that it had jurisdiction over 
the large number of defendants many of whom had little or no contact with the 
relevant state. If this basis of jurisdiction exists, it is because of the "plaintiffs 
inability to reasonably carry out the litigation in another forum". 270 It is, however, 
unclear whether jurisdiction by necessity is an independent ground of jurisdiction 
or whether it simply affects the reasonableness of a court accepting jurisdiction. 271 
What is clear is that the lower courts are willing to use this basis of jurisdiction to 
enable the consolidation of judgments. 272 Thus, multiple defendants can be sued 
in the same action, for this reason it is comparable to Article 6 of the Brussels 
Regulation. 
There has also been an indication that United States courts may be willing to 
consolidate intellectual property infringement cases. In Boosey & Hawkes v Walt 
Disnq 273 the Second-Circuit US Court of Appeals overturned the District Court's 
ruling that each claim must be tried in each of the countries whose copyright laws 
267 Ibid at 1039-40. 
268 There is, however, considerable doubt about the extent of this ground of jurisdiction: see for 
example, Fraser (195 1). 
269 (1950) 339 US 306. 
270 Scoles and Hay (2004): 350. 
271 ibid. 
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are invoked. 274 Instead, the Court of Appeals made it clear that a US court may be 
the most convenient forum for the determination of various foreign copyright 
claims, thereby enabling the consolidation of trans-national copyright 
infringement cases in a single US court. The decision was not a final 
determination of whether a court can hear a foreign copyright claim; it merely 
held that the court should not dismiss it on the grounds offorum non conveniens. , 
It is unclear whether this can apply to disputes involving patents or trade marks, 
but it is probable that it does. However, US Patent Attorneys are very successful 
at arguing that validity of patents is a matter of such expertise that it should be 
determined only by the home state (obviously they argue foreign states cannot 
determine anything to do with the validity of US patents). Despite this caveat, the 
flexible approach demonstrated by Boosey & Hawkes supports both the First and 
Sixth Propositions. 
(vii) Act of state 
The act of state doctrine in the United States is often traced back to the English 
case of Duke of Brunswick v King of Hanover 275 and the basis of the doctrine 276 
was set out by the Supreme Court in Underhill v Hernandez. 277 The rationale for 
the act of state doctrine has varied. It was originally thought to be part of 
272 See for example, In re DES Cases (EDNY, 1992) 789 F. Supp 552. 273 (2 nd Cir, 1998) 145 F. 3d 481. 
274 Boosey & Hawkes v Walt Disney (SDNY, 1996) 934 F. Supp 119 at 125. 275 (1848) 2 HL Case 1,9 ER 993. Although others have also traced it back to the earlier English 
case of Blad v Bainfizeld (1674) 3 Swan App 604,36 ER 992. 276 It has been suggested that the act of state doctrine is not a matter of jurisdiction, but of 
applicable law: Bom (1996): 703 277 Set out on page 261 above. 
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international law, 278 but the leading case, Banco National de Cuba v Sabbatino, 
279 
suggested that it is a constitutional principle based on the separation of powers, 
whereby matters of foreign relations are for the executive and not the courts. 
However, the most recent Supreme Court decision, W. S Kirkpatrick v 
Environmental Tectonics, 280 held that the doctrine should be linked to challenges 
of the "validity" of foreign acts. 28 1 But which foreign acts? 
The case of Ayried Dunhill ofLondon v Cuba 282 makes it clear that only "public" 
or '(sovereign" acts fall within the doctrineý 83 and lower courts have ruled that 
"ministerial acts", including the grant of patents, are not covered by the doctrine: 
Mannington Mills v Congoleum. 284 This being the case, despite the fact that the 
grant of a patent appears to fit squarely within the definition of an act of state, it is 
not such an act. Therefore an American court can consider the validity of a foreign 
patent (although not affect it) and so there appears to be no conflict with the 
relevant Propositions. 
(viii) Recognition offoreignjudgments 
The several States of the United States must recognise the decisions of sister 
states on the basis of "Full Faith and Credif,. 285 Thus, it is possible to enforce 
both money judgments and equitable decrees rendered in other States. However, 
278 Ibid; also see Oetien v Central Leather (1918) 246 US 297 at 3034; for a broader discussion of 
the development of the doctrine see Born (1996): Chapter 9. 279 sUpra. 
280 (1990) 493 US 400. 
281 Ibid at 405. 282 (1976) 425 US 682. 
283 "No statute, decree, order, or resolutioW' of the Government mandated the action therefore it 
was not an act of state: Ibid at 695. 284 (3d Cir, 1979) 595 F. 2d 1287 at 12934; also see Sage Intl v Cadillac Gage (ED Mich, 1981) 
534 F. Supp 896 at 904 and Forbo-Giubiasco v Congoleum (SDNY, 1981) 516 F. Supp 1210. 285 For a discussion of this Scoles and Hay (2004): 1272-1307. 
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this provision does not apply to foreigri judgments, 
286 which have traditionally 
been recognised on the basis of comity. 287 In practice, foreign judgments, 
including injunctions and equitable decrees, 288 are recognised in a similar fashion 
to those of sister states. 289 
However, the recognition of foreign judgments is a matter for individual States 
and each State has developed a different approach. The two main camps are those 
following the common law rule and those following reciprocity. 
290 The common 
law rules have now been codified in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act (1962), which has been enacted by a number of states. This Act 
states that money judgments should be recognised and enforced on the same basis 
291 
as the judgment of a sister state (which is entitled to full faith and credit), 
subject to a number of conditions which are very similar to those for sister State 
recognition. 292 
It is not intended to review the various approaches taken by the States in any 
detail; but, it is clear that a judgment will not be enforced where the rendering 
court lacked jurisdiction; the judgment was obtained by fraud or duress; or it was 
contrary to public policy. 293 The last of these grounds, in relation to sister states, is 
286 Ibid: 1146. 
287 Ibid: 1150; also see Hilton v Guyot (1895) 159 US 113. 
288 Restatement (Second) §102, comment (b) and (g). Provided the decree is "consistent with 
fundamental principles ofjustice and of good morals": Restatement (Second) §98, comment (b). 
289 Restatement (Second) §98, comment (b). 
290 The reciprocity approach stems from the US Supreme Court decision of Hilton v Guyot (1895) 
159 US 113. 
291 Section 3. 
292 The most notable distinction is that of "a seriously inconvenient forum! ', although some courts 
have applied this to sister state cases: Scoles and Hay (2004): 13134. 
293 There are other grounds of refusal, but they are not relevant. It should also be noted that the US 
courts rarely invoke the public policy exception, and when they do it is limited to a narrow band of 
cases: see Minehan (1996). 
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very narrowly construed in that a judgment should be accorded full faith and 
credit even where it is based on something that is contrary to the public policy of 
the enforcing state, 294 a similar approach is appropriate to foreign judgments. 295 
Finally, it is important to note that it is possible for federal law to dictate a 
national recognition requirement, either by statute or treaty. 296 It can therefore be 
seen that the Fifth Proposition is (should a treaty be entered) likely to be in accord 
with US law. 
C. France 
(1) Articles 14 and 15 ofthe French Civil Code 
The detennination of whether a French court has international jurisdiction 
depends solely on the French rules. 297 The basic grounds of jurisdiction in 
international cases are set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code. 
These provisions specifically grant jurisdiction to the French courts where the 
dispute involves a French national. Essentially they establish a privilege for the 
French court to hear a dispute, which the parties may renounce if they wish; in 
which case the domestic rules of jurisdiction apply. 298 This emasculation of 
Articles 14 and 15 was compounded finther by the Court of Cassation who ruled 
that the courts cannot apply them automatically as they are a matter of "public 
order"; 299 they are now listed in the Annex I of the Brussels Regulation as 
294 Hieston v National City Bank of Chicago (App DC, 1922) 280 Fed 525 at 528. 295 Scoles and Hay (2004): 1314 n. 6 and 1333-6. 296 For a discussion of this see lbid at 1322-6. 297 Loussouarn and Bourel (2004): 444; Scheffel (1963) 52 RCDIP 387. 298 Taelman (2004): France at [112]. 299 Marocaine de Boissone v Soci&9 vincole du Languedoc (1964) 53 RCDIP 340. 
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prohibited grounds of jurisdiction. Indeed, even the French courts have dictated 
that they are subsidiazyýo 
(H) Yhe domestic rules applied to international cases 
Once the privilege has been renounced and the domestic rules apply, it is 
necessary to determine the content of those rules. The New Code of Civil 
Procedure (NCCP) does not include international rules of territorial jurisdiction. 
However, according to the Court of Cassation: 
in French lint-, internationaliurisdiction is governed by the domestic 
rules of territorial jurisdiction "'hatever the law applicable on the 
merits and the nationality ofthe parties. 301 
NO 77ze basic rule 
The basic domestic rule is set out in Article 42 of the NCCP, which states that the 
court territorially competent shall be that where the defendant has established 
their dwelline02 (actor sequitur forum rei) and where there are multiple 
defendants the claimant may elect the court where one of them lives. Only where 
the defendant has no domicile or residence can the claimant sue in their own 
domicile. 
300SOC COP= and Brandiesftom France vSoc. Orloas (1986) 75 RCDlP 712. 301 BvB0 981) 70 RCDlP 331 (extract translated in Taelman (2004): [118]); also see Gangspill V 
-4ries (1997) ILPr 198. '102 Article 43 NCCP detennines the place %%here the natural person lives is where they are dOlniciled or in relation to a legal person where it is established. 
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(iv) Special ndes ofjurisdiction 
The claimant may elect to commence proceedings in a different court under 
c. 
303 Article 46 NCCP which read.. 
The claimant may seise at his choice, in addition to the court in 
whose province the defendant has established his dwelling: 
- in a contractual matter, the court in whose province actual 
delivery of the personalty or in whose province the 
performance of the agreed service has been contemplate4 
- in a delictual matter, the court in whose province the 
uTongful act it-as occasioned or the one in whose province 
the damage was suffered 
In relation to contract it has been held that the payment of money is not the 
Performance of a service. 304 It is therefore, unclear where intellectual Property 
contracts are performedL A licence is, however, unlikely to be performed at the 
place where payment is made. In terms of intellectual property, this ground of 
jurisdiction is somewhat uncertain. 
This liberal grant of jurisdiction led to the controversial decision in LICRA & 
UEJF v Yahoo! Inc & Yahoo France v Yahoo P05 where the relevant Internet 
content was accessible from within France and so the court held that because of 
303 
All translations are based on the version of the New Code of Civil Procedure on '-vww. lcgifrance gouv fr 304 lluguet v CIRCO 0 982) Bulletin Civil 11 No 7. 305 ludgment of 20* No,. vznbcr 2000; see Dalton and Hugot (2002). There has also been a Protected saga involving the enforcement of this judgment in the United States this culminated with the court refusing to enforce it: see Yahoo! v LCJZA (9h Cir, 2004) 379 F. 3d 1120. 
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the "loss having been suffered in France, [the French Court] has jurisdiction to 
entertain this case by virtue of the provisions of Article 46"306 and, in a later 
decision, the French court concluded: 
Yahoo! is aivarc that it addrcsscs itscy'to Frcnch nationals sincc, in 
connecting to its auction site from a computer situated in France, it 
responds by posting aaWrlising banners in the. French language, in 
this case therefore, the link to France is sugiciently established 
which thereby confers jurisdiction upon [the French court] to 
entertain the claim. 307 
This wide interpretation of Article 46 would lead to a multiplicity of litigation and 
the attendant incfficiencies. Thus, not only is this permissive ground contrary to 
the SWh Proposition but it undermines certainty. 308 However, the general rule of 
the NCCP, set out in Article 42, is compatible with the Suth Proposition, except 
that jurisdiction is based on domicile rather than habitual residence. 
(v) Choice of court clauses 
I'lle French courts recognise choice of court clauses, to a limited degree. Article 
48 NCCP states: 
Any clause which, directly or indirectly. shall departfrom the rules 
of territorial compacncc shall be deemed non existent save where it 
306 
307 
Cited in ibid at 50. 
Cited in ibid at 5 1. 
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has been agrccd bent-cen the parties to a contract entered into in the 
capacity of tradown and that the same has been providedfor in an 
explicit manner in the undertakings of the party against whom it 
shall be cnforccd. 
Ilerefore any jurisdiction agreement between two private persons or between a 
merchant and a consumer is forbidden. Perplexingly, where the case involves an 
international element (Lm it is not between two French residents) it need not be 
between merchants; as the Court of Cassation has held "clauses extending the 
, 309 international competence are lawful when they involve international litigation. 
This rule has been surnmarised by Loussouarn and Bourel, jurisdiction selection 
clauses will be valid if- 
(a) the litigation has an international characten and 
(b) it does not conflict with the exclusive competence of the French 
jurisdiction3lo 
Where the agreement is purely domestic and it is not between merchants the 
French law is not in compliance with the First Proposition. However, if the 
French Courts apply the flexible international rules of territorial competence to 
domestic matters then the First Proposition would be met. 'Mis is, however, likely 
to meet much resistance. 
3(m In Re Dominanet (2003) EIPR N-129 another French Court took a different view, suggesting that Offering the offending articles over the Internet was not enough, it u2s necessary for there to actually be proof of deli. ry. 309 x Signaux el dEntreprisestkctriques vSw- Sarelec (1986) 75 RCDIP 537. 
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(W) Subject matter restrictions 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the subject matter restrictions which apply 
before the French courts. It is generally thought that the French courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of French patents and trade marks, because 
they pertain to a matter of French sovereignty. 31 1 Likewise, the Court will not 
interfere with the sovereignty of other states by annulling an administrative 
decision of a foreign state or any act of state. 312 Disputes arising from the 
registration of a trade mark are therefore within the jurisdiction of the country of 
registration; '" so even where a French court has competence over a person, either 
because of domicile or a choice of court clause, it will decline to hear the matter if 
it involves the validity of af 314 orcign registered right. This rigid approach 
conflicts with the relevant Propositions. 
(W) Recognition ofjudkments 
For a foreign judgment to be recognised by a French court it must be granted the 
eXCquatur. 315 'Me requirements for such a grant results from Re Munzer. 316 A 
French judge must ensure that five conditions are satisfied: (i) that the foreign 
court exercised jurisdiction appropriately, (ii) that the foreign court's procedure 
was regular, 317 (iii) that the law the foreign court applied was in accord with the 
French rules of private international lay, -, (iv) that the judgment was in conformity 
310 
uarn and Bourel (2004): [454-1 ] (author's translation). 311 
32 
Taelman (2004): [125]. I Mayer and 11=6 (2004): [318]. 313 La AfartnSqUa, 5e V Compctnhia Geral DaAgricultura Das Finhas DoAlto Douro (199 1) ILPr 451. 
314 Aid. It has been suggested that this is because to interfere in a foreign state's dealings would be 
contrary to rules of public international law- Mayer and 11=6 (2004): [318]. 313 Taelman (2004) at [355]. 316 
317 
(1964) 53 RCDIP 344. 
This is now probably limited to ensuring that it is compatible with public order. see Bachir v Bachir (1968) 57 RCDIP 98. 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments 3 07 
with the international public order, and (v) the absence of any kind of violation of 
law. Determining whether those conditions are met is the extent of the judge's 
power in relation to criforcement of a foreign decision. 3 18 These conditions are 
quite restrictive; however, the first condition is required by the Fifth Proposition, 
the third condition would automatically be satisfied provided that the Second and 
Seventh Propositions are met. Ile remaining conditions (the second condition is 
defacto defunct) arc in conflict with the Fifth Proposition. 
D. Germany 
Ile German courts distinguish between three types of jurisdictional rules: 
international jurisdiction (internationale Zustandikkeit), local jurisdiction 
(driliche Zustfindigkeit) and subject matter jurisdiction (sachliche Zustandikkeit). 
But with very few exceptions, the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozei3ordnung, 
ZPO) does not provide rules for determining international jurisdiction; instead the 
rules of local jurisdiction are applied. 319 
Habitual rcsidcnce 
Ile basic rule for determining the venue is set out in Article 12 zpO which 
reads: 
320 
The court before which a person is generally amenable to suit 
[hereinafter: "general venue'7 shall have jurisdiction for all 
complaints brought against him or her, unless an exclusive venue 
shall be establishedfor a complaint. 
319 Tachnan (2004)- [3561. 
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And Article 13 ZPO states: 
The general venue of a person shall be determined by his or her 
residence. 
This basic rule of international jurisdiction is, therefore, that the court of the 
defendant's residence has jurisdiction (actor sequiturforum rei). Similarly, a legal 
person's general venue is determined by the location of its general 
management. 32 1 However, the ZPO also grants jurisdiction on the basis of the 
"branch" rule, whereby an action can be brought against a corporation at any 
place where there is "an establishment from which business is transacted 
directly" . 
322 
Thus, the basic rule, subject to issues of exclusive venue, is in accordance with the 
Sixth Proposition. However, the "dual" liability of legal persons - both at the 
corporate seat and at the branch - is contrary to that Proposition. 
(H) Specialjurisdictional rules 
There are a number of permissive grounds of jurisdiction set out in the ZPO and, 
where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is a matter for the claimant to decide 
in which court they should sue. 323 In relation to torts, Article 32 ZPO grants the 
court jurisdiction where a tort was committed within the jurisdiction. In fact, this 
319 Dannemann (1993): 89. 
320 All translations based on the ZPO in Stewart (200 1). 
321 ZPO Article 17. 
322 ZPO Article 2 1. 
323 ZPO Article 3 5. This is also linked to Article 10 1 (1) of the Basic Law which forbids anyone to 
be "removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge": Dannemann (1993): 90. 
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provision grants jurisdiction both to the place where the defendant acted and 
where the damage was suffered; 
324 this is called the principle of ubiquity 
325 (ubiqui0sprinzip). Article 29 ZPO grants jurisdiction to the court of the place 
326 
where the obligation in dispute is to be performed. The place of performance is, 
in relation to an unperformed sales contract, the seller's place of business; 
whereas in relation to unpaid money, the obligation is considered to be located at 
the same place as the debtor. Thus, the rules are probably similar to those imposed 
under Article 5(l) of the Brussels Regulation. 
There is, however, an "umbrella7' rule in Article 23 ZPO, which grants jurisdiction 
over a person where they have any property located within the jurisdiction. Such a 
claim is not limited to the value of the property; 327 hence if someone leaves an 
I'umbrelW' behind in a hotel room they can be sued in an unconnected matter for 
millions of Euros. This ground of jurisdiction has potentially been curbed by a 
decision of the Bundesgerichtschof where it held that jurisdiction was only valid 
where there was "sufficient connection" with the jurisdiction; unfortunately this 
tenn was not defined. 328 It is, however, an exorbitant ground of jurisdiction listed 
in Annex I of the Brussels Regulation. These permissive rules are, therefore, not 
in compliance with the Sixth Proposition. 
324 Dannemann (1993): 92; Taelman (2004) at [70]. 
325 See The Car Importing Case (1980) NJW 1224. 
326 Although any provision deeming the place of performance is only valid between merchants: 
ZPO Article 29(2). 
327 Dannemann (1993): 93. 
328 Re Muduroglu Ltd (199 1) NJW 3092. 
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(M) Agreement between the parties 
Article 38(l) ZPO permits a court without jurisdiction to have jurisdiction in 
accordance with an express or implied agreement between the parties. 329 
However, such an agreement is only valid where the parties are merchants or 
certain other types of legal persons. In addition, Article 38(2) ZPO allows a 
written agreement between parties where at least one of them has no domestic 
general venue. Otherwise, an agreement is only permissible where it was entered 
into after the dispute arose. This provision goes some way to satisfying the First 
Proposition, albeit it is much more restrictive. 
(N) Subject matter restrictions 
There are certain subject matter restrictions imposed on courts. In Germany the 
validity of any patent can only be determined by the specialist patents court. Thus, 
as Stauder argues: 
If an actionfor infringement of a German patent is brought in Paris, 
the court may (as may the national court in Germany) - where there 
is doubt as to the validity of the patent in question - stay the 
proceedings pending the decision ofa German court, specifically the 
Bundespatentgericht [Federal Patent Court) 
... 
330 
329 It is also necessary to show that agreement relates to a specific legal relationship (ZPO Article 
40) and for the other party to have clear and unambiguous notice of the clause: Re A Wood-Cutting 
Machine (1995) ILPr 191. 
330 See Stauder (1998): 317 and 321 (translation by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office). This 
argument was based on European patents, but the argument appears equally applicable to various 
national patents. 
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However, he does argue for an alternative way forward where there is an 
international elenient: 
The phenomenon of multiple jurisdictions would invariably be 
avoided if the court adjudicating in the infringement proceedings 
examined the foreign patent at issue, and in the event of invalidity, 
dismiss the action only with inter partes effect (incidentally, as a 
preliminary issue) at least ifpermitted to do so under the applicable 
law. 331 
Thus, it appears that the German courts may be quite liberal and actually permit 
foreign states to consider the validity of German patents 332 and visa vcrsa; 
although obviously the court could not actually make the patent invalid. It could, 
however, between the parties at least, allow a determination of validity to be 
made. Thus, it appears the restrictions imposed by subject matter may not be an 
impediment under German law. 
(y) Recognition ofJudgments 
333 The basic rule of recognition of final and conclusive foreign judgements, in the 
absence of a treaty, is reciprocity. 33 14 
The court may also refuse to enforce a 
judgment when to do so would be contrary to the German ordre public. 335 To 
obtain enforcement of such a judgment it is necessary for the receiving court to 
331 Ibid: 321. 
332 This was not always the case, older texts suggest that foreign patent infringement actions were 
not permitted to be heard in German courts: Drobnig (1972): 298; although trade mark 
infiingement could be so heard: ibid: 304. 
333 ZPO Article 723(2) limits enforcement to "final"judgments. 
334 ZPO Article 328(l) par. 5. 
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have jurisdiction under the domestic rules. 336 The purpose of domestic 
proceedings is limited to the enforcement of the judgment. The requirement of 
reciprocity would be satisfied if the foreign country adhered to the propositions. 
However, the ordre public exception would be contrary to the Fourth Proposition. 
IV. Conflicts and solutions 
This chapter has set out a number of problems that may adversely effect the 
implementation of the First, Fifth and Sixth Proposition, most however are 
relatively minor and have parallels elsewhere. However two problems remain: 
whether a country will allow a foreign court to determine the infringement and 
validity of its intellectual property rights and the incorporation of choice of court 
clauses into consumer contracts. 
A. The validity of foreign intellectual property rights 
Aside from perhaps the German337 and the US courts, there is a great reluctance 
for the courts themselves to pass judgment on the validity of foreign intellectual 
property rights. Notwithstanding, some of the leading academics in the field have 
suggested that in some cases it should be possible. "' The problem with permitting 
such decisions was explained by Mr Justice Aldous in Plastus Kreativ AB v 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing: 339 
335 ZPO Article 328(l) par. 4. 
336 Taelman (2004): [210]. 
337 The courts have, on occasion, been willing to enforce arbitration agreements based on an 
arbitral determination that a foreign patent is invalid: see Kur (2005): 33. 
338 Fawcett (2002): 165-6 
339 (1995) RPC 438. 
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I would not welcome the task of having to decide whether a person 
had infringed a foreign patent. Although patent actions appear on 
their face to be disputes between two parties, in reality they also 
concern the public. A finding of infringement is a finding that a 
monopoly granted by the state is to be enforced. The result is 
invariably that the public have to pay higher prices than if the 
monopoly did not. exist. If that be the proper result, then that result 
should, I believe, come aboutfrom a decision of a court situated in 
the state where the public have to pay the higher prices. 340 
Accepting this reitrictive view, by not even considering infringement, would 
probably curtail rules that have already developed. However, as far as the 
statements 'can be linked to the validity of registered rights they remain valid. 
Therefore, how can the Propositions be reconciled with the reluctance of courts to 
address the validity of foreign rightS? 341 
Despite this traditional reluctance, states are beginning- to show a willingness to 
consider allowing other courts to determine the validity of their own patents. This 
is demonstrated most aptly by the European Patent Litigation Agreement, 342 
Articles 42 and 43 of the draft Agreement pen-nit a "European Patent CourV' to 
revoke a patent and for the revocation to take effect in every member State, 
despite the fact that the patents remain purely territorial. 
340 Ibid at 447. 
34 ' This reluctance is attributed, by Fentiman (2005): 132, to the regulatory character of intellectual 
property. Which leads to every state having a legitimate interest in the protection of intellectual 
zoperty rights according to its own law. 
42 Draft Agreement on the establishment of a European Patent Litigation System, 16'h February 
2004. 
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The Propositions require a French court to determine that its patent and many 
others governed by US law are invalid according to US law (or partially invalid). 
This would produce a somewhat unusual result, because each right is granted 
according to national law and so it would lead to something being declared invalid 
when it had never been determined to be valid according to that law. This may 
make some States initially reluctant to agree to this approach. 
Therefore, an altemative halfway house is possible. The altemative proposal is 
that the French court could determine world-wide infringement on the basis of the 
single applicable German law, but if (and to the extent that) the underlying patent 
is invalid a domestic court can only declare the domestic (French) patent to 
actually be invalid. The global validity detennination would, however, be binding 
between any parties to the litigation but not in relation to anyone else. This result 
is undoubtedly fair as the proprietor selected the law under which they wished the 
patent to be governed. This approach is also gaining momentum in the 
international debate as it now fonns part of the Max Planck Institute's proposal. 343 
To reinforce the effectiveness of this alternative proposal following a finding of 
invalidity, the national authorities would notify the authorities of every other 
signatory State, who would in turn then register a "notice" against the patent. This 
notice would have no legal effect, but would be a warning to the public as a 
whole. However, if a new infiingement action were brought (save between the 
parties) it would not be possible to rely on doctrines such as issue estoppel to 
343 See page 208 above. 
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preclude consideration of the validity. There is already a precedent for such a 
system, in that the UK Patent Office will soon issue opinions on the validity of 
UK patents; these opinions will be entered onto the register, but beyond that they 
have no legal effect. 344 
The proprietor, following any determination of invalidity, would be free to "re- 
nominate" an applicable law. This should be effective against everyone in the 
world (although the "French" patent will no longer exist), but it would not be 
effective between the parties to the original litigation (i. e. the litigation which lead 
to the invalidity of the patent in France). 
B. Contracts with consumers 
The French and Germans are unwilling to allow consumers to enter choice of 
court agreements, except after the event. Indeed, the Brussels Regulation reflects 
this limitation (Article 13). However, many of the clauses in such agreements are 
incorporated, or purported to be incorporated, by "click wrap" agreements. 345 
During the negotiations of the Hague Convention the issue of consumer choice of 
court clauses was raised, with a divergence between the views of the United States 
and the European Community. 346 A similar problem would also certainly be raised 
in relation to the First Proposition. In many circumstances where a contract was 
entered into between a consumer and a business it may not be "freely entered 
into" as required by the First Proposition. The bargaining power of the consumer 
being much less than that of the business. However, provided the courts are able 
344 Section 74A of the Patents Act 1977 (to be inserted by section 13 of the Patents Act 2004). 345 For a discussion of the enforceability of these agreements see Johnson (2003). 346 For a general discussion see Martin (2002). 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments 316 
to take bargaining power into account when determining whether a choice of court 
clause is valid, it would be sufficient to satisfy the First Proposition. 
If, however, this issue became a sticking point in any negotiations on a 
convention, then excluding consumer contracts would have a minimal impact on 
the efficiency of the scheme. This is because the amount of litigation involving 
"consurners" is negligible and the Sixth Proposition, the natural alternative, is the 
second most efficient choice. If such a forum were found to be inefficient then the 
consumer would be able to submit to a different efficient forum after the matter 
had arisen. 
7 
Applicable Law, Nomination and Minimum 
Rights 
This chapter examines the remaining propositions in the context of international 
law, regional law and the national law of the target jurisdictions. In contrast to the 
previous chapter, some of the propositions are novel. This chapter will begin by 
considering the Second Proposition (parties should be free to select the applicable 
law that will govem any intellectual property dispute) and the Seventh Proposition 
(where transaction costs are prohibitively high, thereby prohibiting agreement, the 
applicable law should be nominated ex ante by the proprietor of the intellectual 
property right). In combination with this assessment the Third Proposition (only 
one law may be selected and that law should have universal effect) and the Ninth 
Proposition (any nomination should have universal effect, except where the 
Second Proposition applies) will be examined. There will also be an assessment of 
mandatory rules, which involves the Fourth Proposition (no aspect of intellectual 
property law can be considered to be a mandatory rule for the purposes of private 
intemational law). 
The Eighth Proposition (any nomination should be made available in the most 
conspicuous way possible) requires no legal assessment. However, there will be a 
317 
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practical assessment of how a nomination could be made. Finally, the Tenth 
Proposition (non-proprietary users of intellectual property should be granted 
minimum rights) will also be discussed briefly, this will show that the limited bars 
that exist are balanced by competing interests. 
1. International law 
It remains clear that there are no customary rules of international law which 
detennine when a particular law is applicable. ' There are also no treaties that 
provide general rules for determining applicable law, although the intellectual 
property treaties have been thought to include basic choice of law rules. Even 
amongst those who follow this view, there is some dispute as to the actual rule; 
some argue that it is the lex originis (the country of publication or grant); others 
the lex protectionis (the country in which protection is sought), some go as far as 
to suggest that in relation to registered rights it is self-evident that the lex 
2 
protectionis is applicable. Another argument is that national treatment, or 
"assimilation", means that a foreigner is "assimilated" to being a national and so 
the lexforl should always be applied, as there would never be a foreign element. 3 
Yet another view is that national _treatment simply requires 
the same conflict of 
laws rules to be applied to both foreigners and nationals. 4 Of these diverse 
theories the first two demand substantive consideration. 
1 See page 53 above. 
2 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 478; also see Ulmer (1978): 57; although the Madrid Agreement 
and Protocol link protection (for five years) to the original marIL 3 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 419. 
4 Ibid. 
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A. The country of publication or grant 
if the applicable law is determined by reference to the country from which the 
intellectual property originates then, in relation to copyright, the law of the 
country where the work was first published would apply, wherever the work was 
exploited. Similarly, in relation to registered rights the law of the country in which 
an application was first lodged would apply globally. The underlying idea behind 
the application of this law is that intellectual property (in particular copyright) is 
5 
non-territorial and that it is a universally recognised concept. The pedigree of this 
approach derives from a bi-lateral authors' rights treaty between France and the 
Netherlands, 6 which mandated that the law of the country of origin would dictate 
the applicable law. 7 Thereafter, the South American Congress on Private 
International Lawa held at Montevideo in 1889, dictated at Article 2 of the 
Authors' Right Convention9 that: 
The author of any literary or artistic work and his successors shall 
enjoy in the Signatory States the rights that are granted by the law of 
the state offirst publication orproduction of the work 10 
5 Westkamp (2006). 
6 See Pataille and Huguet (18 55): 272. 
7 The relevant part of article I reads "... the authors of works... to whom the laws of the one of the 
two countries currently guarantee or will guarantee in the future the right of ownership will have 
the ability to exert this right on the territory of the other country during the same time and same 
limit" (author's translation). 
8 For a brief summary of this congress see Puetne (1943). 
9 Article I of Trade Marks Convention states that "Any person to whom shall be granted in one of 
the contracting States the exclusive right to a trade-mark shall enjoy the same privilege in the other 
States, but with due respect to the formalities and conditions established by their laws" (ibid: 152); 
Article I of the Patents Convention is more ambiguous about whether or not the country of grant 
a pplies (the treaty is at Puetne (1943): 155). 
Translated by the author; the treaty, in French, is available at 90 BFSP 680. 
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Although, this Convention has now been superseded, because all its members 
adhere to the Berne Convention, " it has been suggested that Berne also uses the 
country of origin principle to determine the applicable law. 12 Article 5 of the 
Berne Convention includes a definition of the country of origin, which it has been 
suggested should apply throughout the convention and not only to its scope, 13 or 
as Koumantos suggests: 
Article 5(1) states that two of the three means ofprotection under the 
Convention ... namely assimilation and minimum protection; 
do not 
apply in the country of origin of the work. Article 5(3) states that, in 
the country of origin of the work, that country's national law 
applies ... The conflicts rule is clear: application of national 
legislation in the country of origin. But it is equally clear that it is a 
unilateral or incomplete rule of conflict that must be interpreted 
bilaterally .... [thus) if copyright is governed 
by the country's national 
legislation in the country of origin, in all other countries it must be 
governed by the same law. 14 
He supports his argument by relating it to the Universal Copyright Convention in 
which the saving for the Berne Convention" is based on a work's country of 
origin. Therefore, he argues, the country of origin must be a point of attachment in 
Berne itself. This approach leaves the national treatment principle, at the heart of 
11 The parties to this Convention were: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, and Uruguay. Unlike its sister treaties on Trade Marks and 
Patents it was possible for non-South American countries to accede. 12 Koumantos (1988). 
13 ]bid: 420. For example, the country of origin determines certain limitations on duration (Article 
7(8)) and whether an industrial design is protected (Article 2(7)). 
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the Berne, requiring only that foreigners and nationals be treated in the same 
fashion under domestic conflict laws. 16 If this interpretation is correct then Article 
5(2) does three things, none of which relate to choice of law. Firstly, it dictates 
there should be no formalities; secondly, enjoyment should be independent of 
formalities in other countries; 17 finally, it applies the lexprotectionis (meaning the 
lexfori) to the extent of protection and the means of redress (thus it only applies 
to remedies). 18 This interpretation is in accordance with the general rule that a 
court should apply the lex fori when determining the remedies available to a 
claimant. 
In contrast to the Berne Convention, Article 2 of the Phonograms Convention 
(Rome) includes a definition of national treatment: "the treatment accorded by the 
domestic law of the Contracting State in which protection is claimed"; but the 
Monograms Convention (Rome) includes no mention of the state of origin. 19 
Similarly, the Paris Convention, in Article 2(2), grants national treatment but once 
more there is no reference to the country of origin. Therefore it is difficult to read 
the lex originis into those Conventions; this, of course, does not preclude its 
application. The TRIPS agreement, like the other conventions, includes the 
national treatment principle; however, unlike other treaties it defines the term 
"protection" as including 'ýrnatters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, 
maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights... "20 This quite 
14 Koumantos (19 8 8): 424-5. 
15 Article XVII and Appendix (declaration relating to Article XVII). 
16 This view of the national treatment principle is, it is submitted, correct for other reasons see 
page 324 below. 
7 This is based on the use of the word "such! ': Koumantos (1988): 424. 18 This interpretation plays down (or even ignores) the word "consequently" in Article 5(2). 19 Koumantos (1988): 476; Ulmer (1978): 56. 
20 See n. 3 to Article 3. 
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clearly covers both contentious and non-contentious use. 
21 Thus, the critics of the 
country of origin approach argue, Article 5(2) cannot relate solely to remedies; 
22 
otherwise there would be a conflict between Berne and 
TRIPS. 23 They accept, 
however, that the limitation does not apply to every aspect of intellectual 
property. 
24 
In addition, according to Binyomin Kaplan, the application of the laws of the 
country of origin leads to inequitable results because a law would be applied 
which may have virtually no connection to the work. 
25 It is not clear why such an 
approach is inequitable, particularly as the greatest inequity is caused by parties 
not being aware of the law that applies, rather than finding an "Unrelated" law 
being applied. 26 
The advantage of a rule based on the country of origin is that it automatically 
means, in relation to a particular work, there would be a single applicable law. 
Such an approach would lead to a number of different laws applying in a single 
country, as each work would be governed by the law of the state of origin. This, it 
has been suggested, makes it difficult, or a "practical impossibility", 27 for those 
exploiting the rights to know which country's law governs the work . 
28 However, 
" This interpretation of the phrase "enjoyment and exercise of these rights", found in Article 5(2), 
has been criticised as ignoring the peaceful enjoyment of the rights: Fawcett and Torrernans 
(1998): 474. Torremans argues elsewhere that not all matters fall within this def"mition: Torremans 
(2006). 
22 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 481. 
23 If Berne and TRIPS were incompatible then, according to Article 59 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the later (TRIPS) would prevail. 
24 Goldstein (2000): 90 and Torremans (2006). 
25 Kaplan (2000): 2079. 
26 Kaplan acknowledges that the expectations of the parties should be considered to determine 
whether something is inequitable: ibid: 283. 
27 Boytha (1988). 
28 Koumantos (1988): 475. 
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the selection of applicable law by contract, under the Second Proposition, means 
that any licensee or other exploiter must be aware of what law applies. Thus 
collecting societies, for instance, would be able to contract for all their licences to 
be governed by the same law; similarly, the producers of audio-visual works 
could ensure that all the rights are governed by one law. Further, provided the 
Eighth Proposition is satisfied and a nomination is conspicuous, it is not 
problematic for a user to determine which law applies to a work when the Seventh 
Proposition applies. 
B. The law of the protecting country 
The alternative, and majority, reading of the various international conventions is 
that the law of the protecting country29 should apply, 30 except where specifically 
excluded .31 This would dictate, for example, that an English court should apply 
French law when copyright is infringed within the territory of France. 
In relation to copyright, this interpretation is based on the principle of national 
treatment set out in Article 5(l) of Berrie. Thus, it is the national treatment 
principle that requires the law of the country in which protection is sought, the lex 
protectionis, to apply. 32 This analysis is supported by Article 5(2), which suggests 
that "the extent of protection... shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the 
country where protection is claimed". The country where protection is claimed 
29 Some argue that the law of the protecting country means the lexfori: see Tydniouk (2004): 913. 
Stewart (1989): [3.17] suggests that the effect of the words is that the lexfori is applied. 30 Although the majority view in the United States leaves initial ownership of copyright to the 
country of origin (see page 341 below) following the courts decision in Itar-Tass v Russian Kurier 
(2 nd Cir, 1998) 153 F. 3d 82 at 90-1. 
31 Goldstein (2000): 100. 
32 Boytha (1988): 409. 
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means, the majority argue, the country in which the work is used. 33 Thus, Article 
5 sets the substantive level of protection, 34 with Articles 5(l) and (3) ensuring that 
the author receives protection both in the country of origin and the country where 
35 
protection is sought. Similarly, they would suggest that the Paris Convention 
requires the application of the lex protectionis because of Article 2(1 ). 36 This 
provision also states that a person "shall have the same legal remedy against any 
infringemenf '. If Article 2(l) were a choice of law rule, this would require an 
English court to grant French remedies where it was adjudicating a dispute 
involving infringement in France. This would be quite contrary to the normal 
rules of private international law which suggest that procedure and remedies are a 
matter for the lexfori. 37 
The problem with this, as Blanco points out, is that the whole legal system applies 
by reason of national treatment and not just the intellectual property laws. 38 If one 
suggests that applying the lexprotectionis is an international, legal obligation then 
it would suggest that an English court would have to apply French law to 
everything, including procedure and remedies. 
C. The absence of a choice of law provision 
If the intellectual property treaties do not provide choice of law rules, then those 
rules are purely a matter of domestic law. The WIPO Guide on Article 5(2) of the 
Berne Convention suggests that "the courts [will] apply the appropriate provisions 
33 Ulmer (1978): 10-11. 
34 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 467. 
35 Ibid: 468. 
36 Sender (2002): [5.42] notes those holding the opinion. 
37 This is partly due to a problem caused by enforcement; where there is no enforcement 
mechanism for a particular remedy how can a court give it effect? 
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of private international law to resolve any conflict that arises's. 39 If Article 5(2) 
governed the applicable law then there would be no "appropriate provisions" as 
Article 5(2) would itself be an appropriate provision . 
40 This implicit suggestion is 
supported by other leading commentators, either by denying "national treatment" 
was a choice of law rule or going further by attacking the words "the country 
where protection is sought". 
It has been suggested by Richard Fentiman that the only impact the national 
treatment principle has on private international law is to exclude the lex originisý' 
The basis of this suggestion is that the principle, excludes one country's laws 
being applied over activity in another. Indeed, applying the lex originis could lead 
to local right holders getting less protection than foreign right holders. 42 In which 
case foreigners could never get the same protection as nationals; by this very fact, 
the national treatment principle would be offended. Thus, if the court of origin is 
excluded, the only possibility that remains, Fentiman suggests, is the lax 
protectionis. However, he makes it very clear that this is not mandated by the 
Conventions. 43 
However, Mireille van Eechoud goes further. 44 She argues that the words in 
Article 5(2) of Berne (and by implication elsewhere) do not require the lex 
protectionis to be applied, instead it has a more limited purpose: to end the 
38 Blanco (1998) (cited in Sender (2002): [5.48]); also see Ladas (1938): 268. 39 WIPO (1978). 
40 Although see Cornish (1997), where he criticises WIPO for offering interpretations of 
international conventions. 
41 Fentiman (2005): 135. 
42 ibid. 
43 Ibid: 137. 
44 She makes it clear that she does not think national treatment is a choice of law rule: Van 
Eechoud (2003): 107. 
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reciprocity tests that had been applied between contracting parties. 
45 She also 
suggests that the word "where" in the phrase "in the country where protection is 
claimed" is being read as "for whiclP and the drafters should not be assumed to 
have made a "mistake". 46 If the drafters wanted to require the application of the 
lex protectionis they would have said so. Therefore, like Fentiman, she says the 
Conventions contain no conflict rules; 47 however she points out that courts, in 
particular in Germany, have tried to read the rule into the Conventions to justify 
their application of the Schutz1and principle (more commonly know as the lex 
protectionis). 48 
The absence of choice of law rules in the Berne Convention has always been a 
minority view, but in a recent case the Court of Justice has apparently joined the 
minority. In Tod's SpA v Heyraud, 49 the court suggested that: 
As is apparent from Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, the 
purpose of that convention is not to determine the applicable law on 
the protection of literary and artistic works, but to establish, as a 
general rule, a system of national treatment of the rights 
appertaining to such works. 50 
45 ibid. 
46 Ibid: 108. Although the literal interpretation would imply that the author can chose the law they 
wish to apply: Kerever (1993): 104. 
47 Van Eechoud (2003): 109. 
48 Ibid. See Walter (1976): 50, who makes a similar point nearly thirty years earlier. Van Eechoud 
cites a number of authors who also hold a similar view. The German Supreme Court has held that 
the Berne Convention dictates that the lexprotectionis applies to the whole dispute: Alf (1993) 24 
lIC 539 at 541 and the French Courts held similarly in Veuve Glazounov v Soc. du Matre des 
Champs Elys& (1969) 58 RCDlP 670. 
49 (unreported) 300'June 2005 (Case C-28/04). 
'0 Ibid at [32]. 
I 
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it is unclear exactly what this Delphic statement means, but it does support the 
suggestion that there are no rules on applicable law in the Convention. However, 
the Court of Justice is no more authoritative on the Berne Convention than any 
other tribunal. This indication does, however, show that many commentators in 
the majority may have played the common trick of lawyers: to read into legal texts 
that which they want to see. It is suggested, therefore, that the conventions contain 
no choice of law provisions and the national treatment principle only requires the 
same rules of private intemational law to be applied to nationals as to foreignerss' 
and so states are free to apply whichever law they chose, without constraint. 
11. Regional laws: the European Community 
The European Community has passed a number of directives which harmonise the 
intellectual property laws of the member States, and Regulations which grant 
52 
supra-national (regional) intellectual property rights. Further, all the member 
States have also signed the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations. 53 
51 This second point is supported by Goldstein (2000): 104. 
52 In particular, the Community trade mark (EC Regulation No. 40/94), Community design right 
(EC Regulation No. 6/2002) and Community plant variety right (EC Regulation No. 2100/94). In 
addition there are a couple of Council of Europe treaties which lead to harmonisation of patent 
law. In particular, the Strasbourg Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive 
Law on Patents for Inventions (1963) and the European Patent Convention (1973). 
53 This is due to be replaced by a Regulation. Further, the European Commission has proposed a 
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), which was 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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A. The Rome Convention 
The Rome Convention applies to "contractual obligations in any situation 
involving a choice between different laws". 
54 The convention, being a Community 
treaty, should be interpreted uniformly throughout the Community. 
" However, 
unlike the Brussels Convention (or Regulation) and other Community documents 
there is no obligation on contracting states to make references to the Court of 
Justice. 56 
The Convention is limited to contractual obligations and therefore it does not 
apply to intellectual property disputes. 57 However, it does apply to contractual 
obligations relating to intellectual property, such as licence agreements. The 
Rome Convention, unlike the Brussels Convention, applies to all disputes whether 
or not the law to be applied is that of a contracting State. 58 Thus, a German court 
should apply French law, Peruvian law or any other law selected by the 
appropriate rule. For this reason, it is not permissible for parties to contract out of 
the Rome Convention; to do so would defeat its purpose. 59 
54 Article I (I). The Convention does not apply to any contract entered into before the convention 
came into force in the relevant State (Article 17). 
55 Article 18. 
56 The Two Protocols to the Rome Convention set out that courts may refer questions to the Court 
of Justice: see Cheshire and North (1999): 528-9. 
57 Giuliano and Lagarde Report (19 80): 10. 
58 Article 2. 
59 North (1993): 185-7. It had been proposed by Mann (199 1) that it was possible to opt for the old 
"proper law" and so opt of the Rome Convention. This view was soon criticised by Hogan (1992). 
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(i) Freedom of choice 
Article 3 of the Rome Convention permits parties to select the law applicable to 
their dispute, or just part of it. 60 Although the contract can be governed by the 
chosen law, it is unlikely that a court is obliged to extend this freedom to the 
"property" selecting approach mandated by the Second Proposition. 61 However, it 
is also clear that there is nothing in Article 3 of the Convention prohibiting that 
approach. 62 The only potentially conflicting provision is Article 3(3) which makes 
it clear that freedom of choice does not extend to contracting out of mandatory 
rules. This restriction is incompatible with the Fourth Proposition, a problem 
which is compounded in relation to consumers where Article 5 makes it clear a 
consumer cannot contract out of a protective mandatory rule imposed by their 
home state. This aside, Article 3 is compatible with the Second Proposition. 
(H) Contracts which include no choice of law 
Where the parties do not agree the law applicable to a contract, Article 4 sets out 
the method for determining it. The basic test, in Article 4(l), is that the contract 
shall be governed by the law of the state with which "it is most closely 
connected". 63 This is a purely objective test and so the intentions of the parties 
are irrelevant. 64 
60 Issues of the substantive (or material validity) of a contract are determined according to Article 
8; those of formal validity according to Article 9 and capacity according to Article 11. For a 
discussion of these aspects of the Convention see Cheshire and North (1999): 586-95. 
61 It has been suggested that this is prohibited by the Rome Convention: see Goldstein (2000): 116; 
for a discussion of copyright and the Rome Convention (based on earlier drafts of the Convention) 
see Walter (1976). 62 However, the Austrian Court of Justice has decided that it is not permitted to choice the 
6pplicable 
law by contract: Hotel Sacher (1986) GRUR Int 735. a 
The connection has to be with the country in question rather than the system of laws: Wdil 
ýV onnais v New Hampshire Insurance (1997) 2 Lloyd's Rep I at 5. Cheshire and North (1999): 566. 
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When determining which law is most closely connected, the court may sever the 
contract so that different laws apply in relation to different parts of the contract. 65 
However, this power should be used as "seldom as possible"; 66 indeed, the courts 
power to sever may actually be discretionary. 67 Whatever the case may be, this 
undermines the universality principle of the Eighth Proposition. 
The problem with the "close connection" test is that it is extremely uncertain. To 
limit this problem, Article 4(2) presumes that the contract is most closely 
connected to the habitual residence of the party who has to effect characteristic 
performance. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine what amounts to such 
performance. In relation to simple intellectual property assigm-nents it is probably 
easy to determine that the place of characteristic performance is the residence or 
business premises of the assignor. In relation to licences it has been suggested that 
the characteristic performance of the licence is the place where it is granted by the 
licensor; in contrast Modiano 68 argues that the country of the licensee should be 
the country most closely connected; others argued that it should be the country of 
the licensor; 69 finally, some suggest that it should be the lex protectionis. 70 This 
demonstrates the real problems which exist with this sort of approach: there is no 
general agreement. This is compounded by the fact that the practical application 
of the test is far from simple, and "the more complex the transaction, the less help 
, 71 the [characteristic performance] criterion becomes'. Unfortunately, most 
65 Article 4(l). 
66 Giuliano and Lagarde (1980): 23. 
67 Cheshire and North (1999): 567. 
68 Modiano (1979) (discussed in Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 565-5). 
69 See Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 561-564. 
70 This is the view supported by Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 566-570. 
71 Juenger(1982): 301. 
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intellectual property licences are based on royalty agreements, 
72 which are 
anything but simple. 
In any case, the presumption does not apply where characteristic performance 
cannot be determined or where another country is more closely connected with the 
contract. 73 Furthermore, the fact the presumption can be rebutted means that a 
court will always have to consider to which country it is most closely connected. 
74 
In any event, it can be seen that this approach is incompatible with the Seventh 
and Eighth Proposition. 
(W) Mandatory rules and ordre public 
A "key concept" of the Rome Convention is that of mandatory rules. 
75 These rules 
are defined as "rules of law... which cannot be derogated from by contract' 
76 
Essentially they are the rules of the lexfori which are applied irrespective of 
which law would normally be applied under the choice of law rules. There are six 
provisions in the convention which cater for mandatory rules. Three of these 
impose limitations on the parties' freedom of choice, 77 one applies in relation to 
formal validitY78 and two are general provisions . 
79 
Where the parties select a "foreign law", Article 3 states that if "all the other 
elements relevant to the situation7' are connected with another country, a particular 
72 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 560. 
73 Article 4(5). 
74 Cheshire and North (1999): 574. 
75 Ibid: 575. 
76 Article 3(3). 
77 Article 3(3) the limitation on freedom of choice; Article 5(2) consumer contracts and Article 
6(l) on employment contracts. 
78 Article 9(6). 
79 Article 7(l) and (2). 
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provision (but not all) of the contract may be over-ridden by the mandatory rule of 
that country (not necessarily the forum). In addition, consumers are given 
protection, by reason of Article 5(2), which means that certain mandatory ruleS80 
of their home jurisdiction apply. Article 7 is a general provision which permits 
the application of mandatory laws. The second paragraph of that Article states 
that: "Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the 
law of the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable to the contract". This makes it clear that a court can continue 
to apply its own mandatory rules, despite the choice of the parties or the law that 
would normally apply under the Convention. 
81 The first paragraph of Article 7, 
82 which is an optional provision, allows a court to apply the mandatory rules of a 
foreign country "with which the situation has a close connection". 
It can be seen that the Convention enables mandatory rules to be applied in a 
number of situations. However, what sort of rules are mandatory? The Giuliano 
and Lagarde Report give examples: rules prohibiting cartels, competition and 
restrictive practices, consumer protection and certain rules concerning carriage. 83 
Therefore, are laws relating to intellectual property mandatory? 
There are two theories which suggest that all intellectual property laws should be 
mandatory. 84 The first is based on competition law. The starting point for this is 
that all competition laws are mandatory and that all intellectual property rights 
so There are certain limitations, which make it clear that the consumer has to be "approached7' to 
some degree for this provision to apply. 
81 Cheshire and North (1999): 583. 
82 The United Kingdom does not apply Article 7(l): see section 2(2) of the Contracts (Applicable 
Law) Act 1990. 
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restnct competition and so should also be mandatory. This approach has been 
criticised by Fawcett and Torremans as too crude and improperly inhibiting 
contractual freedom. 85 The second theory is simple: it suggests that intellectual 
property is territorial and therefore, within each territory, the laws of the state 
should be applied as mandatory laws. It was explained in Chapter I how all laws 
are territorial; therefore, it is difficult to see why intellectual property should be 
treated differently. This approach also presents problems where a licence covers 
exploitation in a number of countries. 86 How can a term of a contract be 
interpreted in accordance with a number of different laws at the same time? 
In addition, the Rome Convention includes, at Article 16, a provision permitting a 
court to refuse to apply a foreign law on the grounds of public policy. This 
provision is only intended to be used in exceptional circumstances. 
" its 
application, in intellectual property cases, is unlikely to have a significantly 
different effect to applying a mandatory law. For example, if the waiver of moral 
rights is considered to be objectionable then this leads a court to refuse to 
recognise that waiver: i. e. applying the local rule. Thus the result is the same 
whether the local rule is applied as a mandatory rule or the foreign rules are not 
applied on the basis of ordre public. 
83 Giuliano and Lagarde (1980): 28. They also mention that mandatory laws may be necessary to 
address member States' constitutional issues (at 27). 
84 These are set out in Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 582-4. 
85 kid: 583. 
86 Ibid: 577. 
87 Giuliano and Lagarde (1980): 38. The report uses the term "special cases". 
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The Fourth Proposition prohibits mandatory rules being applied in relation to 
intellectual property, therefore to the extent that the Rome Convention permits 
such application it is incompatible with that proposition. 
B. European Community Directives 
There have been a number of directives on intellectual property law, most of 
which harmonise the law of the member States and have little or nothing to do 
with applica e aw. 88 
(i) Rules ofapplicable law 
At first blush it appears that the Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission 
Directive 89 includes a rule on applicable law. Article I(b) of the Directive 
mandates that a "communication to the public by satellite occurs solely in the 
Member State where... the programme carrying signals are introduced into an 
uninterrupted chain of communication... "; although different rules apply when 
the transmission originates outside the European Community. However, as 
Fawcett and Torremans point out, this is not actually a rule of private international 
law, but a substantive rule. 90 This provision means that the right-holder can only 
exercise their exclusive right in the country of uplift; but this is because the 
"broadcast" itself does not occur in any other country. Notwithstanding this 
limitation, it is clear from the seventeenth recital that when paying to exploit 
rights account should be taken of the actual audience, as well as the potential 
audience, suggesting that any activity outside the country of uplift should be 
88 Harmonised standards, of course, mean that the applicable law becomes less important as the 
law is similar (if not the same) in the various member States. 
89 Directive 93/83/EEC. 
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included. Thus, "the up-link country is singled out as the applicable law while any 
other law is in practical terms ruled ouf'; 
91 even though these laws are ruled out, it 
appears, that activity within those states is not. 
(H) Country of origin 
The country of origin principle was introduced in Chapter 1, where it was 
explained that it could have an impact on private international law. The central 
tenet is that only one state should regulate an activity and every other state should 
92 refrain from regulation. The rule is designed to address uncertainty and double 
regulation. 93 Therefore, for example, where a person was merely aiming services 
94 
at another member State (but not their own), they are still governed by the country 
of origin. 95 
The country of origin principle, in the European Community at least, provides a 
substantive law solution to many of the problems raised in earlier Chapters. 
However, relying on this principle only works where the contracting states are 
96 fairly homogenous. It does demonstrate, however, that states will refrain from 
regulation where they are willing to trust foreign laws. So where states are 
confident that a proprietor of intellectual property (and so the incentive to 
produce) has protection and that there is adequate protection for users (mandated 
90 See Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 505; also see Goldstein (2000): 107 and 11ohloch (1994): 
391 n. 52. 
91 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 506. 
92 The Court of Justice, in Paul Denuit (1997) 3 CMLR 943 at 960 (Case C-14/96), was strict in 
prohibiting the receiving member States from regulating a broadcast under the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive (Directive 89/552/EC). 
93 H6mle (2005): 122. 
94 The problem is the "evasion principle" which applies where someone sets up in another country 
to avoid the regulation in a third country; this, as H6mle suggests "cut[s] a hole in the country of 
origin rule': H6mle (2005): 117. 
95 See VT4 Case (1997) 3 CMLR 1225 (Case C-56/95). 
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by the Tenth Proposition), it is possible that States would agree to refrain from 
regulation. 97 
(W) Mandatory laws 
It could be argued that the Computer Software Directive" contains a number of 
mandatory rules. Article 6 mandates that a lawful user should have the right to 
decompile a program. Similarly Article 5(2) makes it clear that the right to make a 
back-up of a work cannot be abrogated by contract. 99 Article 4 of the Rental 
Rights Directiveloo requires that authors and performers be granted an equitable 
remuneration even where it is not available under the lex protectionis. 
101 
However, it is unclear why these rights should be considered to be so fundamental 
that they are given the status of mandatory rules. If they were considered to be 
mandatory then they would be incompatible with the Fourth Proposition, but it is 
not clear that they should be so recognised. 
C. Community Rights and the European Patent Convention 
The Community Trade Mark Regulation and the Community Design Regulation 
both include simple choice of law rules. Thus, Community trade mark courts (or 
design courts) apply the rules from the Community Trade Mark Regulation 102 (or 
the Design Regulation'03) to any dispute involving these rights, with the 
96 H6mle (2005): 123. 
97 In the EU, the country of origin principle still does not apply to intellectual property. 
98 Directive 91/250/EEC. 
99 A similar provision exists in relation to databases, see Article 6 of the Database Directive 
(Directive 96/9/EC). 
100 Directive 92/100/EEC. 
101 See Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 584. 
102 See Article 97. 
103 See Article 88. 
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remaining rules being set by domestic law. 
104 Considering the Community wide 
scope of these rights, conflict rules are not only self-evidently necessary, but the 
rules are obvious. The unitary nature requires no special provision but the 
Regulation would still need amendment to accommodate the Propositions. 
The European Patent Convention includes, at Article 64(3), a simple provision 
which states that "any infringement of a European patent shall be dealt with by 
national laV'. It could be argued that "national" law must be the law of the 
protecting country, but a stronger argument is that this requires the national courts 
to apply their rules of private international law to any dispute. 105 The strength of 
the argument arises from the wording of Article 64(l), which makes it clear that a 
European patent has the same effect as a national patent. Therefore, only if a 
national patent is judged by the lex protectionis should a European patent be so 
judged. ' 06 
D. Concluding remarks 
It is quite clear that the Rome Convention, particularly Article 3, facilitates the 
implementation of the Second Proposition. However, where there is no express 
contractual choice of law (thus leaving the determination to the Sevcnth 
Proposition) it is difficult to see how "connecting factors" with a country would 
necessarily lead to the application of the nominated law. Thus, if a patent 
proprietor, resident in Austria nominates French law and then enters a licence 
with a Russian to use a patent in Germany; it is difficult to see how Article 4 of 
104 In relation to additional domestic rules: see for example, the threats provisions in the 
Community Trade Marks Regulation 1996 (SI 1996/1908) regulation 4. 105 Sender (2002): [5.78 to 5.80]. 
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the Rome Convention could, when properly applied, determine French law as 
applicable. However, this limitation could be modified if the intention of the 
parties were considered, because if the proprietor had nominated French law 
(outside the contract), it would be quite clear that they intended to apply French 
law to the contract and the other party must have similarly intended for French 
law to be applied: otherwise they would have negotiated for a different applicable 
law (as pennitted under the Second Proposition). This approach would be, in 
some ways, similar to the old English "proper law" of contract, which required the 
courts to determine which law the parties intended to apply. 
111. National laws 
This section will be divided, not by each country, but into sections dealing with 
the creation of the right, the exploitation of the rights (contracts), their transfer 
and, finally, infringement. 
A. Creation, substance and initial ownership 
(i) Registered rights 
The very nature of registered rights means that their existence is dependent on 
registration. The procedure followed for registration, whether a purely deposit 
system 107 or after examination, is always based on domestic law. It is clear 
beyond doubt that when the UK Patent Office examine an application for a patcnt 
106 ibid. 
107 This is common in relation to registered designs (see EC Regulation No. 6/2002 on the 
Community Design) and utility models: Suthersanen (199 8). 
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they do so under the Patents Act 1977: 108 whether the applicant is English, French 
or South African. 109 There is no doubt that this is what happens in fact, but it is 
also clear from the Paris Convention that this is what should happen in law. The 
Convention makes it clear that patents"o and trade marks"' are independent 
within each territory and that administrative procedures are reserved to signatory 
States. 112 On a more technical point the convention recognises the right of 
priority, ' 13 which is vital for determining novelty or prior uses. Priority only 
makes sense if each registered right is granted according to each territory's laws; 
otherwise the Paris Convention would not require the recognition of priority, but 
simply re-registration. 114 
It is clear, therefore, that the law of the country of registration applies to the grant 
of those registered rights. This applies equally to national rights as it does to 
regional rights such as the Community trade mark. Similarly, the duration of these 
rights, based on renewing registration as it is, must also be based on national law. 
108 The UK Patent Office also handle applications under the European Patent Convention and 
Patent Co-operation Treaty, but generally only as far as regard the basic formalities (except where 
they are converted: see section 81 or enter the national phase: see section 89A). 
109 From a purely practical poini of view, it would be impossible for a registry to work on the basis 
of various foreign laws. Not only would this require knowledge of foreign substantive law (in the 
United Kingdom this is divided between primary legislation (e. g. the Trade Marks Act 1994) and 
secondary legislation (e. g. the Trade Marks Rules 2000 (SI 2000/136))), but also judicial decisions 
and commentaries. Even where substantive law is similar, such as in relation to designs or trade 
marks in Europe, the domestic procedure for applying for these rights varies: time limits differ as 
to the relevant forms and materials. If a registry applied foreign law to registration, even if only a 
substantive law (i. e. ignoring procedural differences) it would make the cost of running the system 
prohibitive. 
110 Article 4bis(l) and (2). 
111 Article 6(3). 
112 Article 2(3). 
113 Article 4. 
114 Such systems do exist; for example, in Jersey a trade mark application must be based on a UK 
registration: see Trade Marks (Jersey) Law 2000, Article 4(l). 
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(H) Copyright: England and Wales 
In England and Wales, the subsistence of copyright is governed by the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988.115 Under that Act, it is permissible for the 
provisions of the Act to be applied to works from other countries as they are 
applied to British works. 116 Notwithstanding, Fawcett and Torremans suggest that 
the Act contains no applicable law provisions. 117 They argue that the law of the 
protecting country should apply to the creation of the right, 
118 but that initial 
ownership and authorship should be governed by the country of origin. 
"9 It is 
submitted, however, that the under the terms of the Act and the Order made under 
it, the law applicable to copyright within the UK is the law under the 1988 Act. 
120 
It is not clear from the terms of that Act what law applies in relation to non-UK 
copyrights. Dicey and Morris suggest that the lex situs applies to foreign 
movables 121 and "choses in action generally are situate in the country where they 
can be enforced7'. 122 More specifically the editors argue that "a patent, a trade 
115 This is not true as in relation to works created before I" August 1989 which are governed by 
older statutes: the Copyright Act 1956 and the Copyright Act 1911 (by reason of paragraph 5(l) of 
Schedule I to the 1988 Act). 
116 This is achieved by an Order in Council; the most recent Order is the Copyright and 
Performances (Application to other Countries) Order 2005 (SI 2005/852). 
117 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 499. They suggest it only contains "qualificatiore' provisions, 
i. e. those found in Chapter 9 of Pad I of the 1988 Act. 
118 This is based on their view that the application of lex protectionis is required by the Berne 
Convention: see Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 499-500. 
119 See Fawcett and Torremans (199 8): 509-15 and Torremans (2005). 
120 Section 159 of the 1988 Act states that the provisions of the Act apply to a foreign works as 
they apply to British works. This is even more explicit in the terms of the 2005 Order. For a more 
detailed discussion see Johnson (2006). 121 Dicey and Morris (1999): Rule III at [22R-00 1]. 122 Ibid: Rule 112(l) at [22R-023]. They treat intellectual property as a chose in action; however 
patents are not "things in action7: see section 30(l) of the Patents Act 1977 (it is unclear what 
classification a UK patent should attract). 
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mark or copyright is situate in the country whose law governs its existence"123 
Thus, under that approach the lex situs is the same as the lexprotectionis. 
124 
(iii) Copyright: United States 
The position in the United States is somewhat unusual. The law applicable to 
initial ownership, in relation to works for which copyright has been restored, is 
totally clear. Section 104A states that "the work vests initially in the author or 
initial rightholder of the work as determined by the law of the source country of 
the work". It is not clearwhether this provision is to confirm the law or present an 
exception to it. 125 However, the pre-eminent case in this field is the decision of the 
Second Circuit of the Court of Appeals in Itar-Tass v Russian Kurier. 126 The Court 
opened by indicating that: 
choice of law issues in international copyright cases have been 
largely ignored in the reported decisions and dealt with rather 
cursorily by most commentators. 127 
After considering the issues, somewhat briefly, the court held that the "most 
significant relationship" test should be used to determine ownership and, on the 
facts, this led to the law of the country of origin applying. 128 This test was applied, 
123 Dicey and Morris (1999): [22-051]. In previous editions the editors took a different view, 
namely that the applicable law was governed by the country in which the intellectual property 
rights can be effectively transferred under the law governing their creation. This view was 
criticised by Fawcett and Torremans (1988): 489-494 and is no longer followed by the editors. 
124 Fawcett and Torremans argue that the applicable law should be the lex prolectionis; thus, the 
two views now converge. 
125 Goldstein (2000): 103. 
126 (2d Cir, 1998) 153 F. 3d 82. 
127 Ibid at 88. 
128 Ibid at 90. 
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with difficulty, in Films by Jove v Berov, 
129 where, once more, the ownership of a 
Russian work was determined by Russian law. 130 In contrast, in Bridgeman v 
Corel, 131 the court held that US law governed whether or not a work was 
protected by Copyfi&t. 
132 
Following these decisions a number of academics have argued over what law 
should be applied to determine subsistence, most of them propose complicated 
approaches. Kaplan argues for a "three-tier" approach. First, the law of the 
country of origin applies; secondly, it is determined whether this causes an 
-inequitable" result; and thirdly, if it is inequitable, the law with the most 
significant relationship is applied. 133 This policy based approach, which was 
criticised at length in Chapter 2, is uncertain to say the least. In contrast, Geller 
suggests the application of the lexprotectionis, 134 except in "hard casee' (such as 
where a work was produced under an employment contract), in which case the 
court should apply common standards; 135 whatever those standards may be. 
(iv) Copyright: France 
The position under French law was until recently unclear. This is because of the 
problematic decision of the Court of Cassation in Soc. Fox-Europa v Soc. Le 
129 (EDNY, 2001) 154 F. Supp 2d 432; reheard (EDNY, 2003) 250 F. Supp 2d 156. 
130 Amazingly, on re-hearing, the US Court refused to review its interpretation of Russian law, 
despite a Russian court concluding the exact opposite on the same issue. The US court stating that 
the Russian decision was improperly influenced by the government. 
131 (SDNY, 1999) 36F. Supp 2d 19 1. 
132 This decision was based on the copyright clause of the Constitution; the court held that it was 
impossible for Congress to adopt a treaty granting "unoriginar' works protection in the US (ibid at 
194). 
133 Kaplan (2000): 2083-4. 
134 Geller (2004): 361. 
135 Ibid: 366. 
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Chante du Monde ("The Iron Curtain Case'). 136 The judge rapporteur for the 
case argued that the court ruled that the lex protectionis should be applied to 
creation and subsistence. However, the text of the judgment mentioned that the 
authors also had protection in the USSR, which was the country of origin. This led 
others to suggest that the case advocated the application of the lex originis, 137 with 
the law of the protecting country being used to enforce those foreign created 
rights. 138 The French lower courts appear, on the whole, to have interpreted this 
decision as mandating the lexprotectionis. 139 However, in Turner Entertainment v 
Huston 140 the court relied on mandatory rules to apply French law, implying that 
initial ownership may not be governed by the lex protectionis, but something 
else. 141 Indeed, the Court of Cassation held in Scania v Diesel Technic 142 that the 
lex originis applied to the ownership of copyright. Notwithstanding, in the recent 
Sisro Case, 143 that court ruled that: 
the law to be applied was not the law of the country of origin or of 
the court invoked, but rather the law of the country in whose territory 
the infringements occurred. 
This decision would appear to suggest that the modem view of the French courts 
is that the laxprotectionis determines the applicable law for creation, subsistence 
136 (1960) 28 RIDA 120. 
137 Batiffol and Lagarde (1983): 11 at 202; although this approach went via the le-x situs. 138 See Desbois (1966): 34 (cited in Torremans (2001): n. 10). 139 Raynard (1990): [473 to 475]. 
140 (1992) 23 IIC 702. 
141 Van Eechoud (2005): 29 1. 
142 (1998) 177 RIDA 254. 
143 (2003) 34 IIC 701. 
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and ownership, which seems to be in accord with prevailing French academic 
opinion. 144 
(y) Copyright: Germany 
The ownership of German author's right (or neighbouring right) is to be 
determined by German law, whatever the nationality of the author, although 
certain rights are restricted in relation to foreigners. 
145 The German Supreme 
Court confirmed in Spielbankaffaire (the Casino Affair)146 that: 
the question of who must be regarded as the author andfirst holder 
of the copyright in a ... work 
is, like the question of the protective 
effect of copyright, decided by the law of the country providing 
protection. 147 
Recently in Re Multi Media Recht, 148 the German courts confirmed that the lex, 
protectionis applies to all aspect of a foreign work and further that this cannot be 
changed by contract. 149 
B. Licensing 
The exploitation of intellectual property, through licensing, is normally a matter 
of contract. 150 The rules governing the licensing of intellectual property are the 
144 See Raynard (1990): [391] n. 9. 
145 See Drobnig (1972): 293-4. 
146 (1999) 30 IIC 227; also see Show Format Case (2004) 35 IIC 987. 
147 Spielbankaffaire, supra at 230. 
148 See discussion of the case in Vahrenwald (1998). 
149 This was confirmed in the Open Source Case (2004) (DC Munich) (trans: T. Feldmann and J. 
Hoeppner); also see Dreier (2004): 13 1. 
150 Of course, an intellectual property licence need not be included in a contract. 
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same for registered rights and unregistered rights. In relation to three of the target 
jurisdictions: England and Wales, France and Germany the rules relating to 
contractual choice of law are determined by the Rome Convention. 
15 1 Therefore, 
only the United States' rules on choice of law clauses need to be considered 
further. 
The courts of the United States have tended to support party autonomy and upheld 
choice of law clauses. 152 Any choice of law does not extend to include the forum's 
rules of private international law 153 or its procedural rules. 
154 However, the law 
chosen by the parties must have some relationship to either the parties or the 
contract and, even where it does have that relationship, the parties are not allowed 
to override certain important policies of the state whose law would otherwise 
apply. 155 
(i) Choice oflaw clauses 
US law does not distinguish between mandatory laws and laws that violate public 
policy. However, a US court will not apply a chosen law where it offends the 
151 In contrast to the Brussels Regulations, there is no place for "traditionar' rules as the rules of 
the Rome Convention have universal effect. There are, however, certain rules which apply 
irrespective of which law applies to the contract (e. g. the German courts, for example, have held 
that the contractual transfer of German authors' right is governed by German law; only the 
underlying contract is governed by the contractual choice of law: Drobnig (1972): 295 and Dreier 
(2004): 137); however, in the Open Source Case, supra the German court suggested that the right 
of use (i. e. licensing) is governed by German law. 
152 Scoles and Hay (2004) point out that "party-autonomy has support in American case-law dating 
back well into the nineteenth century" (at 860). 
153 Restatement (Second) §187, comment (h); also see McGill v Hill (Was AC, 1982) 644 P 2d 
680. 
154 See Federal Deposits Ins Co? p v Peterson (10th Cir, 1985) 770 F 2d 141 at 142-3 where it was 
suggested that a choice-of-law clause does not include procedural rules, unless the parties 
expressly state otherwise. 
155 Scoles and Hayes (2004): 954. The Restatement (Second) provides that this law is the law that 
would otherwise apply under the Restatement (§ 187, comment (c)). 
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forum's public policy, 156 but the fact that a domestic law is different from the 
foreign law is not a reason to disregard the choice of law clause. 157 It is not clear 
how grossly the foreign law must offend public policy for it to be trumped. It may 
need to affect "strong7158 or "fundamental"' 59 policies; the exact test is different 
for each state. 160 In addition, the US courts require some relationship between the 
state and the choice of the parties; this reduces the likelihood that selection by the 
parties would undermine a substantial state policy. 161 
This means that parties cannot select an "unconnected law" for a "local 
transaction7'162 to avoid the local states laws of contract. 163 The factors connecting 
the chosen law to the contract can include matters such as the domicile of the 
parties, the place of the contract's formation and the place of performance. 164 
It can be seen that requiring this reasonable relationship is contrary to the Second 
Proposition; however, many US commentators are critical of this very restrictive 
ap roach. 165 Indeed, it has been suggested that these limitations are not actually rp 
applied and the vast majority of such clauses are upheld. 166 Therefore, although a 
156 Restatement (Second) § 187(2)(b); Hill (1985): 1627. 
157 Restatement (Second) § 187, comment (g); see Reese (1960): 54. 
158 See for example, Superfos Investments Ltd v Firstmiss Fertilizer (SD Miss, 1992) 809 F. Supp 
450 and LazardFreres & Co v Protective Life Insurance (2d Circ, 1997) 108 F. 3d 1531 at 1538. 
159 Restatement ýSecond) § 187(2)(b); Blalock v Perfect Subscriptions (SD Ala, 1978) 458 F. Supp, 
123; affirmed (5 Cir, 1979) 599 F. 2d 743. 
160 The New York courts, in Reger v National Association of Bedding Manufactures (1975) 372 
NYS 2d 97 at 116, have gone as far as suggesting that a court should only override a law where the 
lepislature specifies that the statute applies to choice of law situations. 
16 Yntema (1955): 60 and Scoles and Hayes (200ý2: 974-5. 
162 New England Mutal Life Insurance v Olin (7 Cir, 1940) 114 F. 2d 131 at 136; Scoles and 
Hayes: ibid. 
163 Scoles and Hayes (2004): ibid. 
164 See ibid: 977-9. 
165 Some support a functional "policy balancing analysis": eg Weinberger (1976); others support 
more general autonomy: e. g. Scoles and Hayes (2004): 980-1. 
166 Symeonides (1998): 273. 
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departure from the general position in the United States, the implementation of the 
Second Proposition is quite close to the present state of the law. 
(H) Applicable law in the absence of choice 
Where there is no choice of law clause the US courts fall back to using one of the 
various choice of law approaches. 167 The majority suggest, using the rules set out 
in the Restatement (Second), that where the place of negotiation and performance 
are the same, the law of that place applies. 168 This is because such a place would 
have the greatest interest in having its law applied. 169 Alternatively, the 
Restatement (Second) "approach" suggests that the following factors should 
determine what law applies: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of 
negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the 
subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties. However as Professor Reese, 
the Restater, indicated: 
in contracts, the courts pay heed to thefact that the basic policy... is 
the protection ofjustified exceptions. As a result, there is a distinct 
tendency to apply a law that will uphold the contract provided 
[that]... the validating law has substantial contacts with the 
transaction. 170 
167 These are set out in Chapter 2. 
168 Section 188(3). 
169 Comment (f). 
170 Reese (1980): 737. 
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However, save where these exceptions exist, the approach of the Restatement 
(Second) is based on the most significant connection, which is very similar to the 
rules of the Rome Convention. 17 1 Thus, it leads to considerable uncertainty and 
would be contrary to the Seventh Proposition. 
C. Transfer 
The transfer of intellectual property rights is very complicated. 172 This complexity 
stems in part from how "transfer" is classified in private international law. Is it a 
contractual matter, or an intellectual property matter? In England and Wales, it 
appears to be a contractual matter, because a transfer of intellectual property rights 
is valid, provided it is valid under the law of the contract. Similarly, under US law 
the transfer of rights will be upheld as long as the bargaining power between the 
parties is not uneven (in other words the normal contractual transfer rules apply). 
Notwithstanding, it has been suggested by some commentators that it is difficult 
to divorce the creation of rights from their transfer. 173 This being the case, in the 
US at least, it may be that at some point in the future, the transfer of copyright 
may be determined by the most significant relationship test (which often leads to 
the application of the lex originis). 
However, many civilian countries, including France and Germany, cbaractcrise 
the transfer of intellectual property rights as an intellectual property matter, rather 
than a contractual matter. 174 Thus, French copyright is only transferred where it 
171 See Scoles and Hayes (2004): 1037-9. 
172 See Ginsburg and Lucas (2004). 
173 Nimmer and Nimmer (1964-2004): § 17.05(2). 
174 However, see Walter (1976): particular at 82, who suggests that the law of the contract and not 
the lexprotectionis should govern the transfer. He argues this on the basis that it promotes security 
of commerce. 
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satisfies the necessary formalities in the French legislation. In Germany transfer of 
German intellectual property rights is governed by German law, only the 
underlying contract is subject to the usual rules of contract. 175 This inflexibility 
completely undermines the effective management of intellectual property rights 
and with it the Propositions. 
D. Infringement 
England and Wales 
In English law, the law applicable to tort is determined according to the rules set 
out in Part 3 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 
(the 1995 Act). 176 Section 9(l) suggests that the provisions apply "for choosing 
the law... to be used for determining issues relating to tort... ". 
First, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether infringement of intellectual 
property rights is characterised by an English court as a matter "relating to 
tort". 177 Initially, there was doubt whether it could be so characterised. 
178 
However, Fawcett and Torremans argue compellingly that infringement must be 
characterised as tortious. They support this assertion on four grounds: at common 
law, the tort choice of laws were applied to infringement; for jurisdictional 
purposes it is quite clear that infringement is a tort; domestically infringement is 
175 Drobnig (1972): 295. 
176 The provisions of this Act only apply to a tort which occurred after its commencement on Ist 
May 1996: section 14(l). Due to the six year limitation period no new actions can be commenced 
on the basis of the old common law rules. Therefore, the old rules will not be considered here. 177 Peculiarly, in Morris (2000), it is suggested that the English courts will not entertain a matter 
relating to the infiingement of a foreign intellectual property right (at 369), but suggests that where 
they will hear a matter it will be determined under the 1995 Act. 
178 See House of Lords (1994-5): Written Evidence p. 54 and Briggs (1995): 522. 
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considered to be a tort; finally if infringement is not characterised as a tort then it 
is unclear how else it could be characterised. 179 
The general rule, once a matter is tortious, is that: 
the applicable law is the law of the country in which the events 
constituting the tort ... in question occur. 
180 
Thus, the law of the place where the tort was committed applies. The rule does not 
allow issues to be split (dýpecqge), although the displacement rule (discussed 
below) may apply in relation to a single issue. Thus, if a copyright was infringed 
in the Netherlands, Dutch law will apply to the entirety of the dispute by virtue of 
this rule. 18 1 However, where a tort involves more than one country then the 
special rules apply: 
Here elements of those events occur in different countries, the 
applicable law under the general rule is to be taken as being ... the 
law of the country in which the most significant element or elements 
of those events occurred. 
182 
It was suggested by the draftsman of the Bill that this special rule would not apply 
to infringement. 183 However, it has been pointed oUtI84 that there are situations 
where elements of the infringement may take place in different countries: satellite 
179 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 615. 
180 Section 11 (1). 
181 Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership (2000) Ch 405 at 444. 182 Section 11 (2), paragraph (c). 
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transmissions (where the footprint covers many different countries) and 
infringements on the Internet. Fawcett and Torremans suggest that in relation to 
both of these the most "significant element" is the uplift and therefore the law of 
the country of uplift should apply. ' 85 
This rule can, however, be displaced where another law is substantially more 
appropriate, 186 this is determined by "factors" connecting the dispute to another 
country. These factors can include matters relating to the parties (such as 
domicile), to any event constituting the tort or the consequences of that tort (such 
as the location of the economic damage), ' 87 but policy factors may not be 
considered. 188 The nature of the 1995 Act is internationalist and so the fact that 
the case is heard in England should not be considered. 189 
Once the relevant factors are identified, it is then necessary to determine their 
significance. How these are weighed is a matter for each court. At this stage, 
policy considerations, but not State interests, may be taken into account. 190 
However, the territoriality of intellectual property rights is something to which a 
court may give great weight. 191 In any event, the effect of displacement is simple; 
183 House of Lords (1994-5): 61 (Parliamentary Counsel). 
184 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 621. 
185 Ibid: 622. 
196 Section 12. The rule was criticised on the basis that it lacks any conceptual basis: House of 
Lords (1994-5): 28-31 (Fentiman). 
187 Section 12(2)(b) includes an exemplary list. 
188 The - Law Commission specifically rejected the American government analysis: Law 
Commission (1984): [4.364.45]. 
189 Cheshire and North (1999): 639. 
190 Cheshire and North (1999): 63940. 
191 Cornish was strongly opposed to displacement on this basis: House of Lords (1994-5): 64 
(Cornish). Also see Mjlnlycke v Proctor and Gamble (No. 4) (1992) 1 WLR 1112 where it was 
taken for granted that an infringement of a UK patent could only occur in the UK and therefore the 
Patents Act 1977 applied and it was unnecessary to consider tort choice of law rules. 
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the law which is substantially more appropriate applies instead of that selected by 
the general rule. 
It can be seen that the English approach, more or less, follows the lexprotectionis 
albeit by a very roundabout route. The problems, and inefficiencies, associated 
with this approach have been discussed at some length and it is clear that it does 
not accord with either the Second or Seventh Proposition. 
(H) United States 
There are very few US authorities on choice of law for intellectual property 
infringement. The leading case is Itar-Tass v Russian Kurier, 192 which adopted 
the normal tort rule of lex delict! (so applying US law), 193 However, by 
implication, the court suggested that using an "interest" analysis another law 
might sometimes apply. 194 In a subsequent case, Bridgeman v Corel, 195 the court 
ruled that because the infringement occurred abroad US law did not apply but the 
foreign law did. 196 However, if an interest based analysis is applied then it is 
impossible to determine a hard and fast rule. Notwithstanding, in contrast to 
ownership, academic commentators generally agree that a US court should apply 
the lexprotectionis to infiingement. 197 
192 sUpra. 
193 Itar-Tass, supra, at 9 1. 194 The court suggested that because the defendant was a US corporation and the infringement 
occurred in the United States, an interest analysis would also apply US law. Thereby suggesting 
that if the infringement was in the US, but the defendant was not a US corporation another law 
may possibly apply. 195 Supra. 
196 Bridgeman v Corel, supra, at 428. 197 See Geller (2004): 328 et seq and Torremans (1999): 375-6. 
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(W) France 
The French approach to choice of law in tort is based on the lex delicti, which is 
derived from a gloss on Article 3(l) of the Civil Code. 198 The French courts tend 
to be unwilling to depart from this general rule. 199 However, the Court of 
Cassation in the Sisro Case made it clear that the lex protectionis applies to 
infringement as it does to other aspects of intellectual property law. 
(iv) Germany 
The German choice of law rule for torts was developed from Article 12 of the 
Introductory Law to the Civil Code (EGBGB). This provision limits a claimant's 
-recovery to that which would be obtainable under German 
law and it was 
extended by the courts to the effect that tort liability was governed by the lex 
delicti. 200 This rule has now been codified as EGBGB Article 40.201 
However, this general rule is not applicable to intellectual property infringement. 
Indeed, it was made clear in the Parliamentary documents accompanying the 
codification of the tort choice of law rules that it was unnecessary to include a 
special rule for all intellectual property rights, because it was clear from the 
jurisprudence (in particular, the Spielbankaffaire that the applicable law is that of 
the protecting country. 202 This was confirmed in Re Multi Media Rech? 03 and the 
Gennan courts took this to its logical conclusion in Thumbnails, 204 whcre it was 
held that any work made available over the Internet and which is accessible in 
198 Morse (1984): 52. 
199 Ibid: 56. 
200 Morse (1984): 57. 
201 See Appendix to Hay (1999): 650. 
202 Bundcstagedrucksachc 14/343 (1' January 1999): 10. 
203 Vahrenwald (1998): 260. 
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Germany shall be governed solely by German law, even where that work was 
uploaded and modified abroad. 
Notwithstanding the fact that intellectual property disputes are governed by the 
lex protectionis, the limitation imposed on recovery by Article 40 still applies. 
Until recently, an imaginary German "trade mark" was used to determine the 
extent of liability for infringing the foreign trade mark . 
205 However, the new 
Article 40 probably removes this limitation and only prohibits damages which go 
beyond that required for "appropriate compensation! ', or where they provide for 
purposes "other than the provision of adequate compensation". It is unclear how 
the courts will determine whether compensation was "appropriate" or "adequate", 
but it is likely to be judged by local values. 206 Courts may, therefore, continue to 
use "imaginary" rights for this assessment. 
E. Mandatory rules and public policy 
The Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 makes 
provision for not applying the foreign law, where to do so would be contrary to 
English public policy. 207 At present, there is very little case law on what could be 
contrary to public policy for the purposes of this provision, 20a but it is clear that 
rules of evidence and procedure (including the assessment of damages) are 
governed by domestic law. 209 
204 4 35 IIC 478. 
205 Drobnig (1972): 304. 
206 Hay (1999): 642. 
207 Section 14(3)(a)(i). 
208 This is unsurprising as under the double actionability rule it was impossible for such a tort to be 
recognised at all (see page 287, n. 206 above). 
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There is nothing in the Patents Act 1977, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 or the Trade Marks Act 1994 setting out any "mandatory rulee'. However, 
in Chiron Corp v Organon Teknika (No. 2), 210 the Court of Appeal held that 
section 44 of the Patents Act 1977 (avoidance of certain restrictive conditionsýl 
I 
has overriding effect in relation to a UK Patent. Similarly, it has been suggested 
that it would be quite wrong in principle to apply UK law to infringements that 
have occurred abroad, or to apply foreign law to infringements that have occurred 
in the UK. 212 This is because any other result would lead to: 
two IP rights competing in one country which appears contrary to 
the principle of national treatment upon which the IP conventions 
and legislation is based. 213 
In addition it has been argued that the moral rights of an author should be 
considered to be mandatory as they protect a fundamental public PoliCY. 
214 It is 
unclear why, in English law, the moral rights of an author should be considered 
"fundamental", as they certainly have never been stated to be fundamental either 
by the legislature or the courts, indeed allowing waiver would suggest against 
it. 215 
209 See Law Commission (19 84): [4.4]. 
210 (1993) FSR 567. 
211 Section 44 was repealed by section 70 of the Competition Act 1998. 
212 Fawcett and Torremans (1998): 601-3. 
213 House of Lords (1994-5): 62 (Beatson). This, of course, now happens because of parallel 
Community rights and domestic rights in both trade marks and designs (although the underlying 
substantive law is meant to be the same). 214 Torremans (2001): 55. 
215 Johnson (2006). 
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The United States does not generally provide for mandatory rules per se, 216 but 
the policy approach used by most states makes mandatory rules unnecessary 
because the important public policies protected by mandatory rules are already 
balanced in the selection of the applicable law. In contrast, France and Gennany 
have well defined mandatory rules. The French courts have opined that moral 
rights form mandatory rules, even without reciprocity: Turner Entertainment v 
217 Huston. 
It is also clear that under German law it is not possible to override the relevant 
mandatory rules by contract or otherwise. 218 These mandatory rules include the 
prohibition on the transfer of the economic and moral rightS2 19 and the right of 
both authors and performers to gain an equitable remuneration. 220 Therefore, 
whenever a matter relating to German copyright is heard before German courts 
these rules will apply, but it is possible that some non-German courts would not 
apply this aspect of German law, even if that law were otherwise applicable. 221 
Allowing any mandatory rules to be applied would be contrary to the Fourth 
Proposition. 222 
F. Nomination 
In relation to registered rights, it would be straightforward for an application for a 
registered right to include a requirement to nominate an applicable law. In 
216 This has changed slightly with the 2001 modification of the Uniform Commercial Code: Scoles 
and Hay (2004): 961-3. 217 Supra. 
218 See Fromm and Nordenmann (1998): Vor §§120 md 8 (cited in Van Eechoud (2003): 34). 219 Article 29 of German Copyright Act. 
220 Article 32 to 32b. 
221 Hilty and Peukert (2004): 449. 
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contrast, in relation to unregistered rights, it is common practice to include a 
46copyright notice" on any work produced. Thus, the proprietor would have to 
include such a notice if they wish to nominate an applicable law. If they do not 
include a notice, they do not lose copyright, they simply cannot nominate the law 
applicable (and the default law applies). 223 At first blush, there may be a problem 
with "down-stream" copying, which occurs when someone copies a copy. The 
first copy may have omitted the nomination and it would be wrong to expect a 
user to be bound by a law of which they were unaware. In such a case, the 
proprietor would have a choice; they could sue the first copier, under the 
nominated law (assuming they could find them) or they could sue the person 
down-stream under the default law. 224 
IV. Minimum rights 
To implement the Tenth Proposition (non-proprietary users of intellectual 
property should be granted minimum rights) it would be necessary to expressly 
protect minimum rights in a convention. International treaties in many fields 
require its parties to it to grant specific rights to their citizens or citizens of other 
signatory States. The various intellectual property treaties are no different; each 
mandates that, within its scope, certain minimum rights must be granted to 
authors, inventors and producers. However, with very limited exceptions, 225 those 
Conventions do not grant minimum rights to users. 
222 Similarly, allowing a court to refuse to apply a rule on the grounds of ordre public would be 
contrary to that Proposition. 
223 It would, therefore, be compatible with the requirements of Article 5(2) of the Beme 
Convention which precludes formalities being required for the enjoyment of copyright. 224 See page 242 above. 
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Despite this failure it is unlikely that states would oppose including users' rights. 
The progressive harmonisation of intellectual property laws has demonstrated that 
states view certain "user" rights as very important. 226 Therefore, the problem 
would not be getting states to agree to the principle that users should be given 
rights, but agreeing what those rights should be. Instead of providing a 
prescriptive list it is likely that general "fair use" type provisions would be 
necessary. 
227 
In addition requiring minimum rights would ensure that the signatory States' most 
important interests are maintained. Therefore, the rights of free speech, protected 
by the first amendment to the US Constitution and by Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, would be provided for as a relevant minimum 
standard. In contrast, where a state does not consider freedom of speech to be 
important, assuming it were protected as a minimum standard, copyright could not, 
be used as a way of inhibiting speech, *but other regulation could be used for that 
purpose (i. e. censorship). 
V. Conflicts and solutions 
A. The application of the lexprotectionis 
Any choice of law provision in the intellectual property conventions must, 
according to the majority, mandate the lex protectionis. Similarly, the national 
laws of the target jurisdictions tend to suggest that the lex protectionis is 
225 Paris Article 5ter and Berne Article 9(l). 226 In particular, see the large number of exceptions included in Article 5 of the Information 
Society Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC). 
227 See Ricketson (1987) on the problems that were faced by delegates at the Stockholm 
conference when they tried to draw up a prescriptive list of exceptions. 
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applicable. There are, however, a number of different reasons why the answer 
may not be that simple. These need only be considered in relation to the 
conventions, but every argument is equally applicable to the national law. Indeed, 
each of these points is equally pertinent to a rule based on the lex originis. 
(i) The acceptance ofa single applicable law 
If the conventions mandate that the law of the protecting country must be applied 
then where a right was infringed in a hundred countries, it would be an 
international requirement for the infringement within each country to be judged 
by its own law. Put bluntly, a single applicable. law would be contrary to the 
conventions. However, there are a number of proposals for selecting such a law. 
Notable scholars such as Professor Ginsburg and Professor Dreyfus propose 
methods of selecting such a law as part of the commentary to their convention. 
228 
This high profile project is not the only one suggesting or proposing a method of 
selecting a single applicable law as the discussion in Chapter 4 shows. 
229 of 
course, the fact that others propose solutions that deviate from the lax protectionis 
does not make such deviations compatible with the conventions; but, of course, it 
shows prevailing opinion and legal thought is moving in favour of ending strict 
adherence to the lexprotectionis. 
(H) Arbitration 
It is clear that parties to arbitration are free to deviate from the 1cx protcclionis if 
they so wish. Thus, should two parties agree that a dispute should be governed by 
US patent law it does not matter that no infringement actually occurred in the 
228 See page 191 et seq above. 
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United States. Although courts can refuse to uphold arbitration awards under the 
New York Convcntion on the grounds of public policy, 230 it is cxceptionally rarc 
that this occurs. However, it is undeniably true that intellectual property disputes 
are not non-nally the subject of arbitration, 23 1 but in relation to the Second 
Proposition, should an award be made the court would enforce it; thus, it is not a 
giant leap for the courts to apply the Second Proposition directly. 
(W) Presumptions offoreign law 
When a court determines that a foreign law is applicable it must then proceed to 
determine that law. In some countries the determination of foreign law is a matter 
for the parties to prove, in others the court will determine it CX OffCio. 
232 Where 
the proof of foreign law falls to the parties (either as a matter of fact or law) there 
is normally a mechanism whereby the lexfori applies if neither party proves that 
the foreign law is different. 233 
Even in systems (such as Germany) where the court is under a dýty to determine 
the foreign law ex officio, it is permissible (where the parties could have agreed 
the applicable law before the event) for the parties to agree that Gen-nan law or 
229 The Max Planck Institute is also working on a proposal on choice of law, but at present the text 
is not public. 
230 Article V(2)(b); also see Russell (2003): [8-023]. 
231 See Fawcett (2002): 6. 
232 The European Parliament has proposed, in its amendments to the Rome 11 Regulation, that this 
rule be adopted across Europe: see proposed Article 1 lb in Final Report A6-2011/2005,27, h June 
2005: 29-30. 
233 In England, where the foreign law is not proved to the satisfaction of the judge, English law 
applies (see MCC Proceeds (Sub. Macmillan Inc) v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No. 4) (1999) 
CLC 478; Dicey and Morris rule 18(2) at [9-001] et seq; (approved in Bumper Development v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1991) 1 WLR 1362 at 1369). However, this 
presumption may not be applied in cases of infringement: IBM v PhoenLx International 
(Computers) (1994) RPC 251 at 266. ) Historically, in the United States a similar rule applied; 
following the adoption by many States of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act or the 
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act it has become unclear whether this still applies, 
but there is authority that it does: see Scoles and Hay (2004): 555-6. 
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some other law applies to the proceedings. 234 In other civil law countries like 
France the rule falls somewhere between those two stools; 235 a judgment cannot 
be challenged on the basis that the court applied the lex fori instead of the 
applicable law, but a challenge is permitted where the parties do not have the free 
disposition of their rights or where it would be contrary to an international 
convention, such as the Berne Convention. 236 
Thus, even though the applicable law may, in theory, be the lexprotectionis many 
courts, by reason of procedural rules for proving foreign law, would apply a single 
applicable law: the lexfOri. Once more, this demonstrates that, in practice at least, 
the application of the lexprotectionis is not paramount. 
(N) Other rules adopted 
If the application of the lexprotectionis were required by the intellectual property 
Conventions then courts, in signatory states, would be bound to apply that rule 
domestically. However, in fact this is not the case. Article 63 of Greek Copyright 
Law dictates that the law of the country where the work was first made available 
to the public govems the dispute. Similarly, Article 110(2) of the Swiss Private 
International Law allows the parties some limited freedom in relation to choice of 
law and intellectual property infringement. 237 This once more suggests against the 
Conventions requiring the courts of signatory States to apply the lexprotectionis. 
234 Dannemann (1994). 
235 Dolinger (1995): 226-232. 
236 Hartley (1996): 278-282. 
237 See Dessemontet (2001): 502-3. 
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(y) Substantive rules 
If the lex protectionis is considered to be sacrosanct then there is an artificial 
interpretation, based on substantive rules, which enables the relevant propositions 
to be implemented. If states were willing to accept a rule which dictated that all 
infringement is deemed to occur in a particular country, then all the infringement 
would have "occurred" in a single country and the law of that country would 
apply to the entire dispute: facilitating the lex protectionis. This sort of approach, 
although highly artificial, is not without precedent as it was adopted by the 
Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission Directive. 238 
Universality 
The Third Proposition and the Ninth Pýoposition require that the chosen law has 
universal effect. The early conventions, in particular the Montevideo convention, 
demonstrate that universality as a concept is not completely unacceptable. 
239 of 
course most of the other intellectual property conventions probably do not require 
states to apply the law of the country of origin, or even the law of the country in 
which protection is sought. However, the modem approach is not moving towards 
universality, but towards regional agreements such as within the European 
Community. 240 Notwithstanding, there is a general move towards including more 
minimum rights in international treaties and so it is clear that there is a move 
towards harmonisation, which may hint at aspirations of universality. 
238 See page 334 above. 
239 It was proposed that universality should be adopted at both the Paris and Berne Conferences: 
see page 20 above. 
240 Another example would be those who are signatories to the Cartagena Agreement; it is 
unsurprising that these countries were all parties to the Montevideo Conventions. NAFrA, as yet, 
has only included a few outline provisions. 
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C. Nomination 
The requirement to nominate a law could be incorporated as a requirement for 
filing under the Patent Co-operation Treaty, the Madrid Agreement and Protocol 
and the Hague Agreement on Industrial Designs. Thus, in relation to registered 
rights it is possible to create a mechanism for nominations. In contrast the 
nomination of laws in relation to copyright is slightly more problematic; however 
the "formalities" requirements of the Universal Copyright Convention 
demonstrate a willingness of states to agree to limited formalities in certain 
circumstances. 
'1 
Conclusion 
This work had four purposes. The first, to demonstrate that there is no consistent 
theoretical framework for private international law; the second, to show the 
limitations of the various proposals for resolving the problems associated with 
private international law, intellectual property and the Internet; third, to propose 
an alternative wealth maximising solution; and finally, to place this new solution 
within the present legal fraineworks. 
In Chapter 1, two central problems were identified: forum shopping and 
multiplicity of claims. The judicial response to forum shopping itself has bccn, as 
Bell suggests: 
almost entirely negative... [with] the phrase generally [can-ying] 
pejorative connotations whenfound injudgments. ' 
It was therefore easy to identify forum shopping as a particular problem 
associated with a medium (the Internet) that has as its greatest strength (and of 
course, its greatest liability) ubiquity. It was also explained in Chapter 3 how, 
from an economic point of view, ex post forum shopping led to inefficiency, 
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whereas ex ante forum shopping could in fact lead to a more efficient forum being 
selected. 
The second problem identified, multiplicity of claims, was shown to increase the 
cost of enforcing intellectual property rights to a grossly inefficient degree. This 
cost was attributable to the potential requirement to litigate the dispute in every 
jurisdiction in which there was infringement, which may even include every 
jurisdiction in the world. Once this problem was identified it was clear that the 
consolidation of claims would increase efficiency, but only where there was a 
single applicable law would efficiency be optimal. 
1. Theoretical framework 
It is quite clear that there is no universal agreement in the approach that should be 
adopted to resolve questions of private international law. The various "traditional 
a 
theories" examined in Chapter 2 were often mutually exclusive. The fairness 
theory strongly contradicts the power theory-, whereas the power theory, does not 
fit within the realms of allegiance. This disparity of methodologies demonstrates 
why private international law is causing problems for disputes involving the 
Intemet. 
In choice of law, there are two distinct camps that have evolved: those upholding 
private interests and those upholding state (policy) interests. Yet even within these 
camps there are real divergences; six different approaches, each based on the state 
interests approach, were scrutinised. Every one of these approaches requires a 
1 Bell (2003): 336. 
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court to determine the underlying policy of a legal rule. Some even go as far as to 
oblige the court to determine which was the "better" rule. In contrast the 
internationalist approach, which is in direct conflict with the State policy 
approach, has been cannibalised and modified so much that it can never achieve 
its underlying aim: uniformity of result. These varying theoretical approaches 
were shown to be unsatisfactory and inconsistent, leading only to uncertainty. 
This problem of uncertainty was no less prevalent in many of the economic 
methodologies proposed for the determination of the applicable law. In Chapter 3, 
the various ways of determining comparative imperative or comparative 
regulatory advantage are little better, if not worse, than those promoted by the 
non-economic theorists. In fact, because of the basic assumptions of their 
proponents (namely that choice of law relates to state policies) complex schemes 
are suggested to determine what may be a very simple question. In contrast, the 
economists promoting the private interests of individuals appear to be morc in 
tune with normal economic thinking. Amongst the melee of theorists, it was the 
work of O'Hara, Ribstein, Whincop and Keyes and their "pragmatic" approach 
that showed the way. 
Unfortunately, in relation to tort law, of which intellectual property law is a part, 
these theorists maintained the complexities and uncertainties of the other 
economic approaches, in particular trying to determine the comparative regulatory 
advantage. Of course, they did not consider intellectual property inffingement 
specifically and had they done so they may not have retained this imprecise and 
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uncertain test. However, Whincop and Keyes show an awareness of the problems 
caused by the Intemet when they suggested that: 
Theorising the effect of the Internet on normative analyses ofprivate 
international law resembles a scientific crisis for the established 
paradigms... It also gives an opportunity for alternative theories to 
demonstrate their superior analytical power. 
11. The limitations of the present proposals 
Once the theoretical frmneworks had been scrutinised it was necessary to briefly 
examine the various proposals to tackle the problems associated with the Internet. 
The most obvious would be to make the Internet an entirely new jurisdiction, but 
it was shown that this approach would be, in reality, unworkable; similar 
problems were identified with creating a uniform lex informatica. Once these 
radical departures had been explored, the solutions proposed within private 
international law were studied. Unfortunately, even the best of the proposals 
examined permitted, albeit restricted, ex post forum shopping to continue; and 
none of the proposals devise a scheme which would satisfactorily deten-nined the 
applicable law. Therefore it was shown there is room for the proposal of an 
alternative theory. 
111. The neW proposal 
The Ten Propositions making up the new proposal were explained in Chapter 5. 
The basis of this proposal was very straightforward; that exchange is efficient and 
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maximises wealth. Using this very basic premise two paradigms were devised: the 
bilateral and the unilateral. 
The bilateral paradigm relied on the fact that two parties will only agree 
something between themselves where it is mutually advantageous to do so. 
Therefore, the parties should be able to agree which court will hear the matter and 
which law should apply to any dispute. It was also emphasised how the chosen 
law should be given effect by prohibiting of the application of mandatory rules, 
which by their very nature undermine the parties' own wealth maximising 
solution. It was noted that the bilateral paradigm is actually in accord with many 
of the traditional theories and economic theories and therefore would not be 
controversial. 
In contrast, the unilateral paradigin was based on the efficiency of unilateral 
contracts (except in relation to jurisdiction where the defendant's domicile was 
shown to be the most efficient choice). The unilateral contractual model, put 
simply, is where an offeror makes an offer which is advantageous to the other 
party (offeree), that other party can accept it; when it not advantageous the offerce 
can make a counter-offer. If the second scenario occurs then the bilateral 
paradigm applies; otherwise, the unilateral paradigm (following a unilateral offer) 
is efficient. The basic question, therefore, was how to substantiate that original 
offer; the answer proposed was the proprietor nominates a law to be generally 
applicable. The requirement that this nomination be ex ante inhibited a choice 
being made which always benefits the proprietor in every case and, more 
2 Whincop and Keyes (2001): 19 1. 
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importantly, it removes the need for the user of intellectual property to have to 
comply with the law of every jurisdiction in which the intellectual property is 
protected. It was, however, indicated that to avoid states entering a "race to the 
top" in the protection of intellectual property, certain minimum rights would need 
to be protected. The two paradigms, somewhat controversial as they are, were 
compared to the existing legal norms. 
IV. The present legal framework 
The final part of this work considered the legal franieworý regulating the various 
aspects of intellectual property law. It was shown in Chapter 6 that the two 
propositions relating to jurisdiction were, more or less, compliant with the present 
legal framework. The developing international consensus is strongly in favour of 
allowing parties to select the jurisdiction for the dispute, except where consumers 
are involved. Therefore, a policy choice would need to be taken: ought a 
consumer be able to chose the forum where they wish to litigate (provided it is a 
fully informed decision)? Or should he have to litigate in their home forum? The 
protectionist nature of most states would probably lead to the latter result. 
However, the result of this selection would not be that inefficient, indeed, it was 
demonstrated that requiring the courts of the defendant's home jurisdiction to hear 
a dispute is, in efficiency terms, the best of the rest. 
The other problem identified related to the problems caused by a court 
detennining the validity of a foreign registered intellectual property right. It was 
shown how, once more, there is an international consensus moving towards 
allowing such adjudications. The European Patent Litigation Agreement 
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specifically enables such rulings and the Max Planck Institute proposes that such a 
ruling should be valid between the parties, but not otherwise. It therefore appears 
that proposing that foreign courts should be able to determine the validity of a 
foreign right, inter partes, is no longer as controversial as it once was; although, 
nobody else has yet proposed that the foreign court's decision on validity should 
bind other states, in time this may also become acceptable. 
However, in the short term pending this being acceptable, to avoid infonnational 
asymmetry, it was proposed that the implementation of the Ten Propositions 
should impose an obligation on national intellectual property offices to include 
details on their registers of any foreign detennination of validity of the relevant 
registered right. 
The Propositions relating to the selection of the applicable law are more 
controversial. In Chapter 7 it was explained how the majority view was that the 
lex protectionis is mandated by the intellectual property conventions and how, 
despite a number of authors cogently arguing against this position, it appears that 
courts (in particular in Germany) are repeatedly finding this to be the case. It was 
explained in Chapter I that one of the reasons for the adoption of TRIPS was 
because of the difficulty in obtaining the necessary consensus to amend the 
various intellectual property conventions; indeed these problems led to the 
proliferation of new treaties such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the Patent Law 
Treaty and the Trademark Law Treaty. 
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Therefore, if Berne and Paris do mandate the lexprotectionis as the applicable law 
then they would appear to prohibit the adoption of the new proposal. However, it 
was explained at the end of Chapter 7 that a number of countries do not adopt the 
lex protectionis, including Greece and Switzerland. It was also noted that a 
number of mechanisms routinely adopted in litigation involving foreign law 
substantially undermine this principle; demonstrating that the lex protectionis is 
not sacrosanct. The proposals by the ALI and others, which provide for a single 
applicable law, further demonstrate that there is growing willingness amongst the 
legal community to limit, if not abandon, the lexprotectionis in certain cases. 
Notwithstanding this willingness, it must be accepted that the nomination of the 
applicable law would be very controversial and is likely to be difficult for many 
states to accept. But the provision of minimum rights for users to accompany the 
existing minimum rights for proprietors may sweeten the pill sufficiently to 
convince states to accept this wealth maximising solution. 
.. Final remarks 
This work returned to first principles to establish an efficient way to determine the 
rules of private international law. The subject is, however, centuries old and the 
discussion in Chapter 2 reflects this, but in contrast, the economics of law and in 
particular its application to private international law is in its infancy. Using a 
theory in its infancy, which it is still evolving, means that the application of those 
provisions might not yet fully "demonstrate... superior analytic powee', but 
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"every man has a right to utter what he thinks truth, and every other man has a 
right to knock him down for iV9.3 The proposal is, therefore, uttered. 
Boswell (1998): 1073. 
Annex: The Ten Propositions 
First Parties should befree to select thejurisdiction that will 
Proposition adjudicate any 
intellectual property dispute 
Second Parties should befree to select the applicable law that will 
govern any intellectual property dispute Proposition 
Third Only one law may be selected and that law should have 
universal effect Proposition 
Fourth No aspect of intellectual property law can be considered to 
be a mandatory rulefor the purposes ofprivate Proposition international law 
Fifth Any properjudgment made on the basis ofthese 
propositions shall be enforceable in every State and shall Proposition not be subject to challenge on its merits 
Sixth "ere transaction costs are prohibitively high, thereby 
Proposition prohibiting agreement, 
the courts of the defendant's 
ld h i di i h h bi l id ou ave jur s ct on ence s a tua res 
Seventh Here transaction costs are prohibitively high, thereby 
Proposition prohibiting agreement, 
the applicable law should be 
d b nominate ex ante y the proprietor of the intellectual 
property right 
Eighth Any nomination should be made available in the most 
Proposition conspicuous way possible 
N. inth Any nomination should have universal effect, except where 
Proposition 
the second proposition applies 
Tenth Non-proprietary users of intellectual property should be 
Proposition 
L 
granted minimum rights 
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